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Abstract
This research addresses gender-focused international aid in Afghanistan in the 
aftermath of conflict, focusing on the period of the Bonn Agreement (December 2001 
-  September 2005). The investigation begins with a contextualized understanding of 
women in Afghanistan to better understand their role in social transformations 
throughout history. This history is in some measure incompatible with the discourse on 
Afghan women that was created by aid institutions to justify aid interventions. Such a 
discourse denied Afghan wom en’s agency, abstracting them from their historical and 
social contexts. In so doing, space was created tor the proposed intervention using a 
discourse of transformation. This discourse sought to 'empower' and 'liberate' Afghan 
women, yet implementation of interventions did not reflect such goals, nor the reality of 
the Gozargah (transition, juncture). This research illuminates the discourses animating 
gender-focused international aid in the aftermath of conflict in Afghanistan and the 
effects of these discourses on the gender order.
This political and institutional ethnography was conducted first through an examination 
of policy texts and media discourses, then through an investigation of program 
practice through the perspectives of policy-makers and policy implementors. The 
findings were then weighed against the perspectives and experiences of women and 
men in Afghanistan. This research employs a gender analysis to illustrate the story of an 
aid intervention, starting with how it was represented at the highest levels to how it was 
understood at the lowest levels. This story reveals that first, Afghan women have been 
neither 'empowered' nor 'liberated' because the discourse on Afghan women was 
not historically and socially contextualized. This is further compounded by aid 
interventions that addressed political -  and highly politicized -  gender concerns with 
technical aid responses. The result is that promises of strategic transformations tell short 
of their goal, resulting in unintended effects in the form of continued insecurities tor 
Afghan women.
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CHAPTER I: Framing and Contextualizing the Research
From the dry and objective tone o f official UN reports to the anger of journalists and  
feminists shouting 'gender apartheid', one thing is clear: the world failed Afghan 
women for six solid years, and this neglect has d irect outcomes... Extreme caution 
should be taken not to make the same mistake twice.
(Nassery 2004: 5)
This research addresses gender-focused international a id ’ in Afghanistan in the aftermath ot 
conflict, beginning in late 20012. This is the story ot an aid intervention -  how it is represented 
at the highest levels to how it is understood at the lowest levels. This aid intervention is one 
historical moment in an ongoing institutional process. This story reveals that such interventions 
are political processes -  with political outcomes.
To illustrate this, the investigation begins with a contextualized understanding ot women in 
Afghanistan to better understand their role in social transformations historically. The first 
argument advanced is that this history is in some measure incompatible with the discourse^ 
on Afghan women that was created by aid institutions^ to justify aid interventions^. It is 
argued that this latter discourse has denied Afghan women's agency, abstracting them from 
their historical and social contexts. Aid sought to empower' and 'liberate' Afghan women, 
yet implementation ot interventions did not reflect such goals. Illuminating the discourses that 
animated gender-focused international aid in the aftermath ot conflict in Afghanistan might 
present one way to understand what effects these discourses might have had on the gender 
order. This is the primary argument ot this research.
’ I have elected to employ the term 'aid' to encompass both relief and development work os the lines between  
them ore often indistinct in the context of conflict and the aftermath. I have employed the term 'development' to a  
lesser extent os I believe, in line with Ferguson, that the concept (in quotations) is one that needs to be  
problemotized in and of itself and is subject to varying definitions. Both aid and development os concepts ore 
employed os interpretive grids through which w e com e to understand the contexts of poverty. I do not assume that 
there are uniform interpretations of this grid - or of its varying outcomes. Ferguson, J. (1994). The Anti-Politics 
Machine: "Development", Deooliticizotion. and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press.
2 The period of conflict in Afghanistan began with Soviet occupation in 1979, ending with the fall of the Taliban in 
late 2001. In using this periodization I am  aware that beyond the end of formal warfare, conflict persists.
3 1 define discourse as "a system of language which draws on a  particular terminology and encodes specific forms 
of knowledge" Tonkiss, F. (1988). Analysing Discourse. Researchina Society and Culture. C. Seale. California, Sage.
* For these purposes, aid institutions include international relief and development organizations (such os those ot UN 
agencies and international NGOs).The term does not include local Afghan organizations unless specified.
3 For these purposes, aid interventions refer to the policies and programs of aid institutions.
There is also a more tentative secondary argument, namely that these said aid interventions 
have actually made life more difficult for women, and that such difficulties might have been 
avoided if a more nuanced and sensitive approach had been taken. However, this 
constitutes a sub-argument because a causal relationship between aid interventions and 
the hardship experienced by women is very difficult to establish. Nevertheless, there are 
elements of my analysis that potentially support what is commonly known as the 'backlash' 
phenomenon, highlighted in the literature on other conflict aftermaths, which points to the 
difficulties faced by women in such circumstances^. Similar experiences are demonstrated in 
the thesis through the voices ot Afghans -  particularly Afghan men -  throughout giving 
credence to the approach, although a direct causal relationship is in no way claimed for the 
present research.
It is through these Afghan voices that this thesis makes its main contribution. This research also 
adds to the gender policy discourse, particularly through discussions with Afghan men on 
gender issues, social change, and aid effectiveness. In addition, this research tests Western^ 
development constructs in on Afghan setting. Gender analysis is only one part of fhe story. 
This research is about aid policy -  about what is said as much as what is not said. This 
discussion of the effects of aid could present lessons for policy and programming. Finally, if 
reveals that Ferguson's theory of anti-politics can be viewed through a gender lens -  and is 
therefore applicable fo Afghanistan.
This study is conducted first through on examination of policy fexts and media discourses, 
then through an investigation of program practice, drawing on the perspectives of policy­
makers and policy implementers^. The findings are then weighed against perspectives and 
experiences of women and men in Afghanistan. 2007 - five years into the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan - is an opportune time to begin a discussion of the effects of gender-focused
‘ Donna Ponkhurst speaks well to this. See Ponkhurst, D. (2007). Gender Issues In Post-War Contexts: A Review of 
Analysis and Experience, and Implications for Policies. Peace Studies Papers. Bradford, UNRISD and University of 
Bradford.
7 Similar to Kensinger, I use the terms West and Western to loosely define the European and American hegemonic 
constructions of culture, ideas, and politics. This should not be token as an assumption that the ‘Western’ 
perspective is a  uniform one, rather that it is perceived as uniform from the perspective of Afghans. Kensinger, L.
(2003). "Plugged in Praxis: Crifical Reflections on U.S. Feminism, Internet Activism, and Solidarity with Women in 
Afahaniston." Journal of International Women's Studies 5f1). Building on this, I employ Robinson’s use of the terms not 
intending to moke broad geographic divisions but because there is a  lack of other terms that could reframe the 
discussion to challenge power imbalances. Robinson, J. (2002). Introduction. Development and Displacement. J. 
Robinson. Oxford, Oxford UP.
8 Gender policy-makers and policy implementors ore Afghan and non-Afghan women and men who are heads of 
aid insfitutions, gender/women focal poinfs, gender/women program implemenfers, heads of Afghan w om en’s 
NGOs, and others.
aid for both women ond men in the country ond to exomine the implementotion ot policies 
in light ot the promised tronstormotion ot the gender order. Indeed, Atghoniston is toeing o 
unique set ot development chollenges: poverty, insecurity, underdevelopment, limited 
humon copitol, o stote locking copocity ond legitimocy, ond on opium economy (Byrd 
2007). It is in this context thot the following discussion tokes ploce.
Research Questions and Framework
My reseorch is driven by the premise thot gender-tocused internotionol oid depoliticized o 
highly politicol discussion in Atghoniston -  ond brought politicol effects in doing so. The 
process ot depoliticizotion begon with o discourse on Atghon women serving to justify o 
porticulor kind ot oid intervention^. This discourse creoted imoges ot Atghon women thot did 
not fully motch or represent their sociol, economic, ond politicol reolities. Interventions tor 
Atghon women were designed bosed on this discourse -  o one-dimensionol depiction ot o 
choddori-clod ’o figure in need ot ossistonce - with tronstormotion ot the gender order os the 
onticipoted outcome. As one result ot this depoliticizotion process, gender-tocused 
internotionol oid in the ottermoth ot conflict in Atghoniston hos hod unintended ond 
unexpected effects.
To test this premise, my reseorch is guided by the following presuppositions: (1) Policy 
tormulotion reflected o discourse on women thot wos not sociolly ond historicolly 
contextuolized (2) Policy intent wos to tronstorm wom en’s position, yet policy interpretotion 
resulted in o discourse on tronstormotion thot denied wom en’s ogency (3) Policy 
implementotion reflected on emphosis on meeting politicol concerns with technicol 
interventions ond therefore did not monitest the gool ot tronstormotion (4) Depoliticizing 
gender-tocused oid interventions con produce signiticont unintended politicol effects.
9 1 make the stylistic choice to refer to myself in the first person for methodological reasons. I am  aw are of the 
influence on the research of my own presence, enquiry and interpretation as a  researcher and therefore do not 
want to obscure my presence and involvement through depersonalized language. David Mosse speaks well to the 
dynamic of social researcher as parficipant insider, engaging in both “social investigation and lived experience". 
Mosse, D. (2005). Cultivatina Development: An Ethnoaraohv of Aid Policv and Practice. London, Pluto Press.
'0 The chaddori is a  full-body form of covering fraditionolly worn by Pashtun women in Afghanistan to mark the 
symbolic segregation between men's and women's spheres. Amongst non-Afghans, if is more commonly known as 
bourka. However, bourka is the Arabic/Urdu term, while Afghans use the Dari/Persian term chaddari. See Barakat, S.
(2004). Setting the Scene for Afghanistan's Reconstruction: The Challenges and Critical Dilemmas. Reconstructina 
War-Torn Societies: Afahanistan. S. Barakat. Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan. I use the term bourka when it has been  
used by respondents, but prefer the term that is more common to Afghans.
Such understandings are more complex in theory and practice than these presuppositions 
may suggest. I recognize that attempts to problematize the workings of the aid apparatus”  
in Afghanistan through this research will likely fall short of the complexities of this historical 
moment. However, this work aims to shed light on causes and effects with the knowledge 
that the lines between the two are often indistinct.
A study of an aid intervention as a political process entails engaging with James Ferguson's 
work on ‘anti-politics’ from his study of development policies in practice in Lesotho (1994). 
Ferguson examined the aid apparatus as a social in s t i t u t io n >2 in its own right, with a view to 
deconstructing development discourse to understand its effects. In this vein, I extend the 
concept of anti-politics by examining it through a gender lens in Afghanistan. This case study 
exploring gender-focused international aid is not simply a critique but rather an effort to 
understand what this particular approach to aid meant to those who were implicated in its 
social reality.
1. Introduction to ttie Afghan Context
Why Afghanistan?
History demonstrates the ebbs and flows of Afghan wom en’s issues and fortunes. The 
wom en’s movement in Afghanistan marks time, and tells the story ot social change in a 
context where evolutionary change is repeatedly abandoned for revolutionary change 
(Dupree 1985: 14). Afghan women have received inconsistent signals from above during the 
course of history: at one time enforced modernizations and at another a reversion to 
traditionalism -  with little time to negotiate these opposing changes. Today, they have lost 
the clarity that comes with traditional roles, yet they lack the resources to seize so-called 
modern opportunities (Dupree 2004: 327). Reforms repeatedly flood Afghanistan faster than 
the country can absorb them, should it choose to do so. Lacking local foundations and 
popular demand, present-day reforms can only be imposed as they have been throughout 
Afghan history, from the top down (Centlivres-Demont 1994: 339).
" For these purposes, the old apparatus refers to aid Institutions, aid interventions, and the discourses surrounding 
them.
'21 define institutions os the rules that govern behavior in economic, social, and political systems and organizations 
at the local, national, and international levels. Crisis States Programme (2001). Crisis States Programme Concepts 
and Research Agenda. London, London School of Economics Development Research Center.
At the level of rhetoric, Afghanistan can be viewed as one of the largest gender-focused aid 
interventions. It has been argued that the aid apparatus has been repeatedly employed 
throughout Afghan history to showcase the country os a success for aid institutions (UNDP 
and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 208). At the level of action, however, such 
opportunism has done little for Afghans. Despite the rhetoric, it has been argued repeatedly 
that "the international community, led by the United States, has consistently failed to provide 
the economic, political, and military support necessary for security the most basic rights of 
the Afghan people” (Human Rights Watch 2006: 3). Many Afghan women argue that their 
cause has been manipulated for political reasons, they lack genuine and sustained support, 
and external pressures to fast-track gender equality would foment a backlash (Sultan 2005: 
26).
The UNDP 2004 Afghanistan Human Development Report states unequivocally that the 
engagem ent of the aid apparatus in Afghanistan did not begin based on an analysis of real 
needs or a carefully planned process. "On fhe contrary," the report states, "it was initiated 
by external actors as part of a rushed reaction to the sequence of events that followed 
September 1 2001” (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 211). The aid
apparatus successfully marketed its interests and priorities in the Afghan project “with little 
reference to evidence” (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 211). As a result, 
priorities that were determined were actually supply-driven based on aid biases, thereby 
perpetuating "the perception that aid is to sustain the presence of a large international 
community” (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 214).
Aid interventions added their gender-focused messages to the series of political and social 
experiments in Afghanistan granting women rights from above and then subsequently 
stripping them away. And yet, some women have gained strength through these vacillating 
initiatives, others as a result of economic necessity. Most Afghan women, however, cannot
At the level of rhetoric, Afghanistan can be viewed as one of the largest gender-focused aid 
interventions. It has been argued that the aid apparatus has been repeatedly employed 
throughout Afghan history to showcase the country os a success for aid institutions (UNDP 
and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 208). At the level of action, however, such 
opportunism has done little for Afghans. Despite the rhetoric, it has been argued repeatedly 
that "the international community, led by the United States, has consistently failed to provide 
the economic, political, and military support necessary for security the most basic rights of 
the Afghan people” (Human Rights Watch 2006: 3). Many Afghan women argue that their 
cause has been manipulated for political reasons, they lack genuine and sustained support, 
and external pressures to fast-track gender equality would foment a backlash (Sultan 2005: 
26).
assume this traditionally-male role. In studies of the Afghan family, Nancy Hatch Dupree’3 
was among the earliest to ask: "Do men feel emasculated because women are more self- 
sufficient? Much emphasis has been placed on the rights of women. It is time to pay 
attention to what is happening to the dignity of men" (2004:328).
This research therefore seeks to understand what the changes in Afghanistan’s aftermath 
have meant to Afghans in terms of their own sense of identity and their relationships. It also 
aims to illuminate their perceptions and experiences in engaging with the aid apparatus. This 
work hopes to present a counter to the abounding preference for simplistic impressions of 
Afghans. Exposing the context’s complexities mokes it harder for the aid apparatus to sell 
their particular political project.
Afghan Women and Men Today
In late 2001, Afghan wom en’s human rights and wellbeing were at the top of the aid 
apparatus agenda. Despite good intentions and strong words, in 2004 these issues were an 
afterthought (Human Rights Watch 2004: 4). Expectations -  overly high at the outset -  hove 
not been met. Progress has been slow, and, according to a 2007 World Bank report, "in some 
areas important progress during the first two-three years was followed by slowdown, drift, or 
backsliding -  adversely affecting future prospects" (Byrd 2007). Women have suffered 
disproportionately from these adverse effects. Afghan women continue to be among the 
worst off in the world in virtually all aspects of life - health, education, poverty, literacy, civil 
and political rights, protection against violence, and public participation.
The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) report lists obstacles that 
women are facing in present-day Afghanistan: tradition, lack of available services, 
econom ic constraints, inability to take initiative and manage their own affairs, family 
obstacles, domestic violence, patriarchy, and illiteracy (AIHRC 2007).
In the health sector, Afghan women have a life expectancy that is at least 20 years shorter 
than most other women in the world. Afghanistan’s Maternal Mortality Ratio, estimated at
'3 Nancy Hatch Dupree Is one of the foremost authorities on Afghanistan. She has directed the ACBAR (Agency 
Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) Resource and informofion Centre in Peshawar since 1989. She is the author of 
six guidebooks on Afghanistan and has published over 150 articles on Afghanistan. Her husband, the late Louis 
Dupree, was a  prominent anthropologist and Afghanistan specialist. No research on Afghanistan is complete  
without referencing the Duprees’ work.
1,600 to 1,900 maternal deattis per 100,000 live births, is one of the highest in the world 
(UNFPA 2005). Each Afghan woman will have approximately 6.6 children during her 
childbearing years. This is nearly one third higher than even the least developed countries’ 
average of 5.02 children per woman (United Nations 2005). One million new Afghans are 
added to the population every year -  onto an increasingly-weakening economic and social 
infrastructure.
Afghanistan ranks far below its neighbors with respect to literacy, especially for adult 
females. AIHRC elaborates that female education is im peded by a lack of available schools, 
security concerns, poverty, and “widespread gender discrimination in society’s customary 
practices’’ (AIHRC 20 0 7 ) ’4.
Despite recent progress in women’s political participation, women are still a minority in public 
life and are often marginalized in policy-making and decision-making. There is a general lack 
of awareness of wom en’s rights and certain vestiges of inequality remain in some laws of the 
c o u n t r y '5 .  a mini case study on advancing the ’gender agenda ’ through parliamentary 
elections con be found in the appendices.
Afghanistan and Afghan women fall at the bottom of global poverty indices - with a Human 
Development Index value of 0.346 and a Gender Development Index value of 0.300, ranking 
Afghanistan as fifth and third lowest in standard of living and gender disparity in standard of 
living, respectively, in the world (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004). The 
average per capita  income is less than $200, and only 13.5% of families have access to a 
sustainable source of income (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and UNDP 2005; AIHRC 2006).
Livelihoods ore deteriorating. A context of prolonged war, continued conflict, and periodic 
drought has increased poverty and vulnerability, particularly in urban areas. Poverty has 
brought increased corruption, posing yet another risk to an already precarious and steadily 
deteriorating security situation. Displacement and urbanization have brought a transition 
from a largely agricultural economy to one where livelihoods are precarious and daily 
survival is tantamount. As a result, women continue to enter a variety of fields in order to 
support their families, the most dangerous of which is opium production (Rostami-Povey
Chapter IX provides further information on constroints to femole educotion.
'5 This section wos odopted from the first drott of the Notionol Action Plon tor the Women of Afghoniston (NAPWA) 
of which I wos the primory outhor. Subsequent drofts ond the finoi product were outhored by UNIFEM.
2007: 58). Women are engaged in livestock and agricultural work and micro-enterprises, yet 
they lack access to capital, information, technology and markets.
In urban areas, Afghans have very little access to basic services and social infrastructure. A 
report from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) attributes this to limited 
resources and authorities' unwillingness and lack of capacity to meet people ’s needs (Beall 
and Schutte 2006: 1). As a result, most of Afghanistan’s urban population has no choice but 
to enter into informal employment. Increased vulnerabilities due to irregular incomes forces 
women to supplement the income -  at times through exploitative and hazardous work (Beall 
and Schutte 2006: 2).
The increased poverty has forced more women into sex work (Rostami-Povey 2007: 1). The 
number of widows and female-headed households continues to increase. Their situation is 
far more serious because households with male labor are still better off than those without 
(Beall and Schutte 2006: 2).
Afghan women continue to experience violence and threats of violence at home and in 
public spaces. Domestic violence and self-immolation are also increasing, although 
emerging statistics remain unreliable. Both women and men expected more from the 
reconstruction process, and yet by 2007, hopes of peace, security, and development have 
been thwarted (Rostami-Povey 2007: 41).
With fhe US-led invasion cam e poverty, rurai-fo-urban migration, uprooting, crime, 
drug addiction, unemployment, alien culture: ail these factors are leading to the 
breakdown of [Afghan] social relations as their basic safety net.
(Rostami-Povey 2007: 75)
Evidence from Afghanistan’s Human Development Report 2004 shows that social indicators 
for women in Afghonisfan are among the worst in the world.
Social Indicators 
Population
Total population: 29.93 million
Urban: 28.8% (Kabul population 2002: 1.7 million, 2003: 3 million) Rural: 71.2% 
Population growtti: 4.8%/yeor
Health and Mortality
Life expectancy: 44.5 years Heaittiy life expectancy: 33.4 years
Child mortality (under 5): 260 out ot 1000 (1 out of 5 children dies before the age of 5)
Infant mortality: 165 out of 1000
Maternal mortality: 1600 out of 100,000 (1 woman dies every 30 minutes from
pregnancy-related causes, highest maternal mortality in the 
world)
Population without access to health services: 81%
150-300 landmine injuries/deaths per month (10 million landmines in Afghanistan)
Education
Primary education: 36% Girls: 21% Boys: 51%
Adult literacy: 28.7% Women: 12.7%
Poverty and Refugees
Level of poverty: 53% Level of hunger: 48%
Population without access to safe drinking water: 87%
50,000 widows in Kabul
Refugees returned since 2002: 2.5 million Refugees remaining outside: 3.4 million 
Human Development Index
Measures average achievements: life expectancy, education, standard of living (GDP) 
Afghanistan’s rank: 173 out of 178
Gender Development Index
Measures gender discrepancy between men and women for HDI indicators: life expectancy, 
education, standard of living (GDP)
Afghanistan’s rank: 3.00 (3^  ^ lowest rank, slightly above Niger and Burkina Faso, significantly 
lower than neighboring countries) ______________________
2. Operationalizing Key Concepts
Aid in the Aftermath
Adapted from (2004). Afghoniston Notionol Humon Development Report 2004. U. N. D. Progromme. Kobul, United 
Notions Development Progromme Afghoniston, Islomic Republic of Afghoniston. Also see 
www.oecd.ora/dev/institutions/GIDdotobose ond www.unfDO.oro/swD/2005/Ddf/en swD05.pdf
For the purposes of this study, I have elected to use the term a f t e r m a t h to define the 
period following a conflict. The more familiar term 'post-conflict' connotes an end to 
violence and a linear progression toward peace. In fact, post-conflict situations are 
circuitous and often entail a relapse into violence. For countries that have undergone long 
periods of warfare, the boundaries between conflict and so-called post-conflict situations 
are sometimes indistinct. Afghan history demonstrates that relapses into conflict are not 
unusual. Indeed, Deniz Kandiyoti confirms thaf Afghanistan's transition from war to peace is 
still incomplete (2005: 15). This is further reinforced by researcher and lecturer Elaheh Rostami- 
Povey who states that the term 'post-conflict' is not applicable to Afghanistan (2007:50). This 
research will argue that present increases of violence in Afghanistan are a manifestation of 
this dynamic.
Conflict can be defined as a complex socio-political struggle over processes of 
transformation. And therefore, the policies that guide interventions in conflict contexts are 
also political processes. Joanna Macrae of the Overseas Development Institute states that 
"humanitarian aid is now the primary form of political engagement" (2002). Attempts at 
denying the political nature of such aid only strips interventions of their political reality -  
making their application a mere technical exercise that has little relevance to local realities. 
Such was the case in Afghanistan.
In conflict contexts such as Afghanistan, meeting practical needs becomes a particular 
imperative as aid interventions focus on immediate humanitarian concerns. Research on aid 
interventions in emergency contexts reveals that interventions can often inadvertently 
increase the vulnerabilities of the communities they aim to serve through misguided policies 
that neglect to take longer-term strategic interests into account (Anderson and Woodrow 
1998). Mark Duffield notes that strategic actors can facilitate violence by failing to recognize 
the political nature of so-called ‘political emergencies’ (2001). Humanitarian assistance thus 
increasingly becomes both a political process and colored by political considerations 
(Duffield 2005: 15).
It is assumed, in the so-called 'relief to development continuum’ ’® that conflict -  similar to 
development -  is a linear process. The progression toward peace is long-term, multi-
’7 The term aftermath is based on Meintj'es, S., A. Pillay, et al., Eds. (2001). The Aftermath: Women in Post-conflict 
Transformation. London, Zed Books.
'8 For further information on this concept, see Ross, J., S. Maxwell, et al. (1994). Linking Relief and Development. 
Brighton, Institute of Development Studies.
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dimensional, dynamic, and unique to each context (Lederoch 1997). In Afghanistan’s 
aftermath, programs transitioned from immediafe relief fo longer-ferm developmenf 
interventions, yet political implications were further denied. The aid apparatus viewed the 
rising levels of violence, instobilify, and inequalify in Afghanisfan as part of fhe standard 
‘post-conflict package ’ . As one result, aid becam e conflated with security, and aid-as- 
security becam e the primary means of international a s s i s t a n c e ’9. None-the-less, the track 
record of aid in reducing social risks and promoting stability remains unproven (Duffield 
2002). Afghanistan represents a case in point. There remained an imbalance between short­
term, visible interventions and long-term strategic interventions that change the ways power 
relationships are expressed as part of a process of transifion^o.
Few aid insfifutions exisfed in Afghanistan prior to 20022'. This was due in large part to the 
difficulties of operafing during the Taliban period and previous regimes. In the post-Taliban 
period, wom en’s agency and empowerment were accorded significant attention in plans 
for fhe reconstruction of Afghanistan. Aid institutions poured into Afghanistan with wom en’s 
issues at the top of their agendas. Improving wom en’s position and addressing structural 
issues appeared to be the order of fhe day. As one resulf, programs failed fo infegrate a 
contextualized understanding of Afghan women in fheir plans.
The aid process in Afghanisfan is said to have been "prescriptive and supply-driven, rather 
than indigenous and responding to Afghan needs" (Oxfam 2008: 2). Aid instifufions in Kabul 
employed ‘conflict experts’ whose experience did not coalesce with Afghan r e a lif ie s ^ ^ . This 
confribufed to a failure to incorporate a contextualized analysis in interventions. International 
staff generally knew very little about Afghanistan when they arrived, and by the time they 
achieved a modicum of undersfanding, fhey were already in Iraq (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 
207). Indeed, in conflict and the aftermath, the same people are rotated and the same 
partnerships are formed in a patfern of free-floafing experfise thaf lacks confext (Ferguson
”  Mark Duffield speaks further fo this in his article: Duffield, M. (2001). "Governing fhe Borderlands: Decoding fhe 
Power of Aid." Disasters 25(4) : 308-320.
20 For further information, see Pugh, M. (1998). Posf-Conflicf Rehabilitation: The Humanitarian Dimension. Nefworkina 
fhe Security Community in fhe Information Age. Zurich, Swiss Interdepartmental Coordination Committee tor 
Partnership tor Peace. Pugh uses the concept ot transition not os a  movement from relief to development, but to 
illustrate the change from overt war to (perhaps temporary) non-belligerence. Such a  transition does not assume a  
particular end. Instead, it reflects a  process.
21 There was also very little scholarship on Afghanistan during the Taliban period (1996-2001). During this time, 
material was obtained from refugee camps or using secondary sources. Kandiyoti, D. (2003). Integrating Gender 
Analysis into Socio-Economic Needs Assessment in Afghanistan. Kabul, United Nations Development Fund tor 
Women.
22 Personal observation, 2002-2004. This is also reinforced by my own experience. I received no training on 
Afghanistan before being deployed to the country.
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1994: 259). As a result existing disparities between local and international perspectives in 
Afghanistan were exacerbated by differing priorities regarding wom en’s issues.
The Gender Order
This study uses the term gender order to represent the way in which society is organized 
around wom en’s and men’s roles, needs, and interests in various contexts. The gender order 
is a political process that changes and evolves -  although it might appear resistant to 
change. The gender order is historically constructed and influenced by other identity 
markers. The term stems from Cynthia Cockburn’s definition's, meaning "power relations in 
any given society that establish a basic sexual division of labour, an initial social 
differentiation by gender that permeates and underpins all other distinctions’’ (2004 :33). I use 
the term gender order because it reintroduces the underlying power and politics that 
animates gender.
An examination of the gender order in the aftermath of conflict is particularly relevant as 
Afghan society is undergoing a process of transformation, one result of which is the 
fluctuation of gender identities. There is a burgeoning literature on wom en’s roles in conflict 
and the aftermath, affirming that " ‘peace ’ involves a reworking of power relations, not just 
between nations or parts of nations but between men and wom en” (Kelly 2000: 62)24. No 
consensus exists on whether these new roles are, firstly, advantageous to women and, 
further, sustainable in the long term. Conflict can stimulate a shift in gender roles while 
simultaneously provoking a retreat to conservative notions of masculinity and femininity 
(Meintjes, Pillay et al. 2001: 152). While these changes in gender identities are largely 
indigenous, they can be supported or hindered by external influence, in this case aid 
interventions. Afghanistan presents an interesting case study in this regard.
The gender order merits deconstruction in Afghanistan because conventional gender 
divisions are not sufficient explanation for the fluidity of Afghan identities (Rostami-Povey 
2007:3). The use of the gender order as a category of analysis shifts focus away from women 
to examine the interconnectivity of relationships and entails a recognition that gender is only 
one aspect of social relations and is not the only source of inequality in wom en’s and men’s
23 Cynthia Cockburn originally credits Jill Julius Matthews for this definition. For more Information, see Cockburn, C. 
(20041. The Line: Women. Partition and the Gender Order In Cyprus. London, Zed Books.
24 For examples, see Sweetman, C., F. Cell, et al. (2001). Editorial. Gender, Development, and Humanitarian Work. C. 
Sweetman. Oxtord, Oxfam GB. SharonI, S. (2001). Rethinking Women’s Struggles In Israel-Palestlne and In the North of 
Ireland. Victims. Perpetrators or Actors? Gender. Armed Conflict and Political Violence. C. O. N. Moser and F. C. 
Clark. London, Zed Books.
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lives (Kabeer 1994: 65). Gender should be viewed as a process that continues to evolve in 
the context ot Afghan social struggles throughout history.
3. Historical Overview of Women in Afghanistan
Much of Afghan history has emphasized geo-politics rather than gender politics (Moghadam 
1999: 175), and yet the question of women's role in Afghanistan has been an on-going part 
ot political discourse, linked to modernity and progress on the one hand and preservation of 
tradition on the other. Indeed, "Afghanistan may be the only country in the world where 
during the last century kings and politicians have been made and undone by struggles 
relating to wom en’s status" (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003: 1). Afghan wom en’s history is much more 
complex than existing formulations of pre- and post-Taliban. In fact, state-building, 
revolutionary change, and wom en’s rights have always been intimately connected -  with 
w om en’s rights as the most politicized of the trinity (Moghadam 1994: 97).
In 1985, Nancy Hatch Dupree wrote: "for nearly a century there had been much talk -  and 
some significant action -  regarding the enhancement of w om en’s role in society” (1985: 14). 
An understanding of Afghan wom en’s hisfory therefore could begin in the 1880s, when 
Afghan rulers of the period launched one of the earliest attempts at emancipation and 
social reform in the Muslim world. However, these rulers also proclaimed men as the 
guardians of women, marking the beginning of a non-linear pattern of social change. 
Amidst various contradictory laws concerning women, the ‘protection of wom en’ was 
employed as a call for Afghans to expel the British: "Should these foreigners overrun the 
country, the men ot Afghanistan would lose hold over their wives, for, according to [British] 
laws women enjoy liberty and under them no husband has any control over his wife" (Rahimi 
1977:36).
Modernization and Modernity
During the 1920s, wom en’s emancipation began to play a prominent role in the nationalist 
ideology of modernization (Hans 2004). Popular perceptions of King Amanullah’s immorality 
and excessive Western influence fueled a strong resistance, and religious conservatives and 
the rural population met his attempts at reform with violent o p p o s i t io n s ^ .  This is significant in 
that the rural population has historically presented the greatest challenge to social reforms.
25 For further information, see Emodi, H. (20021. Repression. Resistance, and Women In Afghanistan. Westport, 
Proeger.
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This dynamic ploys out again in present day Afghanistan and is increasingly magnified by the 
rural population that is now displaced in Kabul city.
At this time, violence against women increased, perpetuated by those who considered 
women's families shamed by calls to abandon veiling and adopt Western attire. It is 
estimated that 400 women were murdered during this period os a result (McAllister 1991; Ellis 
2000). Mullahs^^ circulated a rumor that unveiled women's children would be stolen by the 
Communists and m ade into soap. Mullahs, feeling threatened at the challenge to their 
religious authority, further instilled fear by claiming that natural disasters would befall 
Afghanistan because of the women's sins. When, in 1927, an earthquake did occur, it was 
blamed on women who had shamed their families and communities by removing their 
chaddaris. Women eventually succumbed to pressure and those who had removed their 
chaddaris donned them once again to appease religious authorities and regain their 
respect in the communities (McAllister 1991).
Emancipation continued to be enforced and subsequently challenged. Despite incremental 
changes, responses to wom en’s rights vacillated between enforced modernity and 
conservative backlash^/. And yet, attempts at modernity throughout history have always 
been imposed from above -  with little im pact on the lives of fhe majorify. Such modernity 
has also been selective: so-called modern contributions such os technology and advanced 
weapons are accepted, while movements towards wom en’s public participation in Afghan 
society are not^s.
Afghan women were officially enfranchised in the 1964 Constitution and later were given 
equal rights in the 1977 Constitution (Dupree 1996). The Sour (April) Revolution of 1978 
introduced an aggressive program for social change, enforcing such modernizations as 
women's right to work, serve in the army, and choose their spouse. Mandatory literacy 
programs for women and the abolition of bride price were viewed as direct attacks on 
Afghan culfure and honor, insfigafing yet another wave of violence (Skoine 2002: 17). 
Afghans felf a total disdain for fheir values, so much so that an Afghan woman said that the
26 Mullahs are religious leaders in Islam.
22 For c thorough review of the fluctuations ot women's human rights during various periods, see Nilond, N. (2004). 
Justice Postponed: The Marginalization ot Human Rights in Afghanistan. Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid. Peace and  
Justice in Afghanistan. A. Donini, N. Niland and K. Wermester. Bloomfield, Kumorian.
28 Noroyan also speaks to this phenomenon. See Norayon, U. (19971. Dislocotino Cultures: Identities. Traditions, and 
Third World Feminism. New York, Routledge.
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Russians deliberately “came [to Afghanistan] to play with the dignity of women” (Skaine 
2002: 18-19).
Thus, Afghan women once again found themselves a t the center of a conflict between 
Western concepts of modernization and Afghan codes of culture (Hans 2004: 235). To most 
Afghans at that time, the government was perceived to be interfering with Islamic values 
and disregarding social traditions. It was further encouraging women to engage in public 
activities which were deemed "unladylike, ...undignified and detrimental to family honour” 
(Dupree 2004: 317). The Soviet invasion prompted contradictory changes in lives of Afghan 
women - emancipation and greater opportunities for some (a minority, largely urban), and 
death and destruction for others. The Leftist group in power during Soviet occupation 
promised full equality for women but did not deliver on it. Women might have been more 
visible in Kabul during that time, but they had no real decision-making or power-sharing roles 
(Skaine 2002: 17). In writing of the im pact of the various Soviet decrees on Afghan society, 
researchers Weiner and Banuazizi describe it this way:
The alien ideological rhetoric with which these programs were imbued, the haste with 
which they were formulated, and the zealotry with which the local officials 
attem pted to implement them led to a massive resistance among large segments of 
Afghan society.
(1994:25)
They could also have been talking about present-day Afghanistan, and perhaps the many 
other periods in Afghan history where social change has been imported and imposed 
through foreign intervention. Thus efforts to em ancipate women are not new -  and have 
never been well received.
Women's Honor
Women’s honor is the cornerstone on which the politics of women's rights rests. Social 
change and attempts to improve wom en’s status have repeatedly brought strong resistance 
because of affronts to honor. These fluctuations in w om en’s rights -  enforced by the state’s 
attempt to exercise centralized control - have actually led to violent, fundamentalist 
backlashes (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). As one example, opposition to Soviet reforms for women -  
and concern for the symbolic value of w om en’s honor - fueled the fundamentalist
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movement that took hold in refugee comps. This in turn served as the grounds for the 
Mujaheddin opposition to expel the Soviets and regain control both of women and 
A f g h a n is t a n ^ ^ .  After the Soviet pull-out, however, "security for women becam e nonexistent, 
os their homes were invaded and their bodies were used os rewards for victorious soldiers” 
(Skoine 2002: 40).
In the 1920s, Afghanistan was a secular country working to extend wom en’s rights, yet by the 
1990s the country was a captive of religious fanaticism, tribal patriarchy, and 
underdevelopment (Moghodom 1999). Kondiyoti explains that Muslim fundamentalism 
grows in contexts of rapid social change, particularly as a response to colonialism and 
economic d e p e n d e n c y T h is  phenomenon combines with the international pressure that is 
exerted a t the intersection of Islam, the state, and gender politics. As a result, the ‘p lace ’ of 
women becomes “one of the few areas of relative autonomy left to societies whose ties of 
political and economic dependence severely restrict their choices in every other sphere” 
(Kondiyoti 1991: 8). Afghanistan repeatedly demonstrates the strong and yet volatile link 
between wom en’s honor and external interventions.
Enter International Community^’
Why has the status of women become a central issue in the west’s perception of 
Afghanistan? ...Western public opinion -  or a t least the media (a valid distinction) -  
was hardly interested in Afghan women before 1996.
(Dorronsoro 2005: 291 )
The so-called ‘international community’ and the Western media hardly took notice of the 
situation of women in Afghanistan until the fall of Kabul on 27 September 1996. It was the 
Taliban who, ironically, drew world attention to the situation of Afghanistan and Afghan 
women. During the Taliban period, Afghan women were portrayed as victims of violence 
and oppression by the international media. Yet the situation of women in Afghanistan is not
29 The Mujaheddin (literally holy warrior) - US-sponsored freedom fighters - fought to expel the Soviets from 
Afghanistan. This period is known for its violence towards women in the form of rapes, abductions, and restrictions on 
mobility.
30 Kondiyoti cites Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi as the inspiration behind these ideas. As one example of her 
work, see Mernissi, F. (19751. Bevond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a  Modern Muslim Society. New York, John 
Wiley & Sons.
3' For these purposes, the "international community" refers to the aid apparatus. I limit use of the term in that it 
appears to be a  misnomer, assuming uniformity of opinion and behavior, in the way one might imagine of a  
‘community’ . Regarding Afghanistan’s official entry into the international community, the country gained  
membership to the United Nations on 19 November 1946.
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simply a product of Taliban p o lic ie s ^ ^ . The international shock a t the Taliban’s treatment of 
women took place in a historical vacuum, with little attention paid to pre-Taliban abuses 
(Benjamin 2000). Their belated ‘discovery’ of the discrimination of Afghan women 
(discrimination that passed largely without com ment during previous regimes) is a reflection 
both of the political agenda and of wider ignorance of the realities of Afghan society 
(Barakat and Wardell 2001).
Much has been written on women’s abuses during this period. For these purposes, it is 
sufficient to say that women suffered under many regimes in Afghanistan, but wom en’s 
sphere of influence under the Taliban was virtually annihilated (Giles and Hyndman 2004). 
The Taliban were able to manipulate the deeply em bedded system linking women to honor, 
issuing policies that “wrapped entrenched customary practices and patriarchal attitudes in 
the mantle of Islam’’ (Dupree 2004: 323-4). It is worthwhile to note that men also suffered 
under the Taliban, although this was hardly noted by the media^^. Since the capture of 
Kabul by the Taliban, women in Afghanistan found themselves on the top of aid and media 
agendas (Dupree 1998). Underlying the logic of ousting the Taliban in order to ‘liberate’ 
women was the notion that, once the Taliban were gone, their stringent restrictions would be 
gone as well (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 82). Such facile understandings reveal the scant 
attention paid to abuses of women’s human rights by previous regimes, and the absence of 
on understanding of Afghan women’s history.
Violations of Afghan wom en’s rights began to take on an increasingly prominent role in the 
justification of the US bombing campaign in Afghanistan (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2002: 
602; Clark 2004; Rawi 2004). The Bush Administration’s vociferous concern for Afghan 
wom en’s rights os justification for military intervention was undercut by their support to the 
lawless factions that have repeatedly inflicted violence against women (Niland 2004: 79). As 
such, the military cam paign was launched with little regard for longer-term social 
consequences. Alison Jaggar is one of many who believe that, following the overthrow of 
the Taliban, the US installed a weak government in Afghanistan under which wom en’s lives 
remained precarious (2004: 13).
32 Contrary to popular understanding. It is important to note ttiat thie chaddari was not invented by thie Taliban. 
Traditionally, thie chaddari was worn by elite women In order to aid ttieir mobility \A/tiile retaining their modesty and  
respectability. Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Retlections on 
Cultural Relativism and Its Others." American Anthropologist 104(3): 783-790.
33 Examples include regulations on length ot men’s beards and wearing Afghan-style clothing. The Taliban’s 
domination over women was also domination over non-Talib men. The massacre ot Hazara men in Bamiyan is a  
case in point.
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The concept of rights - and the subsequent rights discourse - first became a part of the aid 
apparatus in Afghanistan with the release of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (SFA) 
in 1998. “ Rights becam e the lens through which assistance was viewed, whether it was the 
question of humanitarian space (the right to assistance) or discrimination against women” 
(Johnson and Leslie 2004: 69). Atghanistan viewed the concept of rights as something to be 
handled within the community and social environment, not by individuals. Afghan identities 
are grounded in communal structures and continuously redefined by economic, social, and 
political currents. However, the SFA presented -  and therefore negotiated - rights in a largely 
Western (read: individual) framework. It was thus perceived by Afghans as a language used 
by the aid apparatus "to define their own agenda in other people ’s countries” (Johnson and 
Leslie 2004: 76).
The rhetoric during this period was in terms of liberating, or saving, Afghan women (Abu- 
Lughod 2002). This high profile came with controversy -  and without context. Afghanistan 
specialist Jeanne Bryer writes that veterans of other crises3", inspired by the 'liberation' 
agenda, flooded Afghanistan in the early days of the intervention:
Many however, possessed little knowledge of the country, its culture or means of 
properly planning or implementing their ‘projects’. Although the majority of the 
Afghan people appeared glad, initially, to be rid of their oppressors and had high 
expectations of improvements from the huge donations promised, it was not long 
before disillusionment set in.
(Bryer 2006: n.p.)
This politicized aid history has left the country a graveyard for failed fast-paced etforts by 
outsiders (Smillie and Minear 2004: 102). Afghan women engaged in aid activities were not 
comfortable with the high international visibility and felt that they were not consulted on 
campaigns on their behalf (Benjamin 2000). Many Afghan women are still struggling to find 
the space within which they can rectify this image.
3" These aid individuals, along with war reporters, were often referred to os ‘‘emergency junkies" based on their 
careers built on moving from one emergency context to another. Many of these saw Afghanistan as an extension of 
their previous country assignments and were therefore able to revive previous professional relationships and  
programs with little regard for whether they were valid in the new context.
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4. A Series of ‘Events’
The Bonn Process
Afghan disillusionment grew in the progression ot a number ot ‘events’ ottered to publicly 
reottirm the aid apparatus’ commitment to Atghanistan. The process ot reconstruction was 
guided by the Bonn Agreement, a political timetable determined by international donors in 
Bonn, Germany in December 2001 to set in train a three-stage journey towards democracy: 
electing a transitional authority; adopting a new constitution; and electing a representative 
g o v e r n m e n t s ^ .  The Bonn Agreement also established the Ministry ot Women’s Affairs (MoWA) 
- the weakest link in Afghanistan’s national machinery - much touted but marginalized and 
under-funded.
The Constitution - adopted in January 2004 by the Afghan Constitutional Loyo Jirga, or 
Grand Assembly - secured women's rights and ensured equality before the low, yet human 
rights and women's rights organizations have begun to identity fissures in the document 
where women's rights may vanish (Abirateh 2004). Women comprised 20 percent ot the 
delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga. These women secured the passing ot several 
articles encouraging equality. Article 7 requires Atghanistan to observe the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and all covenants to which Atghanistan is a party. This includes 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
which Atghanistan signed in March 2003 - without reservation. Despite ratification, the 
Afghan Government has yet to submit its first annual report, which was due in March ot 2004. 
Article 22 ot the Constitution guarantees the legal equality ot men and women. While it 
might be touted that women were present and active in the Loya Jirga, this should not 
overshadow the tact that these women expressed concern tor their safety on the streets and 
at home in addition to the harassment they experienced at the event itself (Abirateh 2004). 
As Kandiyoti articulated: "The scene seems to be set tor the development ot tensions 
between the "rights on paper’’ spelt out in the new Constitution and wom en’s actual 
opportunities to avail themselves ot these rights’’ (2005: 22).
In line with the Bonn Process, Hamid Karzai was elected President in October 2004. The final 
step in this process was the parliamentary election ot September 2005. A discussion ot the
35 www.afahanaovernment.com/AfahanAqreennentBonn.htm
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gendered implications of this event can be found in Appendix 2. The Bonn Agreement can 
be regarded as the "first official position of the international community’s good intentions 
towards developing gender equality. In reality... the good intentions [have] not been 
m atched by adequate achievements" (UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender 
Equality, OECD/D AC Network on Gender Equality et al. 2003: 7).
Post-Bonn Processes
Following Bonn, donors met in Tokyo in 2002, in Berlin in 2004, and in London in 2006. In Tokyo 
in early 2002, conference participants renewed their commitment to the Bonn Process. 
According to the Co-choirs' Summary of Conclusions:
The Conference emphasized the centrality of restoring the rights and addressing the 
needs of women, who have been the prime victims of conflict and oppression. 
Women’s rights and gender issues should be fully reflected in the reconstruction 
process.
(2002)
The National Development Framework (NDF), emerging from the Tokyo Conference, 
claimed that gender was to be a cross-cutting theme. In the paragraph to which gender 
was relegated, the report states that it does not want "gender equality to be treated as a 
ghetto” , elaborating that programs must pay special attention to women and men, not 
merely including women as an afterthought (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2002: 13). The 
report further states that "because our women are often invisible that does not mean they 
are always excluded" (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2002: 13). Finally, the NDF advocates 
a “societal dialogue to enhance the opportunities of women and improve cooperation 
between men and women on the basis of our culture, the experience of other Islamic 
countries, and the global norms of human rights" (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2002: 13). 
This particular line is problematic because of its assumption of a uniform culture. Further, the 
experiences of Islamic countries are diverse and open to vast and contradictory 
interpretations regarding wom en’s rights. Finally, potential for disagreement exists in the 
concept of global norms of human rights (Kandiyoti 2005: 20).
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The following conference, in Berlin in March 2004, produced yef onofher feme. Securing 
Afghanistan’s Future (SAF) renewed its commifmenf fo gender issues, and strengthened the 
discourse to include nnore aggressive -  and elusive - language:
The gender element is critical, given we are moving from gender apartheid to 
gender integration, addressing the capabilities of women in the culturally 
appropriate way requires special attention. However, as shown by the Loya Jirga, 
when women take on these roles they are accepted^A the key is not to discuss the 
role of women in Afghanistan, but to create facts on the ground regarding 
integration and wom en’s roles.
(Islamic Republic ot Atghanistan 2004: 14)
In January ot 2006, 60 donors met in London to renew their commitment to Atghanistan and 
determine the next course ot action. These donors committed military and reconstruction 
support tor the country over the next five years. At the time ot writing, ot the $10.5 billion 
(over five years) that was pledged in London, it is not clear how much has actually reached 
Atghanistan. It is not surprising, therefore, that Afghans remain skeptical. Given their history ot 
abandonment following the expulsion ot the Soviets in 1989, Afghans are once again tearful 
that they will not benefit from sustained international attention in the long-term.
The Afghanistan Com pact -  the document emerging from the London Conference - is the 
successor to the Bonn Agreement, providing the framework tor the aid apparatus to 
continue its assistance to Atghanistan. It is believed to be the lost chance the aid apparatus 
might have to create sustainable structures. This window continues to narrow as donor 
fatigue, new emergencies, and low momentum set in. In terms ot what has been done, the 
aid apparatus has fallen short os many have argued that reconstruction in Atghanistan was 
attempted "on the cheap” (Robichaud 2006: 17). Indeed, gender interventions present an 
ideal example ot support ‘on the cheap ’, where funding received was in no measure 
compatible with the level ot rhetoric.
3* This statement is problematic as women were in fact harassed at the Loya Jirga.
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The Aid Apparatus in Perspective
A good start to an examination of such support ‘on the cheap ’ is to trace funds allocated to 
the c o u n t r y 37. From 2001 until 2003, Afghanistan received a total of US$4,262.3 million, of 
which 72.2% was channeled through the aid apparatus. Of this 72.2%: UN agencies 
swallowed 45.9% (US$1,957.2 million); local and international NGOs 9.7% (US$413.1 million); 
and private companies (largely American i.e. Louis Berger, Bearing Point, etc.) received 
16.5% (US$705.1 million). The remainder - 27.8% (US$1,186.9 million) - of the total was 
channeled through the Afghan government (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
2004: 214). This was particularly problematic because the government felt undermined in its 
reconstruction and development efforts, therefore failing to achieve broad credibility in the 
eyes of the Afghan p e o p le ^ s .  Further, it is the responsibility of the state to safeguard rights -  
including women's rights -  but its capacity to do so was debilitated by limited funding.
In the Tokyo and Berlin meetings, donors p l e d g e d ^ ?  a combined $13.4 billion toward 
Afghanistan's estimated reconstruction needs of $27.5 billion over seven years (Robichaud 
2006). However, by February 2005, donors had implemented only $3.3 billion in 
reconstruction projects^o. More troublesome, however, is that experience in Afghanistan has 
revealed that the amount pledged is for greater than what Is actually delivered (Roashan 
2006).
Finding accuracy in figures proved to be an even greater challenge when attempting to 
extract what was actually spent on women and gender etforts. Significant funding had been 
committed, but there were no listings of what was actually disbursed. The US states that $72.5 
million of US appropriations to the country over the last three years was earmarked to assist
37 It proved to be extremely challenging to find figures, and much less to find consisfency in those figures. It was also 
difficult to access figures fhat demonstrafed whefher money was spent on actual projects or on overhead costs.
38 For more information, see Ashraf Ghani articles and UNDP (2005). Human Development Report 2005: International 
cooperation at a  crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an unequal world. New York, UNDP.
39 Pledges are defined as sfafements m ade by governmenf minisfers or officials sfating a  serious intenfion fo supply 
funding. Commifments refer fo funds fhat have been committed (usually irrevocably) to a  specific organizafion or 
secfor. Disbursemenfs are funds fhaf have eifher been fransferred from fhe original donor fo fhe reclpienf 
organizafion or where funds are available fo be drawn down by fhe organizafion. For more informafion, see 
Development Initiatives (2003). Afghanistan: How Pledges Are Being Turned Into Spending. Afghanistan Update. 
Somerset, Development Initiatives.
0^ It is important to note that these figures are nof consisfenf across documenfs and sources. For example, anofher 
source lisfs Tokyo pledges as $4.8 billion, of which 72% was disbursed. See Ibid. I have elecfed fo use Rubin’s figures 
as he is an aufhorify on Afghanistan, having worked closely with the Afghan Governmenf. Therefore he has access 
fo more accurafe figures. Searches fhrough the Afghanistan Donor Assistance Database resulted in no clarification 
as nearly all of fhe links fo funding sources and lisfs of pledges were broken or unavailable. See 
www.af/dad/index.hfm .
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Afghan women (Sultan 2005: ix). ActionAid has slightly less optimistic figures, referring to 
USAID funds in particular. They state that 5% (or $3.8 million) ot the nearly $75 million given in 
grants to Afghan civil society groups between 2002 and 2004 was devoted to wom en’s civil 
society groups (2005: 2). It commitment to the Ministry ot Women's Affairs com pared to other 
ministries is any indicator, the situation is bleak. Ot 41 national machineries, that ot women 
ranked 32"^  ^in terms ot expenditures in 2002 and 35'^ in 2003^'.
Aid to Afghan women perhaps has been meager because the bulk ot funding has been 
swallowed tor the War on Terror. Since late 2001, the aid apparatus has operated with a 
narrow definition ot security, meaning the dominance ot armed forces. As a result, 
interventions to win “ hearts and minds’’ actually sought to p lacate a potentially hostile 
population and not as a precondition tor the realization ot peace and human rights (Human 
Rights Watch 2006: 9-10). Further, when addressing insecurity is defined as a purely military 
matter, instead ot adopting a broader view ot security to encompass human security, 
wom en’s concerns are relegated to ‘softer issues’ . This unfortunate omission was also 
brought to light in the recent Global Peace Index that tailed to rank the most prevalent form 
ot violence - violence against women - as an obstacle to peoce^^
Afghan ‘hearts and minds’ were certainly not swayed by the paltry aid they received 
compared to other conflicts. Significant amounts ot aid in the first years ot post-contlict 
interventions have brought relative success in other countries. Immediately following their 
respective conflicts, Bosnia received $679 per capita, followed by Kosovo at $526 and East 
Timor at $233. According to studies, Atghanistan received a meager $57 per capita in 2006 
(Jones 2006). Other studies say that Afghans have received an even more dismal $42 per 
capita since 2002 (CARE International 2003). Regardless ot the discrepancy in per capita 
figures, Afghanistan’s lack ot resources has resulted in a sacrifice ot long-term priorities to 
achieve short-term gains. “This malnourishment a t the formative stage has left Atghanistan 
today as a shell ot a state facing daunting development challenges and an accelerating 
insurgency” (Robichaud 2006).
This information was relayed to m e by officials af the Ministry of W omen’s Affairs.
42 For more informafion see htfD://www.rhrealitvcheck.ora/bloa/2007/07/30/violence-aaainsf-women-nof-included- 
in-oeace-index
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Further studies suggest that Afghanistan was short-changed in its allocation of security 
forces43. According to CARE's policy brief on peacekeeping commitments in internal 
conflicts since 1993, Afghanistan ranks lowest in terms of peacekeeper support per capita. 
The table below presents these figures in perspective:
Peacekeeper Support per Capita
Conflict Peacekeepers (Pk) Square kms. Per Pk Population per Pk
Kosovo 48,159 0.2 48
Bosnia 62,000 0.9 58
East Timor 9,327 1.9 86
Somalia 28,000 11.4 212
Cam bodia 15,991 11.3 727
Rwanda 2434 10.8 3,350
Afghanistan 4,800 134.9 5,380
(2003: 4)
To further illustrate the above point, a 2005 security study asked Americans to rank the 
importance of 30 international concerns: Afghanistan ranked last (Security and Peace 
Initiative 2005). The situation was aptly brought to light in a personal communication from an 
Afghanistan specialist on the condition of the country in 2006:
It is nof good - I guess I expected that. Then, too, I checked out the Millennium 
Development Goals stats - updated in June this year - a very quick analysis of these 
reveals some terrible results. What are we all doing with this money and effort? So 
much goodwill, so many words but we seem singularly incapable of actually putting 
ideas and words into practice. We have lost the plot - we observe, commentate, 
wax lyrical, recommend then - what? Check again, write another report, tie 
ourselves in to bureaucratic knots to make people accountable but sometimes this 
results in a kind o f paralysis. We can 't move forward without a radical rethink - or 
rather redo. ...As I am writing to you I am feeling so strongly about our failures. I of 
course include myself in this - but recognition is necessary before you can tackle 
anything.
<3 For more Information see Jones, S. G. (2006). "Averting Failure in Atahanistan." Survival 48 (Spring 2006): 111-128.
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5. Methodology and Structure
This study was conducted through on academ ic lens, building on four years of experience as 
an international aid worker in Afghanistan. My interest in Afghanistan began in 1997 through 
my work on Afghan wom en’s human rights in Washington, DC. I moved to Afghanistan in 
2002 to establish the Afghanistan office of an international non-governmental organization 
(NGO) -  Women for Women Internationa^'^. In 2003, I joined the London School of 
Economics as a PhD candidate in order to refine my thoughts, hone my analysis, and delve 
more deeply into my observations. I continued to work in Afghanistan in various capacities. 
My professional engagem ent with the country ended in September 2006.
Data collection consisted of textual analyses followed by interviews, questionnaires, and 
focus group discussions in Kabul with gender policy-makers, practitioners, and p a r t i c i p a n t s ' ’^. 
The study focuses on the period of the Bonn Process, December 2001 -  September 2005, and 
builds on observation of and engagem ent with Afghan women's issues from 1997 to 2007. 
Additional information on the methodology is available in the appendices.
Structure o f the Thesis
Chapter II will discuss four phases of aid in Afghanistan’s aftermath: (1) Formulation, (2) 
Interpretation, (3) Implementation, (4) Unintended Effects. Formulation (1) begins with the 
concept of the gender order and discourses on women. It begins by deconstructing the 
gender order in the Afghan context socially and historically. It presents an understanding of 
how gender-focused aid might be formulated. The following section addresses interpretation 
(2) of aid, which was crafted with the intent to transform the gender order in Afghanistan. It 
seeks to understand what ‘transformation’ entails in practice. It is based on the view that aid 
interventions cannot transform, per se, but can support or hinder wom en’s potential in 
achieving transformation through policies and programs. Implementation (3) raises the 
possibility that aid was implemented in a way that presents a disconnect between policy 
and practice. It examines the difference between technical and political interventions.
44 Women for Women International is an international NGO supporting women in conflict and post-contlict countries 
providing women survivors ot war and violence with the tools and resources needed to move out ot crisis and  
poverty into stability and selt-sutticiency through a  holistic approach ot three programs -  sponsorship, training in skills 
and rights awareness, and income-generating opportunities. For more information see www.womentorwomen.ora
45 For this study, I use the term ‘participants’ to represent those who might be more commonly known os 
'beneficiaries’ ot aid interventions. The designation ‘beneficiary’ is passive and tails short as it does not fully convey 
the depth and complexity ot the relationship between actors.
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Finally, the section on unintended effects (4) proposes that certain effects have emerged as 
a result of the disconnects above. The theoretical framework builds on the work of James 
Ferguson, informed by Deniz Kandiyoti and Elaheh Rostami-Povey, placing their theories in 
the context of Afghanistan's aftermath with a view to examining the discourses surrounding 
gender-focused international aid.
Chapter III begins with the textual analysis ot five aid institutions ot high profile in order to 
examine their aid and gender policy papers in light of the above framework. These five 
institutions -  UNAMA, USAID, UNDP, UNIFEM, and the World Bank -  were selected because of 
their prominent role as aid institutions as well as their membership on the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs Advisory Group on Gender -  the key players on all things ‘gender’ in Afghanistan. 
Afghan government policy papers are also analyzed as a comparison. A discussion of 
institutional support in the aftermath through the formulation of policy contributes to a better 
understanding of what was committed in terms ot gender-focused aid and serves as a 
starting point to examine gender rhetoric. An analysis and ranking of these documents 
concludes the chapter.
Chapter IV addresses the specific discourses and discussions on women in Afghanistan that 
were employed during the period of study and that served to animate the aid apparatus. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of international perceptions through media and 
popular literature, tested against the perceptions of a focus group. This is weighed against 
Afghan perspectives on the images that likely led to the formation of aid interventions. The 
analysis of media messages and public perceptions underlies the rest of the research and 
leads to a discussion on policy formulation.
Chapter V illuminates the journey from policy formulation to interpretation to implementation 
through the voices of 45 policy-makers, policy implementors, NGO leaders, and Afghanistan 
specialists. Their experiences and perceptions are organized around emergent themes that 
are then checked against those of Afghan women and men. This chapter also brings to light 
the media messages that were discussed in Chapter IV and places them in the context of 
policy interpretation and implementation.
Chapter VI presents data  collected from interviews with 71 Afghan women and 50 Afghan 
men on identity markers, definitions of gender roles and relations, and evolution of gender 
roles in different periods throughout Afghan history. It begins with an understanding of how
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Afghans define and negofiate fheir various idenfifies and what this means for the 
formulation, interpretation and implementation ot aid interventions.
The next chapter presents an in-depth discussion ot the major themes from interviews with 
Afghan women and men. These perspectives and experiences are then com pared with 
focus group discussions. Chapter VII concludes with comparisons and implications at the 
family and community levels using wom en’s life histories and profiles ot couples. This chapter 
concludes by raising the possibility that violence against women could be an unintended 
effect.
Chapter VIII focuses on violence as an unintended effect. This in-depth view starts with a 
discussion ot violence in conflict and the aftermath and presents a comparison with other 
countries and cases. The chapter continues with a discussion ot perceptions ot violence and 
concludes with a brief overview ot documented cases.
The final chapter resumes the discussion from Chapter I on gender roles in the aftermath ot 
conflict and what implications this might have tor aid interventions. This chapter concludes 
with the voices ot Afghan women and men and their views ot what the future holds, 
followed by avenues tor possible future research.
Appendices include a detailed research methodology (in Appendix I) as well as a list ot 
acronyms and abbreviations and Dari terminology. In addition. Appendix 2 provides a mini 
case study to illustrate an example ot gender policy in practice -  the advancing ot the 
'gender agenda ’ through Afghanistan’s 2005 parliamentary elections. Additional 
appendices provide illustrations ot wom en’s life stories as well as profiles ot couples and 
feedback from specialists when verifying findings.
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CHAPTER II; Theories of Transformation and the Gender Order
This research is grounded in development studies in that it seeks to argue in favor of social 
change and policy interventions. This research employs both an academ ic and a 
‘developm ent’ discourse on Afghanistan as parts ot the story. The latter discourse retains its 
independent validity because it deliberately sets out to create space for its own 
'development' intervention. In short, it justifies its own existence. The 'development' 
discourse is fueled by rhetoric which is revealed though its own texts and brought to fruition 
through its own interventions. This, in turn, is illuminated through the (perhaps contradicting) 
social realities that emerge and sometimes by academ ic analyses of the 'development' 
process such as this research.
This research employs gender analysis^^ in order to include an understanding ot the roles and 
needs of both women and men in Afghanistan’s conflict aftermath to understand what 
changes in the aftermath have meant to Afghans. Gender-relations frameworks help to 
establish an inductive analysis, grounded in a contextualized understanding of the gender 
order in Afghanistan. Such analyses might in fact reveal that boxes sexes are excluded in 
their own ways^^
Above all, this is a study of an aid intervention. In this vein, this research seeks to examine 
some of the practical implications ot theory to better understand what effects aid policies 
have in practice. Alberto Acre recognizes the “need for a sociology of development and a 
politics of social change that address the language cartography of intervention policies and 
their outcomes’’ (2000: 50). The term 'development' can be employed in diverse ways for 
strategic purposes'*®. Ferguson recognizes a distinction between development contributing 
to a modern society and development contributing to a better quality of life. Because these 
two are often conflated in aid interventions, it becomes possible to offer a technical 
response contributing to a modern society as an answer to improved quality of life. In so 
doing, a project for rubble removal becomes a port of an aid institution’s contribution to 
women'*’ . Kabeer explains it this way:
For a  thorough explanation of a  gender analysis, particularly in contlict contexts, see Mertus, J. (20001. War's 
Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenae in Bosnia. Kosovo, and Atahanistan. West Hartford, Kumarian.
For additional information, see Atshar, H. and D. Eade, Eds. (2004). Development. Women and War: Feminist 
Perspectives. Development in Practice. Oxtord, Oxfam.
^  To this end, I have opted to use ‘a id ’ instead of ‘development’ os it avoids potential pitfalls in definitions and -  
perhaps ideally -  carries less baggage in its application.
"9 Chapter V provides further details of this particular project as well as other ‘technical’ interventions.
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Development planning is nof simply a technocratic response to neutrally determined 
imperatives; it is also a process of struggle over concepts, meanings, and priorities 
and practices which themselves arise out of com peting world-views about the final 
goals of development.
(1994: 289)
It is useful to trace Afghianistan’s patti alongside Sylvia Walby’s approachies to political 
sociology as an initial understanding of ttie progressions of ‘gender’ and tiow they influence 
aid interventions (1988). She sees four phases of engagem ent with women and gender 
issues. The first phase entails the near-total neglect of gender, or the mention of women as 
an aside or footnote. This is followed by a second phase that exposes the flows and fallacies 
from the previous neglect. The third phase adds women as a special case to compensate 
for previous neglect. Afghanistan sits here in its approach. Walby elaborates that this 
approach presents women's activity as exceptional and restricts gender analysis to women 
only (1988: 217). This third phase is limited in its view of women's activity as a deviation from 
the norm. In Afghanistan, this can be represented by the media's obsession with the few 
‘gender heroines' as an antidote to the downtrodden chaddari-clad womon^o. Furthermore, 
this approach omits men as actors in gender politics "as if the existing studies take men as 
gender neutral and only women os gendered subjects" (Walby 1988: 223). Walby places her 
emphasis on patriarchal practices, but the contributions of male advocates and supporters - 
not just opponents - are crucial to advancing gender politics. Finally, the fourth phase 
represents the full theoretical integration of a gender analysis. This cannot occur until there is 
a body of empirical work that relates to both sexes. To this end, this research examines the 
gender order based on the perceptions ot both men and women as key players, with a view 
to pushing analyses of Afghanistan into the fourth phase.
1. Formulation: Theories of the Gender Order and Discourses on Women
As a socially and historically em bedded institution, the gender order must first be 
deconstructed and subsequently contextualized in Atghanistan to enable a better 
understanding of the operations of gender. In so doing, it will become apparent whether 
gender is indeed a relevant category in the Afghan context. Rostami-Povey argues critically
“  Examples of these women include Mosudo Jolol, Simo Somor, Mololoi Joyo ond others who ore populor with the 
medio -  whether they odequotely represent Atghon women or not.
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for a consideration of gender, agency, and identify -  and how these discourses intersect 
with the discourses ot class, culture, religion, and ethnicity (2007). It is these multiple identities 
-  and the way they intersect -  that was neglected in gender interventions in Atghanistan. 
Instead, a solitarist approach to identity was taken^i.
In aid parlance, the term gender is used to demonstrate commitment to women's 
empowerment and equality. However, static and technical understandings ot the term strip 
gender ot its political implications, resulting in isolationist and reductionist interpretations. In 
other words, gender becomes a politically neutralized euphemism tor women. When gender 
is conflated with women, the language ot aid becomes centered around women's 
objectives. While 'gender' is a political term, 'women' lends itself more readily to technical 
solutions. Projects that ‘add women' often toil to understand underlying power relations and 
dynamics ot social change (Atshar 2004: 1). Haleh Atshar argues tor a nuanced 
understanding ot gender, power, and politics in Islamic contexts. Fatima Mernissi has long 
challenged assumptions ot women's inferiority in the Muslim world. Both Mernissi and Atshar 
are relevant in this discussion because they emphasize women's agency and indigenous 
feminisms in discussions ot gender. It is in this vein that this understanding ot the gender order 
takes place.
An analysis ot the gender order in Afghanistan's aftermath can illuminate the ways men and 
women translate "broader processes ot change into concrete gains and losses tor different 
groups ot women and men" (Kabeer 1994: 301). Such an approach contributes to an 
understanding ot the gender order by serving os a reminder that the concept is dynamic 
and varied not only between men and women, but between different types ot women. 
There is therefore a need to deconstruct the different understandings ot the gender order 
animating the aid apparatus and how these understandings have contributed to the 
formulation ot aid interventions around particular women's needs.
An understanding ot the Afghan historical trajectory -  particularly regarding gender politics -  
could illuminate patterns and problems that might pose obstacles in present attempts to 
restructure the gender order. Further, Kandiyoti advises that "there is no short-cut to a 
historically and sociologically informed analysis ot the socio-economic transformations and 
institutional context ot Afghan society as a backdrop tor gender analysis" (2003: 4-5). More
5’ Chapter VI elaborates on the discussion of identities.
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profound analyses of and engagement with Afghan society could prevent women from 
being addressed in a social vacuum, allowing space tor the creation ot programs that 
complement w om en’s realities.
Patriarchy and fhe Gender Order
The term gender order does not reflect a particular gender hierarchy, yet the reality in most 
countries is one ot p a t r ia r c h y 5 2 .  Atghanistan qualities as a part ot what Deniz Kandiyoti might 
refer to as the system ot classic patriarchy (1988). But Kandiyoti will also argue that it is 
insufficient to conclude that the gender order in Atghanistan is based simply on a Muslim 
model ot patriarchy. An understanding ot patriarchy is important, but other factors (such as 
class, ethnicity, and age group) may play a significant role in contextuolizing the gender 
order in Atghanistan. Patriarchy alone is an insufficient argument and could serve to 
obfuscate the agency ot both women and men. An understanding ot gender inequalities in 
their cultural, political, and social contexts is therefore essential. These contexts are not 
uniform or static, but an understanding ot these elements reveals one port ot the picture that 
was overlooked in analyses ot gender interventions in Atghanistan.
Walby also argues tor an analysis ot gender equality rooted in an understanding ot 
patriarchy in context (1990). The concept is not historically static, but changes over time and 
has a relationship with other systems ot oppression. However, Walby’s analysis ot patriarchy 
might tall short in the Afghan context as it does not fully engage with the differences in social 
positions ot women in different cultural contexts (Moghodom 1992). Contrary to common 
understandings ot patriarchy in Muslim contexts, patriarchy in Atghanistan is more tribal than 
Islamic. Tribal practices often overshadow Islam -  particularly its more enlightened messages 
on gender issues (Kamali 2003). Therefore there is a need tor a nuanced understanding ot 
power and patriarchy that shows their interconnections (Abu-Lughod 1989). Abu-Lughod 
argues in favor ot understanding wom en’s and men’s lived experiences ot patriarchy -  and 
how these change based on current political projects. Thus patriarchy -  like the gender 
order - is a political process but also influenced by political processes.
52 Sylvia Walby defines patriarchy as a  “system ot social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress 
and exploit women". Walby, S. (1990). Theorizina Patriarchy. Oxtord, Blackwell. I agree with Walby in that it is 
important to note that all men are not dominant, just as all women are not subordinate.
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The gender order opens up the opportunity to understand if the institution of patriarchy is 
valid in Afghanistan and how it manifests itself in a cultural and temporal context. For the 
purposes of this study, I aim to illuminate the dynamics of patriarchy in the Afghan context, 
while recognizing that more broadly there are many patriarchies.
Kandiyoti, Jaggar, and Walby speak to the same concerns as those of Maxine Molyneux in 
their examinations of social change in patriarchal societies, where patriarchal controls are 
being eroded by socio-economic transformation, creating what Kandiyoti calls a "favorable 
climate for the emergence of a conservative backlash against the emancipation of 
wom en” (1991: 14). She puts this in context:
In Afghanistan, where there is a strong norm of male responsibiiity for the protection 
of women in the domestic domain, these dislocations may be experienced not 
merely as econom ic disasters and humanitarian tragedies but as normative and  
moral crises that demand regulation, sometimes through violent and ideological 
means. The contradictory effects of war and displacement on age and gender 
hierarchies in households and communities both unsettling and reinforcing aspects of 
patriarchal control, have yet to be investigated.
(2005: 7)
As Kandiyoti has articulated, Afghanistan is similar to other patriarchal societies in that its 
gender order is shaped by socio-cultural f a c t o r s ^3 largely based on women’s role as keepers 
of the family honor^^. Attempts to separate women from family and community ore met with 
strong resistance. It is neither possible nor appropriate to refer only to ‘Afghan wom en’ since 
their plight is usually inextricably linked with that of their families (Barakat and Wardell 2001). 
Aid for Afghan women is perceived in the context of interrelationships (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003), 
however many aid programs in Afghanistan have focused on women by excluding men, 
thereby perpetuating an environment that has little basis in Afghan society.
An examination of the gender order also places men as a subject of analysis as they too 
have a role to play in gender order transformation. Indeed, Kabeer explains that while "the
53 In this case, socio-cultural factors refer to mobility and ability to work and earn income, amongst others. These 
factors depend on age, ethnicity, economic status, etc.
5" For more information, see Centlivres-Demont, M. (1994). Afghan Women in Peace, War, and Exile. The Politics of 
Social Transformation in Atahanistan. Iron, and Pakistan. M. Weiner and A. Banuazizi. Syracuse, Syracuse University 
Press. Dupree, N. H. (1998). Afghan Women Under the Taliban. Fundamentalism Reborn? Atahanistan and the 
Taliban. W. M a ley. London, Hurst and Co. This is further elaborated in Chapter VII.
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terminology of gender, gender roles and gender relations has been widely adopted, its 
implications have not always been fully worked through. For some, it remains just another 
word for ‘wom en’” (1994: xii). Similarly, in Afghanistan, gender has been conflated with 
women, and the language of aid programming has been oriented around wom en’s 
objectives, without a broader definition of gender. This is not unusual in the context of 
conflict and the aftermath, where, “ conceptually, there is still a great deal of confusion and 
debate about what this really means, and what are the real political and programming 
implications of a gender focus” (Jones 2004: 213)55. Political implications of a gender order 
and gender politics means that we must examine power among women and men - not just 
between them.
Walby recognizes men’s agency in gender politics in that men can advocate wom en’s 
struggles or present opposition to women articulating and acting on their interests (1997: 18). 
Jaggar would argue that wom en’s experiences differ from men’s interpretations and 
therefore that they could provide clues as to how reality might be interpreted from the 
standpoint of women. It is of value to examine the role of men, particularly in traditionally 
patriarchal societies such as Afghanistan, to better understand wom en’s agency in its social 
contexf56. Rostami-Povey argues for a need to recognize the challenges that men face -  
and men’s need fo search for new identities and redefine masculinities (2007). Building on 
these arguments, understanding m en’s perceptions provides insights to their own 
interpretations of reality and to their perceptions of how social change is received -  or 
resisted. This is at the crux of a feminist perspective on gender.
2. Interpretation: Transformation of the Gender Order
Aid is often conflated with radical social change (Hilhorst 2003). For aid agencies, their 
proclaimed target for women in Afghanistan was indeed such change. Rhetoric of wom en’s 
‘liberation’, ‘empowerment’, and other terms were used frequently to justify intervention -  an 
intervention that was fueled by the propagated discourse on Afghan women. This is further 
magnified in contexts of conflict and the aftermath where gender identities are in flux.
55 Jones elaborates on the progression of gender and contlict, explaining that gender as a  concept m ode progress 
in 1999 in changes such as the UN decision to incorporate gender advisors in peace-keeping missions and to 
'mainstream' gender programming. This was followed in 2000 by the Windhoek Declaration and later United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325. For more information, see Jones, B. D. (2004). Aid, Peace, and Justice in a  
Reordered World. Notion-Buildina Unraveled? Aid. Peace and Justice in Atahanistan. A. Donini, N. Niland and K. 
Wermester. Bloomfield, Kumarian.
55 For a discussion of these ideas in an Afghan context, see Azorboijani-Moghaddam, S. Ibid.Afghan Women on the 
Margins of the Twenty-tirst Century.
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offering space for women to access new resources and claim new roles. As Afghanistan 
moves beyond an immediate post-war situation, aid interventions become increasingly 
contlictual and contested processes, as people negotiate priorities and resource distribution 
in an effort to secure their livelihoods (Beall and Esser 2005). In the aftermath, gender- 
focused international aid can play a role in helping women achieve greater security. I do 
not doubt the sincerity in seeking to provide tor wom en’s security - political, economic, and 
social -  but interventions were hampered by inadequate understandings ot the intersection 
ot poverty, gender, power, and security
To this end, one intention ot intervention in Atghanistan tor women was to transform the 
gender order. In theory, transformation is achieved by a strategic im pact on the gender 
order, a fundamental structural change in gender relations that brings women closer to 
equitable relationships with men^s. Social change and transformation move women from an 
oppressive present to a liberated future (Jaggar 1988). Transformation is a long-term process, 
working at a deep structural level to address gender inequalities. Transformation is also more 
than an outcome; it is a non-linear process to be put in place entailing consciousness-raising 
and wom en’s agency. Indeed, the most important transformations are not simply introduced 
by aid interventions but ore being negotiated through a complex process that involves all 
those with something at stake (Ferguson 1994: 281). In theory, transformation is not a difficult 
concept to grasp. Implementing programs that raise the probability ot transformation, 
however, is not as apparent. Aid interventions themselves do not transform, per se, but they 
support or hinder wom en’s potential in achieving transformation through their policies and 
programs. For the purposes ot this research, I do not seek to measure transformation or to 
judge its success. Transformation in this case is relevant in that it was used as a discourse that 
was not m atched in p r a c t i c e ^ ’ .
Discourses are sites where meaning is constructed and contested, and power relations are 
defined (Tonkiss 1988; Karam 2000). Artificially imposed discourses are not likely to reflect 
local realities. Such discourses guide interventions, or at least illuminate their intentions. Yet 
discourses do not operate outside ot people ’s agency. People can negotiate and reshape
57 This builds on Deborah Eode’s argument in her discussion of Rwanda. Eade, D. (2004). Introduction: Peace and  
Reconstruction: Agency and Agencies. Development. Women and War: Feminist Perspectives. H. Atshar and D. 
Eade. Oxford, Oxtom.
581 use the term transformation also to represent the array of aid agency terms that have come to have similar 
meanings. Empowerment is one such term. I do not intent to imply that the two are synonymous, but they are used 
in similar ways in development rhetoric.
59 For these purposes, transformation in practice will be measured by political and technical interventions.
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discourses, although they may be forceful elements in creating people's realities (Hilhorst 
2003: 77). Discourses encompass multiple forms of social practice that incorporate concrete 
forms of knowledge, and thereby have real effects and consequences when employed (de 
Vries 1992: 84). A discourse on transformation con produce certain ideas -  whether applied 
or not -  that generate their own effects. An analysis of intervention should therefore include 
on examination of battles over the interpretation ot images and meanings that take place 
a t the interface between ‘outsiders' (aid institutions) and local groups (Villarreal 1992: 264).
In the case of women in Afghanistan, language was used as a political practice to present a 
specific picture and to achieve particular ends. There is little existing scholarship on Afghan 
women's agency at the interface between aid interventions and women's needs and 
interests. An examination of 'transformation' in practice should therefore begin with on 
examination of aid institution's statements of intent in order to explore their performative 
effects and semantic qualities (2005: 2).
The ‘Empowerment’ Act
The Afghan Women Empowerment Act of 2006^ presents a good starting point for a 
discussion of discourses animating gender interventions in Afghanistan. This ac t provides 
evidence of the above discussion, namely that certain terms can carry a moral imperative 
to act and an assumption that the action must come from the top, in this case the US 
Government.
The Empowerment Act began in January 2004 as the Afghan Women Security and Freedom 
A ct championed by US Senator Barbara Boxer. This Act authorized $300 million per year 
through 2007 and earmarked funds for the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission, and Afghan women's NGOs. Two years later, 
Barbara Boxer attem pted to revive the dormant act. She argued that President Karzai 
himself "adm itted that we are falling short on the issue of Afghan women” . She continued: 
“As we work to foster democracy in Afghanistan, we must be vigilant in ensuring that women 
take their rightful p lace in Afghan society” This bill never becam e law.
*0 For more Information, see:
httD://www.oneworld.net/external/?url=httD%3A%2F%2Fwww.democracvinactlon.ora%2Fdia%2ForoanizationsORG% 
2Ffeministmaioritv%2FcamDalan.isp%3FcamDaian KEY%3D4334%26t%3DtemDlate2.dwt 
For more Information, see www.boxer.senate.aov.
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The Act is problematic because it begins with a denial of Afghan wom en’s agency and 
assumes a moral imperative to act. It further insists that funding shall focused on the 
adherence "to international standards for wom en’s right and human rights’’ and includes a 
commitment "to disseminate information throughout Afghanistan on the rights of women 
and on international standards for human rights’’. Senator Boxer’s message was sent to me 
through a small distribution list with the following preface from an Afghan woman leader: "I 
hope on the Afghan side this humanitarian money is spent wisely and efficiently in the right 
spots for the right reason".
It is not unusual for empowerment discourses -  not unlike the ac t - to reveal an assumption 
that empowerment is a top-down effort (Parpart 2002: 50). This approach, combined with 
contradictions in the discourse, could inevitably lead to difficulties in implementation. 
Indeed, implementing empowerment is often less clear, despite its triumph at the level of 
d i s c o u r s e 62. Kabeer explains that there is no agreement on the meaning of the term. Despite 
its centrality to the concept of power, the term is frequently used in a way that strips it of 
political meaning (Kabeer 1994: 224). Indeed, empowerment has achieved buzzword status, 
making it increasingly more slippery to put into practice. David Mosse elaborates that such 
strategically or politically useful ideas often lock conceptual clarity and are challenging to 
put into practice (2005: 15-16). And yet, such buzzwords frame solutions, giving aid policies a 
sense of purpose and suggesting a world that can be neatly repaired through technical 
solutions (Cornwall and Brock 2005: iii). In Afghanistan, technical interventions were applied 
to address political and structural issues, further masking social problems. Technical 
interventions allow little room for Afghan feminists advocating for structural change in their 
own contexts.
The discourse of technical interventions - and the buzzwords that animate them -  are not 
neutral. These buzzwords assume meaning as they are employed in policies which then 
influence how the aid apparatus understands what it is doing -  and why it has a moral 
imperative to do it. The agenda for transformation brings such a responsibility, and provides 
the legitimacy that the apparatus needs in order to intervene. The empowerment discourse 
mysteriously becomes stripped of politics and power -  its core values -  and assumes a
1^ 2 Much has been written on discourses of development. For example, see Gasper, D. and R. Apthorpe (1996). 
Discourse Analysis and Policy Discourse. Arguing Development Policy: Frames and Discourses. D. Gasper and R. 
Apthorpe. London, Frank Cass. Grillo, R. and R. Stirrat (1997). Discourses of Development: Anthropological 
Perspectives. Oxford, Berg. Gardner, K. and D. Lewis (2000). "Dominant Paradigms Overturned or 'Business os Usual'? 
Development Discourse and the White Paper on International Development." Critiaue of Anthropology 20(1): 15-29.
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depoliticized aid identity ttia t no one can disagree withes. The term is then negotiated and 
operationalized in different ways in different settings. In so doing, it is further stripped of any 
understanding of, or engagement with, the local contexts in which it is applied.
The empowerment discourse can be seen as emanating from the ‘rights-based 
developm ent’ agenda^ where empowerment is defined as an awareness that one is a 
subject of rights with a capacity  to ac t on the world and change it to benefit individuals, 
collectives, and society (Molyneux and Lazar 2003: 9). However, elements of this discourse 
are contested on the grounds that they are seen as a Western imposition and an act of 
moral imperialism, further representing an individualistic worldview that counters the 
collective identities of patriarchal societies (Molyneux and Lazar 2003: 2). I agree with 
Molyneux that the language of rights is not created or owned by the ‘West’ (2007). However, 
this perception holds much weight in Afghanistan, based largely on the means by which the 
‘rights’ message has been delivered. Many theorists have argued this point, particularly in 
the Afghan context with the link between ‘liberation’ of women and the War on Terror. Vron 
Ware aptly states that "the notion that wom en’s rights could be delivered by stealth 
bombers along with the funding of high profile initiatives requires extra careful scrutiny’’ 
(2006).
It can be argued that Orientalismes is at play when the West views the Eastern woman, 
building on the view that this discourse denies the agency of the ‘Third World wom an’ 
(Mohanty 2003; Whitlock 2005). Chandra Mohanty further calls for on examination of the 
political implications of Western strategies and principles though the eyes of Third World 
women (2003: 21). The rights agenda is not easily put into practice, and runs the risk of failure 
when translated into action if it is not contextualized. The rights discourse needs to undergo 
adaptation and translation in context os a first step to ensuring that local priorities are 
represented. This does not comprise its underlying principle of equality. On the contrary, it 
offers a more solid foundation for indigenous movements.
63 Cornwall and Brock also argue, in the vein of Foucault, that the word 'discourse' itself has achieved buzzword 
status. For more information, see various works by Foucault and Cornwall, A. and K. Brock (2005). Beyond Buzzwords: 
"Poverty Reduction", "Participation" and "Empowerment" in Development Policy. Overarching Concerns Proaromme 
Paper Number 10. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
6^ Molyneux and Lazar present a  thorough evolution of the ‘rights-based’ discourse, explaining its origins in the 1990s 
as an effort to repoliticize the rights discourse tor women, representing the difference between proclaiming rights 
and actually exercising them. For more information, see Molyneux, M. and S. Lazar (2003). Doing the Rights Thina: 
Rights-based Development and Latin American NGOs. London, ITDG Publishing.
65 This term was first coined by Edward Said. Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. New York, Vintage.
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In Afghanistan, there is no hegemonic aid discourse^^, per se, but some perspectives hove 
becom e more powerful than others, leaving little room for alternative (perhaps indigenous) 
discourses on women. The discourse on women in Afghanistan suggested that aid 
interventions would transform Afghan women from their position of subjugation to 
‘em powerment’ and ‘liberation’ . Implicit In this message is the idea that women are 
‘prevented’ from achieving aid because of socio-cultural constraints, as if it were simply a 
matter of changing attitudes and values (Ferguson 1994: 58). Such a perspective denies 
indigenous forms of agency, leaving women no role in their own ‘empowerment’ . It is 
problematic to assume that Afghan women need to be liberated, developed, and 
empowered. Images of Afghan women as victims serve a strategic purpose for various 
actors but tell little about women's realities, serving only to dislocate them as historical and 
political actors<^7 Further, in Islamic contexts, international pressure exerts influence on 
gender priorities and policies (Kandiyoti 1991), making it difficult for women to demonstrate 
agency in a context of pre-determined international opinion about the status of women in 
Islam.
An Afghan Feminism
Global feminisms are not alien importations but ore responsive to issues women face within 
their own contexts, evolving when there is recognition of circumstances, norms, institutions 
and traditions that are detrimental to wom en’s lives -  and a desire to create alternatives 
(Narayan 1997: 12-3). Afghan women hove struggled and negotiated the various 
fluctuations in their social status throughout history, using long-established mechanisms to 
achieve gains on their own terms. Feminism did not need to be imported; it has a long history 
in Afghanistan (Rawi 2004). Afghan feminism seeks firstly to distance itself from a Western 
feminist model. Although the underlying principles ore the some, a link to Western feminism 
could appear to be a cooptation by the aid-occupation, thereby undermining Afghan 
wom en’s long struggle. Furthermore, Atghan feminists view their battle as being against male 
domination os well as imperial domination (Rostami-Povey 2007).
I borrow this term from Hilhorst, D. (2003). The Real World of NGOs: Discourses. Diversity and P^veiopment. London, 
Zed Books.
The hegemonic geopolitical discourse on Afghanistan has been primarily American. It can be argued that images 
of Afghan women os victims serve various political projects such os the American offensive against the Taliban, and  
the aid apparatus' quest for funding -  and legitimacy.
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Most Afghan women have never been militant activists but their appearance of public 
passivity often masks a private persuasiveness (Dupree 1990: 129). Interviews conducted with 
Afghan women activists for the book Women of fhe Afghan War include several comments 
that represent the views of many. Fatana asserts: "We need support from... organizations... 
But nobody can use us. We are very strong women. We are not stupid" (Ellis 2000: 193). Her 
views are not unique. In my experience, Afghan women -  even those who were in the most 
dire of circumstances -  had similar things to say. I also heard Sajida’s sentiments repeated on 
numerous occasions: "People write about Afghan women being oppressed but because 
you are here you can see that Afghan women also fight back" (Ellis 2000: 217). Other 
literature also points to the strength of Afghan women, for example Chekeba: "With a veil on 
her head, no Afghan woman has ever stopped herself from letting her voice be heard, and 
frequently is it she who has the last word" (Delloye 2003: 158).
Afghan feminism -  perhaps not labeled as such - is indeed responding to the conditions of 
Afghan w o m e n ^ s .  Narayan speaks to the idea of ‘Third World' feminism as something 
indigenous to those countries (1997). Jaggar elaborates: "Whether or not they call 
themselves feminist, innumerable groups outside the West are currently working to promote 
what Molyneux calls wom en’s ‘gender interests’" (1998: 18). In so doing, Afghan women are 
exercising agency -  despite the aid apparatus' inability to recognize it as such.
3. Implementation: Technical or Political Interventions
The phrase ‘gender and developm ent’ (GAD) evolved from a focus on its acronym 
predecessor, WID (‘women in d e v e l o p m e n t ’ ) ^9. The focus on WID can be credited to its 
founding mother, Esther Boserup, in her 1970 work that brings women into economic 
development (1970). Gains have been made in the early days of the WID discourse, 
however, since its onset the discourse has also:
... continued fo create a colonized poor and marginalized woman who needed fo
be m anaged and educated; whose capacity  for work and local decision making
needed building; and who needed to be controlled reproductively and sexually
*8 RAWA, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, is an oft-cited example of on Afghan feminist 
movement fwww.rawa.orai although there ore many others.
*91 hove elected to ovoid use of the WID/GAD collection of acronyms, opting instead for less loaded ferminology. 
However, they deserve a  brief explanation here os they present relevant background to the evolution of the 
discourse.
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fhrough a series of development interventions designed for ‘wom en’s 
empowerment'.
(Harcourt 2005: 43)
For these purposes, however, the WID/GAD distinction presents on interesting point of entry 
into the discussion on technical and political interventions. In a criticism of WID, Kabeer 
argues that “WID advocacy was grounded in a theory of 'irrational' prejudice and sex-role 
stereotypes when what was needed was a theory of male power and conflicting gender 
interests" (1994: 37-8). I will argue that aid interventions for women in Afghanistan have 
progressed much along the same lines as the evolution of WID and GAD - only backwards. 
Afghanistan began with a GAD-centered discourse, but resulted in WID-style 
implementation. A WID-style implementation is more conducive to technical solutions and a 
standardized aid package -  the ideal scenario for an aid intervention.
Molyneux’s work on strategic and practical gender interests^o ottered an initial framework to 
examine implementation of gender policies in light of intent. Practical interests address 
conditions of daily life (1985), while strategic interests are those aiming to “ transform social 
relations in order to enhance women's position and to secure a more lasting repositioning of 
women within the gender order and within society at large” (1998: 75). Strategic and 
practical interests are not in opposition to each other. Indeed, Molyneux articulates that 
practical interests can be the basis for political transformation (1998: 78). Kate Young refers 
to this as transformatory potential (1993)7'. However, this is difficult to measure as it requires 
women themselves to transform practical interventions into strategic gains. Practical interests 
rest on the assumption that there is compliance with the existing gender order, while 
strategic interests explicitly question that order (Molyneux 1998: 78).
While Molyneux's framework has value, it has been criticized. Beneria argues that the 
distinction sidelines women's diverse survival strategies, labeling them as un-feminist because 
they do not directly address feminist concerns (2003). Rostami-Povey advocates for a 
nuanced understanding of the strategic and practical distinction, demonstrating through 
her research on women in Iran that access to resources can indirectly bring women closer to
70 It Is essential to moke ttie distinction between gender interests and w om en’s interests. Women's interests do not 
necessarily reflect gender issues, wtiile gender interests are ttiose arising from ftie social relations and positioning of 
the sexes, therefore pertaining to both men and women. Molyneux, M . (1998). Analysing Women’s Movements. 
Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy. C. Jackson and R. Pearson. London, Routledge.
7' For more information on the practical needs approach to transformation, see Alvarez, S. E. ( 19901. Enaenderina 
Democracy in Brazil : Women's Movements in Politics. Princeton, Princeton UP.
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gender equality. Iranian women found empowerment through their varied survival strategies 
(Rostami-Povey 2005).
Molyneux’s framework might be too rigid for Afghanistan because it might obfuscate such 
forms of empowerment. Equating strategic gender interests with transformation may work in 
theory, but such formulations will have their limits when applied to the Afghan context. In 
Afghanistan and other aftermath contexts, aid interventions focused initially on practical 
needs. The discrepancy in Afghanistan is between the rhetoric (strategic) and the 
implementation (practical). There has therefore been a gap between observed needs and 
planned responses (Stockton 2004) for women. Although interventions rarely challenge 
existing patterns of power (Mosse 2005: 19), implementation should at least attem pt to 
reflect the intent -  transformation of the gender order. This measure may not be applicable 
to Afghan realities in its current form, however it presented a useful starting point for analysis 
and an opportunity to engage with a concept that originates from a Wesfern ‘gender and 
developm enf agenda and to test its relevance in another context.
I subsequently elected to make a distinction between political and technical interventions. 
Political issues can include women's strategic interests, addressing structural issues and 
transforming the gender order to bring it closer to equality. As Ferguson explains, politics is 
about the distribution of power -  resources and influence -  and understanding who gets 
what, when, and how (1994). Technical interventions, on the other hand, are apolitical. They 
dangerously ignore the political nature of gender issues and shy away from confronting 
imbalances of power. The aid apparatus Is equipped to provide technical solutions, 
although such inputs are less likely to achieve transformation. Whether the intent is technical 
or political, aid interventions are always received as a political tool -  with a political 
message.
In Afghanistan, political and technical gender interventions need to work in tandem in order 
to instigate longer-term strategic change in gender relations. Jo Beall's analysis of Colombia 
and South Africa reinforces this, demonstrating that
Advancing gender equality demands striking a balance between the essentially 
political project of ensuring women's social and econom ic participation and political 
representation, and the more technical project o f institutionalizing or mainstreaming 
a gender perspective in policy and practice.
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(1998: 530)
As this research seeks to demonstrate, there are possible consequences in prioritizing one 
over the other. An understanding of the distinction betv/een technical and political 
interventions helps to unpack the tension between policies which seek to distribute resources 
in ways that preserve and reinforce inequalities and those seeking to challenge inequalities 
(Kabeer 1994: 91). This distinction is more apparent in theory than in practice, yet it serves as 
a starting point to measure actual implementation in light of intent^^ y^is research is in line 
with Mosse's argument that aid interventions are not necessarily driven by policy intent. In 
fact, interventions might very well be concealed by policy, leaving actors to maintain 
“coherent representations regardless of events” (Mosse 2005: 2). Therefore, the identification 
and implementation of inferests is highly polificol and should be seen within a larger context 
of social change, one in which aid agencies are both products of, and actors in, particular 
political processes. Rostami-Povey explains it well:
Women’s rights issues have become depolificized and have been hijacked... In this 
context, everybody and everything responsible for gender equality in Afghanistan 
equates to nobody and nothing being responsible for putting wom en’s interests and  
experiences of injustice on the political agenda.
(2007: 138)
The gendered effects of aid policy and practice cannot be divorced trom the operations of 
aid institutions. There is an increased risk that aid interventions will have unanticipated effects 
when policy rhetoric does not match actual implementation. Gender-focused aid policy in 
Afghanistan employed a discourse of transformation, using terminology associated with 
political and structural issues with the goal ot encouraging social change and redressing 
gender inequalities. However, implementation of those policies focused on meeting 
practical needs through technical interventions, such as initiatives to rectify gender 
imbalances in education and employment.
72 Molyneux’s framework has been operationalized by Caroline Moser, who incorporated practical and strategic 
needs into gender program planning. For present purposes and following Kate Young (1993), I will refer to strategic 
interests and practical needs. For more information on the concept ot needs and interests, see Jonasdottir, A. G. 
(1988). On the Concept ot Interest, Women’s Interests, and the Limitations ot Interest Theory. The Political Interests ot 
Gender: Develooina Theory and Research with a  Feminist Face. K. B. Jones and A. G. Jonasdottir. London, Sage.
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There is no agreed-upon measure of transformation or progress for women in Afghanistan. 
From the perspective ot the international media, the chaddari has often token on a symbolic 
role os the barometer ot social change. Yet the chaddari, or any act ot veiling, must not be 
contused with, or made to stand tor, lock ot wom en’s agency (Abu-Lughod 2002: 786). In 
current discussions on Afghanistan, generalizations on the ‘situation ot women' often refer 
unconstructively to visible transformations - prevalence ot veil or chaddari, or meetings ot 
men and women - over institutional changes such as laws and improvement in status 
(Centlivres-Demont 1994). Preliminary conversations with Afghan women^^ suggest that 
gender inequalities have not been rectified by engagement in aid activities as they had 
expected, based on aid rhetoric. The promise ot transformation, os it were, did not 
materialize as women hod anticipated. In tact, these women were quite vocal about what 
they saw as a deteriorating situation regarding gender equality. They expressed concern 
about the high-profile focus trom aid agencies and the media, and felt that facile analyses 
regarding the chaddari and their low social status were misguided and did not reflect 
Afghan realities.
The framework ot political and technical interventions is applicable to Afghanistan in that it 
allows space tor strategic examination ot existing aid interventions with regard to the goal ot 
addressing social and gender inequalities (Wieringa 1994; Rowlands 1998). This framework 
helps to reveal the ways in which wom en’s interests and needs were formulated and 
subsequently implemented by aid institutions with a view to what they say and measuring it 
against what they do. Further, this is Ferguson’s dichotomy that is also recognizable trom 
gender literature as explored by Moser, Molyneux, and o th e rs ^ -» . This research does not 
intend to be wedded to this theoretical construct. It is therefore more important to 
understand how Afghan women -  and different groups ot Afghan women - define 
transformation and what it is they hope to see transformed.
4. Unintended Effects
Similar to any aid activities, gender interventions may produce significant unintended 
consequences tor women and tor the gender order. Kondiyoti reinforces this point.
73 Within the NGO I worked with, many discussions were held regarding Afghan wom en’s perceptions ot their lives 
after conflict and their participation in development activities. The program supported over 3000 women during its 
first year of operation (2002-2003).
7" As one example, see Moser, C. O. N. and F. C. Clark, Eds. (2001). Victims. Perpetrators or Actors? Gender. Armed 
Conflict and Political Violence. London. Zed Books.
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articulating that socioeconomic transformation and state policy aggravates and reproduces 
gender inequalities (1991). Kabeer calls development a “ purposeful project" that entails 
“unacknoNATledged assumptions and unanticipated outcomes” (1994: 69). Intervention is a 
non-linear, socially constructed and negotiated process with unintended consequences, 
including the responses of those who "may struggle to define and defend their own social 
spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the wider power field” (Long and Long 1992: 
37). As Ferguson’s case study demonstrates, these "side effects” of aid endeavors, emerging 
regardless of the aims and strategies of aid institutions, may be significant enough to 
overwhelm the intended effects of the intervention (1994). An examination of aid 
intervenfions could reveal an attem pt at social transformation, carrying both negative and 
positive connotations (Kabeer 1994: 70). It is therefore important to study aid interventions in 
practice ethnographically using both the analysis of everyday practices and discursive 
constructions (Gupta 1995).
Anthropologist Norman Long distinguishes between two types of approach used in aid 
interventions to initiate social change: the improvement approach and the transformation 
approach. The transformation approach attempts to establish new forms of social 
organization, making a radical break with existing systems (1977). He explains the disconnect 
between policy and its effects this way:
There is no one-to-one relationship between policy commitment and the actual 
consequences of policy. This is most strikingly the case with the attempts a t 
implementing a transformation approach, which generally spawns a large number of 
apparently unintended consequences.
(1977: 183-4)
Long also presents a useful tool for a sociological analysis of structural change, based on 
"focusing upon the critical points of intersection between different levels of social order 
where conflicts of value and social inferest are most likely to occur” (1984: 177). These 
junctures, labeled ‘intertaces’ by Long, are found where "outside agencies intervene in 
order to implement a particular development policy or programme” (1984: 177). There are 
several interfaces at play in Afghanistan. In turn, these interfaces can yield unanticipated 
effects. One such unanticipated effect can emerge from gender-focused interventions 
when they fail to address gender issues, focusing only on women. The neglect of men in aid 
programming is an area of concern as transforming the gender order entails a focus on both
44
women and men. Local gender ideologies are already on unstable ground in the aftermath 
of conflict -  gender interventions notwithstanding. Gender interventions could further 
exacerbate this instability, presenting a challenge to Afghan forms ot patriarchy. It is in this 
vein that I argue for a re-onimation of gender in the Afghan context.
Gender interventions create and work with particular discourses, as has been previously 
illustrated. Studying gender and aid discourses in practice can help to explain how these 
discourses operate in everyday situations and how they order social relationships in local 
communities -  intentionally or not (Hilhorst 2003: 80). The difference between on aid 
discourse and an academ ic discourse, according to Ferguson, is that the academ ic 
discourse is historically contextualized (1994). Therefore, on exploration of the effects of 
discourses should contextuolize the social experiences of Afghan women and men. This is a 
particular challenge in Afghanistan, where rhetoric has taken precedence over meaningful 
interventions (Niland 2004), particularly for women (Clark 2004). Further, the supply-driven, 
technical nature ot projects hove focused on outputs over im pact (Leader and Atmar 2004). 
Such formulations hove varied effects on the gender order.
Interventions deny Afghan women's agency by promoting the discourse of externally-driven 
transformation. The assumption is that Afghan women are unable to act on their own behalf. 
Facile analyses of women as "vulnerable individuals living in a vacuum may eventually 
isolate rather than reintegrate women" (Azorbaijani-Moghaddam 2004: 103). Despite the 
discourse, this research seeks to reveal the manifestations of Afghan wom en’s agency.
Creating an artificial divide between technical and political interventions could result in 
unexpected social outcomes. It is difficult to isolate factors and determine which aspect of 
implementation produced particular effects. The separation of aid intervention into 
implementation and effects is an oversimplification of a highly complex set of processes that 
can only be understood in context. It is possible only to illuminate the different paths that 
may have led to certain effects. Aid policy-makers and policy implementors therefore have 
a key role to play, not only in how they interpret wom en’s needs and interests, but also in the 
ways in which they choose to bring these needs and interests to fruition through programs.
In the few existing analyses, there is little consensus on the effects of gender-focused aid on 
transformation of the gender order in Afghanistan. Rostami-Povey notes the consciousness- 
raising that took place during the Afghan conflict, with women organizing around gender-
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related survival strategies and, in ttie process, becoming aware of more gender-specific 
concerns (2004: 172). According to Rostami-Povey, aid in Afgtianistan for women has moved 
from a focus on practical needs to strategic interests through challenging patriarchal gender 
relations (2004). However, journalist and researcher Victoria Brittain asserts that adding 
women to processes to compensate for previous neglect does little to address structural 
issues. She cites Afghanistan as a case in point, explaining that results for women have been 
"very meager" (2002: 8). In fact, "a deconstructive move which is intended to be enabling 
and radical at the theoretical level may turn out to be not only debilitating but also 
patronizing and dismissive of local understandings when it is enacted in a development 
context” (Kondiyoti 1998: 146).
According to a report on increasing women's participation, power dynamics in Afghanistan 
are negatively a ffected when aid is not distributed according to socially defined boundaries 
(Wakefield and Bauer 2005: 2). The report further cautions a recognition of the unintended 
negative effects of gender programs (2005: 7). This is particularly relevant in Afghanistan, 
where gender is a highly charged and politicized project. Definitions and perspectives 
reflect a particular political power, revealing a lack of consensus about the primary goal at 
the strategic level. At the aid level, the apparatus has defined Afghanistan’s ‘problems' in 
depoliticized terms (Leader and Atmar 2004: 175). And yet, as Afghan history demonstrates, 
gender issues (and their affiliated interventions) continue to be a highly charged sphere of 
Afghan life. As a result, aid institutions are political actors "whose actions hove political 
impacts whether they like it or not" (Leader and Atmar 2004: 181).
Unexpected effects have emerged from gender interventions because the creation of a 
particular discourse encouraged the formulation of a particular type of policy that was then 
not implemented in practice. There are therefore several probable paths -  or a combination 
of all -  that have led to these unanticipated outcomes. It is important to recognize that 
these are only partial effects; it is not possible to determine all factors that contribute to a 
certain outcome. Research can reveal select factors that may play a significant role in 
altering the gender order. Gender-focused international aid can possibly have positive 
effects on the gender order. This could be achieved in recognizing women's agency in a 
gender analysis that is historically and socially em bedded. Ideally, this entails a focus on both 
strategic interests and practical needs in gender planning. Effects may be neutral if 
interventions maintain the status quo and do not disrupt the gender order. Negative effects
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are likely when interventions extract women from their historical and political realities and 
undermine wom en’s agency.
Thus at one end of the spectrum, interventions can otter the possibility for more public roles 
for women in the aftermath, including leadership positions in organizations and government, 
at the other end, violence against women is a possible negative effect which prevents 
women from accessing opportunities presented by their engagement in aid activities. In 
analyses of the effects of aid interventions, the positive effects -  more public in nature -  tend 
to obfuscate potential negative effects, and are often used as measures ot social changers. 
The combination ot positive and negative effects could therefore hinder transformation for 
women.
Research on women in other contexts reveals that violence against women can increase in 
the a f t e r m a t h 7 6 .  | recognize the difficulties in demonstrating that increased violence against 
women may have been a possible negative effect, however it is possible that aid 
interventions created an enabling environment for such effects. Chapter VIII elaborates on 
violence in the aftermath and the challenges in obtaining accurate information. However, 
based on data in the chapters that follow, Afghan perceptions reveal that aid interventions 
may have played a role in producing these effects. Gender rhetoric coupled with the high- 
profile focus on women could be a key element in fomenting a backlash. Kandiyoti notes 
that gender-transformatory initiatives bring significant political risks, including a "hardening of 
attitudes" (2005 p. 19). Such negative changes can be understood within a context of 
patriarchal social structures (Walby 1990)77. Walby demonstrated that in industrialized, 
capitalist countries there is a shift from private to public patriarchy in that women are no 
longer restricted to domestic life but are now exploited in public structures such as the state 
and employment (1990). In Afghanistan, women face the obstacles of both public and 
private patriarchy, yet there has been significant decrease in public patriarchy since the 
ousting of the Taliban. An increase in violence against women (specifically in the form of
75 For example, In Afghanistan, women represented one-third ot the delegates in the Loya Jirga, or Grand Assembly, 
yet these women expressed concern tor their safety on the streets and at home.
75 Much ot the evidence to support this emerges trom the Bosnia example. There is extensive scholarship on this 
issue.
77 However, men ore not immune trom these social changes. The interview with General Nazari in Appendix 5 
illustrates that men are also experiencing increases in violence. In addition, violence against women by other 
women is also an unacknowledged concern. Such violence is not simply about men os perpetrators and women as 
victims.
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domestic violence and self-immolation) could connote a stiift from public to private 
patriarchy in Afghanistan's.
As one example to demonstrate thie Increase in violence, see RAWA at www.rowo.ora
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Conclusions
While understandings of patriarchy and the notions of a possible backlash present a 
common argument, Afghanistan is unique in that new forms of violence might be created. 
These arguments might tell one part of the story, however they remain insufficient. Donna 
Pankhurst speaks well to this, and emphasizes the importance of nuanced understandings 
that present a counter to simplistic assumptions (2007). A nuanced understanding would 
reveal that in many Muslim societies, "women become the marker of political goals and 
cultural identity... when power is contested" (Moghadom 1999: 174). Afghan history 
demonstrates that such politicizations of the gender order are not uncommon. However, 
there is a need to expose the possibility of an aid-driven restructuring of the gender order -  
and its effects on women in Afghanistan.
Theoretically, this research builds on the work of Ferguson, informed by Kandiyoti, Walby, 
Jaggar, Molyneux, and Rostami-Povey, placing their theories in the context ot Afghanistan’s 
aftermath with a view to examining the discourses surrounding gender-focused international 
aid. Using a historically and culturally informed analysis, I aspire not to develop 
generalizations but to contextuolize diversity (de Vries 1992: 66). This study aims not only to 
problemotize the way wom en’s interests were formulated by the aid apparatus but also to 
understand the effects of such formulations on women and men in Afghanistan.
This research is also in line with the key themes outlined in the recently-released book 
Feminisms in Development. The authors see several emerging themes that can be aligned 
with my presuppositions as stated in Chapter I. Firstly, the authors see a battle over 
interpretation, namely a struggle for interpretive power as a core element of the feminist 
engagem ent with the aid apparatus. This fits with my discussion of interpretation rooted in 
matters of agency. Secondly, the authors address how feminist intent is undermined by the 
functioning of the aid apparatus. This raises the issue of agency to address the discourse of 
transformation and the distinction between strategic interests and practical needs. Their third 
theme advocates a feminist engagement with aid as a political project. Indeed, this is the 
underlying theme of this research: an attem pt to depoliticize gender-focused aid will have 
unintended effects (Cornwall, Harrison et al. 2007:2).
Chapter III begins with an understanding of the trends, themes, and similarities that 
characterize aid and gender documents of international and national institutions. To this
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end, the point of departure for an examination ot discourses of transformation and gender in 
Afghanistan is through policy texts. This is checked against the perspectives of the policy­
makers and policy implementors charged with bringing those texts to fruition in order to 
understand the political subtexts that underpin articulations of needs and interests. Kabeer 
writes that “ for a sociol-relations framework to be useful, it is important that the institutional 
analysis of gender relations is linked to the design and evaluation of policy and planning” 
(1994: 285). This analysis is followed by the experiences and perceptions of Afghan women 
and men. It is through these perceptions that the entire aid intervention in Afghanistan is 
imagined. The effects of gender programs are a mechanism through which Afghanistan’s 
intervention is discursively constituted. Therefore, this story prioritizes Afghan women and 
men’s experiences and interpretations of their own realities in the context of the aid 
apparatus in Afghanistan’s aftermath.
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CHAPTER III: Gender Policy on Paper: Transformation In Texts
1. Trends and Ttiemes
In line with Molyneux's work, it is essential to question how for notional and international 
instruments have taken account of wom en’s needs and interests -  and to assess the extent 
to which strategic interests have become "entom bed within official doctrine" (1985: 250). In 
this vein, an investigation into policy formulation begins here with a textual analysis of aid 
and gender policy papers of the large aid institutions operating in Afghanistan. Molyneux 
expressed particular interest in the priorities allocated to the goal of wom en’s emancipation 
alongside other goals, such as econom ic development. She does not question the link 
between the two as they actually coexist, but instead problematizes the nature of the link by 
asking if wom en’s em ancipation is merely a means to achieving economic development, or 
if it exists as a goal in and of itself (1985: 250-1). Mosse also advocates an examination of 
texts os narratives defining problems and interpreting events (2005: 8). He argues for fexfs to 
be read backwards, within their own contexts, to better understand the sociology of the 
document (2005: 15). To this end, an examination of aid and gender policy texts is relevant 
to this discussion.
The following analysis begins with five aid institutions -  UNAMA, USAID, UNIFEM, UNDP, and 
the World Bank -  and an introduction to their roles in Afghanistan. These organizations were 
selected based on their roles as core members of the Advisory Group on Gender (AGG), the 
high-level body charged with supporting the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and providing 
strategic direction on all things gender in Afghanistan.
The AGG, the GAG, and the GSG
The AGG works to ensure that gender is mainstreamed across the various thematic areas of 
focus as outlined in Afghanistan’s aid in te rven tionsTh is  is guided by an "understanding of 
the different situations, needs and power relations between men and women, and the 
different impacts of policy and financial decisions on men and women" as critical for 
achieving national development goals (Ministry of Women's Affairs). The AGG furfher 
recognizes that gender comprises what is referred to as a cross-cutting concern and, to that
79 For more information, see httD://www.of/aa/aender/index.osD
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end, interventions in all sectors must be based on "systematic gender analyses and 
consideration of ttie  implications of policies, programmes and budgets on women's and 
m en’s well-being” [emptiasis added] (Ministry of Women's Affairs). In 2002, ttie Minister ot 
Women's Affairs appointed UNIFEM, UNDP, and USAID as core members of ttie group.
But ttie AGG is not new. Dupree writes about ttie composition of ttie group in 1996:
UNDP set up an advisory group on gender, it consisted of between ten and fifteen 
women, haif o f them foreigners, half Afghans. The foreigners did all the talking. Only 
when you asked one of the Afghan women a direct question would she com e forth 
with her observations. This is symptomatic o f the leadership problems.
(1996: 15)
Today, ttie AGG still consists of between ten and fifteen women. However, ttiirteen or 
fourteen of ttiem are non-Afgtian, and only one or two ore Afgtions, depending on ttie 
day®o. It is wortti noting, ttia t ttiere is no male member ot ttie Advisory Group on Gender 
[emptiasis mine]. During 2002-2003, ttiis group was referred to os ttie Gender Advisory Group 
(GAG) but was ctianged to Advisory Group on Gender (AGG) because of ttie former's 
unfavorable acronym. Ttie AGG was also referred to as ttie "Gender Nazis” by many in 
Afgtianistan's international aid apparatus.
In my capacity as ttie tiead of an international NGO, I tiad a very difficult time gaining 
access to ttiis impenetrable group. Wtien I was finally granted memberstiip, I understood 
ttia t ottier NGOs -  botti local and international -  would not be able to access ttiis group. As 
a result, I used ttie leverage I tiad to set up a parallel structure called ttie Gender Sector 
Group (GSG) in early 2003 to stiare discussions and events in ttie AGG meeting and play an 
intermediary role. Ttie GSG met ttirougti ttie Agency Coordinating Body for Afgtian Relief 
(ACBAR) and gattiered approximately 60 local and international NGOs working on women 
and gender in Afgtianistan. Since my departure from ttie aid apparatus in Afgtianistan, ttie 
GSG tias lost its link to ttie AGG and ttie  two groups no longer speak to eacti ottier.
80 This is based on personol observations and my participation in the AGG, 2002-2005.
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Themes for Analysis
Analyses of at least two ot the operating documents are presented tor each institution: the 
core aid policy paper at the onset ot the study period, and a follow up docum ent to 
examine evolution ot the discourse. An analysis ot the gender policy documents then follows. 
An exception to the time frame is m ade tor the Afghan government documents. The most 
recent aid and gender papers have been used as they represent an amalgam ot previous 
documents produced during Afghanistan's aftermath. They are also the most thorough and 
detailed documents available, and therefore they comprise the only exception to the 
requirement that papers tit within the study period.
For aid and gender documents, I examined the level ot substantial reporting on women and 
gender. I assessed the documents with a view to the presence ot gender issues -  and the 
quality ot that presence. My approach was informed by a number ot studies where aid 
policy documents have been analyzed tor their gender content or to discern their approach 
to women and gender. Beall articulates that "experience has shown that when gender 
issues are not flagged, they are subsequently missed" (1998: 238). I am further concerned 
with the extent to which gender has been ‘mainstreamed’ in the document. Despite 
rhetoric, very often gender is not a cross-cutting issue but has in tact been isolated in the 
document. It merits questioning when a claim to mainstream gender issues is substantiated 
by an isolated paragraph on gender.
Beall explains that the gender and poverty nexus forms the core ot Moser’s “anti-poverty" 
approach^' and a part ot the liberal WID discourse. This focus shifts attention trom 
transformation and wom en’s strategic gender interests (1998: 239). Such an approach could 
also result in an emphasis on women-as-victims as opposed to a focus on wom en’s agency. 
Further, this approach facilitates the creation ot technical solutions to a political problem, 
clearly designating space tor the aid intervention as the only alternative tor women. “All too 
often policy statements trom international agencies are written as it the agency itself is 
engaging trom a neutral position" (Beall 1998). Given these conditions, it becomes difficult 
tor the aid intervention to assess progress made tor women. This is usually done in terms ot 
quantity -  money spent, women trained, and so on -  in lieu ot actual improvements m ade in 
women’s lives.
8' For more information, see Moser, C. O. N. (19931. Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and  
Training. London, Routledge.
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A further contradiction entails the mention of men in so-called gender documents. In these 
cases, men are included in the document only as obstacles to wom en’s development, or 
when making negative comparisons to women (Cleaver 2002). This is problematic as it 
negates men’s roles in women’s development -  and negates the importance of their own 
development. As a result, interventions assume that gender relations and power are a zero- 
sum game, and that interventions for women should offer no alternatives for men (Cleaver 
2002: 1). Further, Mohanty argues that binary divisions between men and women are 
reinforced through facile analyses of man-as-exploiter and woman-as-exploited. These 
simplistic formulations are historically reductive and programmatically ineffectual (2003: 31).
Molyneux advocates a review of policy documents to confirm fhe shift that she has noted in 
definitions of intervention priorities. She writes of a "move away from an idenfification of their 
work as needs-based and service-driven to a more strategic [emphasis original] approach, 
in which rights issues were increasingly incorporated into their work and were given special 
relevance in work that targeted poverty’’ (Molyneux and Lazar 2003: 6). However, despite 
lofty claims to instigate social change, there were few practical applications for this shift. To 
this end, she advocates a textual analysis that includes an understanding of the presence of 
ferms like empowerment and gender in order to illuminate the extent of this intervention 
priority shift on paper. This is the approach adopted here.
Guiding questions for the textual analysis of general aid documents include:
• Is there a discussion of gender and/or women? In what context (s) ?
• What definition of gender is employed in the document?
• Is gender mainstreamed in the document or found only in isolated section(s)?
• Are women being used instrumentally in the document? Is there an emphasis on
women’s needs and interests -  or is wom en’s presence only to ensure effective
development outcomes (Beall 1998:239)?
The review of additional aid documents will examine for noticeable changes to the themes. 
The textual analysis of gender-specific documents was guided by the following:
• What definition of gender is in operation? Is there explicit mention of men? If so, is it 
only in the context of men as obstacles to wom en’s development?
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• What language accompanies use of gender and/or women (i.e. empowerment, 
rights, etc.)? Is empowerment language employed as a way to escape the anti­
poverty approach (Beall 1998)?
• Is there an assumption that ‘wom en’s problems' con be solved with technical 
solutions through aid interventions?
2. Policy Formulation: International Textual Analysis
UNAMA
Established in March 2002 through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401, UNAMA’s 
original mandate was to support the Bonn process®^. Since the conclusion of the process, 
UNAMA has moved on to provide political and strategic advice for the peace process; 
provide good offices; assist Afghanistan's government towards implementation of the 
Afghanistan Compact; promote human rights; provide technical assistance; and m anage all 
UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination 
with the government. UNAMA has two main pillars - development and politics -  within which 
issues of human rights, rule of law, police, military, gender, drugs, and legal issues are 
addressed. The UNAMA website states that:
The programme of work is determined by Afghan needs and priorities; fhe Mission 
aims a t having as many nationals as possible in posts that traditionally have been 
occupied by expatriates; capacity-building is a cardinal principle and UNAMA works 
towards the establishment of strong and sustainable Afghan institutions - in that 
context its ultimate goal is to work itself out o f a job.
UNAMA's main operating documents stem from the reports to the Secretary General on the 
situation in Afghanistan®®. These are issued three to five times per year and comprise the 
latest information on Afghanistan. The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for 
International Peace and Security: March 2002 is UNAMA's first document of this nature 
(2002). The report mokes 12 references to women, seven of which refer to “women and men 
of Afghanistan" or moke negative comparisons of women's suffering as com pared to men.
82 For more information, see httD://www.uncma-ofa.ora/
83 Ttie full fit le of ttiese reports is: Secretory-General Report to ttie UN Security Council on ttie Situation in Afgtianistan 
and its Implications for International Peace and Security. Ttiese reports con be found at: tittp://www.unam a- 
afa.ora/docs/UN-Docs.titm
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The use of the term gives little indication ot wom en’s agency and in tact places an emphasis 
on wom en’s poor condition. No mention is made, however, ot solutions to address this 
condition. Seven references are made to gender. While none ot these are in an incorrect 
context, the report refers vaguely and unconstructively to “gender issues’’ and a “gender- 
sensitive approach ’’, while tailing to define what the term might mean in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, while ‘gender issues’ are present, they appear to lack a robust definition. Further, 
use ot the term is concentrated in the paragraph on “human rights and gender issues’’ and 
not throughout the document.
The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: 
Emergency International Assistance for Peace, Normalcy and Reconstruction of War-stricken 
Afghanistan: March 2006 (United Nations 2006) is used as a comparison with its predecessor, 
to examine possible changes and evolution ot gender rhetoric. This 2006 report makes 
special mention ot women throughout, particularly in reference to their participation in 
politics and the 2005 parliamentary elections. Many references to women also form part ot 
discussions on increased violence against women and the creation ot wom en’s shelters and 
sate houses. It is worthwhile noting that this report has 18 references to women, only three ot 
which refer to “women and men’’ in general terms. In terms ot gender, the trend is reversed. 
There are three references to the term gender, two in discussions ot various UNAMA units ot 
operation (the UNAMA Gender Unit), and one making reference to “human rights and 
gender issues’’ as areas where the Afghan National Police need training. In summary, while 
the dialogue on women has matured in the tour years between these reports, the use ot the 
term gender has in tact diminished. And still, no definition or operational guidelines are 
provided on how to bring the various “gender issues’’ to fruition.
The Report of the Secretary General on the Situation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan 
(United Nations 2003), written in January 2003 and presented to the Commission on the 
Status ot Women during their 47*^  session in New York in March ot 2003, emphasizes the 
extent ot wom en’s suffering in Afghanistan. The report contains 48 references to the term 
gender and no definition ot its operation in Afghan contexts. Further, there are only six 
references to men, none ot which discuss their participation in gender-related efforts. The 
report states that it presents an overview ot “gender-related assistance” . The report makes 
five references to “gender sensitivity” , five references to “ the gender perspective” , and nine 
references to “gender mainstreaming” . It also emphasizes the importance ot a permanent
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position of "gender advisor” to ensure ttia t ttie sensitivity, perspective, and mainstreaming 
are done. Yet ttie report foils to explain w tia t ttiis means in ttie Afgtian context.
Ttie 2005 report (United Nations 2005) follows ttie same lines, making 53 references to gender 
wittiout incorporating a workable definition of the term. However, the majority of these uses 
refer to gender in the robust sense and focus the discussion on "gender and  wom en” 
(emphasis added). Other references to gender include "gender training modules” , "the 
gender perspective” , "gender task force” , "gender-sensitive amendments to law” , amongst 
others. All of these are used in the abstract, without a clear understanding of how this is to be 
put into operation. The only indication given in these documents of operationalizing these 
concepts is to incorporate the technical solution of adding women to all existing efforts and 
also isolating women os an ‘ob ject’ of aid interventions. These reports also give little 
indication of wom en’s agency in Afghanistan, implying that the presence of the aid 
institution is therefore justified as it is the only way to achieve gains for women.
USAID
According to the USAID Afghanistan web page: "To rebuild the country and com bat 
terrorism, USAID works to build a safe, stable society that meets the needs of its people and 
eliminates an environment that breeds extremism”®^. USAID efforts include improving 
agricultural productivity, seeking alternatives to poppy, promoting basic education for girls, 
and providing access to basic health care, amongst other things. It is worthwhile noting that 
each USAID initiative has its own section (comprised of approximately two paragraphs) that 
begins with a problem statement explaining that the deterioration of the sector is due to the 
Taliban. The statement is immediately followed by a detailed explanation of USAID’s efforts 
to rectify perceived Taliban damage. One such example follows:
Years of corruption, brufality and tyranny imposed by the Taliban reduced  
Afghanistan to political, econom ic and social ruin. USAID supported voter 
registration, civic and voter education programs in 29 of 34 provinces, polling, ballot 
counting, security and logistics to allow an estimated 6.84 million Afghans to cast their 
vote in the historic parliamentary elections of September 2005.
84 For more information, see httD://www.usaid.oov/iocations/asia near eost/afahonistan/
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Finally, USAID touts ttie reconstruction of 389 kilometers of ttie major Kabul-Kandatiar 
tiigtiway as an effort ttia t tias "revitalized entire v i l l a g e s ” 85. On ttie ground in Afgtianistan, 
USAID interventions are often conflated witti US government interventions, and vice versa. 
Ttie US government does include its efforts ttirougti USAID as part of its contribution to 
Afgtianistan, but for ttiese purposes, I am examining USAID interventions exclusively and 
tiave elected to keep US and USAID efforts analytically distinct.
Afghanistan's Path to Reconsfrucfion: Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress 
(Margesson 2002) of May 2002 makes nine references to women, seven of w tiicti refer to ttie 
“pligtit of women and ctiildren” in a paragraph) on Women and Ctiildren. Ttie ottier two 
references to women discuss Taliban treatment of women. Ttiere is no mention of 
constructive plans, nor any mention of gender issues. Ttie report Afghanistan Reborn: Building 
Afghan Democracy (USAID 2004), written in October of 2004, follows similar lines. Ttiis presents 
a good example of ttie use of rtietoric in aid documents, particularly regarding women. The 
report has 44 references to women, and none to gender. There is a discernable pattern 
here: USAID's ‘accomplishments' for women are each at first juxtaposed by their abuses 
under the Taliban in that specific sector. For example, according to a quote by Andrew 
Natsios, the former USAID administrator:
Afghans have already made huge advances from life under a cruel, medieval 
fheocracy that barred girls from school, kept women from public life and am putated  
limbs as punishment Today Afghanistan is a land o f bustling markets, schools filled 
with eager students and people enjoying a new birth o f freedom. We can be 
proud...
(2004: 1)
The strong use of anti-Taliban rhetoric stands out in USAID documents more than anywhere 
else. It could appear to be employed as a constant justification for US actions in Afghanistan. 
Any statement regarding Afghan women's poor condition is qualified by Taliban abuses. 
There are nine cases where wom en’s suffering under the Taliban is mentioned, five of which 
are followed with examples of USAID accomplishments to rectify the situation. One example 
of many can be found in the one-line overview on the Table of Contents page: “Afghan and
85 This controversial highway cam e up repeatedly in interviews with Atghans as an example ot a  highly-publicized 
and extremely expensive eftort that has done little to improve the daily lives of Afghans. In fact, the highway has 
achieved notoriety as a  signiticant security risk, turther restricting its use.
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Coalition forces remove Taliban, liberate women, ctiildren and minorities, and pave way tor 
return ot 3.7 million refugees” .
It is also important to note ttie frequent employment of liberation rtietoric, such os the 
heading "Freedom Arrives" to announce Afghanistan’s "liberation” from the Taliban regime. 
Thus, of 44 uses of "women", 28 address women specifically -  and constructively. The 
remainder refer to "women and men" in a general sense, wom en’s abuses and suffering, 
and "women and children" along with other vulnerable groups. The final analysis includes 
both ot these documents combined.
These points are again found in a speech by James R. Kunder, Assistant Administrator for Asia 
and the Near East, on USAID's Progress in Helping fhe People of Afghanistan made on 28 
June 2006 before the Committee on Armed Services at the US House of Representatives. 
Kunder makes four references to women: one of these states that "more and more women 
ore making their own choices about their lives" (2006: 1); another refers to the suffering of 
"women and children"; one addresses the need for training for women; and the last one 
refers to "US men and women in uniform". There are no references to gender, nor any 
concrete measures to illustrate USAID’s progress for women.
When I consulted USAID’s Afghanistan desk for their main operating documents and gender 
policies on women, I was told to look firstly to the International Women’s Day Special Report
2006, providing on overview ot USAID’s projects that are geared toward women. I was also 
told to consult the fact sheets on USAID’s midwifery program as well as their sectoral 
program sheets: democracy and governance, agriculture, alternative livelihoods, 
infrastructure, economic growth, education, and health. These fact sheets make token 
mention of women where relevant, demonstrating an effort to indeed mainstream wom en’s 
concerns across sectors.
The International Women’s Day Report states that funding for wom en’s programs in 
Afghanistan has been planned into USAID’s 2007 budget. Of the $802,800,000 requested for
2007, the report states that $76,405,000 will “directly benetit women and girls" (2006: 1). This 
ambitious figure includes the following:
$23.2 million for health programs 
$20.7 million for education programs 
$5 million for women-led NGOs
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$2 million for entrepreneurship
$10.1 million for olfernafive livelihoods
Based on previous -  largely unfavorable - evaluations of USAID’s past performance in 
Afghanistan, there is much skepticism that fhe above programs will be brought to fruition 
and that women will indeed benefit. The USAID/OTI (Office of Transitional Initiatives) gender 
evaluation presents an example ot such skepticism. I include this evaluation firstly because it 
is the most detailed ot its kind in terms ot assessing implementation ot gender interventions. 
Secondly, in my professional capacity I was asked to conduct this evaluation but was unable 
to accep t the assignment due to a repeated change ot the schedule. However, I was given 
all ot the core documents and incorporate these in the analysis that follows.
The document Evaluation of OTI's Program in Afghanistan: Focus on Gender Scope of Work 
states the following: "The volatile political and econom ic nature ot transitioning countries 
requires tost, emergency-type political responses that show immediate, visible and positive 
effects" (2005). One might argue that Afghanistan needed precisely the opposite. There are 
many contradictions in this phrase, not the least ot which is the idea that "political 
responses" can be "fast", and, even more so, that aid interventions are equipped to provide 
political solutions. The following evaluation demonstrates that USAID’s solutions are hardly 
political but are in tact technical. Further, one could easily dispute what constitutes 
"immediate, visible and positive ettects", as demonstrated by a project such os the Kabul- 
Kandahar highway.
The document states that a focus has been on “vulnerable groups, including women", and 
in this sector "OTI enables USAID to capitalize on ‘windows ot opportunity’ where quickly 
deployed aid can make a critical difference to a country’s transition to peaceful, 
democratic government" (2005). For the duration ot the OTI program -  October 2001 to June 
2005 - $46.6 million was committed ot $70 million budget tor Afghanistan projects. Carlin 
explains that 17%, or $7.9 million, ot which was tor projects "designed, to some degree, with 
women... in mind" (2005: 35). Ot the $7.9 million, $2.37 million funded construction and 
furnishings ot the Women’s Resource Centers (WRC). The Scope ot Work’s heading “Gender 
Activities" states the following:
While gender has not been articulated as an objective, OTI’s implementing partners
have made a concerted effort to include women in most major program
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components, including media, infrastructure projects, and training programs. At the 
beginning of the program, gender was not clearly identified as a major goal, but it 
increased in importance over time due to the influx o f gender-specific funds... 
Additionally, women have been incorporated into infrastructure and other projects 
unrelated to gender activities in order to improve their role in society.
(2005)
No mention was mode of analyses defining whaf women might believe to constitute an 
‘improvement’ in their role in society - or whether they sought this ‘improvement’ in the first 
place.
The Scope of Work lists several themes that guided the evaluation. Selected themes follow:
1. How did the OTI program eventually evolve to include women and women's issues, 
and why? How did OTI incorporate women's issues into projects that may not be 
friendly to women's participation, and has this had any im pact on women's roles in 
Afghan society?
2. Has there been a change in women's status and opportunities, or a t least in attitudes 
about women and how they should be treated?
3. In a culturally challenging country like Afghanistan, was OTI able to assist in the 
advancem ent of women's rights while working within the context o f a conservative 
culture? Was OTI able to be sensitive to the culture so as to work within while still 
progressing?
4. How have OTI partners addressed internal/external resistance to the inclusion of 
women? How do others perceive the gender integration efforts o f OTI partners? Is a 
focus on gender appropriate for transitional programming?
(OTI 2005)
The questions guiding the evaluation also asked what the best measure would be for success 
of their Afghanistan program. For theme (1) listed above, one must ask why the program 
“eventually evolve[d] to include women". It leaves the impression that programs for women 
were not deliberate but accidental afterthoughts. This is ironic, considering that USAID/OTI 
had a particular responsibility as it was representing the US administration who justified its 
invasion of Afghanistan with promises to “ liberate Afghan women from oppression” (Carlin 
2005: iv). Yet, Carlin’s evaluation clearly documents OTI’s capacity for “one-off 
programming” with too much focus on “ rapid” and too little on “quality” (2005: 2).
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Regarding theme (2), a change in wom en’s status proved difficult to achieve considering 
that projects lacked creativity and seem to hove arisen neither from Afghan communities 
nor from women (Carlin 2005: 19). Carlin further explains that women were not consulted 
about any aspect of the program and felt compelled to accep t the projects that were 
designed to benefit them as a fait accompli. This was compounded by the fact that “no 
coherent strategy to support Afghan females was developed by OTI to demonstrate 
consistent, nationwide US support for the women whom US forces had apparently liberated" 
(Carlin 2005: 5).
Carlin notes that OTI “did not address the longstanding cultural and... political division 
between the genders" (2005: ivjs^. She unequivocally states that “OTI would probably have 
benefited from a better understanding of Afghanistan’s social dynamics, especially gender 
issues, and then targeted its program accordingly" (2005: iv). This demonstrates the 
propensity to offer technical solutions to political problems and the tendency for elevated 
claims that could not be met through these technical solutions. Further, it was noted that 
“addressing the needs of one segmenf of the population while ignoring others might have 
hindered rather than helped the healing and transition process that OTI wanted to support" 
(Carlin 2005: 2).
Regarding resistance encountered, Carlin reports that moving from program rheforic to 
reality was extremely challenging and that the resistance was just as much from an internal 
inability to follow fhrough on commitments as from the “conservative culture” . It is interesting 
to note that the evaluation seeks to question the raison d'etre  of the gender focus, 
considering the publicity that Afghan women received and the promised commitment to 
their ‘liberation’ . One concrete example of a promise that has failed fo materialize can be 
found in the form of the Women’s Resource Centers, a highly-touted USAID initiative.
Women’s Resource Centers
Women’s Resource Centers (WRC), also known as Women’s Development Centers (WDC) by 
UNIFEM, are a joint US-Afghan initiative to create centers in each of Afghanistan’s 32 
provinces to provide a variety of services for women, including education, microfinance, 
basic health, and child care, amongst others. This effort is m anaged by the Ministry of
861 note with interest that even Carlin conflates sex and gender in this case.
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Women’s Affairs, the US-Afghan Women's Council, and USAID, along with other partners. The 
website of the US-Afghan Women’s Council states that “centers will strengthen Afghan 
wom en’s legal, economic, political and social standing and will also promote visibility at the 
local level of U.S. support’'^/.
The OTI Evaluation states that a January 2003 agreement between USAID/OTI, the Ministry ot 
Women’s Affairs, and other partners outlined the US’s agreement to support the construction 
of 14 (out of 32) WRCs. Land acquisition and land deeds dragged for months, coupled with 
bureaucratic and legal delays, issues over design and security -  the lack of a securify 
protection wall and guardhouse being a “major oversight’’ (Carlin 2005: 15). Two and a half 
years affer signing of the agreement, only a few cenfers were open. To dote, it remains 
unclear who will fund fhe resf of the construction and what will take place within the walls of 
the centers -  and if women will even use them at all®®.
Carlin explains that “some of the difficulties con be attributed to the fact that the centers 
arose os a result of discussions in Washington, not Kabul’’ (2005: 15). Further, the public focus 
on funding for the centers drained money from other -  strategic -  programming that could 
have been channeled to Afghan wom en’s own priorifies. And yet, the rhetoric reigns. The 
USAID International Women’s Day Special Report for 8 March 2006 sfafes thaf “ fifteen new 
wom en’s resource centers now offer outreach and training for women in rural provinces to 
continue boosting wom en’s social, economic, and democratic advancem ent” (2006:3).
As a member of the AGG, I was involved in discussions on the WRCs from the onset. I 
distinctly recall extensive debates over land rights and building design and a notable lack of 
discussion on potential use of existing space in order to provide immediate social services. I 
also becam e one of the lone voices arguing that more time should be spent determining 
what was to take place within the walls as opposed to what the walls themselves would look 
like. As construction delayed further, credibility was lost due to the clumsy process and the 
derailed timetable. The WRCs have been much criticized as symbolic development, 
particularly as they constitute what appears to be highly-publicized and glorified office 
space for provincial level MoWA staff under fhe guise of actual training and support centers 
for women. At time of writing in 2006, function of WRCs was still unclear.
87 For more information, see httD://usawc.state.aov/c7547.htm
88 WRCs ore located in provincial capitals and most women in ttie provinces do not tiove transportation to bring 
ttiem to ttie capitals.
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UNIFEM
The United Nations Fund for Women provides financial and technical assistance to promote 
women's human rights, political participation and econom ic security. The organization’s 
stated goal in Afghanistan is “ to increase opportunities for women that transform the 
development ot Afghanistan into a more equitable and sustainable process”®’ . The 
organization seeks to advance women's human rights and gender equality. To this end, 
UNIFEM strategies entail capacity building of various institutions, building knowledge and 
action networks, and “experimentation on the ‘how to ’ of achieving gender equality". 
UNIFEM works very closely with MoWA through “organizational development, gender 
training, research and planning in order to build its capacity  to lead, facilitate, monitor and 
support inter-ministerial work on gender mainstreaming". UNIFEM is also working with MoWA 
on establishing Women's Development Centers a t the provincial level. The website states 
that the "elimination of violence against women is a dream for every Afghan woman" and 
to this end the organization is working “ in a culturally sensitive way" to bring this dream to 
fruition.
It was with great difficulty that I obtained the UNIFEM strategy paper. The strategy was never 
com pleted and remained in draft form. The following is on excerpt from a personal 
communication with a senior UNIFEM officer about obtaining the document:
We have a strategy paper for Afghanistan. And I am tempted to give it to you but I 
do not have the authority to do so. What should we do? Should you ask [the 
director] ? Or should I give it to you and you will pro tect the identity o f the source?
The following is an analysis of UNIFEM’s never-released Promoting Women's Empowerment 
and Gender Equality in Afghanistan draft of 28 April 2004. Despite their belief that a “clear 
gender strategy" is a “critical element" for Afghan reconstruction, UNIFEM did not release this 
strategy (2004). The report addresses “ the gender community" in Afghanistan and begins 
with an introduction to the Afghan context, recognizing that, despite progress, conservatism 
is brewing. This return to patriarchy, though old and entrenched, is actually exacerbated by 
violence. UNIFEM writes that only when such conservatism is understood, respected, and
89 For more information, see httD://afahaniston.unifem.ora/
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engaged that it can be overcome. The strategy seeks to demonstrate measurable progress 
over the next four years (2004-2007) with the caveat that:
The pace o f change will remain very slow for some years; this must be accep ted  by
all. The standards by which we gauge progress must be reasonable and appropriate
for this region and in light of the history and current circumstances of Afghanistan.
(2004)
The report fails to mention what actually constitutes “ reasonable and appropriate progress” . 
The strategy then recognizes the need for a gender analysis, approaching this with a degree 
of atypical humility. The report states: “We must never forget that we as a foreign-based 
agency have more than we realize still to learn from our national colleagues and partners 
about Afghanistan, and how to get things done here” . And later in the document: 
“ Institutions will com e and go, but the people that staff them, and the public that uses them, 
will retain what they have learned” (2004).
The latter is noteworthy because it assumes that the “people that staff” these institutions are 
Afghans and therefore will remain in the country. The reality, however, is that these 
institutions are largely populated with non-Afghans, particularly in senior positions’ .^ With this 
humility, UNIFEM also advises that the government create a national gender strategy. This 
was subsequently done in early 2006 -  produced by UNIFEM and ‘offered’ to the 
government’ !. UNIFEM actually advises against performing duties in the place of the Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs, and yet their actions contradict this. UNIFEM also exercises veto power 
over things gender, leaving room for this in a line stating that national input will be sought 
“whenever possible and appropriate” (2004). One might ask under what conditions it is not 
appropriate to advocate local input and ownership.
As the document is a draft, some sections are left blank. Interestingly, the section entitled 
Outcome and Outcome Indicators is blank. A question -  presumably written by a senior 
UNIFEM staff person -  is in fhis section in bold: "Ellen’ 2 what are we going to put here? Every 
copy I have ot the draft is blank in this section” (2004). Also missing is the Logistical
90 It is worthwhile noting that the perception of other actors in the aid apparatus is that UNIFEM monopolizes the 
‘gender ag en d a ’ and has exclusive and territorial rights over the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, where all 
gender/women decision should, in principle, be m ade.
9' This ‘national gender strategy' -  the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) - will be  
discussed later in this section.
92 The name has been changed to protect identities.
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Framework. It is relevant to note that the sections left blank are precisely the ones that will 
outline how the gender strategy is to be brought to fruition. The report does emphasize the
Pressing need to gender-sensifize media NGO staff and organizations and strengthen 
their capacity  to develop gender-sensitive strategies and programmes, which take 
into account wom en’s rights and interests and promote a public consensus on 
wom en 's advancement.
(2004)
The document offers no further clarity on what this means, how to bring it to fruition, what 
constitutes a "public consensus", and why the media is the channel by which this should 
take place. The following reference to the media notes their use in monitoring changes. 
Finally, the report concludes with lip-service paid to the importance of public dissemination 
of activities. I say lip-service because this strategic plan cannot be used os a good example 
of public dissemination.
UNDP
UNDP has been present in Afghanistan since the 1950s, providing development assistance to 
the country and helping build the capacity  of notional in s t i t u t io n s ’ ^. UNDP did not cease 
operations during the Taliban regime, delivering US$200 million of assistance to the country. 
Since late 2001, UNDP has delivered more than US$600 million of assistance to Afghanistan 
organized around three pillars: State-Building and Government Support, Democratization 
and Civil Society Empowerment, and Promotion of Sustainable Livelihoods. UNDP 
acknowledges that Afghanistan is still a country in transition and is therefore at a crucial 
point in its shift to longer-term development. On gender issues, the site states that: "UNDP 
works colloborotively with all partners to empower Afghan women and promote gender 
equality in Afghanistan, ensuring that gender issues are consistently mainstreamed and 
carefully paced” .
In my search for a primary operating document, I consulted various UNDP staff, none of 
whom knew of any document that would qualify. One senior UNDP staff member explained: 
"We didn’t have time to create one when we got here. We were too busy setting up
’3 For more information, see httD://www.unciD.ora.of/about us/overview undo ofq/default.htm
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operations and trying to do somettiing." He further explained that the Country Action 
Programme would be well suited, although I could not have access to it. I have therefore 
elected to consult an array of UNDP documents to com e to on understanding of their 
engagem ent with gender.
The Note by the Adminisfrofor to the Executive Board o f the United Nations Development 
Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, Assistance to Afghanistan (2004- 
2005) provided 12 references to women, most of which referred to women in governance 
and the judicial system. Nearly half of the references to women are an afterthought, and 
others are put to use in discussing past abuses. References to gender lack a definition and 
are sprinkled throughout the document in reference to gender mainstreaming, gender 
training, gender aspects (although it was not clear what these aspects are), strategic 
gender policies, and the government's gender direction (UNDP 2003). The report 
Afghanistan: A Country on the Move provided no more clarity on UNDP’s engagement with 
gender and women. The few references to women offered no insight on program plans 
more than tokenistic mention (UNDP 2005). The UNDP Country Program for the Islamic 
Republic o f Afghanistan 2006-2008 provided many references to gender, most of which were 
gender mainstreaming. Again, it was implicit that -  while neither a workable definition of 
gender nor a plan to mainstream was provided -  aid interventions are best suited to do the 
‘mainstreaming’ -  whatever that entails.
Finding information on UNDP’s gender program plans was equally elusive. In meeting with 
the International Program Officer for Gender and Disability, she explained that no one held 
this position before she joined UNDP one year ago. There was no gender policy, but at the 
time of writing there was one in process. This was not to be a public document, however. The 
Program Officer explained that this document was her own initiative and was born from 
UNDP gender policies and "tweaked for the Afghan context’’. In the meantime, she is 
conducting Gender Awareness Workshops for all staff at UNDP (700+ staff, from cleaners to 
senior management). A gender brochure was to synthesize all of UNDP’s gender material 
and interventions and was to be available for public dissemination by late 2006. The internal 
description for the Gender Awareness Workshop follows below:
Development that is not en-gendered is developm ent that is endangered,.. In
Afghanistan, following the principles of cooperation o f the Afghan Com pact o f
February 2006, recommendations o f the UNDP gender evaluation mission of June
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2006, in keeping with the UNDP Corporate Gender Action Plan and to promote the 
achievement o f MDGs and the objectives of l-ANDS, we are making our own efforts 
to ensure gender is an integral and non-negotiable agenda a t all levels o f operations 
and programmes. This is also in line with the Afghan National Development Strategy, 
which has recognized gender as one of the critical cross cutting themes. Hence, with 
a view to making gender a “ living practice" in UNDP Afghanistan, we have designed 
a one-day workshop that will be delivered several times over the course of the next 
few months (each workshop will have about 30 participants) to ensure that all staff 
are able to participate in these one day events. Participation in these workshops is 
mandatory.
I asked a senior UNDP staff member for his thoughts on the course and he said: "They've 
mode the announcement that the course is going to happen and that seems to be enough. 
Of course it will get delayed and at the end will probably not happen". When I returned to 
that some staff member after the course to see what he felt about his experience, he 
explained that is was "UN-ese blah blah on gender relations" -  another tick-box edict they 
were compelled to absorb. He believed that -  internally -  the gender training served to 
justify the existence of the Program Officer but that it was not likely to make an im pact on 
the ground.
In the absence of a gender-focused document, the most thorough discussion of women 
and gender in Afghanistan can be found in Afghanistan's Human Development Report, 
written in 2004 and released by UNDP in early 2005 (2004). The report uses a human security 
lens to examine linkages between safety and dignity and livelihoods. The human security 
framework allows for an expanded definition of securify beyond the absence of violence to 
include the ability of Afghans to access their basic and strategic needs. The report states 
that it should be used as a measure of accountability and a tool to monitor the performance 
of the aid apparatus in Afghanistan. The report opens with a note from the president of 
Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, who begins with many paragraphs of grafitude and optimism, 
but concludes by saying that "the Government of Afghanistan may not agree with all the 
contents" of the report (2004: v).
Amidst a list of the report’s various intended audiences, one group received the strongest 
recommendation:
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International aid workers, whose contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan 
could benefit from lessons learned in other conflict and post-conflict situations. The 
historical overviews may also help development practitioners and members of the 
international community to better understand the com plicated context in which they 
work.
(2004: xiii)
One would expect the aid apparatus to arm itself with this knowledge prior to commencing 
operations in Afghanistan. Given that the report was released in Spring 2005, this 
recommendation appears slightly belated.
The report issues a strong warning on the possibility of further violence due to exacerbated 
inequalities. Gender is listed as one such inequality that has been manipulated to fuel 
conflict in the past, and could be potentially volatile in the future. The report predicts that 
interpersonal violence will increase, "especially gender-based violence, as a consequence 
of the disruption of social structures such as families and communities" (2004: 7).
A two-paragraph section on “The Plight of Afghan Women” includes select statistics and 
segments on widows and the feminization of poverty in Afghanistan. A section on "Gender 
Discrimination” begins with useful information about the context of Afghanistan’s patriarchal 
culture, male and female roles, the importance of viewing women as part of a family as 
opposed to isolated individuals, and finally the code of honor, linked to women. All of this 
information provides background for designing gender interventions. Immediately following 
this paragraph, the report lists two developments that are challenging gender roles and 
serving as catalysts for change. The first development, globalization, is opening up markets 
and media, and is channeling money to force Afghanistan to join the international 
community. Second, conflict is compelling women take on new roles as heads of household 
in absence of their customary male providers. The report states that these developments are 
expected to shift gender relations, yet it does not illustrate how this should happen within the 
Afghan context, particularly given the above explanation. It does not mention if these shifts 
are positive or negative. Finally, it does not mention if Afghan women want these shifts in the 
first place.
Also in the section on "Gender Discrimination” is a cartoon depicting two images: 
‘Yesterday’ and ’Today’. Under "Yesterday” , a man is holding up an oversized bag in his left
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hand labeled "Taliban Rights” and two small (but equally sized) bags in his right hand 
labeled "Women's Rights” and "Men's Rights” . Under "Today” , the large bag in the man's 
left hand says "Women's Rights” and the much smaller bag in the right hand says "M en’s 
Rights” . This was originally printed in a local Afghan newspaper in February 2002. The Human 
Development Report explains it this way: "According to this cartoon, many men seem to be 
threatened by the attention and funding that is being directed towards women in the post- 
Taliban period” (2004:81).
The thought ends abruptly and a new section heading begins. The report says nothing 
further on this subject. Following over 200 pages of detail -  including substantive criticism of 
the aid apparatus -  the end refers vaguely and unconstructively to "integrating a gender 
perspective" as a peace-building and conflict-prevention measure with no answer as to 
what a “gender perspective” actually entails nor how to "integrate” it (2004: 220). The UNDP 
Human Development Report for 2005 makes mention of Afghanistan in a more optimistic -  
and nearly contradictory -  light, when com pared to the Afghanistan HDR of the previous 
year. It says:
In Afghanistan there are encouraging early signs that improved human security is 
leading to opportunities for rapid recovery from the human development free fall it 
experienced during two decades o f conflic t 
(2005: 48)
The only danger, according to the report, is that the aid apparatus will lose interest and 
prematurely abandon Afghanistan.
World Bank
Afghanistan has officially been a member of the World Bank since 1955’ .^ Operations were 
suspended at the onset of Soviet occupation in 1979 and resumed in 2002. The World Bonk 
works closely with the Afghan government and administers the multi-donor Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the mechanism for coordinating funding of reconstruction 
activities. According to the website, over US$852 million has been contributed to the ARTF by
9" For more information, see
httD://web.worldbank.ora/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0..menuPK:305990~Daa 
ePK:i4i 159~DiPK:141110~theSitePK:305985.00.html
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24 donors. Since April of 2002, the World Bonk has financed 19 projects, committing 
approximately US$893.2 million. The World Bank's Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) directly 
supports the government’s National Development Framework and focuses on livelihoods, 
fiscal strategy, governance and public administration, and private sector development. The 
World Bank is also the largest international funder of the National Solidarity Program (NSP)’ .^
Afghanistan’s Transitional Support Strategy was presented by the World Bank on 12 March 
2002. It remains the primary operating document tor the World Bank’s engagement in 
Afghanistan. The document makes 32 references to women, more than halt of which do not 
refer to women deliberately. These include references to ‘women and children’ or ‘women 
and men’ in general discussions of Afghans. The uses of the term gender do not represent a 
contextualized understanding and lack any definition of the term. More often than not, the 
term is used in place of sex, tor instances in the case of "gender gaps in social indicators’’ 
(2002: 4). The report refers sporadically to wom en’s “vulnerable" status and to their suffering 
under the Taliban. Beyond language referring to “gender imbalances” and the subsequent 
need tor “special attention" to be paid to women, there is little reference as to how to rectify 
imbalances. There is commitment that “ the [World] Bank will undertake analytical work in 
gender as well as civil service reform issues" (2002: 18) but there is no understanding of what 
those “ issues" actually mean and what purpose the “analytical work" will subsequently 
serve.
In 2004, the World Bank produced another tome on Afghanistan, this time focusing 
exclusively on the economic situation in the country. Women were relatively well integrated 
throughout the Country Economic Report when compared to the Transitional Support 
Strategy. In addition, several special sections were dedicated to gender and women. In a 
large boxed text entitled “Gender in Afghanistan -  A Politicized Issue", the document made 
the following astute comments:
There are serious impediments to ‘gender mainstreaming’ in national reconstruction 
and development, including limited awareness of what it means, how to apply it, 
and who to draw upon for support. With gender issues having been highly politicized
95 NSP was conceived os the ‘em powerment’ program, and yet it has been met with skepticism and resistance, 
along with the suspicion that it is "a ‘foreign’ and anti-lslamic program which aims at religious conversion and  
abolition ot traditional Afghan values especially concerning women and family”. Boesen, I. (2004). From Subjects to 
Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Program (NSP). Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit (AREU).
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during the past 100 years, soliciting or addressing the interests of women runs the risk, 
once again, o f being seen as an imposed ‘Western’ agenda running counter to local 
traditions. In order to garner significant public support for policies and promoting 
gender equity, the discourse needs to be shifted from the religious to the social 
domain -  and such policies must be seen as not running counter to Islam. The 
challenge can only be m et through close collaboration with religious and legal 
experts, with professionals in line ministries, and civil society organizations across 
various sectors of society. The voice and initiative for making improvements needs to 
come from women (and men) within Afghan society.
(2004: 14)
The report continues to raise salient gender and wom en’s issues throughout the document as 
well as in additional special sections such as a focus on agriculture and the gender division 
of labor, the particular challenges of female-headed households, and the role of women in 
revitalizing the economy. This report is included because it makes an unusual break from 
previous World Bank rhetoric. This document was written by a senior World Bank professional - 
an American man with a long-running interest in Afghanistan, extensive experience in the 
country over a 30-year period, and fluency in Dari. Further, during the author’s first 
experience in Afghanistan in the early 1970s, he met and married an Afghan woman. It 
would not be far-fetched to assume that the author’s contextualized understanding of the 
country and the people and his prolonged engagement in Afghanistan contributed to a 
better report.
The World Bank’s Country Gender Assessment, prepared in March 2005, actually states that it 
is "not a policy docum ent’’ and advises that “ the challenge now is to formulate policies’’ 
(2005: viii) -  a slightly belated strategy. The report is a self-proclaimed synthesis of existing 
information with mention of "gender-responsive actions’’ that could be taken (2005: xii). It 
then proceeds to outline the status of women in Afghanistan by sector (such as health, 
education, etc.) in terms of history, recent progress, existing efforts, and challenges. The 
analysis of the economic sector concludes with the following: “The traditional role of women 
in Afghanistan is a constraint to their more equitable participation in economic activities" 
(2005: xiv). That may be true on some levels, but Afghan women might argue otherwise as 
they prefer to operate within their "traditional roles’’.
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The report presents a history of wom en’s rights entitled "The Gender Context" in which the 
fluctuation of w om en’s issues is presented. Absent is the relevance of this history lesson in 
present-day engagem ent with women in Afghanistan. The report further states that the 
"core strategy for wom en’s advancem ent is defined as ’gender” ’ (2005: 3). The text abruptly 
cuts and resumes in the next paragraph with a lengthy quote from the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs on "gender equality". The former thought is incomplete, perhaps indicating an 
omission on the author’s part. Still, it ominously reflects the vague nature of the term as it is 
used in such documents and the inability to define it effectively. It is not until page 99 (of a 
128-page document) that a definition of gender is presented.
There are 203 references to gender, of which:
4 refer to ’mainstreaming’
46 address disparities, discrepancies, gaps, discrimination, inequalities 
13 refer to gender roles 
10 refer to gender relations 
23 references to gender should be ’sex’
1 refers to "gender apartheid" (in the context of the US discourse)
Excluding the 23 references that should be ‘sex’, the remaining 180 references to gender are 
not incorrect, but they lack substance and a clear understanding of the term. There is little 
evidence of wom en’s agency throughout the document. The discussions surrounding 
disparities, gaps, and inequalities leave the reader with the assumption that technical 
solutions will ’solve’ these ’problems’ 6^,
3. Policy Formulation: Afghan Textual Analysis
The Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
The Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (l-ANDS) is the Afghan government’s 
strategy for promoting growth and reducing poverty. It provides the framework for
96 It is also worth noting that the author of this report prevented a  World Bonk working paper I had produced (at the 
request of the World Bonk Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit) from being published because she 
disagreed with the report's criticisms of the aid apparatus. She further questioned the extent to which the 
"perceptions" of 121 Afghan women and men could reflect reality. The manager who commissioned my report told 
me to seek publication elsewhere os he was "unable to go against the World Bonk gender establishment" although 
he said he "liked the paper" and found it to be "a different approach with interesting insights not raised in most 
gender work" (personal communication, July 2007).
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government policies and determines ttie allocation of resources. In 2006, ttie l-ANDS was 
beginning to undergo a process of consultations. The com pleted document - AMDS - will 
then becom e Afghanistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The l-ANDS also 
demonstrates the government's commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
as it adapts and integrates MDG targets "to the specific context and priorities of 
Afghanistan, [striking] a balance between ambition and realism" (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2005).
The l-ANDS is the most extensive and detailed government document in Afghanistan to 
date. It is superior to its predecessors -  the National Development Framework and Securing 
Afghanistan’s Future -  because the government acknowledges their hasty preparation "with 
the result that consultation was hurried, and many individuals within ministries (and beyond) 
are not aware of them or acting on them" (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005).
There are 90 references to gender in the core of the document (154 pages). I did not 
analyze the annexes or the consolidated program summaries as this would be redundant 
with the main document. Some of the 90 references conflate gender with sex (i.e. in use of 
"gender disaggregated data"). The others refer vaguely and unconstructively to gender 
terms without providing useful definitions. Examples include:
Gender mainstreaming 
Gender perspective 
Gender-related concerns 
Gender-responsive approach 
Gender training 
Gender analysis
Gender is one of five cross-cutting issues: gender equity; counter narcotics; regional 
cooperation; anti-corruption; and the environment. Gender issues appear to be fairly well 
mainstreamed throughout the document, although there is a sense that these are 
strategically sprinkled where they might seem to be necessary. Gender is not linked to 
empowerment, in fac t the latter term only occurs in the context of econom ic empowerment 
(six coses). The 139 references to women mostly include them in the context of other 
vulnerable groups. The document does not acknowledge Afghan women's agency. The
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sense is that women are present in the document to ensure development gains across the 
various sectors. The wom en’s com ponent of the l-ANDS is the National Action Plan.
The National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan
The National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA) is a 10-year strategy that 
describes itself as the vehicle for implementing the Constitution as well as the international 
instruments to which Afghanistan is a party9^ . NAPWA is one of a series of Afghan 
government documents that "fosters wom en’s empowerment and equality between 
women and men’’ (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2006: 8)9®. NAPWA is the means by which 
the strategies and commitments made in the l-ANDS for women will be brought to fruition 
and implemented. To this end, it aims to present a series of achievable and measurable 
goals for women by sector. Or so it was explained to me.
I was part of a small team of four non-Afghan women tasked with writing the Action Plan’s 
Executive Summary and full document. In working on the National Action Plan for Women in 
Afghanistan, an Afghan gender s p e c ia l is t ^ ’  shared the following feedback in a personal 
email after having reviewed the draft document:
The NAPWA... is in some danger of coming across as very Western and top-down 
through the foregrounding o f international instruments and concepts. This just means that 
there should be some care in the way NAPWA is presented. For example:
• Relevance to Afghans and Afghan values needs to be clear from the very 
beginning rather than later otherwise we worry that the NAPWA would be too 
easily dismissed in early stages and not read through.
• Western-friendly concepts like ‘equal rights’ are harder to justify among some 
Afghans because they would immediately dismiss it as impossible, as the Koran 
specifies particular and different rights for men and women.
• Focus on wom en’s issues sidelines men, yet they are the main group that must be 
convinced to make space for women. The benefits, ethnical/legal/religious
’7 These instruments include the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA).
’8 Examples cited include The Bonn Agreement, Berlin Plan ot Action, Afghan Constitution, Afghanistan Compact, 
and l-ANDS. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2006). Interim National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan: 
Executive Summary. Kabul, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
99 She was the only Afghan participant in that stage ot the process, tasked with editing the document.
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imperatives, and concessions relevant to men should be highlighted where 
possible in the NAPWA's introductory chapters.
And on a particular section of NAPWA that recommended a more equitable distribution of 
labor, she said:
The ideal presented in this is pretty far off from what is currently possible in 
Afghanistan I think. Women working hits male honor hard, and suggesting that men 
take over household duties is adding insult to injury, I think, although the final idea 
that parenting support should be provided for both men and women is good. Any 
way o f getting to the final inclusive point by some other route?
In an electronic discussion on the NAPWA (and similar documents) building on the above 
communication, two international gender specialists had the following to say:
Specialist 1: Totally agree that men are feeling sidelined by the focus on women's 
issues, and perhaps many women are feeling alienated by the Western rhetoric that 
accompanies work with women. I am personally wary o f use of the word “gender", 
as this has become synonymous with “women" (even for development practitioners 
who should know better!}. Further, this term doesn’t translate into Dari and has fallen 
into serious misuse!
Specialist 2: Yeah! I’ve been noticing the same expectation problem more generally 
as a problem with donors, in that they have not adequately m anaged expectations 
through the media. We seem to share a lot of gripes about the aid process, but 
seems like we are the only ones!
The full NAPWA is currently undergoing consultations and was expected to be com pleted in 
early 2007. The guiding document is the Executive Summary. This 21-page document gives a 
full overview of the different chapters as well as the process of consultation and 
implementation.
The NAPWA Executive Summary includes 66 references to gender, of which:
’00 This text is a  verbatim personal communication between myself and an Afghan woman gender specialist and  
editor of the NAPWA on 10 February 2006.
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14 refer to equality/equity 
3 refer fo mainstreaming 
6 refer fo gender “ issues"
3 refer to gender "policy framework”
6 refer fo gender units and advisors 
3 refer fo "the gender perspective"
The NAPWA mokes 166 references fo women (as would be expected) and 21 references fo 
men, nearly half of which are used fo make negative comparisons. The document also 
includes 11 references fo empowerment language and a strong focus on a human rights 
discourse throughout. Again, the NAPWA is intended fo be a plan fo guide concrete actions. 
It is an ideal document fo conclude the textual analysis because it leaves no alternative 
beyond that ot aid intervention to rectify imbalances and bring equality. Through the 
NAPWA, it is made clear that only the aid apparatus can bring 'liberation' to Afghan 
women, and that this ‘liberation’ can only come in the form ot technical solutions that 
constitute the standard package ot interventions.
4. Analysis
This section provides a composite and comparative analysis ot the documents reviewed. For 
the table below, the first column lists the number ot times ‘wom en’ has been used in the 
document. I consider only the main text and not other uses that might be redundant (i.e. 
Table ot Contents). The next column contains the percentage ot its uses as a stand-alone 
concept. This means that I have eliminated the following:
• Use ot "women and men ot Afghanistan" in general terms
• Use ot women to moke negative comparisons with men in reference to social 
indicators, such os "wom en’s life expectancy is tar lower than men"
• Use ot "women and children" among a list ot so-called vulnerable groups
• Use ot women as an afterthought, often between parentheses, such as: (including 
women)
To this end, the second column identities the number ot times ‘wom en’ is referred to 
deliberately.
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The third column lists the number of uses of the term ‘gender'. Following a similar process to 
the one above, the fourth column calculates the percentage of uses of gender in its 
accurate form, not including:
• Use of gender to mean women, such as gender-disaggregated data
• Use of gender as an afterthought
• Use of gender in incorrect context
• Failure to define ‘gender’ and/or a sense that there has been an obligatory sprinkling
of the term throughout the document
Finally, the documents are ranked according to a three-tiered system. This ranking is further 
reinforced by the percentages in columns two and four, as follows:
Low: 1 -33%
Medium: 34-67%
High: 68-100%
Flowever, the numbers and percentages are not intended to be a rigid measure. These are 
not as important as the messages that can be gleaned from these documents. Thus the 
ranking is based more heavily on the conditions below:
Low entails use of the words ‘wom en’ and ‘gender’ but no or limited understanding of the 
meanings and how to bring it to fruition. This category also entails a lack of contextualized 
analysis for women and gender yet heavy use of gender-related rhetoric. The terms 
‘wom en’ and ‘gender’ occur in a tokenistic sense. Further, there is little or no mention of 
Afghan women's agency.
Medium includes a brief discussion of the terms and a limited understanding of women and 
gender concerns. However, this category represents those documents that lack concrete 
planning as to how to bring gender issues to fruition in program plans.
High demonstrates a solid understanding of gender and wom en’s issues. The terms are used 
in relevant contexts - in particular gender is used in the robust sense of the word, including 
definitions. This category suggests a direction for programs and concrete action to be taken. 
It also represents a contextualized understanding of gender in Afghanistan.
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Ranking Aid Documents
Document # of times
‘women’
mentioned
Of wtiicti, 
% used as 
stand­
alone
# of times
‘gender’
mentioned
Of which, % 
used
accurately
Ranking
UNAMA: Situation in 
Afghanistan 2002
12 42% 7 100% LOW
USAID: Afghanistan’s 
Path to
Reconstruction & 
Afghanistan Reborn
53 53% 0 0 LOW
UNDP: Assistance to 
Afghanistan
12 66% 19 95% MED
World Bank: TSS 32 33% 11 100% LOW
Afghan Government: 
l-ANDS
139 67% 90 77% MED
The difference between these two tables is that there is no need to count uses ot women as 
it is assumed that the use ot the term is abundant. The content and relevance ot the terms 
are therefore ot greater interest. Gender as a term is included in the count however, 
because this is a contentious word that sometimes eludes definition in such documents.
For the analysis ot gender documents, UNIFEM and UNDP are considered one entity 
because, as it was explained to me in a personal communication by a senior UNIFEM official:
UNIFEM operates independently (in terms of programs) but UNDP access its expertise 
(for freell!) on gender. Logistically and funding wise, we are under UNDP system. But 
they charge us for the services... whenever we need it.
And how it was explained to me by the Gender Focal Point at UNDP:
UNDP is the parent. We are doing gender - and women. UNIFEM is a part of UNDP, 
but they are doing only women. Yes, there is collaboration sometimes. We are trying 
to work together on some things.
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Ranking Gender Documents
Document # of times
‘gender’
mentioned
Of wtiich, % used 
accurately
Definition?
Context?
Ranking
UNAMA: Situation ot 
Women and Girls 2003
48 100% No
No
LOW
USAID: International 
Women’s Day Report
0 0 No
No
LOW
UNIFEM: Gender 
Strategy
77 100% Yes
Yes
MED
UNDP: not available
World Bank: CGA 203 89% Yes (late in 
document) 
Yes (late in 
document)
MED
Afghan Government: 
NAPWA
66 100% No
No
LOW
Conclusions
This analysis of texts from reputable institutions in Afghanistan is used to illustrate the similarities 
in the discourse and the pervasive extent ot this particular discourse. The texts share a tew 
key commonalities. First, they otter no definitions tor terms used, or on understanding ot the 
application ot these terms in Afghanistan. Practical applications are notably absent, making 
it challenging tor gender to translate from paper to practice. Gender issues might be 
sprinkled strategically throughout the documents, as in the case ot UNAMA and UNDP, but 
the value is lost and mention is largely tokenistic.
Next, they otter no recognition ot Afghan agency but instead leave room to justify their own 
existence by problematizing ‘the women issue’ in a way where the only solution is an aid 
intervention. The rhetoric uses gender terminology but reflects a women-in-development 
approach. In this case, wom en’s empowerment is a means to achieve economic 
development. l-ANDS and USAID in particular use this approach. A parallel can be made 
between textual references to gender and agency and Walby’s progression ot engagement 
with gender issues from Chapter II. I extend this approach to address men’s issues in gender 
programming using a five-phased process. The first phase, near neglect, sees men only as
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perpetrators, and therefore women as victims. The second phase exposes the previous 
neglect, addressing men as obstacles to wom en’s development. The third phase entails 
engagem ent with men only to advance wom en’s interests. The fourth phase is that of 
exceptions: men who are advocates and supporters of wom en’s issues. Finally, full 
integration of men -  the fifth phase - entails working with men in their own right. Most of the 
texts sit in Phase One. Only NAPWA and UNAMA have evolved to Phase Two. None of the 
texts have moved beyond Phase Two.
The documents all frame wom en’s issues as social problems, stripping them of any political 
content. And yet the texts all promise transformation that they cannot deliver on. Proposed 
transformation is not met by real interventions. Strategic interests are not em bedded in the 
texts and only receive lip service without practical applications, such as the documents of 
UNIFEM and UNAMA. USAID’s focus is on technical solutions with outcomes that are quick 
and visible (to US taxpayers). All of the documents treat mainstreaming as a technical 
project well suited for aid interventions. Similar to Molyneux’s analysis in Yemen, institutions 
attempting to transform "operated with a limited conception of what this would entail’’, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter (1991: 251). This discourse marks another step on the 
journey that constructed an image of Afghan women. In this step, Afghan wom en’s 
problems are framed as social, enabling aid institutions to create a situation to fit their 
standardized solutions (Ferguson 1994).
In the case of Afghanistan, it was not difficult to find the image that necessitated an 
intervention. Calls for ‘liberation’ were quickly met with technical packages of aid institutions. 
An academ ic discourse, on the other hand, might not have created the space for such 
packages. An examination of the academ ic discourses might have revealed Afghan 
wom en’s historic ability to ac t on their own behalf. The lines between the academ ic and 
development discourses are blurred in practice, but the purpose is to reveal gaps in the 
development discourse that might have been found in the academ ic discourse (Ferguson 
1994). It might be worthwhile speculating on the following: If an academ ic discourse had  
prevailed in Afghanistan, would there have been room for a gender-focused aid  
intervention and public support for the ‘liberation’ of Afghan women?
The following chapter addresses the specific discourses and discussions on women in 
Afghanistan that were employed during the period of study and that served to animate the 
aid apparatus. The chapter begins with an understanding of the ‘liberation’ rhetoric
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employed in the media and popular literature. This is tested against the perceptions of 40 
workshop participants and tinally compared with Afghan men and women's own 
perspectives on those perceptions. As Beall aptly states, “ the real potential for promoting 
wom en’s empowerment and advancing gender equity lies in its practice" (1998: 235). Thus, 
this textual analysis and the following analysis of discourses and images take the discussion 
closer to an examination of policy implementation and policy etfects.
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CHAPTER IV: Discourses, Discussions, Images, and Perceptions
1. International Perceptions
For the next couple o f years, the words econom ic development and  reform danced  
on a lot o f lips in Kabul.,. For a while, a sense of rejuvenation and purpose swept 
across the land. People spoke o f wom en’s rights and modern technology.
(Hosseini 2003: 38)
The above was written in reference to the mid-1970s, one ot the many periods of attem pted 
"econom ic development and reform" in Afghan history, where women's rights became a 
particular imperative before they were once again stripped away. The textual analysis of the 
previous chapter revealed discontinuities in analyses and assessments of the condition of 
Afghan women and how best to ‘em power’ them. The following discussion reveals how the 
concept of 'liberation' has been used in the media, focusing on how it has played a similar 
role in forming images of Afghan women.
In Arjun Appaduroi's article, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, he 
uses the term 'mediascapes' to define "image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips 
of reality" through which scripts of imagined lives can be born, helping to constitute 
narratives of the 'other' (1990: xii). Appodurai coins the term 'ideoscape' to define a 
concentration of images with political implications. Ideoscapes have to do with ideologies 
and typically employ ideas such as 'freedom' and 'dem ocracy' that feed into the Euro- 
American master-narrative. In this sense, mediascapes and their more powerful brethren 
ideoscapes join forces to tell a story about Afghan women, a story that is transmitted through 
the mass media and subsequently through literature. It is this story that gains prominence, 
promoting an ideoscape that leaves no room for alternatives, no room for Afghan voices. 
This ideoscape thus becomes the master-narrative.
'Liberation' and the M edia Narrative
Researcher Barbara Ehrenreich aptly stated that "women's rights may play no part in US 
foreign policy, but we should perhaps be grateful that they have at least been important 
enough to deploy in the media mobilization for war" (2003: 77). Indeed, the media plays a 
central role in drawing attention to or ignoring a conflict -  or certain aspects of a conflict.
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Afghanistan appeared to present an exception to the belief fhaf gender issues are sidelined 
in conflicfs and the aftermath -  at least at the level of rheforic (Kandiyofi 2005: 1). Media 
atfention forms an impression fhaf influences the way aid institutions approach gender issues 
in conflict and its aftermath (Mertus 2000: 19). Afghanistan presents a particularly interesting 
case in this regard. Analyses of fhe media surrounding fhe sifuafion of Afghan women 
revealed a particular rhetoric that informed public percepfion, which in turn informed the 
design of aid interventions for Afghan women. Particular images of Afghan women in the 
media have served different purposes a t various stages of conflict and aftermath. During 
conflict, Afghan women were portrayed as victims of a chaddari-obsessed archaic 
patriarchal order. In the immediate aftermath, Afghan women were believed to have 
eagerly em braced their (Western-bestowed) gift of liberafion.
On 3 December 2001, BusinessWeek magazine released a special issue on Afghanistan. The 
cover photo showed a young Afghan woman, face revealed, and wearing a large smile. 
The word "LIBERATION” was wriften across the top of her head in capifal letfers. The capfion 
read: "The US vicfory is a defining momenf -  for the Afghan people, for Western values, and 
for fhe cause of moderafion in the Muslim world. Will we all seize the opportunity?" 
(Nussboum 2001). However, alternative reports question journalists’ accounts of ‘liberated’ 
Afghanistan, stating that journalists falsely reporfed mass removal of fhe chaddari, os if 
"unveiling was fhe main preoccupation... For anyone who knew Afghanistan at all, it was 
impossible to imagine women rushing to uncover their faces (Clark 2004: 92). Nonefheless, 
Business Week Magazine’s opening arficle wrifes of the "major victory for Western humanist 
values” , describing it thus: "The scenes of joy in fhe sfreefs of Kabul evoke nothing less than 
the images of Paris liberafed from fhe Nazis. Women taking to the streets to bask in the 
Afghan sun, free at last to show their faces...” (Nussbaum 2001)’°’ .
The aufhor continued to describe the liberation moment as one that encompasses "human 
freedom”, stafing: "If fhis is seen by some as American hegemony, so be it” . The author 
continues to explain that “ the battle for Afghanisfan changes the nature of the debate. 
Women are either free or not free” (Nussbaum 2001). The aufhor frequenfly conflafes 
Afghanisfan with Arab countries. The repeated reference fo Afghanistan as part of fhe 
"Arab World” and even as part of the "Middle East” is both erroneous from a geographic
’O' Whitlock also wrote of the ‘liberation’ of Kabul in 2001, stating that journalists deliberately sought out -  and often 
crafted -  images of women removing chaddaris and men shaving beards. Whitlock calls this “public unveiling" a  
reaffirmation of the Western image ot the passive Afghan woman awaiting liberation as opposed to an active 
agent in history. Whitlock, G. (2005). 'The Skin of the Burqa: Recent Life Narratives from Afahanistan." Bioaraohv 28(11.
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perspective and careless from an anthropological perspective. There remains an underlying 
hostility among many Afghans regarding Arab involvement in their c o u n t r y ’ 02. This geo­
political oversight did not bode well with Afghans and reflected a poor knowledge of the 
context. This was further exacerbated by the reference to Afghans as "Afghanis". While this 
may appear to be a common mistake, even the briefest time spent in Afghanistan will reveal 
that Afghani is the currency. The people are undoubtedly Afghan.
Several other articles appeared, all reinforcing the "liberation" perspective from different 
angles. One actually sites "the Muslim reaction" os if fhere might actually be a uniform 
perspective across the very diverse Muslim world. A further article reinforces the significance 
of liberation to the United States, stating that "these scenes of liberation provide a 
psychological boost to the US and its allies as they wage the war on terror" (Wolczak, Crock 
et al. 2001). The article goes on to state that the US plans to maintain a low profile and use 
"Islamic peacemaking contingents and international aid groups" at the figurative frontlines. 
It becomes apparent that the liberation is really about the US with the following conclusion: 
"What remains to be seen is whether all that energy will translate into the kind of sustained 
aid that would put Afghanistan back on its feet -  and boost Washington’s credibility in a 
largely hostile world" (Wolczak, Crock et al. 2001).
The situation of Afghan women was at that time an effective tactic to manipulate public 
opinion in the Western world (2002: 97), although the sudden feigned devotion to Afghan 
women on the part of the aid apparatus was political instrumentalization. Activists noted 
that Afghan women had been neglected for years, only to be discussed on exotic list serves 
and forlorn internet petitions (Ehrenreich 2003: 77), the most notorious of which, from a 
student at Brandeis University in the United States, was the first introduction that many 
American feminists and activists had to the 'situation of Afghan w o m e n ’ | received the 
petition 17 times from different sources in a period of two months in 1999. Excerpts from the 
petition follow below:
The Taliban's War on Women:
'02 This statement is based not only on Afghan sentiments but also on my personal experience as an Arab working in 
Afghanistan. Knowledge of my ethnic origins was very often met with suspicion if not outright hostility. This subsided 
as soon os I explained my tenuous links to the Arab world and my commitment to an Afghanistan without the 
influence of foreign forces and ideals.
'03 For more information, please see: httD://urbanleaends.about.com/librarv/blafahan.htm
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...The government of Afghanistan Is waging a war upon women. [List of Taliban 
offenses]... It is a t the point where the term human rights violations' have becom e an 
understatement... Everyone has a right to a tolerable human existence, even if they 
are women in a Muslim country in a part o f the world that Americans do not 
understand. If we can threaten military force in Kosovo in the name of human rights 
for the sake of ethnic Albanians, Americans can certainly express peaceful outrage 
at the oppression, murder and injustice committed against women by the Taliban. 
STATEMENT: In signing this, we agree that the current treatment of women in 
Afghanistan is completely UNACCEPTABLE and deserves support and action by the 
people of the United States and the U.S. Government and that the current situation 
overseas will not be tolerated. Women's Rights is not a small issue anywhere and it is 
UNACCEPTABLE for women in 1998 to be treated as sub-human and so much as 
property. Equality and human decency is a RIGHT not a freedom, whether one lives 
in Afghanistan or the United States.
In challenging the Saving Amina petition, Joggor criticized the "sensational language to 
denounce some non-western culture for its inhumane treatment of women and girls” , 
explaining that such protest letters perpetuate negative stereotypes about Islam, inflame 
local sentiments and put those at risk in further danger (2004: 2)'o^. A parallel can be made 
to the Brandeis letter, yet there was no challenge or clarification received on this occasion.
Following the peaks of public interest generated by the petition and, years later, Afghan 
wom en’s subsequent ‘liberation’, the m edia’s interest in Afghanistan -  and the cause- 
celebre of Afghan women -  becam e limited to press-worthy events. Previous media 
analyses of the change in media focus on Afghan women through different periods of time 
indicated that press attention abated from late 2001 until discussions of the Afghan 
Constitution and the Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights were proposed in October 2003 (Sultan 
2005: 31). This attention was short-lived. Afghan women again hardly appeared in the media 
until the following year for the presidential election ot October 2004. There was silence yet 
again for another year, until the parliamentary election of September 2005. And, 
predictably, without the anticipation of major events where women's participation can be 
showcased, the media will pay even less attention to Afghan women in the foreseeable
Amina Lowol is o Nigerian wom an who hod a  baby outside of marriage and was sentenced to stoning. For a  
fuller discussion of the petition and letter, see Jaggar, A. M. (2004). "Saving Amina" Global Justice for Women and  
Intercultural Dialogue, University of Colorado at Boulder.
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future. A senior gender officer for an international institution reinforced this point, arguing 
that the aid apparatus has the responsibility to correct images that appear in the media that 
give the impression "that Afghan women are now emancipated and ‘de-bourka'ed’ 
through international intervention [and therefore] can be forgotten -  again” .
The presence ot a tew ‘liberated’ Afghan women in the media add to the dichotomy 
between ‘victim ized’ and ‘em powered’ women -  likely negating each other (Mohanty 2003: 
248). The media has been periodically peppered with images and stereotypes about 
Afghan women -  particularly in the context ot Islam -  since the tall ot Kabul in September 
1996. In tact, images ot Afghanistan are not unusual. At varying periods in history, depending 
on the current political project underway, Afghans have been regarded as resistance 
fighters, bellicose warlords, and much in between. Such varied perceptions undoubtedly 
influence policy, especially regarding the degree to which the aid apparatus senses an 
obligation to ‘save’ A f g h a n i s t a n T h e  majority of those interviewed expressed strong views 
about media images. An international aid worker in Afghanistan explained: "The media has 
played a huge role in shaping people’s perceptions ot the plight ot women in Afghanistan. 
For most, this is the only exposure that people have to Afghanistan” .
A gender advisor with an international institution had the following to say on the subject:
I guess if we say that media and donor portrayals of Afghan women are negative it is 
in part because we conflate those portrayals with all Afghan women which is in itself 
a problem. I think aid agencies and the media must walk a very fine line between 
depicting the struggles that so many women face on a daily basis and portraying 
Afghan women as helpless victims, often of a barbaric culture. This seems to push 
women into a corner of defending themselves or their culture, religion, nation. That’s 
a tough place to be in and one which seems to happen in many places.
Media attention -  even it inaccurate -  can serve a strategic purpose. Attention can 
generate interest and funding tor particular causes. According to the senior gender officer 
ot a UN agency:
’05 For additional information on ttiis concept, please see Donini, A., N. Niland, et al., Eds. (2004). Nation-Building 
Unraveled? Aid. Peace and Justice in Afatianistan. Bloomfield, Kumorion, Smillie, I. and L. Minear (2004). Ttie Charity 
of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a  Calculating World. Bloomfield, Kumorion Press, Inc.
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The less there is a focus on women's crisis, the less direct funding there is for women  
specifically. Without the horrors of the Taliban presence, less attention is paid to the 
progress being made by women and the support needed for that to continue. It is 
more or less business as usual, with some exceptions... The media definitely played on 
the image o f the bourka, raising a lot of awareness about and sympathy for their 
situation. A t the same time, women were portrayed only as victims, anonymous, 
hidden away. They were rarely portrayed with the kind of strength and courage that 
they really have, despite the bourka. As a result, some of the assistance offered them  
may not have been appropriate.
A further question to be explored below is what the implications might be tor those who do 
not receive media and donor attention and how they seek out their own ways -  positive or 
negative -  to rectify these externally-imposed imbalances.
Literature on Afghan Women
It is possible to track the global feminist discourse -  a part ot the discourse that was 
employed tor Afghan women -  through an analysis ot popular television and print media 
discourses (Mohanty 2003: 237-8). The various contributions to the literature on Afghan 
women also provide ample opportunity tor analysis and an interesting starting point to the 
discussion. A brief and somewhat crude analysis ot books on Afghan women since 2002 
revealed an outcom e that reinforces previously stated concerns with media misconceptions.
In an interview with a senior gender advisor tor an international institution, she explained that 
the discourses and images employed by aid institutions and the media are "typical” and 
should not come as a surprise. She elaborated:
This is orientalism and this is racism... The media has to have shorthand ways because 
it has a short time to convince anybody o f anything. I think it is kind of inevitable. I 
remember talking to the PR person in [the NGO] because I had argued as a policy 
that we would not show images o f women in bourkas. I mean they can be in the 
background but this is not the dominant image. And she said to me 'But how else will 
we know that they're Afghan?' And I said ‘But look a t those pictures of women from 
Bosnia, from Iraq. You ca n 't tell that that Bosnian woman is not from Iraq and that 
she's not from Kosovo and that she's not from Afghanistan because they all look
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pretty much the same’. I think it's also the need to have symbols that are very easily 
translatable.
Book covers also rely on symbols that are “easily translatable" in order to entice readers. 
These books perpetuate images which may have certain eftects. In a brief analysis of books 
using A m a z o n a s  the search engine, and “Afghanistan" and "women" as the terms, 715 
books emerged. As I began my search, I noticed a collection of book covers with images of 
women in chaddaris. I thus narrowed my search to books focused exclusively on Afghan 
women with a chaddari on the cover'o? After I com pleted my search, I noticed that I was 
not the only one concerned about the use of such images ot Afghan women.
Gillian Whitlock had also conducted an analysis of books on Afghan women, inspired by her 
visit to an airport bookstore, noting that "these texts are carefully positioned to project the 
gender apartheid imposed by Islamic fundamentalism towards a receptive [read: Western] 
market" (2005: 64). Whitlock states that these life narratives are specifically geared tor a US 
market, and tor American women in particular. "To pull Western eyes under the burqa in this 
way is a powerful rhetorical strategy; it elicits both sympathy and advocacy that can be put 
to quite different political and strategic uses" (2005: 55). The crux of Whitlock's argument is 
that these auto-ethnographies are put to use as propaganda to justify a military intervention 
with the surface objective of 'liberating' Afghan women from the oppressive clutches of 
Islamic fundamentalism (2005: 56). Many parallels have been made concerning the 
cooptation of Afghan women for the War on T e r r o r
The majority of books found in the search make mention of Afghan women rather than 
focusing exclusively on them. Therefore, this section begins with a brief description of some of 
these references. Frequent references to Afghan women include discussions of their ‘inferior 
status', their abuse under the Taliban, their shared oppression along with other Muslim 
women, and US President George Bush's successful 'liberation' of the women of Afghanistan. 
For example. Off with Their Heads: Traitors, Crooks, and Obstructionists in American Politics,
'0* I used the American version of Amozon, found ot www.omozon.com.
’071 did not include resulting books on Afghoniston thot did not provide o cover imoge, nor did I include ony of the 
myriod books on ‘the situotion of Muslim wom en'. Mony of these books hove provocotive titles obout Islom, veiling, 
etc. I olso omitted published reports os these com e without o cover imoge ond ore generolly produced for the oid 
opporotus or ocodemio. While this seorch yielded 715 books, not oil of these ore exclusive to Atghon women. They 
moke mention of Afghon women, but ore not necessorily devoted exclusively to the subject.
’ 08 For other exemples, see Shopiro, A. (2004). Gender ond the Wor on Terror; Portnerships, Security ond Women in 
Afghoniston, Americon University. Wore, V. (2006). Info-Wor ond the Politics of Feminist Curiosity: Exploring New  
Fromeworks for Feminist Interculturol Studies, Gender Institute, London School of Economics.
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Media, and Business asks: "Why do so few pay attention to the wonderful work the United 
States has done in treeing the women ot Afghanistan from subjugation?” (Morris 2004: 147). 
This is followed by another popular misconception: "In Afghanistan women threw oft their 
burqas when American forces arrived” (LeVine, Mortensen et al. 2003: 57).
Other books reinforce the image ot Afghan women as victims. The Mobilization of Shame: A 
World View of Human Rights states that “among all the horror stories about the degradation 
ot women around the world, the abuse ot females in Afghanistan has a special p lace” 
(Drinan and Drinan 2001: 44). The book Faith in Conflict: Christian integrity in a Multicultural 
World refers to the "savage repression ot women in Afghanistan” (Ramachandra 1999: 43). 
Similarly, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help 
discusses "subordinate women (tor instance, in Afghanistan)” , (Weiss and Collins 2000: 138). 
Another author, Katrina Vanden Heuvel, asks: "Are there any people on earth more 
wretched than the women ot Afghanistan?” (Heuvel 2002: 164).
Finally, the most frequently reoccurring reference to Afghan women comes from a quote by 
Kipling, containing a rather different image:
When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains.
And the women come out to cu t up what remains.
Just roll to your rifle and blow out your brains.
And go to your God like a soldier^^.
This presents an entirely different image ot Afghan women -  as that ot savages who, like their 
Afghan brothers, have tendencies to be ruthless butchers with a strong distaste tor foreigners. 
What follows are but a tew ot the books on women in Afghanistan. They were selected 
because they represent a sample ot the literature that focuses on Afghan women.
Latifa's story. My Forbidden Face: Growing Up Under the Taliban: A Young Woman's Story, 
presents a cover image ot a woman in a chaddari with a close up ot the mesh in the front 
(Latita 2001). Harriet Logan’s book also uses a similar image. These detailed photographs ot 
the mesh covering over the eyes indicate that the book will bring the reader as close as 
possible to Afghan women (2002). These books use images and provocative titles to entice
’09 This poem, written by Rudyard Kipling, can be found in numerous books. It is available in full text here: 
httD://whltewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/K/KiDlinaRudvard/verse/volumeXI/vounabritishsoldier.html
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the reader with a verbal ‘unveiling’ and much-desired view of the ‘forbidden faces' of 
Afghan women.
Some of the available books present women with chaddaris partially removed, in a 
seemingly willing effort to reveal themselves. One such example is Three Women of Herat: A 
Memoir of Life, Love and Friendship in Afghanistan (Doubleday 2006). The book’s cover 
shows a woman peeking out tenuously from beneath the chaddari, and covering her mouth 
with her chaddan-envelopped hand.
The Story o f My Life: An Afghan Girl on the Other Side o f the Sky is about an Afghan girl living 
in the suburbs of Chicago (Ahmedi and Ansary 2005). This presents an interesting contrast 
because the cover depicts an unveiled Afghan woman, presumably revealing what she 
looks like on the "other side’’ (read: the ‘unveiled’ side, further read: the West). The Book of 
Trouble: A Romance is also an atypical example (Ann Marlowe 2006). While the title does 
little to reveal its Afghan focus, the book is actually a love story about an American woman 
and an Afghan man. The cover photograph depicts an unveiled woman (from mouth and 
below) enveloped in what appears to be Afghan fabrics, leaving the reader to assume that 
any engagement between American and Afghan equals ‘trouble’.
Finally, a large part of the books on Afghan women present a full image of the chaddari, or 
several chaddaris. Zoya's Story: An Afghan Woman's Struggle for Freedom (Follain and 
Cristofari 2002) does just that, as does The Silenced Cry: One Woman’s Diary o f a Journey to 
Afghanistan by Ana Tortajada, with its lone white chaddari on the cover (2004).
Jon Goodwin’s Price o f Honor: Muslim Women Lift the Veil o f Silence on the Islamic World 
presents the reader with three chaddaris, and is a focal point for a discussion on images and 
stereotypes. Just like Narayan’s use of particular non-academ ic texts for her book Dislocating 
Cultures, I profile Goodwin’s book because “ it seems to have had a more significant public 
presence and influence than most ‘‘academ ic ’’ writing, and not because there are no 
"scholarly’’ examples of these same problems’’ (1997: 106). The Price of Honor not only uses 
the image of the chaddari to entice the reader, but also employs the concept of honor -  a 
sacred institution in Afghanistan -  as something that comes with ‘a price’. Goodwin’s book 
opens with a chapter entitled "Fundamentally Different?’’ where she recounts the story of her 
inspiration to write the book, Maria, an Afghan refugee she encountered in Pakistan. Maria’s
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story is one of abuse, forced marriage, and a series of tortures. Goodwin is thus inspired to 
embark on her research to ‘unveil’ the mysteries behind the Muslim world. She writes:
It was because of Maria that I began this book. Was what happened to her merely a 
daily occurrence in underdeveloped nations throughout the world -  children born 
into deprivation, raised in ignorance? ...Or was her experience intrinsic to her culture? 
(2003: 6)
Goodwin uses many plays on words that lead the reader to the conclusion that Islam is in 
fact "fundamentally different" (read: fundamentalist) and Muslim women are oppressed 
because of their "culture” . Throughout the book, Goodwin refers to Islam both as an "ethnic 
group", and as an "ancient culture" that is "rigidly traditional" and closed to "us" (2003: 25). 
Just like Japan, she writes, "it has its own way of doing things, its own philosophies, and, most 
important, its own religion" (2003: 25). There is little need to argue that Islam comprises 
diverse ethnic groups and is in fact its own religion. Goodwin’s reference to Islam as a 
"culture" fails to recognize the pluralism of experiences - and culfures - within Islamic 
contexts.
Goodwin repeatedly juxtaposes the language of "us" and "them" to reinforce difference, 
wrifing fhat "despife fhe Islamic world’s growing im pact on our lives, foreign Muslims 
undersfand us far betfer than we know them". In addition to myriad uses of the veil, veiling, 
and its imagery, Goodwin describes the chaddari as a "body-bag for the living... which 
would eventually become an international symbol of the Taliban’s oppression of women” 
(2003: 76). Said "body bag" will also be the galvanizing point for many American feminist 
groups! 10. Kandiyoti writes of fhe debafes that ensued among transnational feminists on their 
roles in supporting women in Afghanistan. She explains that “ these exchanges followed the 
familiar tropes of wom en’s rights as universal human rights versus ‘feminism-as-imperialism’, 
reflected in a spate of articles in both the popular press and academ ic journals" (2005: 1). 
Afghanistan specialist Azarbaijani-Moghaddam reinforces this point:
Complexity and nuances notwithstanding, unprecedented international interest, 
misinformation, and hysteria have surrounded the situation of women and girls since 
the Taliban set foot in Kabul. In recent years Afghan women have been used by
” 0 Hymowitz’s article reflects many of ffiese issues, and also refers fo ffie cfiaddori as "blue alien-creafurely sfiapes", 
fo add  fo fhe Imagery. Hymowlfz, K. S. (2003). "Why Feminism Is AWOL on Islam." Clfv Journal. 2005.
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countless media, polifical, and humanitarian entities, as well as publicity hungry 
wom en’s rights' groups, to pursue their own objectives.
(2004:100)
Campaign Against the ‘Body Baa’
Jan Goodwin's book is an example of literature’s transition into policy. Goodwin’s writings on 
Afghan women had a particular influence over perceptions Americans have of Afghan 
women, leading to her pivotal role in the launching of the so-called “Gender Apartheid’’ 
cam paign ’ ’ ’ . As the researcher tor the Women’s Rights Advocacy Project in the 
International Human Rights Law Group (now called Global Rights), in 1996-1998,1 was tasked 
with maintaining a close watch on the situation of Afghan women (from the vantage point 
of Washington DC). I was therefore present at Feminist Majority meetings, including those at 
the onset of the “Gender Apartheid’’ campaign. One of these meetings was attended by 
Jan Goodwin, who brought along a chaddari from her recent visit to Afghanistan in 
September of 1997.
As the only woman present who was not of American origins, I noted the manner in which 
the women recoiled from the sight of the chaddari. At that point, my knowledge of 
Afghanistan and Afghan women was limited, but my Arab background compelled me to 
recognize that the chaddari, like any ac t of veiling, represents drastically different things to 
different women and could not be taken a t face value. During this meeting, the women 
present decided to cut pieces of the chaddari and wear it on their lapels as a symbol of 
solidarity with Afghan women. In addition to the bourka-swatch-ot-solidarity (as it was 
nicknamed at the time), other ideas included the construction of a giant chaddari that 
would cover the Statue of Liberty in New York to represent the idea that America stands in 
solidarity with Afghan women, or perhaps that American eyes are covered as well. The 
symbolism was ripe tor analysis” .^
For more information on the "Gender Apartheid" cam paign, see Feminist Majority at www.femlnlstmalorltv.ora 
” 2 1 do not dispute that the situation of Afghan women of fhat time was dire. Despite criticism, I credit Jan Goodwin 
and Feminist Majority for bringing to light the situation of Afghan women and for serving as sfrong advocafes to raise 
awareness and funding In the US. Kandiyoti writes that "Feminist Majority's “Cam paign to stop gender apartheid In 
Atghanlstan" scored some US political victories for Afghan women's righfs. Through a  series of petitions and lobbying 
activities, they played a signltlcant role In 1998 In persuading the UN and the US to reject formal recognition of the 
Taliban. They also put pressure on US energy company Unocal to bock out of a  $3 billion venture to put a  pipeline 
through Afghanistan that would have given the Taliban $100 million royalties". Kandiyoti, D. (2005). The Politics of 
Gender and Reconsfructlon In Afghanistan. Occasional Paper. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Developmenf.
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Regardless, it was apparent that while high-profile campaigning on behalf of Afghan 
women might serve well in terms of consciousness-raising, if created difficulties for aid 
operations on the ground (Benjamin 2000; Mertus 2000). Such campaigns, Jaggar has 
argued, waged by North American feminist activists limit discursive openness by centering 
their agendas around certain moral convictions therefore stifling debate. These agendas 
then becom e the foundation for the group’s moral perspectives (1998: 8-9). Many articles, 
such as those by Afghan women ocfivists Sima Wali”  ^ and Rina Amiri, were released during 
that time, expressing concern with the campaign and the possibility that it could alienate 
the very women it was trying to help. These Afghan voices were relatively silent in 
comparison, however. Wali repeatedly expressed her concern that "the true needs and 
wants of the Afghan people are largely absent from campaigns waged on fheir behalf in 
the United States" (2002: 1).
Popular Perceptions o f Afghan Women
The “Gender Apartheid” campaign was deemed successful with the 2001 ‘liberation’ of 
Afghanistan -  and therefore of Afghan women -  from the Taliban. Many years after the 
campaign, images of Afghan women os oppressed creatures beneath chaddaris still 
permeated popular perception, although the m edia’s silence led spectators to believe that 
Afghan women hod been ‘liberated’ and there was no further need to discuss them. One 
author expressed the views of many:
The veil was probably fhe clearest example of the perverse nature of media
coverage.,. The fall of the Taliban has led to the virtual disappearance from the
media agenda of the issue o f the veil, and indeed of Afghan women in general.
(Dorronsoro 2005:291-2).
Indeed, fhe cause of Afghan women had been faken up by Norfh American feminists and 
subsequently forgotten, while Afghan women continued to struggle under external pressure 
to defend fheir agency and their cultural integrity. Meanwhile, Afghan women had “good 
reason fo suppose that if their lives were to become the subject of feminist discussion, their
"3 Sima Wall is a  significant name in Afghan women's circles. Wall is an Afghan woman activist living in fhe United 
States whose activism during the Taliban era and lobbying efforts towards the US government brought attention -  
and subsequent aid - to Afghan women. She is also credited with providing a contextuolized understanding of the 
situation in Afghanistan and balancing the rhetoric of other lobbying groups. Wall is also the President of Refugee 
Women in Development, an international NGO.
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own perspectives might be discounted" (Jaggar 1998: 10). Jaggar has been a critic of this 
sudden interest in the perceived victimization of women in non-Western cultures” .^ She 
argues that this "incomplete understanding distorts Western philosophers' comprehension of 
our moral relationship to women elsewhere in the world and... also impoverishes our 
assumptions about the intercultural dialogue necessary to promote global justice for 
women" (2004: 1). Indeed, there is arrogance in the notion that the aid apparatus knows 
better than the women involved about their needs and interests.
In March of 2005, I tested popular perceptions to better understand the extent to which 
these ideoscapes still held sway. I was invited to speak on the issue of Afghan women at the 
Women as Global Leaders Conference in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. At that point I had 
already been working in Afghanistan for nearly three years. I used the conference as an 
opportunity to gauge public opinion on the situation of Afghan women more than three 
years after their 'liberation' and their virtual disappearance from the media. The audience 
comprised 40 female participants, mostly American. They were conference participants who 
elected to attend my session on Afghanistan. Ages ranged from 15 to 68 and included 
students, academics, and development practitioners. At the beginning of the two-hour 
session, I circulated a questionnaire to the participants and asked that they complete it 
immediately. The answers then served as the starting point for the discussion on images of 
Afghan women.
When asked to describe Afghanistan after the Taliban, most agreed that the images that 
cam e to mind - in their own words - were chaos, great need, struggling, uncertain, unsafe, 
destruction. Examples include: "More liberated but severely underdeveloped";
"Power/leadership vacuum, very fragmented"; and “ Reforming/reconstruction, 
democratization, US military presence", amongst other similar sentiments.
Their images of Afghan women mostly included the chaddari’ ’  ^ and veil. Other answers 
were poverty, anonymity, and limited opportunities. The National Geographic "Afghan girl"
Jaggar gives the full picture ot the history of this ‘perceived victimization’ over the last 30 years. For more 
information, see Jaggar, A. M. (2004). "Saving Amina" Global Justice tor Women and Intercultural Dialogue, 
University ot Colorado at Boulder.
” 5 While most ot the participants mentioned the chaddari, it is important to note that all of them used the word 
bourka. In fact, none ot them were familiar at all with the word chaddari.
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was also a popular a n s w e r ' ' 6 . More positive images included women voting, working in 
government, survivors, strong, resilient. One respondent said tlia t tliere were 
“misconceptions outside Afglianistan". Many agreed that Afghan women are "oppressed 
but wanting change” . It was interesting to note the contradiction in each answer as many 
conveyed the sense that things are bad, but could be good. For instance: “ Hidden but 
struggling to better the life of their people” .
The respondents largely felt that the media contributed to whatever negative images they 
might have had about Afghan women: “helpless women who don 't have rights or 
privileges” , in the words of one respondent. The media “ perpetuated negative image of 
repressed women, veiled unhappy victims” . They felt that there is currently very little focus on 
Afghan women, particularly since world attention has shifted to Iraq and other issues. 
Another said: “The media goes back and forth. We see images of women under the bourka 
but we hear George Bush tell us that wom en’s rights have been restored” . The media 
presented a biased and sensationalized view, victimizing Afghan women further. This 
sentiment summed up the views of many who noted a similar contradiction. She noted that 
Afghan women are presented “as either victims, or as victims-turned-success stories” .
The respondents largely viewed the aid apparatus and its activities in Afghanistan as 
inconsistent and failing to listen to the needs of Afghans. Others were more critical, calling 
the apparatus “self interested” and using Afghan women as justification. There was broad 
consensus on the lack of follow-through and long-term planning. “The international 
community made a lot of promises which they hove not honored” , one participant said. 
Another added: "I think they forgot about Afghanistan with Iraq and the Tsunami” .
When asked what aid interventions should be doing, the following two respondents echoed 
the sentiments of many. One said: “ Build a long term strategy -  actually facilitate the Afghan 
people with building a long-term strategy” . And finally another said: "I think the US should 
have done a lot more before turning our attention to other countries” .
Respondents agreed that there are obstacles for Afghan women including traditional roles, 
misinterpretations of religious laws, remnants of Taliban, patriarchy, gender schemas.
This fanned picture of Shorbot Gulo, on Afghan refugee in Noser Bogh com p in Pakistan, was token by Steve 
McCurry in 1984, and soon becam e fhe international symbol tor Afghan refugees and one ot the most recognized 
(and perhaps exploited) images in the world.
See httD://news.nationalaeoaraDhic.com/news/2002/03/0311 020312 shorbat.html for more information.
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prescribed roles, bias against women, lack of security, entrenched power groups, lack of 
education, stereotypes, lack of opportunity, male-dominated society, illiteracy, intimidation, 
funding. One respondent urged that we examine context and spend more time 
understanding the socio-cultural dynamics of the country and its people. She elaborated: 
"We need more stories and analysis of leadership forms in Afghanistan. How do women 
there exhibit leadership, power, influence, e tc .” .
Can We See ‘Beneath fhe Bourka' Yet?
The chaddari is not a new object of Western obsession. In 1985, Dupree wrote that women in 
Afghanistan during that time "dismiss the stereotyped image depicted by most Western 
media which insist on picturing Afghan women forever enveloped in billowing veils" {1985: 
14). In November of 1997, Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of 
Women Angela King wrote the following in her report following an inter-agency gender 
mission to Afghanistan:
External observers and interlocutors often mistake symptoms and causes: the burqa, 
for example is not considered a major problem for most Afghan women with whom  
the Mission spoke, but is treated as such by many assistance workers in the country, 
agency personnel a t headquarters and sometimes, opinion-makers outside the 
country.
(1997)
The chaddari should be viewed in its socio-political and historical context. There is much to 
be said about the role of the chaddari in Afghan history. A nuanced understanding will 
reveal that the chaddari can also be seen as a symbol of resistance. Its earliest uses by the 
Pashtun elite provided freedom of mobility and anonymity. During the Taliban era, the 
chaddari was used strategically "as a shroud of anonymity and disguise” to transport 
messages, weapons, cameras, and banned publications (Whitlock 2005: 57). According to 
the senior gender officer of a UN agency:
Empowering women is not a self-evident process... For many, the bourka actually  
protects them and gives them a freedom they feel they could not have without it. 
We as Westerners and development agents need to learn to disassociate the 
bourkas from oppression, need to acknowledge emotionally that Afghanistan is not
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the West and need to support Afghan women in a manner meaningful to them, 
whatever that is.
Indeed, "more responsible action in the use of images is needed” (Skaine 2002: 29), 
particularly regarding the use ot the chaddari as a tool to advance Western campaigns for 
Afghan women. The pervasive image of the chaddari was reduced to a symbol of Afghan 
wom en’s oppression. As a result, many of those interviewed viewed representations of - and 
focus on - this garment as part of a larger confusion regarding the intersection between 
Afghan women, culture, and religion. In fact, the obsession with the chaddari obscured 
other gendered consequences ot the Taliban's decrees for men. The Western construction 
of this garment fosters an artificial construct of Afghan men against Afghan wom en” 7. a  
gender specialist elaborated:
Too much focus can push women into a position o f defending their culture and it can  
become a symbol of resistance to ‘tyrannical Western influences' against ‘good  
Afghan women'. It also simplifies the complex situation of gendered identities and  
roles within Afghan culture. By this I don 't mean to suggest that women do not have 
less access to power or control of resources in Afghan cultures but that it's too 
simplistic to suggest that once women remove their bourkas they are free and  
everything has been m ade right.
The head of on aid institution working with women expressed it this way:
The world's image of Afghan women was that they were horribly oppressed and  
abused - the worst image of women anywhere in the world. This has continually 
fuelled programs attempting to help Afghan women. That bourka is the ultimate 
symbol of the backwardness of Afghanistan. Westerners gasp a t its sight. There is 
nothing more reproachable in terms of the absence of women's rights. Even though 
the quantity of coverage [o f Afghan women] has obviously reduced, the quality 
hasn't. It's still catchy to talk about how oppressed and wretched they are.
” 7 It should be noted that the Taliban also did their part to pit men against women by requiring that men enforce 
the edict that ‘their women' wear the chaddari. Failure to do this would result in severe punishment. "In this way, the 
Taliban accomplish control over both men and women. They not only obliterate wom en’s presence but also by 
usurping what was the purview of the family, they put to shame the men of fhe family, thus rendering them  
disempowered." Gross, N. (2000). The Messy Side of Globalization: Women in Afghanistan. Svmoosium on 
Globalization and Women in Muslim Societies. Library of Congress, Washington DC.
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This garment can be credited with bringing much (read: largely Western) attention to 
Afghanistan. It continues to play a prominent role for the aid apparatus, particularly the 
Western media, producing myriad documentaries, articles, and photographs claiming to 
offer a glimpse ‘behind/under/beneoth the bourka' (Abirafeh 2004). This unconstructive 
image of Afghan women serves only to feed stereotypes and deny Afghan women's 
agency. The excessive focus on the chaddari "simplifies the complex situation of gendered 
identities and roles within Afghan culture," a representative of an Afghan NGO explained. A 
gender advisor continued: “Aid agencies have a huge responsibility os they -  os opposed to 
the international media -  have the knowledge and capacity to act against discriminatory 
images". A researcher explained that the chaddari reinforced the pervasive view "that 
‘these people ’ ore backward. The political currency of these messages is: ‘look what they do 
to their women'. These images are taken as further evidence of the ‘uncivilized' nature of 
Afghan society in contrast to the status of women living in 'civilized' nations'" (Hunt 2002: 
116).
The head of on aid institution hod this to say about the lack of contextuolized analysis that 
informed operations in Afghanistan:
We live through symbols, through assumptions. Because it is too difficult to 
understand. The assumption is that a woman who is more Western in terms of dress is 
empowered. That will take you to a conclusion that all European women are 
empowered, which is not correct. It will also take you to a conclusion that there is 
gender equality if there is no bourka.
It is not unusual for any ac t of veiling to be misconstrued os a denial of women's agency. 
Afghanistan is not unique in this case. Many have documented a history of Western 
obsession with the veil (Said 1979; Narayan 1997). Despite this obsession, Afghan women 
repeatedly fail to conform to stereotypical images. The most facile of constructs is the use of 
the chaddari as a barometer to measure social change -  or lack thereof. In my capacity as 
NGO director, I was approached my many journalists and asked to speak on the chaddari 
and explain why it remains in post-‘liberation' Afghanistan. I clearly recall an incident with a 
journalist who noted the presence of the chaddari. He explained that, in early 2002, he felt 
that 95% of Afghan women were wearing the chaddari. He made this calculation based on 
his own estimations during his five-day visit. He had returned in November 2002 (for seven
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days this time) and was sitting in my ottice, telling me that now perhaps 90% of Afghan 
women still wore the chad da ri As a result, he felt that I had ‘fa iled’ to do ‘my job ' in 
‘liberating’ Afghan women. To him, the chaddari was the tool of oppression, the absence of 
which would be ‘liberation’ . The aid apparatus was the means by which this ‘liberation’ 
would occur. Therefore, the persistence of the chaddari on Afghanistan’s streets indicated a 
failure of the aid apparatus to ‘liberate’ Afghan women. His words remained with me during 
my four years in Afghanistan.
In 2006, this journalist might note that the chaddari persists. And yet, as Afghan men and 
women will clearly articulate, the presence or absence ot this garment does little to indicate 
‘liberation’. It is more important, however, to distinguish between the transformation of 
customs -  such as veiling and the prevalence of Western clothing -  and institutional change 
in the form of laws and wom en’s sense ot their rights and roles. In fact, one might assume 
that men have been ‘transformed’ based on the prevalence of Afghan men in Western 
dress. The change in m en’s clothing style does not constitute a ‘Western’ influence, or an 
indication of ‘liberation’ . Indeed, the assumption is that ‘culture’ is static when it comes to 
women, and that the sex of the actors is a determining factor in labeling a change ‘Western’ 
or not (Narayan 1997: 26).
2. Afghan Perspectives on the Aid Apparatus
Chaddari Politics
For him, women are only ghosts, voiceless, charmless ghost that pass practically 
unnoticed along the streets; flocks of infirm swallows... that make a mournful sound 
when they com e into the proximity of men.
(Khadra 2004: 144)
In my October 2004 article, Burqa Politics, I argued that the chaddari had been used as a 
symbol to justify intervention and that it has since served as the barometer to measure 
progress -  or lack thereof -  in Afghanistan. Further, the chaddari and other forms of veiling 
have been conflated with lack of wom en’s agency (Abirafeh 2004). Many of the arguments 
are not only still valid, but are in fact more relevant today.
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Both Afghan women and men noted that the chaddari served as the image under which all 
others were determined. As port of my reflexive journal, the following excerpt was written in 
my capacity  as NGO director in September 2002 to document my first impressions:
My sense is that Afghan women long for choice. The choice fo wear a veil, or a 
bourka, or nothing a t all. The issue extends well beyond the actual fabric of the 
bourka. It is more important to address the psychological bourka, and its progeny - 
the fear bourka and the poverty bourka. Social evolution is a slow process, and our 
task in this is to offer women the tools with which they can achieve self-sufficiency, a 
choice, and a voice.
And yet, in 2006, both the choice and the voice were lacking. And the chaddari remains the 
preferred garment. Afghan women repeatedly expressed exasperation with this facile 
construct, saying that the world thinks "Afghan women ore only bourkas". As a result of this 
image, the world felt compelled to 'save' them. An Afghan woman explained that the world 
thinks of them os oppressed and weak. This is not accurate, she said, "but the world wants to 
see us this way". An Afghan man elaborated strongly that the aid apparatus want Afghan 
men and women to hove:
...Freedom like the Western world. Western women wear clothes, not bourka. So 
Afghan women should wear that too otherwise they have no rights. This is a 
completely incorrect image. We don't approve of it. Afghan men and women are 
Muslims and have their own culture and they do what is in their culture.
It is interesting to note that during interviews, Afghans recognized that the word bourka was 
one that was used more frequently in the aid apparatus and amongst non-Afghans. They 
therefore used the term bourka when referring to foreign images of Afghans, but continued 
to use the more common term chaddari in their doily discussions with each other. This reveals 
the extent to which the preferred terms of the aid apparatus have become port of Afghan 
daily discourse.
Conclusions
As this chapter demonstrates, the liberation discourse played no small part in creating a 
particular image of Afghan women. This image in turn contributed to the design of programs
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and aid interventions. As media and popular literature demonstrated -  and as the focus 
group reinforced -  these images served to create a picture of an oppressed Afghan woman 
beneath a chaddari. Such an image denies agency and did not resonate with Afghan 
women and men. These images and perceptions present a good starting point for a 
discussion of policy formulation from the perspectives of those actively involved. Given the 
tenacious nature of the perceptions surrounding Afghanistan and Afghan women, one 
might question the extent to which these ideoscapes have informed aid interventions.
Chapter V continues the discussion emerging from the data  to better understand the 
journey of policy interpretation and implementation. Indeed, interviews with policy-makers 
and policy implementors, heads of international and Afghan NGOs, and Afghanistan 
specialists -  Afghan and non-Afghan -  revealed striking similarities and trends in attempts to 
put gender into practice. The next section takes the discussion of these themes to the policy­
makers and policy implementors who operated in Afghanistan during the time of the 
research, addressing the lack of contextualization of gender, the agenda of transformation, 
the neglect of men, and the focus on practical needs. This discussion begins by checking 
popular perceptions and pervasive images against images policy-makers and policy 
implementors might have had of Afghan women.
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CHAPTER V: Gender Policy in Practice: Formulation, Interpretation, implementation” ®
Some interventions can be very disruptive. Badly conceived and facile analyses 
based on the assumption that Afghan women are vulnerable individuals living in a 
vacuum m ay eventually isolate rather than reintegrate women. 
(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2004: 103)
1. Policy Formulation: Gender in Social Context
This chapter takes the discussion one step further to illuminate the journey from policy 
formulation to interpretation to implementation through the voices of 45 policy-makers, 
policy implementors, NGO leaders, and Afghanistan specialists.
Animating 'Gender' in the Aid Apparatus
Gender is a buzzv/ord in the contemporary aid discourse that peppers aid reports, policies, 
and program plans. Among the Anglophone aid elite, "gender discourse was privileged and 
pure; the word women was passe... Never mind that gender did not translate well into many 
languages" (Staudt 2002: 57). In a discussion with a senior staff member of UNDP, he said:
We generously employ lots of buzzwords... like gender, I don 't even know what that 
means. But I'm told I have to mainstream it. Even our ‘gender person', she sits in her 
own container on the compound. She's not even physically 'mainstreamed'.
Both the definition of gender and its implications remain under discussion in Afghanistan. And 
yet the term continues to be coupled with other ambiguous words -  empowerment, 
equality, mainstreaming. "It has never been gender mainstreaming," an Afghan human 
rights activist explained, "It is gender segregation, just highlighting the differences between 
men and women. Dividing them, not bringing them together... And that creates a 
reaction... It's the first thing internationals talk about, women, not gender” .
' '8 Segments of this chapter were previously published. See Abirafeh, L. (2004). Burqa Politics: The Plights of Women in 
Afghanistan. Chronoaram. 10/2004. and Abirafeh, L. (2005). Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post- 
Conflict Afghanistan... Learned? Gender in International Cooperation. F. E. Stiftung. Bonn, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
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As a result, Afghans quickly learned that use of this term would guarantee them international 
support, regardless of their understanding of the concept itself and what it might take to 
bring it to fruition. The language animating the agenda of transformation has also been 
debilitating for some Afghans. According to one woman who runs an NGO for women, the 
rhetoric of empowerment leads the aid apparatus to believe that “we are here to save the 
poor victims, and [as a result, Afghan women] are so good at playing the victims.” Indeed, 
Afghans understand what themes are ‘marketable’ in the aid apparatus, and using the 
rights words accordingly to achieve gains on their terms. The aid discourse is one that has 
been mastered very quickly by the communities. Women use the right words because they 
think that this is what foreigners want to hear, although the depth ot the terms has not 
necessarily been absorbed. Men also use the language, as I observed in my work when, on 
many occasions, I was confronted with men who sought to start NGOs for ‘wom en’s 
empowerment’ and approached me for funding. Communities are sufficiently informed to 
know that the presence ot aid institutions is transitory and that they may need to subscribe to 
the lingo now: including women -  on paper -  to attract a id ” 9. a  woman head of an NGO 
felt strongly about the contagious nature of aid lingo and said that “Afghans are very good 
at saying whatever they think the donors want to hear - about ‘empowerment’, ‘right to 
work’ ‘veiling issues’ - and will ask tor just those things” .
An international gender advisor working with an Afghan wom en’s organization illustrated the 
dynamic this way:
Many of fhe women I encountered wanted fheir position in society fo be improved - 
through better health, better support - rather than changed. And I wondered  
whether they used the term gender because it was the term used most often by 
donors.
To further com plicate matters, there is still no agreed-upon translation of gender in Dari and 
Pashto'20. In Dari, the most commonly used word jinsiyat, meaning sexuality, is still heavily 
disputed and is only used to fill a linguistic void. “What I see,” an Afghan woman leader
Wakefield and Bauer aptly articulate that Afghan communities still exercise agency: NGOs consider how tar they 
can push local values and beliefs to encourage women's participation, and communities consider ways to adopt 
NGO requirements to tit local gender norms Wakefield, S. and B. Bauer (2005). A Place at the Table: Afghan 
Women, Men and Decision-making Authority. AREU Briefing Paper. Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit.
’ 20 To illustrate this point, all ot my business cards tor positions with ‘gender’ in the title have been written as ‘gender’ 
in Dari, as it it has becom e a  Dari word. I use the exam ple ot my previous position as "Senior Gender Officer" as case 
in point. ‘Senior’ and ’Officer’ were translated. ‘G ender’ was not.
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explained, "is that most people translate things from other languages and bring these things 
here. In Afghanistan, no one asked what gender means. This word, it is different everywhere. 
For us, it ’s important to know and to find out for ourselves what gender means in 
Afghanistan". Rostami-Povey adds further complexity to this issue by stating that the 
infiltration of English terms gave Afghans the perception that their language and culture was 
under threat (2007).
In a meeting on gender issues in June of 2006, Afghan women made the following points 
regarding the word gender: (1) The aid apparatus lacks a robust understanding of gender, 
(2) There has not been an agreed-upon translation, and (3) The word has becam e loaded 
with the perception that it is part of a Western-driven agenda and is used when it is believed 
that it is "what foreigners want to hear". Later that month, an update on gender activities 
was circulated, ending with confirmation of plans "to settle the definition issue". It is 
interesting to note that this issue was firstly, an afterthough, and secondly, still not resolved - 
four years into so-called gender efforts in Afghanistan.
Experiences based on the perspectives of policy-makers and policy implementors reveal 
that gender programs default to wom en’s programs when translated into practice. Gender 
is not employed in the robust sense of the word. In aid interventions in the context of conflict 
and its aftermath, this is even more problematic as women as a category tend to be singled 
out in isolation from their wider social, cultural and family contexts. This point could not be 
overstated by those interviewed. An Afghan woman working for an aid institution articulated 
that "gender is a Western concept, or another word for women in Afghanistan". She 
continued to explain that aid interventions have not addressed the root causes of wom en’s 
subordination and have therefore failed to im pact gender inequality in any significant way. 
She said that "most mainstreaming approaches to wom en’s development have not been 
based on analyses of the overall reality of wom en’s lives".
An Iranian-American head of an organization working with women expressed the views of 
many:
I am sorry, but I am not sure I understand the difference between ‘gender' programs 
and wom en ’s programs! I am tired of this whole ‘gender’ topic anyway. Seems to be  
an incestuous topic amongst a group o f foreigners, having little to do with the
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realities on fhe ground there. I think Afghanistan is not the p lace to experiment with 
a Westernized construct of wom en 's liberation.
Aid agencies... are just a bunch o f propagandists that have mastered the art of 
talking for fheir funders, not for fhe people they are supposedly here to assist. It ’s such 
an em bedded system, it is impossible to even step back and see how miserably 
flawed if is. The repercussions are that people are left with an overly backwards view 
of countries in the region. The aid agencies have gone too far in creating these 
clichés and now we are stuck with them forever it seems.
A head of on international NGO was trying to demystify the concept ot gender to a
colleague. She relayed the conversation to me:
I was trying to tell her that what she understands gender to be is wrong. That is not 
gender, it's promotion of women. If you give it the title ‘promotion of w om en’ then it ’s 
fine with me. I can definitely share in the need for fhat. But then don ’t call it gender. 
Of course it makes men angry. So a t least try to be honest about it.
An Afghan woman working on gender issues with an aid institution put it this way:
[Gender] is considered as a weapon against men -  which is totally against the 
concept of ‘gender issues’ in the first place. Gender programs should be designed in 
order to reduce existing problems between men and women. Side effects should be 
prevented. The way gender issues are undertaken in Afghanistan now will not work. 
Because gender issues are introduced as wom en’s issues, the whole gender thing is 
considered to be against the cultural and religious values of the country... To stop 
and change the present concept o f gender issues in Afghanistan, gender programs 
need to be transferred fo both women and men equally. For successful 
implementation of gender programs in any country -  Afghanistan or not -  a  few 
basic things should be considered: religious values, cultural values, social structure of 
society, level o f education, and techniques for implementafion. Obviously, a 
successful gender strategy in the United States cannot be successfully implemented  
in Afghanistan, and similarly a successful gender sfrategy in Afghanisfan c a n ’t be 
successful in Iraq. And, most importantly, empowerment of both men and women 
cannot happen by outsiders. Men and women should be able to empower
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themselves fo make choices and decisions. To reach this stage our society needs 
proper and successful gender programs within the framework of our religion and  
culture.
Many Afghan women activists believe that “ talking gender and doing women" actually 
undermines efforts towards equality: "It has created a big problem in Afghan society. Men 
were already sensitive to wom en’s issues. And now the international community is trying to 
talk about women. These things will again make men sensitive” . The programmatic 
separation ot men and women likely reflects a Western-oriented individualistic approach, 
and yet the rights discourse should d ictate that, in the words ot one Afghan woman, the 
same rights should apply tor men and women as human beings: "Do not to separate them. 
People are trying to separate them". A dangerous outcome ot this separation is that it fuels 
men's perception that gender is a negative word. To them, gender has become 
synonymous with wom en’s power over men. An Afghan man working with an NGO 
explained: "Most ot the people, they think that gender is making women in power and 
decreasing the power ot men. Women over men". A gender advisor working tor an 
international NGO explained that the idea ot ‘gender’ as an abstract concept tails to 
manifest itself as equality. In tact, she explained that it was creating an imbalance between 
men and women:
In Kabul the reverse situation already takes place where women get supported in 
such range that men are falling behind also in the job market, women earn much 
more and get easier Jobs than men. Is this what we wanted to do with empowerment 
of women? And is this the way to include men in this gender awareness process?
An Afghan woman implementing wom en’s programs with an international NGO had this to 
say:
Gender programs are mostly failures. Gender training is never held for those men who 
need it. We are taiking about b ig changes and transformation of women, and  
wom en’s organizations are giving hundreds of little trainings for women but they are 
not taking serious action in making changes they talk about. Millions [o f dollars] are 
being spent on conferences and seminars and this has m ade no difference in 
wom en’s lives. There is still violence. Gender programs should have worked with men 
rather than women!
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In the absence of thorough gender analyses, programs were unable to adequately 
integrate men -  nor women. Extracting Afghan women as a target group sans context 
rendered both women and men’s voices silent. It is important to note that gender interests 
are not met simply by adding both sexes to aid interventions. The addition of mole and 
female bodies does not necessarily represent gender issues as I use the term in a more robust 
sense os a vehicle to understand and address wom en’s subordination.
Opportunity Lost: Reaching Out to Men
Gender relations in Afghanistan are complementary. This juxtaposition -  men versus 
women - reflects individual rights and a Western capitalist context. This isn't 
applicable to Afghanistan because traditionally there is coexistence.
These words of on Afghan-Americon gender activist and researcher were shared by many. 
An Afghan-American gender specialist felt strongly about the importance of integrating men 
in gender work, as she stated in a speech given at the World Bonk on 11 March 2002:
We need a full gender perspective because without men and boys, gender work is 
not possible... Be careful not to provoke a backlash. There are examples o f this in 
Afghan history. Instead let the message slowly come from Afghan women  
themselves, not the international a id community... We ca n 't empower women 
without empowering men, otherwise there will be a backlash again and it will 
provoke increased domestic violence. The more disempowered men feel, the more 
resistant they will be to change.
This counsel was shared in 2002. In 2006, her words proved to be prophetic, as many believe 
that a backlash is indeed underway. As Chapter II has shown, attempts a t engineering a 
social transformation will have serious repercussions for women as long as wom en’s agency 
is denied. In conversations with Afghan women, many felt that there was room to work in 
partnership with men, to make gains in the contexts of the family and community. Indeed, 
policy-makers and policy implementors agreed, yet no one was aware of such efforts. In 
fact, many women working with aid institutions felt that an opportunity to engage with 
potential male supporters and advocates had been lost. In the few cases where men were 
involved, many inferviewees expressed their initial surprise that men supported women in
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ways that they had not anticipated. They elaborated to soy that they regretted not having 
reached out to men from the onset. However, many aid efforts to target men often 
pathologize or essentialize them as deviants or as perpetrators of violence in the context of 
conflict.
Many advocated supporting men -  in their own right and as allies to women -  to make gains 
for women. In this vein, it is therefore essential to understand masculinities within a study of 
the gender order -  and the im pact of aid interventions on m a s c u l in i t i e s ’ l l .  When men are 
studied, it is primarily the experiences of men in northern industrialized countries - the rest are 
rendered “exotically ethnographic". Research on masculinities could offer an understanding 
of both men and women and perhaps provide alternative visions of male identity in order to 
reduce negative effects (Bouta, Frerks et al. 2005: 91). Gender equality is not possible without 
m en’s involvement and support. This should be done with a view to reaching the fifth phase 
of engagem ent with men, as illustrated in Chapter II.
It is a particular imperative, therefore, to understand the role of men as participants in aid 
interventions, and the possible negative effects for women when men do not participate. 
While women's issues made gender visible as a category of analysis (Cleaver 2002: xi), there 
is a lack of understanding on the im pact of such interventions on men. Neglect of men has 
political effects and renders the quest for gender equality futile. So-called gender 
frameworks are applied to focus on women and exclude men’^^ . Coupled with a perceived 
mole exclusion, this can result in a backlash against gains made in favor of women (Cleaver 
2002: 24).
In preliminary understandings of Afghan masculinities, it has become apparent that men 
view gender equality as a zero-sum game, fearing that they will lose some of their 
advantage as a result. Conflict contexts reinforce a hegemonic masculinity. In the 
aftermath, men work to retain this masculinity, driven by a fear that their traditional roles 
have eroded. Studies of men in countries in transition demonstrate that men carry the 
burden of the role of ‘provider’ and loss of this role can be emasculating (Paci 2002). This is
I use masculinities to define ttie various socially-constructed definitions for being a  man. Ttiese are dynamic 
concepts that can vary over time and in different contexts. The term conveys the idea that there are perceived 
notions and ideals about how men are expected to behave in a  given context. From Women’s Commission for 
Refugee Women and Children (2005). Masculinities: M ale Roles and Male Involvement in the Promotion of Gender 
Equality. New York, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. As one example, Donna Pankhurst 
speaks well to the need to focus on constructions of masculinities. See (CITË- mainstreaiming gender in peacebldg) 
'22 Moser’s gender framework was cited as a  case in point in this regard. For more information, see Moser, C. O. N. 
ft 9931. Gender Plonnina and Development: Theory. Practice and Trainina. London, Routledge.
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com pounded by the effects of poverty, displacement, and economic and social change 
experienced in the aftermath. As a consequence, men may seek affirmation of their 
masculinities in other ways, such as domestic violence (Women's Commission for Refugee 
Women and Children 2 0 0 5 ) ’ 3^. Interventions for women must therefore offer men alternative 
sources of domestic and political power and credibility (Cleaver 2002: 81-2).
For these purposes, it is relevant to understand that aid interventions do not operate in a 
gender vacuum, and that men are an essential part of gender efforts. Studies from other 
countries reveal that men have largely been absent from gender equality efforts. A study 
conducted in several African countries noted that those organizations that engaged men 
and women together succeeded in reducing not only male resentment over a focus on 
women, but also noted a reduction in domestic vio lence’24 (Range 2005). Respondents to 
the research frequently reinforced fhese ideas and expressed a desire to engage men in 
gender processes, and also to employ men as agents of change to work with other men. 
Many interviewed felt that they would rather reinforce, and not undermine, men's traditional 
roles. An international feminist activist explained: “ Just like we are encouraging the 
government not to ignore one-half of its population - women - we need to start encouraging 
aid organizations not to ignore one-half of their beneficiaries - men".
An Afghan gender specialist had the following to say in an email to me os part of a 
discussion on work with men:
The way that women's roles are drawn in Afghan society adversely affect every 
aspect of women's lives... Men's roles in Afghanistan are also rigidly defined, leading 
men to bear the brunt of econom ic responsibility. It is also evident that Afghan men 
are increasingly frustrated and perceive the international community to be 
exclusively focused on women's rights without addressing the ways that the men 
have suffered from the decades o f war... The majority o f vocational training 
programs and foreign education opportunities are geared towards women. In the 
long run, it will be important to create programming that addresses men's needs as 
well as women. In virtually every post-conflict country, the presence of large numbers 
of unemployed and unskilled men and boys poses a risk to stability... More will have
'23 The discussion on the possibility of increased violence against women will continue in Chapter VIII.
'21 Also see Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2005). Masculinities: Male Rotes and Male 
Involvement in the Promotion of Gender Equality. New York, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and  
Children.
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fo be done fo ensure fhaf Afghan men find consfrucfive means of engagem ent and 
employmenf in sociefy... [in order fo prevenf] fhe alienafion of men and  subsequent 
backlashes to wom en’s advancem ent
A gender advisor explained it this way:
Of fhe programs I have seen, mosf have had a women-only perspective -  often wifh 
lip-service to male inclusion. I don 'f believe fhaf sfrafegy works best here. Emphasis 
should be on the inclusion and accep fance of women as comm unify members first 
and foremosf before focus is given to wom en’s abilify for self-deferminafion and  the 
often infangible notion of ‘wom en’s righfs’... Personally, I myself tend to focus on 
women when fhinking of gender and have a hard time really including men info the 
picfure, which leads me to think that the problem mighf be in the applicafion o f the 
word ’gender’ being that it is applied  to practically any and all woman-focused 
projecfs or discussions.
In the words of an Afghan woman NGO leader: "The best way to make gains is to convince 
men to give freedom to women... Get their collaboration and cooperation, [and] any 
program will be successful” . And another gender advisor lamented: "Stop excluding men 
that are qualified and can help women if we help them!”
An online discussion between an Afghan woman implementer in an aid institution and I 
illustrates the point further. I am "LA” and the Afghan woman is "SA” in this discussion.
LA says: Whaf have your observations been abouf fhe framings [for women]?
SA says: I noticed that the men are angrier because women are in training and they 
are not.
LA says: Whaf do you fhink fhe men fhink abouf fhe women-focus?
SA says: Same as the women think. They see it as less effected, especially the gender 
awareness for women.
LA says: Do you fhink they would prefer fo sfay home and have fhe men work/frain 
insfead?
SA says: No, they prefer equal opportunity for both, because now the opportunities 
are mostly bound to women.
LA says: Would fhe MEN prefer fo work/frain while fhe women sfay home?
i n
SA says: I think yes. There are rumors about NGOs being not fair to men.
LA says: Why fhe rumors?
SA says: I know a woman whose husband is jobless, he will be trying to find job. He 
d idn’t like a t first that his women go out at all, but later he had to let his wife join the 
training.
LA says: Because if was fhe only source of money?
SA says: Yes, and from our culture and people’s point of view it's considered a shame 
for husband to sit and eat the money of the wife.
SA says: Though the lady did not point at this issue at all because she was afraid. But I 
heard it from her colleague, that she is not being treated well because her husband 
is being more aggressive since he is not working.
LA: Are there more women like her?
SA says: Yes. I think women will also not say the truth like that woman, because 
maybe [they are] afraid to lose the present opportunity of working.
LA says: Whaf is fhe solufion?
SA says: If there would be equal opportunity, that will be better.
Afghan women would likely argue in favor of the fifth phase of engagement with men, yet 
they were not asked because, as one gender officer and Afghanistan activist articulated, 
“we have failed to see Afghan women as possible active participants in their own futures’’.
2. Policy Interpretation: Afgticn Women’s Agency and ttie Myth of Liberation 125
In the transition from formulation to interpretation, wom en’s agency was sidelined while the 
myth of liberation gained momentum. In the context of conflict and the aftermath, it is not 
unusual for generalizations and stereotypes to prevail. Such images serve a strategic purpose 
but often fail to reflect wom en’s realities. Analyses of context and understandings of local 
agency require time and commitment that humanitarian emergencies do not usually allow. 
As a result, the aid apparatus is often armed with preconceived notions and facile analyses. 
Many of those I interviewed adm itted to misunderstandings of Afghan women, and a failure 
to understand how best to assist them. They also felt overwhelmed by stereotypes -  many of 
which they often subscribed to. The senior gender officer of a UN agency warned: “ It
'251 borrow ‘The Myth of Liberation" from o section heading in a  report by Jean-Pou! Foguet. Foguet, J.-P. (2004). 
Democracy in the Desert: Civil Society, Notion-Building and Empire. Crisis States Proaramme Discussion Paoer. 
London, London School of Economics Development Research Centre.
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behooves us not to project from our own perspective and assume that their lives are 
restrictive". The head of an international organization working with women explained that, 
even after these last few years of active engagement, "donors and Western implementers 
still do not understand the ‘mind set’ of the women of Afghanistan” . She continued to 
explain that the aid apparatus was unable to view Afghanistan -  both women and men -  
through a lens other than their own.
Agency Denied
The language of ‘saving’ and ‘liberating’ women in Afghanistan was not without 
controversy, implying firstly that Afghan women need to be saved and cannot save 
themselves, and further that they are being saved from something. Such language is 
problematic in that it may not only fail to achieve the promised ‘liberation’ but that it may 
do more dam age than good for Afghan women. Rhetoric on Afghan women is inundated 
with contradictory images of survivor/victim, empowerment/vulnerability, dependent 
aid/independent change (Bouta, Frerks et al. 2005: 143). It is often sensationalized and fails 
to do justice to the complexities involved. An Afghan man with an NGO explained: "for us to 
judge Afghanistan as a backward society where women have no soy is totally wrong". A 
gender advisor for an aid institution explained that facile labels - such as “ backwards” - 
erroneously referred to the perhaps slower pace of change that Afghan women desired 
when com pared to the fast-paced aid apparatus. This strong push for change not only 
denied their own ability to act on their behalf but also appeared to them to be a criticism of 
the ‘Afghan w ay ’, "which in many cases it was". Attempts at engineering a social 
transformation will continue to have serious repercussions for Afghan women as long as their 
agency is denied in the process. Such concerns are not unique to Afghanistan. Mohanty 
presents a strong critique of the assumption that there is a homogenous notion of oppressed 
women in the ‘Third World’ . She explains that this in turn produces the image of an "average 
Third World woman", the antithesis of the modern. Western woman (2003: 22).
These judgments were in turn justified by the myriad "myths created and perpetrated by the 
Western world" -  the most powerful of which was the idea that Afghan women are victims 
and need to be saved (Wali 2002: 6). The American myth in particular included some 
combination of belief in Afghan fierceness and pity for Afghan victimization. This is 
evidenced by the assumption that Afghan women -  a favorite topic -  are a homogenous
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group. According to perceptions, ttie Afgtion woman, as a largely unitary figure, cam e in 
two forms: either as a line of anonymous chaddaris waiting for aid, or os the occasional 
young and em ancipated woman. In a 2004 article entitle Burqa Politics^^^, I wrote the 
following:
The media and international agencies only present opposite sides of the spectrum: 
the few heroines who have attracted the media's fickle eye, and the oppressed 
masses who remain victims. Even this limited picture of Afghan reality fails to capture  
media attention today. Isolating Afghan women - from the burqa-clad to the lipstick- 
wearer - is not the best way to make changes and achieve gains. Focus on Afghan 
women is lessening, leaving the masses with a false perception that Afghan women 
have been "liberated" and our task now lies elsewhere. In Iraq, perhaps.
(Abirafeh 2004)
Despite Western perceptions, Afghan women have always been historical and political 
actors struggling against patriarchy. Their cause is emancipation -  not only of themselves, 
but of men as well. Yet, in Islamic contexts, international pressure exerts influence on gender 
priorities and policies (Kandiyoti 1991), making it increasingly difficult for women to 
demonstrate agency in a context of pre-determined opinion about the status of women in 
Islam. This aversion, particularly pervasive in the US feminist movement, undercuts efforts to 
empower women. The implication is that after ‘liberation’, Afghan women will toss aside their 
chaddaris - along with their Islamic and Afghan identities -  and become secular (Mehta 
2002: 142). Afghan women have struggled and negotiated the various fluctuations in their 
social status throughout history, doing so within the context of Islam.
Many Afghan women are still struggling to find the space within which they can rectify this 
image and demonstrate their ability to act in their own interest. The head of an aid institution 
explained that "there is a seemingly uncontrollable urge to overlay the experience of 'the 
Afghan woman' with the Americans' worldview and to create programs that thrust that 
woman into the American design of what is good and beneficial for them". The head of an 
aid institution explained it this way:
’24 Burqa was the preferred spelling of fhe publisher. Chaddari was not a  well-known term and would not illicit fhe 
some response in the article.
114
Supporting women was not about understanding social dynamics. It wasn't about 
understanding the culture. It wasn't about the causes of poverty. It was very 
superficial. Many of the development agencies were appalled with what is 
happening with women. But then we never did look a t it from a gender perspective. 
It was women under bourka. It was never about men in shalwar kameez’^^ .
The above quote raises an often overlooked but extremely valid point. Discussions of agency 
in Afghanistan are not exclusively about women. Discussions on policy formulation revealed 
that m en’s agency was also denied in the discourses promoted by the aid apparatus. 
Afghan women themselves reinforced this view, further articulating that the juxtaposition of 
"civilized American men to barbaric Afghan men" was based on the view that Afghan 
women were mistreated by their own men. As a result, “American men assume the role of 
the global protector of women, and by extension, civilization" (Hunt 2002: 119).
An Agenda of Social Change
Global protection of women manifested itself as an agenda to enforce social change, 
something that is not without historical precedent, particularly when coupled with the 
perception that it is externally enforced. Those interviewed generally agreed that the aid 
apparatus would do better to proceed cautiously and build on local momentum to ensure a 
solid foundation and sustainability. "The international community has to do its homework first 
before going into a country," on Afghan woman activist explained. "Do homework, and 
then bring in the project". The importance of contextuolizing interventions cannot be 
overstated. A socially and historically informed analysis could guide aid institutions in how to 
proceed -  and how not to proceed -  in order to achieve gains for women and men in 
Afghanistan. This includes taking into account that gender is defined differently in each 
conflict and in each context, and therefore basing gender-focused efforts on gender 
analyses of contexts. "Doing homework" entails not only learning about the communities aid 
institutions will work in, but also giving time for the communities to become acquainted with 
the institutions themselves, and to build trust. "If they don ’t know where you ore from or what 
you are doing and you set up your office with your flag and you tell them what to do, you 
see what happens,” an Afghan woman leader said.
’27 Shalwar Kameez is one name that is used to reter to the traditional male garment in Afghanistan.
115
"Afghan people do not accep t things by power or pressure on them," an Afghan woman 
leader explained. "If our aim is to change Afghanistan’s situation, to change the things that 
people don ’t like, we have different ways to reach this goal. We should gain the support of 
the Afghan communities” . It was generally agreed that, in order to be sustainable, the 
process of social change must come from within. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to 
remain humble and neither overstate the roles, nor impose the particular worldview that 
animates the aid apparatus. Interventions must assess local demand and support for an 
agenda of transformation. Without such support, externally-driven change cannot be 
effective or sustainable. The haste of the aftermath period and the hype surrounding Afghan 
women prevented many institutions from taking account of Afghan wom en’s perspectives. 
Many argued that it was not the message but the m ethod  and the means that were 
problematic. An Afghan man with an aid institution emphasized the importance of a 
moderate approach: "Through force [the Afghan people] w on 't accep t anything. They will 
fight and they will resist. But if you approach well, people will listen". A gender specialist 
continued: "I think we do Afghans a disservice if we assume they do not want change. What 
matters is how things are negotiated and presented. You can do a lot if you understand the 
cultural ways of negotiation".
In addition to the aid apparatus modus operandi, their mere presence -  as a diverse 
community of international women and men - has a social impact. The influx of non-Afghans 
from different countries brings customs and traditions that might appear to be threatening or 
challenging to Afghan ways. Further, the perception is that the influx of kharijis (‘foreigners’ in 
Dari) tends to travel hand in hand with alcohol, parties, and p o r n o g r a p h y ’ ^s. An international 
gender advisor put it this way: "We are witnessing the interaction of cultures... Maybe it 
increases fear in men, thinking ‘Is that what it means to be em powered?’ and it raises 
questions in women like ‘Do I want to be like tha t? "’.
Afghan men are at the same time increasingly influenced -  and increasingly threatened -  
by this new environment. And Afghan women may suffer decreased mobility -  either 
imposed or preferred -  as a result. It is difficult - and in fact counterproductive - to lay blame 
on any sole factor, but many Afghan women have expressed concern that this new (urban) 
dynamic has led to increased harassment on the street. "On one level such sexual 
aggression is almost the inevitable product of the Taliban years... on another level it is clearly
'28 Elaheh Rostami-Povey speaks well to this, particularly regarding the social impact of foreign troops in Afghanistan. 
Rostami-Povey, E. (2006). The Reality of Life in Afghanistan since the Fall of the Taliban. State of Nature. Spring 2006.
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a statement of whiot many Afghans think about the takeover of their capital by foreigners.” 
(Johnson and Leslie 2004: 23). Chapter VIII will present more details on the idea of increased 
violence, particularly in the context of social and economic fluctuations -  and frustrations - 
that accom pany countries in the aftermath.
Despite being able to manipulate the lingo, Afghans nonetheless perceived these terms to 
be items "in the toolbox of those who were party to Afghanistan's wars” (Johnson and Leslie 
2004: 77). In other words, the discourse took the form of an ideological occupation. As a 
result, Afghans becam e resistant to these discourses (not the concepts -  an important 
distinction) because of their perceived ties to Western (largely American) individualism. The 
aggressive promotion of this agenda, and the means by which it is transmitted, therefore 
serve to generate further inequalities. Thus, it is possible to argue that -  to Afghans -  the 
quest for empowerment, for rights, for equality, for liberation is an aid-induced myth. In a 
report by Jean-Paul Faguet, under a section aptly titled The Myth o f Liberation, Faguet refers 
to what he sees as the fallacy of liberation, namely that “external intervention can be used 
to lift the constraints that oppress society, allowing it to spring forth and democracy to 
flourish" (2004: 8). Successful economies and effective governments have, in the past, only 
been built on a foundation that includes social organizations, strong traditions, civic 
interaction, and an institutional framework. Imposed liberation, however, will only leave a 
vacuum between ideologies and real people. "The flower of dem ocracy will not thrive in 
such a desert” (2004: 8). The ‘desert’ that Faguet refers to in this case -  Iraq - could easily be 
extended to apply to gender interventions in Afghanistan.
A Democratic and Gender-Sensitive State
In such a desert, the aid apparatus sought nonetheless to fast-forward history: "It is not just 
the Afghanistan of the late 1970s it wants to piece back together, but a fully representative, 
gender-sensitive state -  something Afghanistan never was” (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 155). 
The aid apparatus is indeed basing its ‘success’ on such a political project -  the remaking of 
Afghanistan as a gender-sensitive state. Afghan women policy-makers, policy implementors, 
and NGO leaders have expressed concern about this agenda. In the words of the head of 
an aid institution:
We bring democracy. You can bring experts and you can organize the elections.
And you might have mechanisms for the institution, for the building of democracy.
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But insfifufionalizing it is going to take 100 years. We know that from other countries' 
experiences.
As previously mentioned, the Afghanistan of recent years has witnessed the aid apparatus 
repeatedly import terms that correspond to the latest aid trends, with little regard for their 
relevance in Afghanistan. Democracy, civil society, empowerment, and gender are but a 
few that are used liberally in Afghanistan. While the concepts exist in Afghanistan, the terms 
appear to be the recent additions to a succession of ideological frameworks as models for 
change -  implying transformations that provide a pretext for conflict rather than a focus for 
unity (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 63). This helps to explain why Afghans are reluctant to 
embrace what appears to be Western-imported and imposed ideals’29.
Amartya Sen effectively clarifies that it is wrong to assume that dem ocracy and gender 
equality are Western products. In fact, there is “nothing exclusively ‘Western’ about valuing 
liberty or defending public reasoning. And yet their being labeled as ‘Western’ can produce 
a negative attitude toward them in other societies’’ (2006: 84). A speech by a political 
science professor at Kabul University articulated that creating an environment of respect for 
dem ocracy and wom en’s rights is not through the help of foreign countries: “ It is a process of 
social movement according to the national values and historical values of a country’’ 
(Women and Children Legal Research Foundation 2004: 60). In this sense, the push for 
dem ocracy is not unlike the pressures for gender equality -  in seeming opposition to such 
values. The terms are used liberally, but without meaning and context. Molyneux and Razavi 
reinforce this point, explaining that this type of agenda represents a new form of Western 
hegemony, lacking content and effect (2002: 4). Afghanistan specialists Magnus and Naby 
aptly state that:
The internalization of dem ocracy based on a Western individualism rather than 
traditional Afghan Islamic communalism, gender-blind social interaction, and the 
elevation of the individual above society, do not appear to be part of the 
emerging,,, Afghan worldview,
(1998: 22-3)
’29 It is Important to reiterate ttiat thie above concepts do tiove roots in Afgtianiston. Indigenous torms of Afghian 
democracy and gender equality do exist (the traditions of Jirgas and Shuras in Afghanistan present but one 
exam ple).
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As a result, wom en’s organizations criticize "the way in which many men frequently bandy 
the word dem ocracy in a meaningless manner, without implementing these dem ocratic 
principles within their own families" (Wieland-Karimi 2005: 6). The outcome is that dem ocracy 
-  and gender -  has been saddled with negative baggage, making men increasingly 
resentful and outcomes for women increasingly deleterious. An Afghan woman policy 
implementor put it this way:
Kharijis cannot fry and change Afghan culture. If they do, it will bring more problems 
for women. It has brought more violence upon women. Women will ask for changes 
when fhey are ready. If a foreigner comes, she cannot help me. I do not think NGOs 
for women are such a big help. If an organization comes to help men and brings 
them work and training, it will be better for them -  and better for women. But we 
must wait a long time for men to change. Every man is old in his head... [but] give 
them training and jobs, and then afterwards start talking to them about women.
"Many men are the victims of too much gender training,” the head of an international NGO 
elaborated. "And now they just make fun of it. It’s the same development we have seen in 
Western societies. If you push too hard, you make it into something which is politically correct 
but not accep ted and understood by the people” .
An Afghan NGO leader expressed the sentiments of many:
In Afghan history, we have imported policies from other places. This is why it doesn’t 
work. If we want democracy, we have to go step by step, starting from the 
beginning, and not running. If we run, we will fall down. We should walk slowly and  
look around us in order to be successful. Again today, just like before, Afghans are 
running, running after democracy, running after gender. And when we fall down no 
one will be able to rescue us. Not even the international community.
As the mini-case study on the parliamentary elections (found in Appendix 2) will show, it is not 
the underlying principles of democracy or wom en’s political participation that are under 
question, but the way the terms are used as part of a Western agenda, leaving Afghans to 
adopt them publicly but resent them privately.
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3. Policy Implementation: Practical Solutions
The case of the parliamentary elections serves as a good example to illustrate the transition 
from policy interpretation to policy implementation. In this phase ot the transition, the 
discussion moves from the stated policies on paper -  gender/liberation/empowerment -  to 
an implementation that translated these ambitious agendas into a WID-style intervention, 
v^here loaded terms are at once depoliticized, replaced by practical and technical 
solutions. Indeed, highly charged and politicized issues will not automatically find resolution 
based on stated goals on paper. Further, such processes are not conducive to quick-tix 
solutions. An Afghan policy implementor working with many wom en’s groups explained that 
international priorities -  on paper - guide aid interventions in Afghanistan and these bear little 
relevance to Afghan needs and priorities. She expressed the views ot many:
The means of aid in Afghanistan, in particular under this fashionable word ‘gender’, is 
totally focused on international policies and priorities. And these are more to show off 
to each other [in the aid ‘community’} than to help Afghans. Though most o f the fuss 
has been made about women, even less has been given to them. And even less 
than that is focused on their needs. So those o f us who have to do the work are left 
trying to sift through the talk and seeking out ways to use the little left in hand as 
efficiently as possible.
An Afghan woman NGO leader continued:
The influx o f foreign aid workers [results in] decision making being done by foreigners 
who know less about the ways and customs and effective solutions than local 
residents. Local residents, particularly women, should lead the way. Aid agencies 
should provide the money and simply document progress to make sure the money is 
being spent on what it was supposed to be spent on.
An international gender advisor explained the importance ot working with all members ot 
the community and sharing opportunities:
Raising a community out of survival mode and into econom ic stability will be of 
significant benefit to all members and will thus create a more conducive
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environment to address gender roles and relations. And more often than n o t the 
community and family will address the subject without external interferencel
Former Minister of Women's Affairs Mosuda Jaiol fiad fhie following fo say on mistakes made 
by aid interventions:
The mistakes maybe have been not proper usage of resources. Not proper planning and  
targeting. Maybe they d idn 't have enough time to think about the investment that they 
were doing. Because it was an urgent situation, and emergencies are like that. But now  
we are not any more in emergency. In terms of wom en’s status, it is the worst in the 
world. So in that sense, that is still an emergency. It is like Tsunami for women in 
Afghanistan. But still we need to take the time to think more about what we are doing 
and where and why we are doing it.
A reflexive exercise -  a questioning of "wfiy we are doing if" -  could have been useful in 
illuminating the extent fo which technical solutions were imposed by aid interventions to 
address political concerns. Policy failed to translate into practice upon implementation 
because the policy was largely strategic while the implementation of it was practical. As 
discussed in Chapter II, the distinction between strategic and practical interventions is 
relevant in implementation because, as Kabeer explains, women are not often treated as if 
they know what they need, with the result being that aid institutions tend to then make 
decisions on wom en’s behalf. The default is to meet practical gender needs (1994: 230). It is 
therefore wise to question the extent to which aid interventions have penetrated the surface 
and challenged real power issues in Afghanistan, particularly as most interventions were not 
designed based on Afghan wom en’s strategic interests, nor with Afghan women af all.
It has been argued that the true strategy in Afghanistan was that of milifary objectives under 
the guise of wom en’s rights. In the words of an Afghan woman NGO leader: "The US 
government’s loud and public promise that they will never again allow Afghan women to be 
forgotten has done damage. They still funded military operations much more than wom en’s 
programs” . Indeed, the link between the rights agenda and military objectives was not clear. 
In Afghanistan, the US policy is informally described as "sex, drugs, and rock ’n’ roll” to 
represent gender, poppy, and terrorism. This three-pronged policy has led to a conflation of 
objectives on the ground, and a sense among Afghans that the ‘liberation’ of women was 
merely a by-producf of military action (Hassan 2002: 137). A report from a US general in
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Afghanistan clearly exemplifies this confusion, stating that “ the protection of Human Rights is 
a military objective” (McCaffrey (US General - Ret) 2006). If it is argued that wom en’s human 
rights have been violated, by extension Afghan men are therefore the perceived targets of 
the "military objective” . It is therefore not a stretch to understand how Afghan men might 
feel personally under atfack.
Gender Anfi-Polifics
These experiences of policy implementation resonate well with Ferguson’s observations from 
his research in Lesotho. Ferguson did not set out to present a critique of policy. Instead, he 
hoped to reveal outcomes -  whether intended or not -  in the light of planning. He viewed 
aid interventions as inherently political and linked to the distribution of power in terms of 
resources and influence. Ferguson argued that the aid apparatus viewed its own 
interventions os apolitical. His ‘anti-politics machine’ illustrates the way aid interventions are 
stripped ot their political content, no matter how politically charged they may be (1994). The 
case of Afghonisfan fits neatly within Ferguson's anti-politics framework. One Afghanistan 
specialist explained:
In spite of the predisposition of the international aid system to treat peace and  
development as apolitical products created from a set of discrete technical tasks, 
actual peace and development can follow radically different pathways and arrive 
a t very different destinations, each of which will generate alternate sets o f winners 
and losers,
(Stockton 2004:30)
To assume that technical solutions can address Afghanistan’s gender concerns is to ignore 
the most highly politicized situation of all. This type of linear transitional thinking was not well 
suited for Afghanistan’s complex socio-political environment and served to ignore 
Afghanistan’s overlapping social realities (Costy 2004: 162). The aid apparatus reflected its 
inability to understand the extent of the political project it was undertaking in failing to realize 
that its attem pt to change wom en’s roles and engineer social transformation through 
technical interventions would initiate a political response. With the unprecedented attention 
placed on the situation of Afghan women, it is important to understand how that attention 
has manifested itself and what effects this attention might have. It might be too soon to 
judge if aid interventions have helped Afghan women foster long-term transformation, and it
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is beyond the scope of this research to pass judgment on perceived success and failure. It is 
possible, however, to understand the foundation of the initiative to determine what it 
actually intends to do. In this vein, the distinction between practical and strategic 
interventions is relevant.
And yet, the two interventions ore indivisible. Kabeer reinforces this point, stating that 
"women's practical and strategic gender interests are not separate and dichotomous 
categories, but rather linked though the transformatory aspects of these different strategies 
for empowerment” (1994: 261). Despite the strategic language that was used, including the 
rhetoric for empowerment, ambitious interventions were destined for failure because the aid 
institutions charged with social change through their assistance to Afghans lacked the 
capacity and the political backing to deliver on such targets. They therefore failed 
Afghanistan far more than if they had gone for less ambitious targets and achieved them 
(Johnson and Leslie 2004: 157). The few gains fhat have been made for Afghan women in 
recent years have served to increase the presence, but not the power, of women. 
Demonstrations of strategic gender interests cannot be represented merely by the presence 
of female bodies.
The propensity of aid institutions to promote " ‘feel good', gimmicky programs with very little 
analysis" have added little value to wom en’s lives (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2004: 101). Due 
to large amount of aid in Afghanistan during early phase of aftermath, it has been difficult 
"to resist the temptation of quick-fix projects that demonstrate immediate results" (UNDP and 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 215-6).
Poultry Projects for 'Empowerment'
Policymakers and implementers persistently take the road o f least resistance, 
engaging women through their traditional gender roles and leaving inequitable 
gender relations unchanged. It should be obvious from looking a t the last twenty 
years in Afghanistan that six months’ funding for a handicraft or chicken-rearing 
project purporting to transform gender relations is utterly useless. 
(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2004: 104)
Income generation projects provide a good example of this "road of least resistance” , 
reinforcing traditional skills for women and focusing on low-paid gender stereotyped
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occupations. These initiatives and their corresponding trainings are too short, too small-scale, 
and too little pro tit-oriented. “Anytime you need to do something for women,” a head of an 
international organization explained, “ it was all about handicrafts and tailoring... In a way it 
reinforced the social construction of wom en’s roles... as if there is no other thing that women 
can do". The market in Kabul is saturated with women tailors who ore unable to find 
employment. “You cannot just have classes and pour in millions of dollars and then have the 
women go back home. There is no tollow-up,” an Afghan woman leader stated. Income 
generation efforts did not take the time to ask women if they actually want to work - or if 
they were doing it because there is nothing available for men. “You have women who want 
to be employed,” a head of an international agency explained, “and you have women 
who say they want their husbands to work instead. It is not always that women are being 
prevented from such things. It depends” . Nancy Hatch Dupree reinforces this point. She 
explains that “while antipathy toward work thought to diminish the family honor is strong, 
econom ic need often forces these prejudices aside” (2004: 328). In these cases, women are 
more likely to don the chaddari to use as a “shield to hide their discomfort when moving to 
and from places of employment” (2004:328). David Mosse expressed it well:
Women workers faced a double trial. They were required to work in ways fhat 
challenged stereotypes and established new norms of gender behavior, while a t the 
same time maintaining behavior that would allow them to com m and respect within 
the community. They paid a high but invisible personal price in fulfilling their roles. 
(2005:91)
Numbers are used to measure the success of income generation projects for Afghan 
women. These indicators drive funding, and projects that achieve their numbers are touted 
as a success. Aid interventions carry the whim of agencies who reset their priorities based on 
funding available. Implementers work to please their donors, not the women they are 
helping. While feedback on the success of income generation projects is mixed, Afghan 
men expressed their dislike tor the initiatives, particularly in their promises for dramatic 
changes for women. This presenfs a further illustration of strategic rhetoric and practical 
implementation. One man expressed the views of many, saying that “Afghan women should 
not be the clothes-washers of f o r e ig n e r s ” An Afghan woman echoed this: “After this
130 Watkins explains that "only poorer classes, usually Hazaras, ever permitted their women to work as maids, so 
servants were and to a  large extent still are males", thus it is not even appropriate for most Afghan women to work in
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much work has been done and promised to women, all women are doing is washing 
clothing in the offices and that is it” .
Practical and Strategic Interventions
Carlin's USAID/OTI Project Analysis, discussed in Chapter III, represents a good example of 
the distinction between strategic and practical interventions. The analysis lists 178 grants 
awarded to interventions "benefiting women and girls” between October 2001 and April 
2005 (Carlin 2005). I was given documentation in confidence, which was not released 
publicly. Of 178 grants, nine can be considered to meet wom en’s strategic interests. Again, I 
do not intend to be rigid about the strategic and practical distinction, and I do recognize 
the ability of practical interventions to have strategic outcomes. However, it presents a good 
point of comparison between the rhetoric that animated interventions and the interventions 
themselves. Carlin writes that "calls by the US Administration to liberate Afghan women... 
raised expectations that assisting women was to be a top priority” (2005: 36). And yet, 106 of 
178 grants were for construction, reconstruction, and equipment. I do not negate the 
importance of construction projects as these do have a value (symbolic as well as physical) 
and take major resources that USAID is well equipped to provide. The point to be taken from 
these examples is the distinction between strategic promises and rhetoric and practical 
interventions.
One example of a strategic intervention merits focus. The grant - Two Civic Education 
Workshops for Women, Bamyan Center -  proposed human rights workshops using the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
Afghan Constitution as foundations for the training. It sought to benefit 100 women and 50 
men - both educated and non-educated of different social groups -  in order to "raise 
awareness and understanding of basic human rights, enhancing women's status in Afghan 
society” . The total amount requested was $3,645 USD (USAID/OTI/Afghanistan 2005: 6).
Examples of practical interventions include: Purchase of Radios for Distribution in the North 
and West ($127,000); Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Zinab Auditorium Rubble Removal, Kabul 
($9,477); Micro-enterprise for Women -  Poultry Raising Courses, Kapisa Province ($19,269); 
and Shallow Wells and Hand Pumps for Aunaba Village, Panjshir ($82,910); amongst many
houses. For more information, see Watkins, M. B. f t9631. Afghanistan: Land in Transition. Princeton, D.Van Nostrond 
Co.
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others. It is worthwhile noting the ditference in financial resource allocation to strategic 
versus practical initiatives in this case.
An oft-cited example of a USAID-supported practical intervention that was perceived to 
come at the expense of other initiatives is the Kabul-Kandahar highway. In the words of one 
journalist:
There has been a lot of talk o f reconstruction and rebuilding, but this issue could only 
be understood it one compares the substance against the rhetoric and the large 
amount o t money allocated tor the so-called reconstruction. Ot all the whooplas 
m ade ot reconstruction... This hallmark ot achievement that the US brags about was 
com pleted 40 percent during the Taliban government. While the highway is 
inaugurated, it still needs significantly additional work to remain intact. The 
inauguration ot the highway was a political ploy aimed to convince the critiques that 
the reconstruction has been going smooth. It is hardly so.
(Miraki 2006)
And in the words of one Afghan man who expresses the sentiments of many: "There are 
more important things than the Kabul-Kandahar road for Afghans right now. We need a rich 
nation with a stomach full of food, not with its eyes full of scenes of buildings and roads".
In addition to the Women’s Resource Centers discussed in Chapter III, one of the more 
contentious projects supported by USAID/OTI was known os the Afghan Beauty School, to 
offer women who are otherwise unable to receive training with “an opportunity to develop a 
sellable skill set that can support themselves and their families" (USAID/OTI/Afghanistan 2005: 
25). The estimated grant amount for the beauty school was $44,685, not including support 
from international cosmetic companies such as Revlon, L'Oreal, and MAC. The grant 
description states that the program will benefit 60-100 beauticians and seven instructors 
every year (USAID/OTI/Afghanistan 2005: 25). This effort has since been “ re-interpreted by the 
West as an example of wom en’s liberation" (Herold 2006). An article aptly titled Lipstick 
Liberation was one of many that appeared about the highly-publicized initiative. It depicted 
a photo of a chaddari-clad  woman with a caption that read: “Many women still choose to 
wear a burka [sic] to hide their unfashionable clothing" (BBC News 2002).
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This controversial project -  a ‘pet project’ of Western women in the fashion and beauty 
industries -  benefited very few but gained so much press that it has since becom e an 
international film, with no plans of an Afghanistan r e l e a s e ’ l l .  Following a dramatic and 
confusing fall-out between the donors and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the school fell into 
anonymity alongside other ‘fa iled’ projects. The beauty school exists today in a much more 
muted form, although its credibility has been significantly dam aged. It is, however, an 
example of an effort whose effects cannot be measured in terms of tangible improvements 
in lives and livelihoods.
The Database on Women’s Projects for December 2001 to August 2003 sought to make the 
distinction between strategic and practical interventions to measure improvements by 
determining where money was going and whether empowerment was indeed the 
outcome. This was one of the first attempts to put wom en’s projects together in a central 
space -  it was also one of the first initiatives of its kind to employ an entirely Afghan team. 
While they recognized that not all projects involving women are ‘wom en’s projects’, per se, 
the team set out to define what constitutes a wom en’s project as opposed to other social 
projects. The database further distinguished those wom en’s projects that focus on wom en’s 
self-sufficiency from those that do not. This con be loosely applied to the above distinction 
between strategic interests and practical needs. Of a total of 943 projects in the database, 
the team argued that 394 projects will contribute to self-sufficiency (The Notional Center for 
Policy Research 2004: 17). If the projects are further divided along the lines of strafegic 
interesfs and practical needs, as described above (with the knowledge that practical 
initiatives can still have strategic outcomes), the picture appears slightly different.
A more focused division of the projects and a removal of those that are focused exclusively 
on practical needs yields 193 projects that could contribute to strategic interests. The rest -  
agriculture, relief assistance, environment, art/culture, and so on -  do not. Of the 193 
projects that could be aligned with strategic interests, many of them were difficult to 
decipher. The final figure is therefore quite generous and may not accurately project reality. 
Despite the discrepancy in figures, the database team still concludes that insufficient 
attention has been paid to women. Amidst international claims that the situation of Afghan 
women has been the measure of progress in Afghanistan is measured, the database team 
calls it a ‘silent yardstick’ (The National Center for Policy Research 2004: 4). The team
httD://www.beautvacademvofkabul.com/html/svnoDsis.htm
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presents a list of additional criticisms, including the very small number of project participants 
that are assisted by these ambitious initiatives and the focus, which they refer to os 
"temporary, one time and short” (The Notional Center for Policy Research 2004: 20).
Measuring Empowermenf
How, then, can one measure a ‘wom en’s project’ on its ability to foster empowerment? 
Kabeer cautions that interventions need to reflect on the concept of empowerment and 
how it relates to wom en’s strategic gender interests (1994: 261). The Human Development 
Report cites measures of ‘em powerment’ from a human development perspective, but 
these can be extended to a focus on gender (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
2004). The following variables can be used to analyze intervention priorities in Afghanistan 
from a gender and empowerment perspective. A key factor is the extent to which there has 
been participation in the elaboration of strategies and implementation of programs. Clear 
indicators to the contrary include lack of consultation with communities, rushed design of 
programs in order to meet deadlines and access conference-related funding, and 
preparation of documents in English by foreign advisors^^ 2 Kondiyoti expressed it this way:
There Is also a disjuncfure between, on the one hand, the time frames adopted and 
outputs expected by international actors driving the wom en’s rights agenda, and on 
the other, the length of time required for non-cosmetic changes in societal relations 
to develop as a result of peace-building. Since the issue of women's rights continues 
to occupy a highly politicized and sensitive place in the struggles between  
contending political factions in Afghanistan, this disjuncture may itself produce  
unintended effects, with disempowering consequences for women.
(2005: vii)
It is impossible to measure what has been achieved if funding cannot be traced and there is 
little understanding of the means by which policies should translate into practice. To 
reinforce this, a gender otficer for an international agency said: "The general impression I get 
is that there is a lack of indicators and a lack of quantitative and qualitative tools for 
measuring change/progress. If you know of any, tell m el” She also expressed strong doubts
The Human Development Report explains that aid strategies tor Atghanistan were presented to Atghans as a  fait 
accompli. UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004). Afghanistan National Human Development Report 
2004: Security with a  Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities. Kabul, UNDP.
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that interventions had consulted women or felt that they were accountable to women. As a 
result, the aid apparatus might not feel responsible for what has happened since they 
intervened.
Research has demonstrated the limitations ot aid interventions in their ability to foster 
empowerment for women. One effect is the perceived disempowerment of men. Cleaver 
states that “men threatened by such changes resort to domestic violence” (2002: 8). She 
questions “whether promoting women's empowerment at the expense of men is beneficial 
to all in the long term" (2002: 8). This will be elaborated in the next chapters through the 
voices of Afghan men and women, however such perspectives also emerged from 
interviews with policy-makers and policy implementers, although to a lesser extent.
An Afghan woman NGO leader urged that Afghan women comply with the country’s social 
and cultural values because “any rapid changes could result in a revolutionary reaction” . 
The senior gender officer of a UN agency elaborated:
There has not been an overnight revolution, a shift from oppression to liberation. 
Change does not happen that fast. Also, women are savvy enough to know that the 
last times there were dramatic and sudden shifts toward a Western model the 
resultant backlash undid any gains made. There is no need for a revolution, rather for 
a gradual evolution towards more gender equality.
Conclusions
The following themes can be gleaned from this analysis of the journey from policy 
formulation to interpretation to implementation: interventions possess neither a clear 
understanding of the definition of gender nor the understanding of how to bring its programs 
to fruition. The de facto  definition of 'gender interventions’ is ‘wom en’s programs’ . The 
agency of both women and men has been denied through attempts to import an agenda 
of social change coupled with the lack of contextualized analysis that accom panied 
program design. In practice, aid rhetoric foils to match implementation reality because 
technical solutions are offered to ‘solve’ political problems. This reflects a disconnect 
between policy and practice, and a further disconnect between an understanding of 
technical and political issues. The argument is not a simple one. To argue that interventions 
focusing on technical over political issues destabilized men’s honor is almost counter-
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intuitive. Interventions presented ttieir goal as ‘strategic’, and in principle ttiis shiould hiave 
been met with high resistance. But when these interventions manifested themselves in 
technical ways, it undermined men’s sense of ‘being a m an’ and ate at their honor. One 
might question how, if political interests had been met alongside technical interventions, 
Afghan women and men would have reacted. In this vein, meeting men's practical needs 
through technical interventions could have resulted in strategic gains for women by allowing 
them the space within which they can define and address their own interests.
This chapter lays the foundation for Chapter VI, which begins the discussion of themes that 
emerged from data  collected with 71 Afghan women and 50 Afghan men on identity 
markers, definitions of gender roles and relations, and evolution of gender roles in different 
periods throughout Afghan history. Gender relations represent the most stark example of the 
difficulties of working in a context of rapid political change and slower social change, where 
international voices have the potential to supersede local priorities (Winthrop 2003). Indeed, 
Sylvia Walby argues that particular feminist movements are endogenous and generated in 
wom en’s own interests, but the conflict occurs when the voices of the international political 
project -  in this case the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the quest for gender equality -  
drowns out local voices (1997). To this end. Chapter VI starts with local voices to provide an 
understanding of how Afghan men and women define their own identities and priorities.
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CHAPTER VI: Identity Markers and the Gender Order
The gender order is presented as a starting point and in this chapter is deconstructed in the 
Afghan context. This concept merits examination in order to illuminate the relations between 
women and men within social processes -  in this case within the context of aid interventions. 
The gender order is a culturally, socially, and historically em bedded concept that can 
change and evolve, os Afghan history has demonstrated. It is therefore imperative that the 
gender order is contextualized using Afghan voices to determine how men and women 
construct their relationships to one another and how these relationships might be changing 
in the aftermath. It is essential to recognize that these concepts vary between and within 
Afghan men and women. "To speak of ‘the situation of Afghan women' is to generalize 
unconstructively" (Centlivres-Demont 1994: 334). Beall states that while it is useful to consider 
women as equal stakeholders, taking into account their needs and interests, it is potentially 
dangerous to characterize women en masse as they are just as likely as men to have 
opposing as well as complementary interests and concerns (1996: 12). She writes: "If women 
ore singled out as one, singular group, specific gender issues get ignored" (1996: 12).
In her research on gender identities in Cyprus, Cockburn argues for greater attention to and 
a nuanced understanding of identities, their relevance and political importance (2004). 
Collective identities ore formed through discourse and are defined by the power and 
persuasiveness of social forces that seek to enforce them (2004: 28). It is in this vein that the 
following examination ot identities is conducted. This also resonates with what Geertz calls 
“seeing their experiences within the framework of their own idea of what selfhood is" (1983: 
59). Molyneux argues that gender interests are not necessarily transparent, just as gender 
identity is not the sole identity, nor necessarily the most salient. Sex might not be a sufficient 
basis for assuming common interests (1998). There is therefore a need to engage with a more 
animated understanding of gender identities - particularly as com pared to other identity 
markers -  and their contributions to shaping women's and men's roles and relationships in 
conflict and the aftermath (Bouta, Frerks et al. 2005: xxviii).
Identity in Afghanistan is a fluid concept and has experienced shifts over time and in 
different phases of conflict and peace. An understanding of Afghan identity in the 
aftermath is an important starting point to determine the ways in which Afghans define 
themselves and how these identity markers are reinforced or sidelined by external influences. 
With the renewed focus on reconstruction, nation building and developing a civil society.
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there is an increasing struggle for identity that merits investigation (Osman and Loewen 2005: 
xxxi). The term Afghaniyat represents the sense of Afghan national identity that fluctuates in 
different periods of Afghan history. Afghaniyat is not based on the individual but is deeply 
em bedded in the collective units of the tribe, clan, and family. "These reinforce accepted 
norms of behavior and function as economic, political and cultural units that act on behalf 
of those who comprise them" (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 11). It is this 
collective nature of Afghaniyat that determines Afghans’ sense of self and place in the 
world and how they deal with alien ideologies (Johnson and Leslie 2004).
Similarly, wom en’s identity is also part of the collective. Despite this knowledge, and the 
myriad efforts to ‘mainstream’ gender, women are continuously singled out as a ‘category’ 
in isolation from their wider social, cultural, and family contexts (UNDP and Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan 2004: 216-7). For a more thorough understanding, researchers on Afghanistan 
have suggested that it is worthwhile to examine the development of policies pertaining to 
wom en’s roles in Afghanistan since the beginning of the 20 ^^  century. Nancy Hatch Dupree’s 
study of fhe Afghan family in the context of crisis arficulafes that social institutions, such as 
the family, warrant investigation. Afghan women traditionally play the role of wife and 
mother, and the conduit through which Islam is passed from one generafion to the next. "Yet 
with too few exceptions, assistance providers have made few attempts to unravel [identity] 
contradictions, even as they doggedly push gender issues to the forefront with singular 
aggressiveness" (2004: 311).
1. An Identity in Crisis
Similar to other patriarchal societies, gender roles in Afghanistan are shaped by socio­
cultural factors largely based on wom en’s role as keepers of the family honor. "Women 
don’t exist in isolation", a married Afghan man explained. Attempts to separate women from 
family and communify are met with strong resistance. It is neither possible nor appropriate to 
refer only to Afghan women since their plight is usually inextricably linked with that of their 
families (Barakat and Wardell 2001). Development for Afghan women is perceived in the 
context of interrelationships (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). However many aid programs in 
Afghanistan have focused on women by excluding men, thereby perpetuating an 
environment that is unable to find roots in Afghan society. Contextualizing sex reveals that it 
is superseded by other social categories and identity markers. "Key to understanding the 
Afghan notion of identity is that it is formed in relation to others: to family, to community, to
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tribe or ethnic group" (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 30). Women and men alike tend to define 
themselves within these social structures. In interviews with Afghan women and men, most of 
them did not identify themselves as women/men over other identity markers (such as nation, 
religion, class, lineage, tribe, clan, and ethnic group’33). a  head of an international NGO 
explained the importance of contextualizing identity this way:
We (fhe organization) work within the family context and do not talk 'gender'. I was 
advised early on by associates a t USAID and UNIFEM to ‘talk gender’ to the donors 
but ‘do family'. You express the issue of gender so well - change in gender roles vs. 
change in gender relations^^^. It cannot be emphasized enough.
An understanding of identity markers is essential for policy-makers and policy implementers 
firstly because it explains how aid can reinforce divisions or cohesion, particularly in context 
of conflict and the aftermath. Aid interventions that have not taken identity markers into 
account could not only reinforce divisions, but also foster new divisions. Johnson and Leslie 
report that aid institutions in Afghanistan demonstrated their feeble understanding of the 
Afghan ‘order’ through the manner in which they sought to distribute aid. Lacking this 
knowledge, aid institutions sought to isolate segments of the population for aid, following 
which the community undertakes its own redistribution according to the social lines that 
make sense to them. The problem arises when aid exclusively targets one social segment 
and the community is not given the opportunity to redistribute (2004: 37). The notion that aid 
interventions might be divisive is not unusual. Aid can be divisive in the context of conflict 
and the aftermath when it is distributed according to crude divisions in society instead of 
based on opportunities for peace. In this vein, it becomes important to recognize where the 
particular fissures are in the society and where connections can be made. Such choices can 
determine whether the effects of such efforts are positive or n e g a t i v e '3 5 .  These choices also 
carry implicit ethical messages. In the context of Afghanistan’s highly gendered intervention, 
one might wonder what the perceptions the men have of the focus on women. These 
strategic and seemingly apolitical decisions end up sending political messages and 
destabilizing deeply rooted social structures.
’33 Ethnic groups In Afghanistan include; Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Aymaq, Turkmen, Baluchi, Nuristani, Pashai.
’34 In this context, she is referring to my previous publications including the FES report, amongst others. FES is Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, the German foundation to support the social democrat party.
’35 The concept of 'do no harm' expands on this, arguing in favor ot a  contextualized understanding so that aid 
interventions ovoid additional dam age to those they are trying to assist. Anderson, M. B. (19991. Do No Harm: How 
Aid Con Support Peace - Or War. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
133
It was generally agreed that it is the responsibility of the aid apparatus and its policy-makers 
and policy implementers to understand that women in Afghanistan do not see themselves as 
individuals as much as part of the community and family. It is possible, therefore, to make 
gains for Afghan women by designing interventions that reflect an understanding of the 
context and that builds on these inter-relationships. On the importance of a contextualized 
understanding, former Minister of Women's Affairs Masuda Jalal had the following to soy:
We are from fhe communify. We know our communify. We are better a t finding the 
righf approaches. We know the problems, we can recognize and idenfify them 
better. We know how to fransfer the informafion in the righf language, using the righf 
words. We have fhis advanfage. We will work better fogefher fhan infemafional 
communify would alone. Reaching the lasf woman in the farfhesf place of the 
CO un fry is only possible if infemafional agencies come fogefher in parfnership wifh us.
Work on gender equality should be grounded in the local contexts and should understand 
the processes of socialization and historical resistance. Change imposed from the outside is 
strongly resisted, as experience in Afghanistan has shown. Working within the local cultures 
and traditions helps ground interventions in contexts that are understood. Reports and 
myriad examples explain that men specifically may be less resisfant to changes when the 
changes are grounded in their own traditions’ 6^. Therefore, without assuming a priori that 
gender is the most salient category, the analysis of this data begins with the possibility that 
gender might not be a category of particular relevance in the Afghan context and that it 
might in fac t extract women and men from their contexts. This research therefore seeks first 
to determine the social categories around which interests are articulated.
Afghan Idenfifies
Magnus and Naby are among the few researchers who present analyses of Afghan 
identities. They explain:
The basic elements of fhe Afghan lifesfyle depend on family relafionships... and a 
sense of permanence, not of fhe individual but of fhe communify. Loyaify pafferns
’36 For further Information, see Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2005). Mascullnlfles: Male 
Roles and M ale Involvemenf In fhe Promoflon of Gender Equollfy. New York, Women's Commission for Refugee 
Women and Children. Also see Pool, P. (2002). Gender In Tronslflon. Woshlngfon, DC, World Bank.
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begin with family and extend fo village or tribe, and then to ethnic group. The 
extension o f loyalty to country has not achieved universal acceptance as has 
allegiance to Islam, which is im bedded in the community traditions... The definition of 
gender roles lies a t the heart of maintenance of these lifestyles.
(1998: 18-9)
In line with Magnus and Naby, Anthropologist Whitney Azoy also explains the social principles 
on which Afghans find common ground. He cites kinship as the most significant institution in 
lives of Afghans, one where there exists a clear locus of authority based on the patriarchal 
structure led by the senior-most male, or rish sated (literally "white beard") (2003: 24-6). The 
concept of Afghaniyat is based on a patriarchal social structure whose foundation is the 
qawm, or collective unit based on dependents, led by the rish safed. Qawm  begins with the 
nuclear family and extends upwards. Underlying this is the foundation of Islam, the strongest 
unifying force in Afghanistan. Nassrine Gross also examines the markers animating 
Afghaniyat, articulating that Afghan national identity is comprised of four separate identities: 
individual, religious, ethnic, national. Individual, in Gross' understanding, comprises family 
identity and traditional roles and relations. The second identity in Gross' hierarchy is religion, 
namely Islam. Ethnic identity follows, os “ the guardian of the history of the social group, 
[teaching] the values and relations of the social group to its members" (2000). Finally, there is 
Afghan national identity: "a t the cross-section of family, religion and ethnicity" (2000).
Due to ethnic conflicts and ongoing tensions, it is often assumed a priori that ethnicity is the 
most salient aspect of Afghaniyat. Contrary to these assumptions, the various ethnic groups 
have evolved into a fairly common culture, psychology and ethos (UNDP and Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 101). Even these seemingly-fixed categories have fluctuated 
over time and as a result of various political projects and powers. The fluidity of ethnic 
identity is a social and political construct, changing according to the pressure put upon it 
(Johnson and Leslie 2004: 52), as is the aspect of one ethnicity being traditionally more 
'conservative' than o t h e r s "War not only brought about an increased awareness of 
ethnic identity", Johnson and Leslie articulate, "it also changed how people categorize
'37 It is generally assumed that Pashtuns are the more conservative ethnic group. This leads to facile analyses 
assuming that all things ‘traditional’ em anate from this particular group. Such an example reinforces the importance 
of not taking ethnic identity at face value. For more information, see Johnson, C. and J. Leslie (2004). Afghanistan: 
The Mirage of Peace. London, Zed Books.
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themselves” (2004: 5 2 ) Cockburn writes of a similar phenomenon in Cyprus, where ethnic 
divisions were initially fixed categories that passed without further scrutiny. She concluded, 
however, that: “Ethnicity... is best seen as an investment in cultural differentiation by 
particular social actors, often elites, with a political intention. For this reason, ethnic names... 
can never be taken at face value" (2004: 29).
The importance of multiple identities merits a brief elaboration at this juncture. Amartya Sen's 
book, Idenfify and Violence, argues strongly against a ‘solitarist* approach to human identity 
(2006 ) ’39. Individuals balance many identities simultaneously, and any pressure to partition 
them under a sole identity label is futile. Sen clearly elaborates that choice of identity 
depends on context and is susceptible to external influences. These external influences 
could even go so far as to fabricate conscious difference where none previously existed. Sen 
further explains that singular affiliations of identity could be divisive, instigating social tension 
and violence. Sen's analysis can be placed in the context of Afghanistan’s historical and 
political changes, where Afghan analyses of their own identity are likely to be im pacted by 
the attention of the so-called international community on the country and its nation-building 
project.
It is in this vein, therefore, that the subject of identities is approached. I argue that aid 
interventions in Afghanistan indeed adopted a 'solitarist' approach to identity -  in this case 
sex - and in fact made those in question more conscious of their sex, particularly in that one 
was prioritized over the other. Afghan women have been characterized as a singular group 
on the basis of a shared o p p r e s s i o n T h e  question that should be asked is to what extent 
aid interventions allowed program participants the freedom to prioritize their identities. To this 
end, I e lected to begin the research by analyzing identity markers in order to challenge the 
assumption that sex was the primary category of affiliation for Afghan women.
Interviews were conducted with 71 Afghan women, selected based on their participation in 
aid interventions through local NGOs, and 50 Afghan men. Twenty-five of the men 
interviewed were husbands or male agnates of the women participants -  fathers and
’38 Johnson and Leslie cite the example ot the ethnic group "Tajik”, explaining that this particular label was applied 
to them by Western and Soviet ethnologists and is still not firmly used. There exists today a  fluidity between the ethnic 
labels Tajik and Haraza, for instance. Works by Olivier Roy also address these issues.
’39 Sen defines a  ‘solitarist’ approach as one “which sees human beings as members of exactly one group" Sen, A. 
(2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destinv. London, Penguin Books.
This concept comes from Mohonty's discussion ot women as a  category of analysis. To counter this, Mohonty 
mokes a  good argument for the analysis of identities as a  source of knowledge and basis tor mobilization. Mohonty, 
C. T. (2003). Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizina Theory. Practicina Solidarity. Durham, Duke UP.
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brothers. Such interviews allowed for a more detailed analysis at the household level and 
provided useful comparison between women and men’s perspectives. Twenty-five men 
were selected randomly.
The majority of the women interviewed (63%) originated from rural areas, were married 
(55%), and have no education (59%). They represent diverse ethnic groups and age groups 
None of the men interviewed were engaged in aid interventions. The majority of the men 
also came from rural areas (66%) and were married (56%). However, the majority of the men 
have seven or more years of education. This reflects Afghan realities as boys’ education is 
prioritized over that of girls. Human Rights Watch states that in 2004, 20% of boys were in 
school com pared to 5% of girls (2006). As with the women, their ages and ethnic groups 
varied.
The discussion began by asking participants to rank five different aspects of their identity in 
order of importance to t h e m T h e  options were as follows:
Notional Identity 
Religious Identity 
Ethnic/Tribal Identity 
Sex
Family Identity
The rationale behind this exercise was to come to a better understanding of how Afghans 
value particular aspects of their identities. Asking respondents to prioritize one identity as the 
most important does not intend to negate the existence of multiple identities simultaneously, 
nor does it ignore the fact that identities and affiliations change in time and in different 
contexts. This aspect of the research simply demonstrates that the artificial divisions in 
programming based on sex might not have been valid for some participants, it might have, 
in fact, extracted women and men from their social roles and challenged their other, 
perhaps stronger, affiliations.
Religious identity ranked first for both women and men as the primary social category within 
which they were more closely affiliated. The majority of the women interviewed placed their
Please refer to the Methodology (Appendix I) tor tables providing a  demographic breakdown ot those 
interviewed.
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Afghan identity as second, followed by ethnicity. Sex and family ranked at the lower end ot 
the spectrum.
Identity Ranking -  Women
Identity Ranking -  
Women
Number of Votes 
(out of 71)
Percentage of Total 
for Women
1. Religion 34 48%
2. Afghan 16 23%
3. Ethnicity 15 20%
4. Sex 5 6%
5. Family 2 3%
Men ranked identity markers similar to women. Religion received the majority vote (60%). 
Afghan identity was tied with family affiliations. Sex received 6% ot the vote, followed by 
ethnicity at 2%.
Identity Ranking - M e n
Identity Ranking -  
Men
Number of Votes 
(out of 50)
Percentage of Totai 
for Men
1. Religion 30 60%
2. Afghan/Family 8 16%
3. Sex 3 6%
4. Ethnicity 1 2%
The Role o f Islam
Religion has always pervaded Afghan daily life, and in this society everyone knows 
perfectly well what is proper and what is not... Afghans are intent on maintaining 
their tradition through... the relationships between men and women.
(Delloye 2003: 17}
The ranking ot religious identity reflects the prominence Islam has in Atghanistan, and the 
consequences it Islam is sidelined or perceived to be so, as Afghan history aptly 
demonstrates. Anthropologist Azza Karam writes that “ the importance ot religious identities is 
insufficiently analyzed and little understood" in her work on Islamisms (2000: 50).
'^2  Segments of this section were previously published. Abircfeh, L. (2003). "The Role of Religion in the Lives of Women 
in the New  Afghanistan." Critical Holt 1(1).
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The role of religion is therefore deserving of particular focus, given its prominence in the lives 
of Afghan women and men. In dialogues with Afghan women, they frequently repeated 
that they are Muslim and choose to define themselves within the context ot Islam and its 
prescribed roles tor women. They defined Islam as a “complete religion", and expressed that 
they are content within its parameters, electing freely to abide by its tenets. “ Islam is the 
primary point ot guidance", one woman articulated. "Without it, there cannot be progress". 
Many men said that their religion is “everything" to them, and therefore those of a different 
religion are “outside ot [Afghan] society’s laws".
Most women argued that their role in Islam is no different from that ot a man, stating that it is 
the duty ot both women and men to be good Muslims. “There is no difference between 
Allah's creatures," one woman explained. Afghan women in the focus groups felt strongly 
that Islam, more than any other religion, guarantees equal rights to men and women. 
“Women have the right to work, to study. Women have lots of rights," they said. “ Women 
have rights in Islam. They can work outside of the house," one woman added. Women 
explained that they prefer to find ways to defend their rights within an Islamic context. They 
want to search for answers in the Koran, or through another practicing Muslim. And fhey 
want to know more about Islam and the rights that it affords them. One woman explained: 
“When a baby is born, the family says ‘you are Muslim, you ore Muslim’ but the child is never 
taught why... so they hove a hard time differentiating between the culture and religion". In 
Afghanistan, this line is further blurred as tribal customs merge Islam with their own practices. 
Norms governing women in Afghanistan are often based on tribal codes that trump Islamic 
laws - particularly in the case of Islam’s more enlightened messages on women^^s ^  woman 
explained the dynamic this way: “There are lots of rules for women in Islam, but people 
weren’t educated enough and didn’t have much information about their religion. So people 
preached some wrong words about Islam."
Discussions on the role of Islam in Afghanistan quickly becam e expressions of duty to 
safeguard the religion and concern that it could once again be threatened by occupying 
regimes. Many respondents evoked their historic responsibility to defend and prefect the 
religion from “outside interference". For example, one young woman originating from rural 
Afghanistan explained: “Our ancestors have always struggled to receive this religion and we
'^ 3 Chapter VII Includes o further discussion on Pashtunwali.
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are responsible to save it” . Most men expressed a strong need to safeguard Islam -  
particularly its measures regarding women - from foreign interference and i n f l u e n c e O n e  
younger man put it this way: "Religion is an important factor for Muslims. To defend it they will 
sacrifice everything". "Islam provides and respects any opportunities for women, but 
unfortunately a non-respectable culture has been mixed with Islam,” one woman said’'‘5. 
Many Mullahs are to blame, they say. "They want to change Islam and mix it with culture 
and custom” . Respondents viewed the Taliban as a manifestation of foreign influence that 
has ‘soiled’ the true nature of Islam. "They tried to ac t like Muslims and they tried to alter 
Islam and disrespect the culture of Afghanistan,” one woman said. "During the Taliban 
regime, it was just the name of Islam, but not real Islam. They were like wild animals” . "All of 
their ideas were wrong. They said that women should wear the chaddari. They said we must 
cover. All things were wrong.” "Taliban regime was a dark regime,” one woman said. "They 
forced people to do things that they w anted” . Many women were quick to blame "invading 
cultures and customs” for polluting the Afghan version of Islam. The women strongly 
expressed a dislike for foreign intervention and a desire to regain Afghan autonomy.
Similar to the interviews, Islam emerged as the unanimous choice of primary identity in all 
focus g r o u p s C l e a r l y ,  the importance of operating firstly within the context of Islam 
cannot be overstated. In fact, many respondents felt that aid interventions "failed to 
operate within the Muslim context” and -  more seriously -  "lured Afghans away from Islam” . 
One woman explained that the fear of aid institutions being perceived and therefore 
labeled as un-lslamic was sufficient reason to avoid them. "Now that we are a little bit free,” 
one woman explained, "I will not be a servant of human beings. I am only a servant of G od” .
Afghaniyat and Other Markers
Women and men who selected Afghan as their primary identification expressed pride in 
being Afghan and a strong sense of Afghaniyat. Both men and women in this category 
generally felt that an Afghan identity is what will bring cohesion to a fragmented society. 
They expressed a desire to re-invigorate the concept of Afghan and, as one older woman
The need to defend Islam is a  reoccurring theme in Afghan literafure and expressions. One such proverb referring 
fo defending Islam is: "O foreigner, do not attack -  attacking is our job!". Shah, S. f2003). The Storyteller's Dauahter. 
London Penguin.
’<5 Allusions to the ‘other’ culture that has altered Islam generally refer to the Wahhabi version of Islam, originafing in 
Saudi Arabia.
Four focus group sessions were held: three with women and one with men. Chapter VII has more details on the 
outcom e of the sessions.
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put it, to “ try to be as one people". An illiterate woman of rural origins put it ttiis way: "We are 
all Afgtians first. The rest just divides us". This is a sentiment shared by many in this category. 
Another older woman said “being Afghan is what holds us together. It should be our 
strength".
Of those who selected Afghan, many connected their Afghan identity with their ability to 
drive non-Afghans away. An older man stated that the “ importance of being Afghan is 
because Afghans never want to convert their Afghan identity". Another man reinforced this 
point by saying: “We don't want to lose our identity and sell ourselves". Many of the men in 
this category expressed a belief in the strength of Afghans as a force to act in unity against 
non-Afghans. A teenage male of rural origins said:
Afghan also means national unify, brotherhood, balance. The first factor to fulfill all
the mentioned aims is fa be an Afghan. And our national interests are in being an
Afghan. It is our responsibility to protect if.
A few of the women who selected Afghan also connected their role os women to their role 
as keepers of men’s honor -  and therefore notional honor. One 23-year old married woman 
with two years of education explained that being Afghan means that "the women shall be 
kept a t home and no one shall see her. Her role is to do the work of the home and to act as 
men wish". Another woman from the countryside put it this way: “ I put women lost because 
men are the highest degree and women are the lowest. It is more important that we are all 
Afghans". One woman ranked her Afghan idenfity lowest, explaining that "Afghan is last 
because Afghanistan has done nothing good for women". She ranked ethnicify as her 
primary form of identification.
Of the few interviewees that selected sex, they recognized that the distinction has become 
important in Afghanistan’s aftermath. One married woman in her early 80s put it this way: 
“This has become the most important thing in our new time of peace". This perspective was 
reinforced by another woman who said: “being a woman is now important in Afghanistan, 
before it was not". A woman from Kabul explained thaf if she were a man, she would have 
picked sex as the most important identity marker - but she is not a man. Only one woman -  
and one man -  expressed a more positive and hopeful sentiment. A 31-year old woman with 
no education said she “believe[s] in the strength of Afghan women". A man from rural 
Afghanistan with primary education held a liberal view, using words like “equality" and
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"rights". He explained that "in recent years, relations between husband and wife - and all 
men and women -  have turned very bad. To remake these relations is an important factor” .
In Afghanistan’s aftermath, very few respondents chose to identify wifh their ethnic group as 
this was a divisive issue during the conflicti^?. in fact, one older woman put it this way: 
"During the conflict, ethnicity became the most important thing for us". She explained that 
she still clings to these views and is not ready to look beyond ethnic lines. The other 
respondents -  mostly women -  guard these identity markers because, as one 21-year old 
woman explained, "this is how we understand each other, as tribes and groups” . Ethnic 
identity also included tribal affiliation as these are interconnected in Afghanistan. Another 
woman from rural Afghanistan reinforced fhis view, stating that "we are closest to our tribe 
because this is where we find the most similarities". A 39-year old widow expressed her 
connection to ethnic identity in opposition to gender, stating that "I selected ethnicity 
because these are the things that identify us first, not gender roles and relations". I took 
interest in her use of the word gender as it was the only part of her response that was in 
English. This emphasizes a reoccurring theme in the text: that gender has become an 
imported buzzword for use by Afghans for non-Afghans, and a word for which no translation 
exists.
Many of those who identified with their ethnic group expressed a need to be in a familiar 
context with ‘their own people ’. In the context of conflict and displacement, many Afghans 
have found themselves removed from their families, communities, and tribes and are now 
without the social safety net that these networks provide. The expression nufus-dar was 
employed in this regard. This term literally means ‘having people ’, having a sense of safety 
and belonging, for example wifhin a tribe or clan (Shah 2003). Despite the importance of 
nufus-dar, family affiliation was not a popular answer for women. For the men who said they 
identified firstly with their role as a male member of a family, fhey explained it this way: "I am 
a member of a family first and have an obligation to protect them". Indeed, men who 
selected family as their primary affiliation likely did so because of fheir prominent socio­
cultural role as head of the family and the sense of duty that this brings. Along with this duty
’<7 To reinforce this point, Afghan literature also confirms that ethnic identity is less important than other categories os 
an identity marker. One can learn about the nature of Afghaniyat through stories. Every story "that is staged in Kabul 
is a  window on a  specific ethnographic location... Those scholars who hove slumbered with the idea that ethnicity, 
especially [Pashtun] ethnicity, provided the tromework tor the production of hegemony and domination in 
Atghoniston, will find themselves sideswiped by Akrom Osman’s stories”. Osman, A. and A. Loewen (2005). Real Men 
Keep Their Word: Tales from Kabul. Afghanistan: A Selection of Akram Osman's Dari Short Stories. Oxford, Oxford UP.
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cornes the obligation to protect the family honor as it is intimately linked with the m an’s own 
honor -  and therefore his credibility in the community.
A young man from Kabul felt that family identity connected him to his ancestors, explaining 
the prominent role of older generations in forming the young. He put it this way:
Parents mean responsibility, developing knowledge, culture humanity, religion. They 
explain to us what other divisions and identities like ethnic groups, man/woman, and  
Afghan mean. But parents could also pass on poverty, ignorance, and darkness to 
their children.
Idenfity Ranking -  Women and Men
Identity Ranking -  
Women and Men
Percentage of 
Women of Total
Percentage of 
Men of Total
Percentage of 
Men and Women
Religion 28% 25% 53%
Afghan 19% 13% 20%
Ethnicity 17% 2% 13%
Sex 5% 5% 6%
Family 2% 13% 8%
It is significant that the majority of male and female respondents (53%) selected religion as 
their primary identity affiliation, while only 6% felt that they identified with their sex. It could be 
argued that aid interventions underestimated the importance of Islam on the lives of women 
and men in Afghanistan -  and did not view it as a channel by which to make change. In 
fact, Muslim identity is more than a religious label. It also is an indicator of a person’s 
reputation and a certification that s/he is credible and trustworthy. The expression khub 
musselman ast, literally meaning ’he’s a good Muslim’ is employed for this purpose (Azoy 
2003).
It is also worthwhile noting that 17% of women and only 2% of men identified with their ethnic 
identity. Indeed, Rostami-Povey emphasizes that ethnic identities offer insights to 
understanding gender in Afghanistan (2007). Similar to gender identity, ethnic identity has 
been manipulated by leaders and foreign invaders and is both political subject and object. 
Gender and ethnic identities are subjects of political forces, but also political issues in their 
own right. Women might identify more strongly with ethnic identity because they have
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periodically undergone the political processes of identification that accom pany their own 
identities.
2. Sex and Gender
Generally, men felt more comfortable answering questions about women than the women 
were in answering questions about men. On both sides, however, many expressed a sense 
that they were not qualified to answer questions about the other sex. When asked questions 
about women, most men answered using 'we' -  on behalf of all men. They felt qualified as 
individuals to express views that they believed were held by all men as a collective. The 
women, on the other hand, answered questions as individuals. Both men and women 
emphasized a division of public (male) and private (female) roles common to other 
patriarchal societies.
The male research a ss i s t an tw ho  conducted interviews with the men noted the following:
There were men who welcomed me and answered eagerly, while some men fried fo 
avoid the questions. Answering questions about gender d idn ’t make them happy. 
They hear too much about this, and they are tired o f it. To them, gender means 
woman. And ‘wom an’ means more important than man to the internationals. I am  
an Afghan man so they told me openly about these things.
The female research assistant explained it this way:
I had discussions with [the male research assistant] and learned many surprising 
things. During my interviews with women, impressions were different than with men. 
Most o f the women were comfortable in answering questions and did not have 
trouble addressing issues. Some of them were happy to complain about men! A few  
of them d idn ’t have answers to some of the questions because they had not thought 
of those things before. Generally, it was nice to compare ideas of a man and woman 
from a family. We learned that there are actually very few couples who are thinking 
the same.
For carrying out interviews in Dari and Pashto, I hired two research assistants -  male and female.
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The majority of the women interviewed initially had a difficult time answering questions about 
what it means to be a man in Afghanistan. They hesitated a t first but were able to articulate 
quite clearly upon reflection. They com pared being a man with being a "lord” , possessing 
power, responsibility, and authority. Some of the women expressed a desire for greater 
equality and a dislike for men’s disproportionate share of power, nofing that “men have all 
the rights they w ant” . One woman said that "men are better than women in all aspects, 
meaning they can do most of the things that women are not allowed to d o ” . Another 
recognized that men "have a good position [and] will not give it up". A few women clearly 
articulated that inequality is not exclusive to Afghanistan. One married woman expressed it 
this way: “ Not only in Afghanistan, but everywhere from the first day men have been more 
powerful, strong, and responsible” . During the focus groups, wom en’s opinions gradually 
became stronger, often fueled and encouraged by the other women. For example, a 
widow in her 40s with little education laughed and said: “A man has to be a caring father, a 
kind husband, and an active citizen. I do not know how many men fit this im age” . Men 
interviewed were far more animated in their responses about what it means to be a woman 
in Afghanistan. Men agreed that women are the responsibility of the male members of the 
household -  husband, father, brother, and son -  and that they must "obey the commands” 
issued to them by the men.
Nang: Women
Most of fhe women - regardless of age, marital status, education level, and place of origin -  
felt that Afghan women do suffer under an Afghan patriarchy but are slowly exerting their 
rights. Many of these women felt that they have become conscious of their own suffering by 
viewing themselves through the eyes of the world and its general perception that Afghan 
women are "weak creatures” , as one woman put it. One young unmarried woman 
explained that through the presence of the aid apparatus and their interventions to support 
Afghan women she has learned that "a woman is not very respected [in Afghanistan] as she 
is in other countries” . One middle-aged married woman put it this way:
One category o f women is fhe rural uneducated women, which are under 
oppression o f the men. The view of the world regarding the women in Afghanistan is 
as slave of men and prisoner in the home. The meaning o f women in Afghanistan has
'^ 9 Nang  is defined as honor, particularly the honor that women represent through their behavior.
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corne to mean being deprived of all kinds of rights. As a result Afghan women are 
synonymous with guilt and shame. The men are afraid and so do not let the women 
have an education or take part in the socio-economic spheres o f the community 
because they think it is very bad work and it is very shameful for them to be in the 
public sphere and with the foreigners.
Many women felt that they wanted to be the ones governing the changes that were taking 
place in their lives. Many echoed the sentiment that they are once again objects ot new 
decrees regarding women's roles. One m iddle-aged married woman from the countryside 
explained that "women in Afghanistan must give position to themselves, they have to 
struggle tor their own rights in society". She emphasized the italicized words to indicate that 
Afghan women hove the ability to moke changes that are important to their lives. The 
interviewees recognized that they have agency and are able to ac t on their own behalf, 
despite the challenges they might face. Most ot the women recognized that they carry the 
burden ot the family, community, and national honor. They expressed that they are 
expected to be "obedient" and to be the "keeper ot the family and the honor". A woman 
widow with rural origins explained that "women's behavior represents the family and the 
motherland. It she is good, people will think well ot the family and the nation".
Most ot the respondents recognized that they have been catapulted into the international 
limelight and that they were a relatively new and certainly short-lived focus ot attention. Ot 
those who noted this trend, they expressed discomfort in being the center ot attention and 
the "object" ot pity. A single woman in Kabul pointed out that “ being o woman is now 
important in Afghanistan, before it was not". Another woman articulated that "woman in 
Afghanistan is a very popular object today". Her use ot the word object was deliberate and 
emphasized. She expressed a sentiment echoed by many, namely that Afghan women are 
objectified in the eyes ot foreigners, particularly the media. And that Afghan women are an 
object ot the discourse animating the aid apparatus.
Namoos: Men '^ o
Many women recognized that a change is taking place, and that men tear loss ot power 
and control. A 30-year old woman from the south explained: "Men are unsure ot their role
Namoos is defined as pride, particularly that which Afghan men defend.
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today. They want to bring back the old ways". Other women felt comfortable operating 
within traditional roles and felt that men should shoulder greater responsibility, as is their 
place. "Men are not only responsible for themselves, but they have the responsibility of their 
wives too," a 34-year old married woman explained. The theme of power and honor also 
cam e up repeatedly, with the notable difference being that women represent honor, but 
men defend  it ’^i. Many women preferred that men take on the public roles and felt that this 
in turn gave them more freedom and room to maneuver. A married woman in her early 20s 
articulated it this way: “Men have the full right and control over women in the family. It is their 
role to give their wives and daughters permission to do their tasks". She was not alone in her 
sentiments. Many preferred that the man represent the “public face of the family and the 
defender of the family".
Men generally felt very strongly about their role as provider and repeatedly defined 
themselves as such. Many men echoed the sentiment expressed by a 47-year old married 
man that “a man is responsible to work outside the house and feed his children” . A 19-year 
old single man with nearly 12 years of education stated that "man means leader, power, 
principle. And his every order should be accep ted by the woman". This presents a clear 
example of a sentiment that is shared across age, level of education, marital status, and 
other demographic indicators. A few men expressed fatigue with the responsibility of 
supporting the family, particularly in the context of the aftermath and the econom ic 
challenges it presents. One man put it this way: "Man means one who is wandering in search 
of food 24 hours a day” .
3. Mamus: Roles and Relations^"
Both mole and female interviewees generally agreed that the period before the 1979 Soviet 
occupation was good for both men and women. Most interviewees expressed that men and 
women were satisfied with their position. Women felt that progress was being made toward 
equality. Men generally felt that there was equality, and that no one was concerned with 
place and position. A 44-year old married man added that “ the eyes of people were shut - 
they had no idea about position of men and of women". Many men expressed that 
everyone was generally content -  a period of "respect, friendship and love". One man
’51 The concept of honor will be elaborated in Chapter VII.
152 Mamus is defined os men's duty to protect and respect women. In this sense it links nang (honor) and namoos 
(pride) and can be used to explain gender roles and relations in Afghanistan.
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articulated that "both men and women had a good position before the war. They were able 
to come out of their houses and work safely and live to their potential” . Another agreed, 
elaborating that "women could work with men shoulder to shoulder and they could take 
advantage of their new freedoms” . A 24-year old married man with little education 
explained: "Men and women coordinated with each other and they were solving their 
problems easily and helping each other in every way” . Some interviewees were more 
critical. One man put it this way: "Women didn't know much about their rights and were 
satisfied with what men expected from them ” . A few women noted that this period was 
more contentious and that "women were beginning to fight for rights, but men were resisting 
changes” . A married Kabuli woman complained: "Women were trying to be equal. People 
say that there was equality, but I think it was not there and it could not have remained 
without much resistance” .
The period of conflict was easier for male and female interviewees to define. There was 
general agreement that roles and relations suffered and were superseded by the conflict 
and ensuing violence. However, responses were split on two issues. Some believed that men 
and women suffered equally, while others -  mostly women -  believed that the various 
conflicts im pacted women more than men. A young single man articulated that "positions 
were very bad because women and men were living in very deep sorrow because they 
were put in war unwillingly” . One 53-year old man put it this way: "During that time there was 
no difference to be a man or woman - both of them were punished the same” . An illiterate 
19-year old woman agreed, saying that "things were very bad for women, and even for 
men” . It was generally agreed that the period of conflict destroyed any progress that had 
been achieved in Afghanistan -  particularly in gender relations. One man from rural 
Afghanistan explained it this way: "All people were unsheltered, displaced to different parts 
of the world, and their love changed to violence” . Another man from Kabul reinforced this 
point, explaining that "during the war, relations between men and women were destroyed 
because of ignorance and poverty - and instead violence and tortures started” .
A few respondents felt that women suffered more during the conflict. Women stated that 
"there was much cruelty on women", adding that war stopped all progress between men 
and women and "women's lives becam e a prison” . Another woman held the view that "all 
groups took their anger out on wom en” . A man in his 40s stated that "women suffered a lot 
more than men” . Another man articulated that wom en’s position deteriorated because 
"they were living in violence and struggling to survive, and men were oppressing wom en” .
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An unmairied man in Kabul explained that during the period of conflict "women didn't have 
any relations with men, and women were not able to go out and work because they were 
afraid". One man recognized that women had to take on additional responsibilities, stating 
that "all women were in search of shelter and protection since male responsibilities came to 
them because of war” . Only one man expressed a preference for women’s behavior during 
the conflict, because "women were more safe under the bourka - not like today".
Responses were mixed on the question of gender roles and relations in the aftermath. One 
woman complained: "Now we are in a situation that we were in before, fighting for rights 
and men not wanting to give them". Another said: "Only God knows how women will be". 
And yet another woman reinforced this point: "Today I am not sure which way things will go. 
Women are struggling for their rights, but that does not mean they will succeed". A 19-year 
old man with no education put it this way: "Conditions of the country have a big effect on 
gender relations. I do not think changing roles and relations is a good thing. In Afghanistan 
today, destruction is easy, but building is difficult". Only one woman -  a 25-year old from 
Jalalabad -  expressed a small sense of optimism amidst frustration: "Laws are now equal for 
men and women, but we have to realize these laws in our lives". One woman made an 
important parallel that was echoed in various conversations with interviewees and emerged 
as a response to a variety of questions:
Before fhe war men and women were under the government’s control. During the 
war they were under the control of different regimes. Now again men and women 
are under control -  this time it is the control of the international organizations
This is a particularly worrisome sentiment as it compares the aid apparatus to an occupying 
force or a dictatorial regime that seeks to control the lives of Afghans. A few were quick to 
align the three "occupiers” -  the Soviet Union, the Taliban, and the aid apparatus -  in their 
similar quests to restructure gender roles and relations.
The Gender Order in Historical Perspective
When asked about gender roles and relations during different periods of hisfory, some 
interviewees presented a fuller picture. Both women and men expressed the sentiment that 
things were "better" before the war. They recognized that conflict presents changed 
circumstances and therefore gender roles and relations change -  generally to the detriment
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of women. However, notable differences occur in their perceptions of gender roles and 
relations in the aftermath. Women generally believed that men sought to cling to power and 
were resisting change. A 17-year old illiterate woman told the story this way:
Women were free in fhe early days and men were learning fo accep f women as 
equals. During fhe war, bofh men and women foughf for freedom, but war put men 
in charge again. And now we are fold  to believe that there is freedom, but men are 
sfill wanfing to be in charge.
Some men also expressed optimism and saw that change can be positive, although these 
were in the minority. The narratives ot two men below illustrate the ambiguity within which 
they feel they are operating regarding gender roles and relations today, as com pared to 
different periods in history:
( I) Before the war, everyone undersfood fheir role. Bofh men and women wanfed  -  
and soughf - love befween them. And  they wanfed fhose fhings which can creafe  
love. Before the war, very few women were in government Alfhough they were not 
in the public eye and did  not have im pacf on men, they were confenf. They did  not 
have violence. During the conflic t violence increased. Not just befween men and  
women, but also homelessness, bad  economy, ofher fhings. All of fhis caused 
corruption. Men and women losf fheir position. During the war, women had no 
impacf. Violence againsf them increased. Men didn't have good relations wifh 
women. Everyone was losf in his work and grief. After the peace agreem ent roles [of 
women and men] were expecfed  to get better. Confacf befween men and women 
increased but we can'f see dramafic changes in relations.
(2) Before the war there was not any discussion of righfs, but sfill women's position was 
getting better day by day. Their relations were good. Bofh were living wifh respecf 
and love. Life was good. There was an undersfanding that men and women's 
posifion had  to be different During the war, men's posifion was good  but women's 
was n o t because war converfed fheir ideas complefely and fheir previous ideas 
were ruined. Their relations were not good because war again had  its bad  effects. 
Weak economy and displacemenf drove them to violence. Now we hope for a 
better future. We are looking forward to a day when -  like before - man and woman  
will bofh have a significanf p lace in the sociefy wifhin fheir fradifional posifions.
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The majority of men interviewed were not happy with changes and felt that women are 
stepping out of their prescribed role -  and are encouraged by aid interventions to do so. As 
a result, many men felt that they were losing their 'p lace ', as this 18-year old articulates:
Before fhe war, man and woman had fheir righfs. They were in a very peaceful 
afmosphere. They had no problem fogefher. They had a very good relafionship. 
Violence level befween men and women was very low. Men had respecf for women 
- and so fhe women fo men. During war time, women losf fheir righfs, and fheir roles in 
fhe sociefy. Violence increased incredibly. Previous respecf collapsed. [Women] losf 
fheir dignify. After peace was built dem ocracy has given righfs to the women which 
are not parf of Islamic rules. And now sometimes violence is coming again.
This sentiment is reinforced by a man from Kabul with nearly 12 years of education:
Before the war, man had his p lace in the sociefy and woman had her place. During 
war time, relations befween man and woman were demolished. No one was paying 
attention to fheir place. After the war finished, man and woman received fheir 
posifion and fheir righfs. There musf be a difference befween man and woman. 
Woman has her p lace and man has his.
Some men felt that the issue of power and rights is a zero-sum game, and that women 
cannot gain these things without men having to lose them. As a response to various 
questions, men expressed a sense of feeling lost, less important, and neglected because of 
wom en’s newly granfed power and rights. One man with 10 years of educafion put it this 
way: "First, there wasn't exactly such a thing as ‘wom an’. Then, both woman and man did 
not exist. There was war. Now there isn't such a thing os ‘man” ’.
Changes
Most men feel that changes in relations between men and women ore not a good thing. 
They prefer thaf each understands and respects their roles as Afghan culfure and Islam have 
prescribed. Many of fhe men recognize that circumstances in Afghanistan have changed 
gender relations, and that fluctuations in wom en’s roles have been largely a result of political 
processes. A 28-year old unmarried man explained:
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Social customs of different regimes in different periods have negatively influenced 
the relationship between men and women. It will take time to ignore the ignorant 
customs that are imposed on society. And ‘relationship’ also means women in the 
house, not only outside.
Another man explained that relations change when situations change, and that these 
changes would be good "if men also got advantages". An elderly man with a few years of 
education reinforced this point, explaining that changes in gender relations are "not a good 
thing, because most of the people do not like these changes". Another man expressed that 
change can be a good thing -  "only if it is not against what Afghans want". A man with 12 
years of education expressed concern, explaining that in the past "men had an active role, 
and they were the ones who supported their family. Now that women have a better place in 
society, I am not sure what will happen to men's roles". One 19-year old man lamented:
Extremely bad changes are happening in relations [between men and women]. All 
of these things are bad  - this urging of UN for wom en’s rights all the time. We haven't 
seen a female president in USA so far, but here we saw female candidates in the 
recent election. And still people are putting pressure on Afghanistan to make more 
changes.
Some men expressed willingness to advance toward equality and a recognition that 
wom en’s roles are changing and expanding. These men were not in the majority. For 
example, one middle-aged married man explained:
It is like a dramatic thing to say that rights o f women and men are same. Everybody 
knows that this is not true. It is too early in Afghanistan to say that. Maybe it takes 20 
or 30 years. People are learning now to practice democracy and things like that.
Women held a more cautious view. Some women, like this married woman with no 
education, felt that change must happen a t a pace that works for both women and men. 
She explained that "it is a good thing that relations change, only if they change in a positive 
way for women. And the change must be slow or men will not be able to follow it". Most 
women agreed that change should happen slowly, should be led by Afghans, and should fit 
within the context of Islam. The following women shared this sentiment, amongst others:
152
• Relations ore changing because the world is paying attention to Afghan women. But 
not all the changes are good. The good changes take a lot of time. In time, we con 
work with men as equals.
• Any changes that are too fast are bad. People will not accep t them.
• If the men and women together decide on the changes, they will be good. If
someone else from the outside makes the changes, no one will be happy with it.
A few women expressed the view that "relations ore not changing the way [they] w ant” and
that "relations change because rules and regulations of government change” . This 
reinforces previously-sfated senfiments about gender relations os the victim of various 
regimes and occupying forces.
One woman explained that gender relations hove changed throughout Afghan history, but 
that this particular change is different because women ore "protected objects” . She shared 
her perspective:
I think that relations between men and women change because in different periods, 
the lifestyles o f people were different. During the war, men had learned to be the 
cruel lords and force women to do whatever they liked because the government 
was supporting them to do  so. But now men can't do anything because everyone 
supports women instead.
Common Themes
A few common themes emerged repeatedly in conversations with both Afghan men and 
women. A few interviewees -  all men - held the view that women are doing better in their 
quest for equality. One man explained: "Relations are good - or almost good. Women can 
work alongside men. Women can defend their rights, but they cannot take advantage of 
their liberty” . He elaborated to say that some men might present obstacles in women's path. 
Others felt that full equality has been granted. One educated middle-age man explained 
that "now wom en’s position is better. Women can work. Nothing is imposed by men. 
Everyone has his freedom". Another man from rural Afghanistan felt that things have 
improved for women since the conflict because "tyranny and violence have decreased 
and women's rights ore given. Also, men don't come violently to wom en” .
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The more commonly held view by men was that women are prioritized over men and have 
received a disproportionate share of support, opportunities, and benefits -  specifically from 
aid institutions. This perspective was shared by a w ide variety of men, regardless of 
education, age, and marital status. Some of their responses were:
• Men’s rights have gotten worse as women's get better. But I hope it will get better in 
the future.
• Men were not open minded to let their women work outside but since the Americans 
cam e and insisted on this, women are outside. Men only accep t so they can solve 
their econom ic problems.
• Today women are more important than men. They can defend their rights against 
men.
• Now again women have their rights [as they did before the conflict] but this time 
men have lost their rights against women. And women are preferred over men.
• As a result of UN urgings, women want more rights than their own rights.
• The UN insists, and so women fight with their husbands for their rights. This is not 
correct.
Women in this category were cognizant of their partners’ concerns. A 27-year old married 
woman with primary education felt that men were neglected and had just cause to be 
angry. She explained that “ the position of women is better than men in the society today. 
Priority is given to women in every aspect ot opportunities’’. Most of the women also 
recognized that they received a larger share of attention by the aid apparatus and were 
not comfortable with the imbalance. However, these women felt that men's concerns that 
women were seeking to usurp power and restructure traditional roles were not founded. 
Women expressed strong preferences to share resources and respect traditional boundaries, 
yet they also expressed frustration that this did not seem easily possible due to the current 
political project to liberate women. These sentiments represent the importance of people’s 
perceptions -  and their ability to undermine reality. Women across ages and education 
levels made the following statements:
• Some men think that women are being cared for by international organizations more 
than men. But the reality is that both men and women suffered.
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• My brother-in-law believes that in the present government everyone pays more 
attention to women than men and so he encourages my husband to prevent, me 
trom coming to the literacy trainings.
• My husband doesn’t have good behavior with me. He is angry because he didn’t 
have a job, so he left me forever. The best times for men and women are long past.
• We have not seen any good thing for us from organizations. Yet men ore feeling 
tricked into accepting women’s authority.
Another emerging theme from interviews was the sentiment that promises for women have 
been made, but few have been delivered upon. This view -  held by women of all ages and 
backgrounds -  reflects their frustration with aid institutions for implementing programs that 
failed to bring drastic changes to fruition. Many women echoed the sentiment that the 
"changes are on paper, not in real lives’’. They expressed an understanding that the 
expectation they had - based on the rhetoric o f aid institutions -  should have been m atched 
in practice. One young woman from rural Afghanistan shared the commonly held view that 
"there is a lot of attention to women on paper, but I am not sure if it is helping women in real 
life’’. Many women said that they felt an obligation to state that there is equality but felt that 
is was merely symbolic and that wom en’s rights are on paper, "but what do [they] do with 
them?’’ os one woman asked. One older woman from Kabul said: "I am told that we are 
equal now, but I am not sure yet’’. It was also not unusual to hear that "promises have not 
been implemented’’, as one woman lamented. A widow in her 40s put it this way:
In general, women have been given rights and freedom. But in my mind, women 
expected more rights because that was what was promised to them. Most of the 
women are illiterate and they cannot analyze and understand what freedom is.
One woman also echoed the sentiments of many when she explained that the aid 
apparatus supported and promoted a few of the Afghan women that are frequently in the 
public eye -  the seemingly-liberated “success stories’’. She explained that the aid apparatus 
has "led one woman to a comfortable life and have led thousands of them to disaster".
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Conclusions
Almost losf am id all fhis were fhe voices o f Afghans... The whole world was talking about 
Afghanistan, but there was little evidence that it was listening to Afghans and their views on 
unfolding events.
(Clark 2004:84)
The sentiments expressed in the preceding paragraphs cannot be divided along age, 
ethnic, or education lines. But there are patterns that can be discerned and that are worth 
noting. There is an overarching sentiment that men have been neglected in aid 
interventions. Both women and men share this view. There is a concern that violence is 
increasing -  a t home and in society. Finally, there is the sentiment that the influence of the 
aid apparatus is yet another variation on an occupying regime in Afghanistan, with its own 
ideas and impositions.
This in-depth view of Afghan identities illustrates the depth and complexities in understanding 
identities when designing aid interventions. A nuanced understanding should entail 
emphasis on the context that animates gender roles and relations, as relayed by Afghan 
women and men themselves. The prominent themes in this chapter are based on men's 
perceptions that they are neglected in aid interventions. Indeed, men believe that women 
are now better off than they were in the past, and better off than men are. Women agree 
that men have been neglected. However, they do not necessarily feel fhat they are any 
better off. In fact, women generally feel disappoinfment because promises m ade to them 
have not been delivered.
These themes and others will be elaborated in the chapters ahead. Chapter VII continues to 
reveal the da ta  gathered from Afghan women and men to address key themes, organized 
around women and men's perceptions. These perspectives and experiences are then 
com pared with focus group discussions to verify findings. Chapter VII also entails 
comparisons and implications at the family and community levels using wom en’s life histories 
and profiles of couples. This chapter concludes by raising the possibility that violence against 
women could be an unintended effect.
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CHAPTER VII: Honor, Agency, Aid
I have hope, but I have no faith.
-  Afghan woman on progress for women in Afghanisfan
In a continuafion from Chapter VI, the crux of this research is to bring to the tore and learn 
trom the voices and perspectives ot Afghan women and men. Beall articulates the 
importance ot distinguishing between people and perspectives. This is relevant, as Afghan 
history aptly demonstrates, because the tenacious nature ot perspectives can sway the 
people -  particularly in regard to gender issues (1996: 4). The perspectives expressed in the 
sections below address the three strongest themes: the importance ot honor, the denial ot 
agency, and the dissatisfaction with aid -  all linked to the neglect ot men in aid 
interventions.
1. Honor
Throughout the 20*  ^century, the debate on women's rights and their role in Afghan 
society has been closely interlinked with the national destiny. Women not only carry 
the burden of symbolizing the honor of the family, but often are seen as embodying 
the national honor and aspirations as well. Gender has thus been one of the most 
politicized issues in Afghanistan over the past 100 years, and attempts a t reform have 
been denounced by opponents as un-lslamic and a challenge to the sanctity of the 
faith and family. (World Bank 2004: 14).
The system ot honor in Afghanistan plays such a prominent role that it merits special focus. 
Honor is the foundation ot Afghan culture, “ largely manifested in the behavior ot one ’s 
‘wom en’" (Nassery 2004: 6). As addressed in previous chapters, Afghanistan is a traditional 
and patriarchal society, within which the protection ot society rests on the protection ot 
women, and the honor ot society is therefore reflected In the honor ot women (Skaine 2002: 
24). Dupree ottered wise advice to non-Afghans working in the country in 1996, yet it merits 
repetition 10 years later:
We must not underestimate the value attached to female purity. Every time a new  
group comes to power in Afghanistan, it has to present itself as the protector and  
arbiter o f wom en’s behaviour, and as being m ade up of good Muslims. This is
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something we have fo understand -  even if we believe that the results of what is 
often largely rhetoric are often extremely negative for women.
(1996: 12)
As a result, wom en’s behavior is circumscribed and they are very conscious of this 
responsibility. However, in the context of social and economic upheaval in the aftermath, 
women ore obligated to meet the family’s basic needs and are therefore compelled to 
transcend prescribed gender roles and social systems. When there is an opportunity for 
assistance, most women prefer to be aided within the context of the family. Regardless, most 
aid interventions overlooked this, actually provoking a retreat to more conservative 
measures. Women’s status as keepers of family honor and identity became increasingly 
magnified -  and purdah more strictly enforced -  when men were “deprived of their ‘normal’ 
means of demonstrating identity and social status: economic and social autonomy’’ (Boesen 
1990: 172). The aid apparatus tended to view the reinforcement of purdah os a 
manifestation of Islamic intolerance. It more likely signified an attem pt to preserve the family 
-  and its dignity - in the context of rapid change beyond men’s control (Centlivres-Demont 
1994: 358).
Thus, many Afghan men -  and women - view wom en’s employment os a reflection and 
reminder of their absolute poverty and destitution, on insult to m en’s dignity, and a 
questioning of m en’s ability to provide. An Afghan saying expresses this well: “While the rich 
can afford honor, the poor must ‘eat shame” ’ (World Bonk 2005: 80). Thus, the idea of honor 
is deeply em bedded in Afghanistan. Azoy explains this system well:
The primary scarce resources remain land, wafer, livestock, and -  in a very real, but 
obviously different, sense -  women. All four are vital, easily lost, and endlessly 
troublesome... It is women, however, who are widely considered the most volatile 
cause for serious dispute. Without control over female reproductive services, a man 
can have no sons (to assist in economic activity, to ac t as the core o f political 
support, and to provide security in old age) and no daughters (to be married outside 
the nuclear family and thus to provide both bridewealth and affinal alliance). With 
their sexuality generally considered unmanageable, women are secluded as much 
as possible from all but the narrowest circle of family males. Here they serve as the 
primal embodiments o f masculine honor. A man may suffer the loss o f material 
property and still keep the core of his self-respect intact. Mere suspicion, on the other
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hand, of illicit access fo his women requires an overt response: immediate and  
extreme. In a purely economic sense, therefore, control over these scarce resources 
-  land, wafer, livestock, and (somewhat more mystically) women -  constitutes the 
main source ot political authority.
(2003: 30)
Thus, many women noted that men’s honor was compromised in their inability to provide for 
the family. As a result, women viewed them as emasculated. Women frequently referred to 
the "special bravery of Afghan men", along with their strength and dignity. One married 
woman of rural origins expressed the concern of many when she said: "We don ’t want [our 
Afghan men] to stretch the hand of need to anyone in the world” . She went on to explain 
that new ‘occupying force’ - namely the aid apparatus - has crippled Afghan men’s ability 
to stand on their own.
Defending the Pashtunwoli
To confirm findings, a focus group was held comprised of Pashtun women from different 
ports of Afghanistan -  Kabul, other cities, and rural areas’ 3^. The rationale behind isolating 
Pashtun women was to provide a context whereby the traditionally ’conservative’ ethnic 
group could share concerns they felt to be exclusive to their community. This was also done 
to determine if Pashtun women -  as a group -  expressed different ideas from those of the 
other ethnic groups. Ethnicity was not used as a category of analysis in the interviews.
Pashtun women are traditionally bound by the Pashtunwoli, the unwritten legal code of their 
population. In this code, women play a symbolic role as the core of the society and 
therefore must be protected. The honor of the Pashtuns is therefore intimately linked with -  
and often entirely dependent on -  wom en’s honor. This results in circumscribed movements 
for women and limited -  if any -  contact with men. This restriction, known os purdah, sets 
clearly defined rules for women’s interactions outside the domestic sphere (Marsden 1998: 
92)154, The penalty of transgression of this unwritten code is worse than death: it is dishonor 
(2003: 118). And death is the only viable alternative to loss of honor. Afghanistan’s other 
ethnic groups have, at varying times throughout history, adopted measures that stem from 
the Pashtunwoli (Dupree 1990: 123). Inaccurate and facile analyses have been made
’S3 See the Methodology (Appendix I) tor o breakdown ot focus groups. 
Purdah refers to the Islamic practice of seclusion of women.
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connecting women's oppression to Islamic practices. However, contrary to common 
understandings of the role of women in Muslim contexts, norms governing women in 
Afghanistan are based more closely on tribal codes such as the Pashfunwali.
The women in this group did express what might be labeled as more ‘conservative’ ideas 
and spent the bulk of the hour discussing the importance of religion and the concepts of aki 
and nomoos, elaborated below'^s. Akl can be translated as ‘responsibility’ in Dari, but has 
much deeper meanings. It refers to a code of accep ted behavior, and suggests “agency, 
com petence, the ability to predict and make rational, sensible decisions, but it also 
connotes a willingness to accep t the consequences of action, self-control and discipline" 
(Tapper 1991: 209). Akl reflects a combination of honor and shame with a notion of 
responsibility that together represents men's control of resources and includes men’s control 
over women'56. Women refer to akl in discussions of men’s honor, and their responsibility in 
safeguarding it. Akl reflects their understanding of their role and the risks that betraying it 
may entail.
Namoos refers to the chastity of women, and implies the duty of men to protect and respect 
women. The term also refers to men’s pride in safeguarding wom en’s chastity. The women 
explained that they run risks of losing their ‘chastitiy’ , or the perception  that they have lost 
their chastity, with greater public exposure and assuming traditionally-male roles. In 
Afghanistan, the worst insult for on Afghan man is to call his women bi-namoos, without 
chastity. This distinction reflects the Afghan tradition of strong divisions between the public 
and private sphere. Namoos can also be defined as shame. The term is used by men to exert 
control over women, by women to instill fear in other women, and by women to rationalize 
their role. The women in this focus group used these terms to explain the risks they take in 
participating in the aid interventions and the desire they have to not step over these Afghan 
lines.
In a discussion of wom en’s place, the women expressed strong desires to remain largely 
within traditional roles. The context of Islam and its view of gender roles was a frequent 
reference point. Women in this group generally viewed their roles as first within the household 
with their children. Tapper’s study of gender roles in the context of marriage in Afghanistan
'55 Although this finding might conform fo fhe sfereofype of fhe ‘conservofive Poshfun', I note that the label 
‘conservative’ is fluid -  and relafive -  based on fhe currenf socio-political project in operation.
'55 For more information, see Tapper, N. (1991). Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriaae in an Afghan Tribal 
Society. Cambridge, Cambridge UP.
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reinforces this concept. She explains that "honorable women" passively accep t their role as 
one ot dependence on men, not as individuals but as part ot a collective household 
structure (1991: 213). Family is indeed a prominent institution in Afghanistan, and motherhood 
the preferred role tor Afghan women. Since Afghan women see themselves in the context ot 
the family and society, it should be Afghan society as a whole -  not isolated segments -  that 
need to debate human rights in their contexts (Skaine 2002: 142).
These women also felt very strongly about men’s role as provider tor the family. They 
explained the connection between this traditionally male responsibility and men’s honor. In 
short, a man with honor is one who is able to provide tor his family. Conversely, a man 
without work is one who has no honor. Women explained that the control ot resources in the 
language ot honor and shame. A m an’s honor depends on his ability to mange and defend 
human and material resources (Tapper 1991: xvii). A woman who has assumed these 
traditionally-male responsibilities becomes ‘like a m an’ or literally, nar shedza, a ‘man- 
woman''57. Shah’s story aptly explains that, to Afghans, "there are more important things 
than family or possessions, even than life" (2003: 29). She is talking about honor’ s^. Women 
repeatedly emphasized the importance ot the dignity ot Afghan men. One woman put it this 
way: "We don 't want men to be unemployed and without dignity. Their dignity will also bring 
us more freedom” .
This finding is reinforced by Nancy Hatch Dupree’s study ot the family as a social institution in 
different periods in Afghan history. She explained that when donors showed a distinct 
preference tor wom en’s employment, many men felt diminished and felt that their 
patriarchal status had eroded (2004: 319). They now depended on women tor their survival. 
Women, in turn, assumed the role ot primary breadwinner, “adding further to male 
sensitivities about their patriarchal prerogatives... These role reversals required adjustments in 
relationships that were often the cause ot considerable tension" (2004: 319). The women in 
the focus group preferred that the men have the responsibility ot working and providing tor 
the household and controlling the domestic resources. Women were conscious ot the tac t 
that they could bring shame on the family by assuming these roles. Women also recognize 
their role in defending and safeguarding male honor, as the "keeper ot the family and the 
honor", as one woman explained. They understand that their actions could undermine male
'57 This concept also appeared In Tapper's study. For more Information, see Ibid.
'58 Shah aptly explains the Importance of honor to Afghan culture. She further elaborates on the Importance of the 
appearance  of honor, even If It Is only o façade. There Is no substitute for the dishonor that results from losing your 
‘public face', she explains. Shah, S. (20031. The Storyteller's Daughter. London Penguin.
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honor and result in serious repercussions. Paradoxically, women find much greater freedom 
to maneuver when they remain within the confines of these traditional roles. In fact, the 
women explained that they run the risk of being further restricted if they try to assume overly 
public lives. An AREU study confirms that such behavior "can bring about negative 
perceptions of a family, [and therefore] men may be even more reluctant to allow women’s 
participation [in development programs]" (Wakefield and Bauer 2005: 7-8). Dupree’s study 
also reinforces these findings, explaining that Afghan men believed that work outside the 
home stripped women of their dignity. As a result, this was seen as a blot on the reputation of 
men who permitted this behavior (2004).
Ghayrat: Protection o f Honor^^^
Afghan literature -  in particular the short stories of Akram Osman and the Landays of Pashtun 
wom en ’ 60 _ offer insight to these contradictions and present a creative interpretation of 
ground-level cultural and social realities (Osman and Loewen 2005: xiii). Soira Shah, author of 
The Storyteller’s Daughter and producer of the documentary Behind the Veil, expressed the 
Importance of stories os a special window to understanding Afghanistan:
Experiences follow patterns, which repeat themselves again and again. In our 
tradition, stories can help you recognize the shape of an experience, to make sense 
of and to deal with it... What you may take for mere snippets of myth and legend 
encapsulate what you need to know to guide you on your way anywhere among 
Afghans.
(2003:8)
In an explanation of Akram Osman’s main story Real Men Keep Their Word, Arley Loewen 
explains the meaning behind the term marda ra qawl. Loewen explains that this idiomatic 
expression literally means ‘men keep their w ord ’, "but on a deeper level it refers to 'men of 
honour’ who will stand by their word at all costs... the highest virtue in traditional Afghan 
culture” (2005: xxxi). Myriad Afghan expressions exist to dep ict the state of a man without 
work, and by extension without honor. In the story From the Root o f a Shrub, a character
'59 Ghayrat is defined as the “right to defend one’s property and honor by force". Ibid.
'50 For more information, see Osman, A. and A. Loewen 120051. Real Men Keep Their Word: Tales from Kabul. 
Afghanistan: A Selection of Akram Osman's Dari Short Stories. Oxford, Oxford UP. Majrouh, S. B. 119941. Sonas of Love 
and War: Afghan Women's Poetry. New York, Ofher Press.
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explains that "a man without a job either tools around or becomes sick,” (2005: 101) 
emphasizing need for man to have work as way to define himself.
Lack of honor can also be manifested in two significant forms: dependence on external aid 
and ‘Westernization’ . In The Deceptive Object, 1971, ‘one who eats bread without shame’ 
"refers to someone who can work but does not work, and eats and lives off others” (2005: 
173). This sentiment has been expressed by men who feel a growing dependency on 
international aid, coupled with an inability to achieve self-sufficiency due to lack of 
opportunity. In The Brains of the Family, the protagonist laments because ‘‘the atmosphere in 
[his] home becam e so Westernized that he felt [he] lost his honour, his dark, heavy dignified 
moustache seemed soiled” (2005: 140). Political leaders such as Muhammad Daud Khan 
linked honor Afghan sovereignty. Daud is well known for his political poem using the eagle as 
a “symbol of freedom and indifference towards the dictates and politics of either the West 
or East” (Osman and Loewen 2005: 204). The poem urged Afghans to be "free like eagles” , 
to retain their dignity, and to cease their pleas for assistance trom foreign p o w e r s ’ l l .  This is 
significant in that many stories during the period of Soviet occupation (1979-1989) depicted 
the discourses ot the day -  replete with contradictions based on the tensions between 
Afghan and Western ideas (Osman and Loewen 2005: xiii).
The Landay, or short poem, also otters insight to the prominence of honor in Afghan culture. 
The term Landay - literally meaning "the short one” in Pashto - is a brief poem of two verse 
lines of nine and thirteen syllables respectively. Landays "frequently punctuate conversations 
where it is used as a quote or a saying, lending support to a feeling or idea" (Majrouh 1994: 
xi) and, in so doing, provide special insight into Afghan society in turmoil (Dupree 1990: 128). 
Landays can also be viewed as an act of resistance "because [the Pashtun wom an’s] 
melodies tirelessly glorify three themes that taste of blood... love, honor, and death” 
(Majrouh 1994: xvi). Of these three, emphasis rests on the honor code, and by extension the 
importance of adhering to traditional gender roles, particularly the role ot men as protectors 
of the family and defenders of honor. These landays use battle as a metaphor to represent 
honor lost or gained in this realm:
Afghan literature, particularly the short stories ot Akram Osman, con be used os social comment. Following 
Muhammad Daud Khan, Osman employed the symbol of the eagle os a  metaphor to criticize foreign influence In 
Afghanistan. An excerpt trom his story entitled "The Blind Eagle" expresses this sentiment: “Here, Immersed In a  realm 
tree trom the dictates ot the East and the West, the eagle lost himself In a  burning desire ot unknown love" (201). 
Osman, A. and A. Loewen (2005). Real Men Keep Their Word: Tales trom Kabul. Afohanlston: A Selection ot Akram 
Osman's Dari Short Stories. Oxford, Oxford UP.
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May you be found cut fo pieces by o frenchanf sword.
But may news of your dishonor never reach my ears!
(Majrouh 1994)
May you be blackened by gunpowder and dyed in blood;
But may you not return from the battlefield and in disgrace.
(Dupree 1990)
It is well that you are wounded in battle, my lovel 
Now I shall walk proudly.
(Dupree 1990)
2. Agency
Women were extremely vocal and articulate in discussions of agency. Most of these women 
felt that the world sees them as 'weak'. A few examples of this include:
• The world did not think well of Afghan women, that is why they wanted to help and 
save them. But Afghan women are stronger than outsiders know.
• They think Afghan women are weak. This image influenced work on women in 
Afghanistan.
• Afghan women are oppressed and weak! This is not accurate, but the world wants to 
see us this way.
• I don ’t think the image was good. They thought we could not struggle for our rights 
without their help. We are happy for help, but we want to direct the changes.
• The world thought Afghan women were prisoners. In a way this was true, but we are 
able to survive as we have over the years. We are not only victims.
In this context, the chaddah  cam e up repeatedly as the Western symbol for their perceived 
weakness of Afghan women, and the source of Western pity. One woman explained that 
the world views Afghan women “just like animals in bourkas. Another said: “ Foreigners always 
want to ask about bourka. It is the most important thing for them. Afghan women do not see 
the bourka. Foreigners only see bourka".
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Afghan women articulated strongly that they want to be the ones to decide on the images. 
“ One day we will have the power to change this image and people will listen!” one woman 
stated. These women felt strongly that the pervasive images were "through the eyes of other 
countries” and had little to do with Afghan priorities. "Their images are their own and we do 
not interfere,” one woman explained. "Buf as we see it, they are far away from the truth” . 
This image, many women explained, should be one that reflects who Afghan women are, 
what they want, and "how [they] would like to see [their] society” . "We don 't wont our men 
to be owned by anyone,” one woman stated. Many women expressed that they feel 
solidarity with their Afghan brothers and would prefer that women not be viewed os "in need 
of saving from Afghan men” . Most women felt that they were artificially juxtaposed against 
men. Facile analyses of women os unhappy victims and men as tyrants and terrorists were 
hard to com bat.
On the part of the men, of the 31 who felt that their agency had been denied in the aid 
process, 71% were of rural origins. Here the data  differs slightly. For the other categories, 
married men appeared to be the most discontent. Regarding agency, men -  and women -  
who were unmarried expressed the greatest concern (55% and 44%, respectively). Rural 
women comprised the majority (67%). Most of the women in this category hod no education 
(62%), while the majority of men (71%) were in the highest category of education. The 
distinction between rural and urban perspectives is likely a result of the displacement felt by 
those of rural origins. This group locks the social safety net of community and kin that rural 
lives provide. Without such ties, the rural population’s sense of disillusionment could be 
greater.
Afghan men articulated that they wanted to feel ‘as men’ and they were actively denied 
this. Many cited a lack of respect and the perception that they were "under the authority of 
others” . They also expressed a sense that interventions did not recognize men’s and 
wom en’s ‘p lace ’ and that they were imposing an alien world-view on Afghanistan. "We 
want a free Afghanistan without the intervention of foreigners,” one man explained. He was 
not alone in his opinion. Many Afghan men in this category felt strongly that they should be 
the ones to decide the direction of the new Afghanistan, and that the aid apparatus should 
adhere to their views. These men did not think well of aid institutions, explaining that "it is all 
because of these organizations that men are losing their rights” .
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These men expressed exasperation with the images they felt the world had of them. One 
man explained: "I think world image is that Afghan women are looked down upon. 
Oppressed and helpless. And men are tyrants, ignorant and bad persons” . Another 
elaborated:
World image is absolutely wrong and is not truth.,. They think that Afghan woman 
lives as a slave in the society. They think Afghan man doesn’t value Afghan woman, 
that man doesn't know her as a human. World image about Afghan man is also not 
correct. They know Afghan man as a tyrant, extremist, and supporter of terrorism and  
war but they support woman, peace and construction.
Men were not opposed to changes, "as long as they are not against what Afghans w ant” . 
And yet, no one had asked them what they want. They asked to be respected "as Afghans” 
-  meaning within the context of their culture and religion. One man said: "Both 'gender' -  
man and woman -  should have their own life” . I nofed the use of ‘gender’ in this sense, 
particularly as it was used in English. Another man put it this way: "For Afghanistan I wish 
peace, safety, Islam, Afghan-ness, freedom. A complete free country which shouldn't be 
occupied by others” .
There is a notable difference in the data  between the demographics of men and women 
regarding issues of agency. Men with generally higher levels of educafion felt that they had 
been misrepresented and denied agency in aid interventions, while the bulk of women who 
shared this view were those with no education. The same trend is true for dissatisfaction with 
aid interventions. Men who noted their dissatisfaction with aid interventions come from a 
largely betfer-educated group, while women who shared their sentiments generally had no 
education at all. There presents an interesting trend. It appears that men with higher levels of 
education are better able -  or more willing - to articulate their dissatisfaction with the issues 
above than those with less education. The opposite is true for women. There appears to be 
an inverse relationship between women's levels of education and their levels of concern 
with the themes of aid and agency - and also with perceptions of violence. Women with no 
education are still able to articulate their needs and concerns, and demonstrate their own 
agency and a level of consciousness that one would not normally associate with 
uneducated women. These women also expressed concerns that they had been singled out 
for support because of the pervasive view from the aid apparatus that they were victims in 
need of saving. Facile analyses of women as victims and men as perpetrators serve only to
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alienate those men who are supporters and who could be mobilized for wom en’s 
participation. It did not require any education at all for women to sense this.
One finding in the category of dissatisfaction with aid deserves particular attention. Of the 
121 people interviewed, 104 (44 men and 60 women) clearly stated that their problems 
stemmed from fhe neglect of men in aid interventions. This is 86% of all of those interviewed -  
a significant majority. Based on the data, the significance of this 'oversight' cannot be 
overstated.
Strength and Resilience
A focus group consisting of women of rural origins of varying ethnicities also expressed issues 
of agency. They all cam e to Kabul in order to benefit from aid activities and economic 
opportunities. The women explained that their perceptions of such opportunities in Kabul did 
not at all m atch their present realities. They felt disillusioned and not entirely confident that 
they will be able to become self-sufficient. Nonetheless, these women preferred to remain in 
Kabul as their village homes had nothing to offer them anymore. The women in this group 
shared stories and anecdotes to illustrate their conditions. They turned to me very early in the 
session and one of them asked me why other countries had abandoned Afghanistan "like 
they did before"
One woman eloquently expressed sentiments that were echoed by other participants: "I 
think other countries pity us, pity Afghan women. You should tell them that if there had been 
peace in Afghanistan, our country and people would be just as educated and successful as 
any other". This was followed by another woman who said: "Tell the world that Afghan 
women are very strong and they will do anything for the future of their country and their 
children".
Despite their displays of strength, the women of this focus group then went on to share stories 
with each other of difficulties at home. They explained that their domestic lives hod become 
increasingly strained in the last months, contrary to what they would have expected. The 
women in this group all have husbands or male family members who are not entirely
’ *2 History documents thie Afghan legacy of abandonm ent following the end of Soviet occupation. The country tell 
into civil war and plunged into international anonymity. All this changed with the Taliban and 11 September 2001.
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supporters of their participation but feel that they have no choice but to send their women 
out to support the family.
One woman told of the negotiations she regularly undertook with her husband in order to 
have permission to attend trainings. She explained that, at first, he gave his permission 
because there was no other source of income for the family. But in recent months, his 
increased frustration and feelings of uselessness had taken a toll on her. She thus hod made 
arrangements to split the little financial assistance she received from the institution with her 
husband in order to buy his com pliance’ s^. She feared that this would not be sufficient for 
long as he has already started asking for more than half of the money, which would not 
leave enough to ensure the survival of the family.
Another woman in the group -  a widow - shared her story. She explained that her 11-year 
old son forbade her to leave the house, saying it would shame him if she were to be seen 
"wandering in the streets” . She argued with him, explaining that there was no alternative 
and in order to support the family and provide food, she must take advantage of the only 
opportunity available to her. His response was: "If you want to leave the house, you’ll have 
to kill me first". She respected his wishes and delayed her participation in the NGO program 
until her son was enrolled in school. Even then, many months into her participation, he did 
not think she left the house during the day.
3. Aid
Afghan women and men frequently stated that they were not pleased with the progress 
made to date by aid institutions and many felt that the money could have been better 
spent, and with farther-reaching effects. Beall and Esser's study reinforces this resentment felt 
by Afghans in general toward aid interventions. For example, one respondent said: "We are 
really angry at all these foreign NGOs... they conduct lots of surveys but nothing happens. 
There are more NGOs than people in Afghanistan. They should either work harder o r ... go... 
home” (2005:27). Indeed, many of those interviewed shared this sentiment.
'63 As one example, women participants in Women tor Women International’s program received $15 every month 
tor a  period of one year in order to meet their basic needs. In receiving the financial assistance, women also agree  
to participate in vocational skills training, rights awareness programs, and other opportunities os needed such os 
literacy, basic health education, microtinonce, etc.
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In Afghanistan motivation has been crippled by the expectation that aid interventions would 
provide for the people. It is important to view the dissatisfaction with interventions in the 
current context of overall hostility towards aid institutions. This frustration had been brewing in 
Afghanistan starting in late 2002 when Afghans began to articulate dissatisfaction with the 
army of ‘internationar aid instifufions -  and their 'international' standards of living -  that were 
failing to make visible and sustainable changes in Afghanistan. This anger moved from the 
streets to the Afghan cabinet with the appointment of Dr. Ramazan Bashardost as Minisfer of 
Planning in 2004. Bashardost coined the now oft-cited term NGO-ism to describe the failure 
of the aid apparatus to assist Afghanistan, opting instead to foster corruption and increase 
their own wealth. Bashardost further accused NGOs of “econom ic terrorism" and blamed 
them for the misuse of the country’s scant development funding (Stapleton 2006: 6). This 
message played well to the Afghan public, particularly in Kabul, and would be replayed 
during the riots in the summer of 2006
Similar to Bashardost's view, many men felt that aid interventions had misused and withheld 
funds from Afghanistan. One older man put it this way: “We want those donations which the 
world is giving to Afghanistan today to be given to the people that are entitled to it, not to 
their agents". By agents, he was referring to aid institutions. “They only saw one layer of 
society," one man explained. It was therefore not a surprise that promised changes would 
not reach the people who needed them most. Indeed, the theme of empty promises was 
oft-repeated. One man expressed it this way: “They haven't done very good things yet, just 
promises of complete freedom. They prepared the opportunities for working. And now we 
wait. The rights which have to be given unfortunately haven't been given". Another added 
that aid institutions have “done their work hypocritically". Another stated that the Afghan 
government “should be based on its people, not on international organizations".
Many men also expressed their dissatisfaction with aid institutions through the lens of women. 
The general sentimenf was that these institutions failed to understand what constitutes 
Afghan culture when it cam e to women. As a result. Institutions abused women “by 
disrespecting their role and religion". Another man stated: “They haven’t done anything 
necessary for women so far. They analyzed wom en’s rights incorrectly. They have no respect 
for Afghan men and women". This discussion raised sensitivities, especially when the men 
blamed the aid apparatus for “unveiling our women" and for leading people away from
Chapter IX will provide further details on these events.
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Islam. One man put it this way: “As UN urges, women fight with their husbands for their rights. 
This is not correct.” It was not unusual for men to feel angered and emofional during this 
segment of the interview. Their frustration was apparent, particularly in the following line: "All 
women's activities... just they talk about democracy and women's rights without any clear 
vision for changing” . Anofher elaborated: "In the area of importing or bringing foreign 
culture and tradition, international organizations have bad effect on Afghan women” .
Women also believed that their participation in aid interventions "has created problems for 
wom en” . These institutions, they explained, "tried to change the way men think” , and they 
have failed. One woman explained fhat the agenda to "make men and women's rights 
equal” is not possible and is far too provocative for Afghanistan. And these institutions 
apparently contradicted themselves when they offered opportunifies only for women. Many 
women explained that women ore the only ones who are given opportunities for work and 
trainings, and therefore the survival of the family becomes their responsibility. One young 
woman from Kabul elaborafed: "[These] acfs have just increased the gap between men 
and wom en” .
Many felt that aid progress was limited, and that promises have not been met. "They haven't 
done that much anyway,” one elderly woman stated. "To moke real progress will take much 
more time” . The little that has been done "is only in a very symbolic way” . One woman 
explained that if she measures against promises made, "the future is in ruin” . Another 
elaborated that "women hove opportunities presented like treats, but they cannot access 
them” . One old woman of rural origins lamenfed: "I am fold that we are equal now, but I am 
not sure yet” . This sentiment was reinforced by another woman who asked: "Now women 
have rights on paper, but what do they do with them?” Other women expressed it this way:
• The organizations are established to help women, but then they work for their own 
promotion.
• There is a lot of attenfion to women on paper, but I am not sure if it is helping women 
in real life.
• Promises haven't been implemented. They trick both men and women of 
Afghanisfan into believing that the world will come save them and change 
everything.
• What have they done yet for Afghan men and women? Whaf good things could the 
future hold?
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• We all fought for freedom, and now we are fold fo believe that there is freedom.
Many women also felt that their situation was an old issue and "the world does not want to 
know of Afghan women now” . Another woman elaborated: "I do not think the world cores 
about Afghanistan anymore. They are tired of saving them and now look elsewhere". These 
women generally agreed that the aid apparatus entered Afghanistan with much fanfare, re­
arranged things, and subsequently made a swift exit. Many women felt that the hidden 
agenda of interventions was "to change what is Afghan culture” and to focus on "rights that 
are not in Islam” . These women argued that their rights are in tact safeguarded in Islam and 
that they are not tor aid institutions to give.
On Afghan Terms
A focus group reinforced dissatisfaction with aid, emphasizing the need to operate on 
Afghan terms. This group brought together the other ethnic groups -  Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, 
Nuristani, and so on -  as these are generally considered less conservative and have, at 
times, been more closely aligned with each other than with the Pashtun community^^s This 
group was comprised of women who were originally from Kabul and other urban areas. Two 
of the women present were from Jalalabad, and three were Kabuli in origin.
The conversation in this group focused on pushing tor progress, and the consequences of 
doing so. The women used examples from Afghan history to illustrate their sentiments and to 
demonstrate the Afghan population's reaction to strong pushes tor social change. Below is a 
sample of the conversation and select quotes from the women in their discussion.
A: In fhe Soviet time when they started to establish literacy classes for women in the 
villages, everyone reacted very strongly. Village leaders warned everyone not to 
have it, period.
6: 1 always insist on the fac t that we cannot copy any other modernity to our country. 
We need to translate international ways into our own language, into our own 
context, and into our own culture.
'*5 This is particularly relevant in the battle between the Northern Alliance (various ethnic groups) and the Taliban 
(largely Pashtun).
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The women also raised the subject of the word gender and its meaning. These women were 
not able to otter a concrete meaning of the word but did quickly share its strong associations 
with a foreign agenda. The women could not define gender, but they were cognizant that it 
was the right word to use in the presence of foreigners to signify progress.
The discussion continued:
C: People do not know what is this gender. My father is an educated man, but he 
sometimes asks me “what is this gender, gender, gender always you are talking 
about?” Even in educated families this is a new word. And in my family, we do not 
know what it means. Only that we hear it very much.
D: i think it's not only a new word in Afghanistan, but in many other countries...
E: But we are copying a model from outside. Copying is not the solution, I think.
C: Men are saying that gender means taking the power from the men and giving it to 
the women.
A: My husband is angry with ail o f these trainings. He says: “Only training for you and  
nothing for me. And gender means I sit a t home and you go out and do everything. 
And what are these international agencies doing? And it ’s a Western idea, and it's 
bad, and it doesn't respect our culture, and it's not Muslim”.
B: [international agencies] say that they cannot find any Afghan expert that knows 
about gender, so they have no choice but to bring someone from a different culture. 
What we should do is find those people who know Afghan culture, not another 
culture, and train them in gender: What does gender mean? What does gender 
want from the people? What is our responsibility to gender?
Indeed, researchers have noted that Afghans are currently feeling culturally displaced and 
are forced to renegotiate identities and gender roles. This sense of despair is in reality a 
frustration that while Afghans continue to struggle for physical survival, they risk being 
overridden by an aid apparatus that imposes hasty solutions before giving Afghans time to 
consider their role in the process (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 218).
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4. Engagement with Men
Interviews conducted withi Afgtian women and men revealed a discontentment with the 
operations of aid institutions, and a sense that the social order had been disrupted in ways 
that have negative effects for women. Men recognize that they are not necessarily a focus 
of attention, and that the economic survival of the family now depends on the woman as 
she is offered greater opportunities. Women have noted that men are increasingly 
becoming angry and impatient as they continue to be denied the traditional role of provider 
in the family. A 20-year old woman explained that "organizations provide opportunities only 
for women... so the women have to step out of the house in order for the family to survive". 
A woman in her late 20s elaborated: "Women ore allowed to work. Actually, there are 
opportunities for work. Allowing women to work is up to the husband. But if he cannot find 
work, he has no choice but to let his wife work".
Many women interviewed felt that the burden of supporting the family was placed on them 
and that many of them did not want it. These women expressed their preference for the 
male members of the family to work. Women explained that they took advantage of existing 
opportunities because there were no opportunities for men to earn a living, as stated above. 
These findings were further confirmed by a report published in April 2006 on urban livelihoods 
in Kabul. A portion of the report profiled households where women were the main income 
earners, stating that these women did not necessarily feel "em powered” by this responsibility 
nor were they happy with the "freedom" from their new role "since it may have been foisted 
upon them by circumstances versus through choice" (Schutte 2006: 49). The author then 
explained:
Husbands who are not able to fulfill their ascribed role as breadwinners have to face  
complaints from their spouses, which in tum may lead to frustration and incidences of 
domestic violence directed against women and children.
(Schutte 2006: 50).
Dar be Dar: Are Men Included?
Almost all the men noted that women were prioritized in aid interventions. They generally 
agreed that aid institutions "did nothing" for them. While they complained to their wives, 
they were concerned about making more public complaints because their wives were
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bringing home money -  which many of them were receiving. However, men expressed that 
they were ottered very little in terms ot services and support, therefore they had no choice 
but to rely on their women to access training and economic opportunities and to share them 
with the rest ot the family. This denied them their traditional role os provider and insulted their 
honor, many stated. One man described his situation os Dar be Dar, meaning being "door to 
door". This Afghan expression describes that ot a man "in a state ot desperation because all 
doors ot opportunity are closed before him" (Osman and Loewen 2005: 85). This sentiment 
characterizes the sense ot desperation felt by many men, and the pervasive view that their 
honor has been insulted by reducing them to beggars. For many men, the insult to their 
honor com e when their wives were able to find work and support the family and they were 
not. Frances Cleaver’s studies on masculinities reinforce the belief that in many countries, 
‘being a m an’ involves providing tor the family. "When economic changes... occur which 
make this difficult, men’s fundamental identity is called into question... sometimes resulting in 
dysfunctional and anti-social behavior" (2002: 3 -4 )'66.
Men expressed concerns that aid institutions were encouraging women to speak out against 
their husbands and deliberately disrupting the household hierarchy. They also noted that 
women were promised dramatic life changes, but none ot this has materialized. 
Expectations were raised, and commitments were not delivered. Many men also felt that aid 
institutions promoted change that was contrary to Islam. One man believed that institutions 
are "unveiling our women". Another man explained: "In the area ot importing or bringing 
foreign culture and tradition, international organizations have bad effect on Afghan 
wom en” . A man in his late 20s from Kabul elaborated that "sometimes [aid institutions] are 
pushing hard tor change that is fast and big, and it is not sensible".
"Most men are not very satisfied with the organizations", a man explained, "they feel that 
these organizations are interfering in family issues” . Another man felt that "organizations are 
creating distance between men and women by encouraging women negatively". Many 
men expressed concern with the influence aid institutions have had on Afghan culture. They 
felt that the interventions deliberately sought to enforce Western codes ot culture as superior 
to Afghan ways. "Aid organizations inspired foreign culture on our men. They introduced
'66 Cleaver cites studies by Save ttie Ctiildren UK and Oxfam UK exploring the link between men's employment and  
their behavior in famiiies. These organizations found that men's reduced employment has given rise to uncertainty 
about their roles and identities; "Where do men fit in what seems to be a wom an’s world, when they hove no 
assured identity as the breadv/inners?" Cleaver, F„ Ed. (2002). Masculinities Matter! Men. Gender and Development. 
London, Zed Books.
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Afghan mon incorrectly. And also they brought down their role in the tomily and society, so it 
caused difficulties and violences between men and women", one man explained. Again, 
many men reiterated the notion that aid institutions were stripping men ot their rights and 
giving them to women. This belief reinforces the view that the concept ot rights is a zero sum 
gome and that more rights tor women leaves men without any rights at all. The following are 
select quotes from men’s interviews to illustrate these points:
[Institutions] have paid their most attention to women and have forgotten men.
They don ’t take care ot our poor men.
In lots ot things, more focus is on women than on men.
Every time first a position is given to women.
Organizations are not loyal on their promises with men.
International organizations pave the ground tor working tor women. And always 
women are the first, before men.
They don ’t do what they say tor men.
In comparison with women, they have done less tor men.
They have done nothing tor men, hardly mentioned them. International organizations 
haven’t paid attention to men’s rights.
While the Western focus on Afghan ‘gender apartheid’ has centered around women, the 
role ot men has indeed been ignored. Wali writes that “ it may surprise Westerners to discover 
that the stereotype ot Afghan men as women-haters and oppressors is incorrect" (2002: 5). 
Men in Afghanistan are actually a key part ot the solution. And men have suffered as well. 
The "Afghan problem" should in no way be reduced exclusively to a problem ot Afghan 
women and the chaddari (Delloye 2003: 161). No one would dispute the focus on Afghan 
women, but it is women themselves who highlight the suffering of Afghan men. One Afghan 
researcher put it this way: “The wound of abandonment runs deep in them. Afraid to be 
vulnerable, fiercely independent, they hide their wounds. This is the way they have coped 
with unspeakable hardship and loss" (Sultan 2002: 202).
Many women articulated that they would enjoy greater freedom -  and feel more 
comfortable with the opportunities they have been given -  if men were also engaged and 
employed. In the words of one young woman from Kabul: “Organizations gave opportunities 
for women to work in NGOs and out of the home. Men need these opportunities also". These 
women explained that women would be "happier" and “more free" if men were working.
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"We want our men to have jobs also so that they can allow us to work,” a married women of 
rural origins explained. Others said: "Men are not working, so women ore also kept at home" 
and, “ if all men had wealth and jobs, they would not interfere with the women os much os 
they do ” . An Afghanistan specialist reinforces this point in her research, stating that men's 
unemployment "renders even more slender the margin of liberty left to women in the 
domestic sphere” (Centlivres-Demont 1994: 354). If liberating women was truly the objective, 
the aid apparatus would hove done better to start with men first. Further quotes from 
interviews with women elaborate:
• [Institutions] hove supported men indirectly by providing jobs and giving trainings to 
their wives.
• I do not know what opportunities men have. I see many of them without 
opportunities.
• No men ore really involved.
• They hove promised to help men also, but they have not done anything.
• Men need to have opportunities like women now so they can work and feel proud.
• Men ore suffering more than women right now.
• [Institutions] wont to create work opportunities for women, but women cannot take 
men’s position.
• They have done nothing for men, my father says.
• They have made things unequal between men because those who hove wasifa^^^
and know people have gotten good jobs and the rest have not.
• Men who know some big people have found a job in the international NGOs.
Women expressed concern that the lack of support for men has made them increasingly 
angry. Many women explained that they would prefer that their husbands were given equal 
opportunities to participate in aid interventions and elaborated that their lives would be 
easier as a result. Some women noted an increased gap between men and women, and 
many women mentioned increased levels of violence as outcomes of this frustration. One 
woman explained: “My husband says that they make men angry when they do nothing for 
them and only offer opportunities to women. He is a teacher so he understands how people 
think about these things” . Another elaborated:
Wasito Is a  Dari term that describes the situation ot having special contacts and access.
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A/ien have become sensitive about women's organizations. They believe that these 
organizations train women to stand against the laws and their husbands. Of course 
this is not true. It is actually what men think.
This reinforces the importance ot perception  over reality. Another woman explained that 
men are becoming "more aggressive and angry to women because organizations do not 
give them any attention” . And yet another woman reiterated the same point: "Men are 
angry with international organizations because they only care about women. Men teel that 
they have dark futures” .
In a speech in 1996, Dupree clearly cautioned against ignoring men:
It is useless to start a wom en’s project without getting the cooperation of the men 
first. This is ignored so many times, and then there are problems... The emphasis must 
be on the whole family, not on individuals. This would seem to be a very simple, 
obvious observation, but... [it has] dire consequences for the programmes.
(1996: 13-4)
Research revealed that both women and men were concerned with the image the world 
had ot them -  an image that they believe has been used to justify aid interventions. The 
repeated themes included a concern that aid institutions artificially separated women and 
men -  even in cases where they wanted to work together to rebuild the country. Further, 
there was an overarching perception that aid programs seek to change what is Afghan 
culture. Both women and men were concerned that men were constructed as the enemy, 
and women were victims needing to be saved from men by outsiders. An Afghan woman 
explained: “The world thinks that Afghan women need their help and they need to be saved 
from Afghan men” . An Afghan man elaborated that "most people in other countries believe 
that Afghan men are the ones who have taken the women's rights from them” .
An Afghan man stated that the world must have had a bad image ot Afghanistan, or their 
freedoms would not be under foreign control. A woman elaborated: "I do not think the 
image was good. It it was good, we would not have so many foreigners coming to say they 
are helping us” . Despite this, many women are happy with aid apparatus support, but also 
felt that they would like to direct the changes. A young Afghan man explained it best: "The 
world thought they could bring freedom to Afghan women [but] freedom is only won from
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inside” . Based on these views, Afghanistan is in the first phase of its engagement with men -  
near neglect - as previously discussed in Chapter II.
This Road Leads fo Turkestan
This phrase was used in an interview with a man who felt particularly frustrated by the lack of 
progress in Afghanistan and disappointed in the aid apparatus. It is a common Afghan 
proverb meaning that a certain action will lead nowhere, or is useless. Akrom Osman’s short 
stories provide a good definition of the use of the proverb: "In colloquial Dari, Turkestan is 
often used as the place where someone who is misdirected ends up” (2005:39).
The following table displays a triangulation ot the data gathered from interviews with Afghan 
women and men based on three large themes that appeared frequently during discussions. 
‘Agency’ refers to a sense that the interviewees’ identity was misrepresented. This also 
reflects a denial of agency and a lack of contextualized analysis that certain respondents 
believe characterized interventions. The theme 'Violence' refers to references -  direct or 
indirect -  that were made by interviewees regarding increased levels of violence in their 
lives, or the fear of increased violence. The category ‘A id’ represents those interviewees who 
expressed a level of dissatisfaction with aid interventions. Concrete examples of 
dissatisfaction include: excessive focus on women, mismanaged or misdirected aid, failure to 
deliver on promises, raised expectations. Neglect of men in aid interventions began as a 
com ponent of dissatisfaction with ‘A id’ but then emerged as its own category because of its 
significance to the interviewees.
The table offers a comparison between men and women across the above three themes 
and in three demographic categories. Women and men are analyzed based on their 
geographic origins (rural, urban, Kabul) and their marital status (single, married, widowed) 
and their education levels (none, 1-6 years, more than 7 years) to determine if there ore 
trends within particular demographic groups. These themes are the ones that women and 
men identified as the most significant issues.
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Comparison Between Women and Men Across Three Themes
AGENCY VIOLENCE AID
TOTAL 76 47 70
TOTAL % 63% 39% 58%
MEN TOTAL 31 14 32
Region: Kabul 8 3 6
Rural 22 8 23
Urban 1 3 3
Marital Status: Single 17 6 13
Married 14 8 19
Widower 0 0 0
Education: None 1 1 2
1-6 years 8 4 11
7+ years 22 9 19
WOMEN TOTAL 45 33 38
Region: Kabul 13 11 11
Rural 30 21 26
Urban 2 1 1
Marital Status: Single 20 11 14
Married 18 20 18
Widower 7 2 6
Education: None 28 24 26
1 -6 years 7 6 5
7+ years 10 3 7
Of those men who expressed dissatisfaction with aid programs and agencies, the majority 
are from rural areas (72%), married (59%), and have had seven or more years of education 
(59%). For women, the majority are also from rural areas (68%), and married (47%), but those 
with no education felt more strongly about aid issues (68%) than did those with increased 
education, as previously addressed.
Alam, Aman, and Ahmadi: Men Speak Out
An impromptu focus group was held with three men who worked in the office where I 
frequently visited. They were curious about my research and began a discussion in my 
presence.
Alam was a Pashtun man in his late 20s from Wardak with four years of education. He was 
married, and had recently become a father. When asked about the role of women in 
Afghanistan, he becam e visibly uncomfortable and said he did not want to answer. He was 
also not comfortable talking about his wife, but he did tell the group that his wife had six
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years of education. He laughed when the comment was made that his wife was more 
educated than he is. "My wife is not working", Alam said. "It she said she wanted to work, it 
would not be allowed according to tribal regulations. It is this way. I cannot explain it".
Alam ’s wife wears the chaddari. He emphasized that this is an important part ot the Pashtun 
tradition. But then he went on to say this:
The chaddari is not im portant but what is important for a woman is modesty and 
reputation and to have a good character. If she decides tomorrow that she does not 
want to wear i t  it's no problem for me.
The other men in the room snickered at this response. They did not believe him. They knew 
each other well and were able to recognize the others’ dishonesty.
Aman was in his mid-20s, a Tajik. He worked as a driver. He spoke more freely ot his wife: "She 
studied up to 8-class and is a t home. She is not working. First she doesn't want to work. But it 
she wanted it would be no problem tor m e” .
The two other men in the room said that he did not answer honestly. They did not believe 
him. Aman smiled sheepishly. He continued to talk about the chaddari:
My grandfather said my wife should use chaddari. My wife wasn’t using chaddari 
before. He died three days ago and now I decide if she wears it or not. But she knows 
that she has to wear it out of respect for my grandfather.
Ahmadi was a 30-year old Hazara man. He was the most vocal ot the three, and also the 
most willing to talk about these delicate issues with a non-Atghan woman. He said:
There is equality of rights between men and women. Woman is respectable and has 
a top position in our society because woman is mother and wife. There is a Dari 
saying: the second mother is our country. So this is how much we respect our women.
Ahmadi continued to talk about the role ot religion in Afghanistan: "We are Muslim so we 
respect that. And also the customs ot Afghanistan are important to us".
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Ahmadi was the most comfortable talking about his wife:
My wife is not working. But she doesn’t want fo work. She takes care o f the kids. Most 
of the women in this country want to have children. It’s not a pressure from the 
husbands to have children. There is not any limitation on my wife. But she is from a 
conservative family. My wife was using chaddari before she married. But sometimes 
she doesn’t wear chaddari, but only chador. If she doesn’t want to wear it, I will 
decide a t that time. In Afghanistan the joint family system is important. All sides must 
be respected. If an elder says that my wife must do something, she must do it.
These three men approached me of their own accord and began a discussion that 
appeared to be new to them. The questions stimulated much discussion, thought, and even 
discomfort. The relevance of this discussion with men was that they took the initiative to 
discuss these issues. While in some instances it was obvious that two of the men were trying to 
tell me what they thought I might wont to hear, this was quickly corrected by the other 
participants. This group of men was also noteworthy because they represent three different 
ethnic groups and could have opposing opinions, particularly from the Pashtun man, and 
even more so when discussing women. Further, these men shared one important thing that 
none of the other men interviewed have -  these men are all gainfully employed (as driver, 
guard, and ' f i x e r ' Regardless of type of employment, these men were all the authority 
figures at home because they were fulfilling their traditional roles. Their wives did not work, 
and none of them felt that they necessarily had any trouble at home. They agreed that they 
have unquestioned authority because they are male, and that they were fulfilling their 
obligations under that role.
5. Implications at Family and Community Levels
The following table provides a comparison between Afghan men and women, non-Afghan 
policy-makers and policy implementors (referred to below as "Aid") and specialists, and 
Afghan policy-makers and policy implementors and specialists. The three themes that 
emerged from the data are com pared based on their frequency. These themes emerged in 
all categories, demonstrating that there are large trends and patterns in opinions, regardless 
of people ’s particular groupings or affiliations.
'68 A ‘fixer’ is defined as one who arranges logisfics, handles procurement of goods and services, and generally runs 
errands for the institution.
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Comparison Across Groups and Themes
# INTERVIEWED AGENCY VIOLENCE AID
AFGHAN 
WOMEN & MEN
TOTAL 121 76 47 70
TOTAL % 100% 63% 39% 58%
AFGHAN
AID/SPECIALISTS
TOTAL 25 19 14 25
TOTAL % 100% 76% 59% 100%
NON-AFGHAN
AID/SPECIALISTS
TOTAL 20 16 9 19
TOTAL % 100% 78% 43% 95%
Of the 25 Afghan Aid and Specialists, 19 (76%) believed that men had been neglected in aid 
interventions. For the non-Afghan Aid and Specialists, 78% (16 of 20) believed that men's 
needs were neglected. Again, these findings resonate with the data  from Afghan men and 
women -  that the perception that men have been neglected is a powerful force that could 
be destabilizing the aid interventions.
International aid has a long and controversial record in Afghanistan. The wrong kinds 
of aid have a t times created perverse incentives leading to renewed conflict. In the 
future, donors and aid agencies must be more self-critical and aware of these 
potentially negative effects.
(UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004:219)
Inja Afghanistan Ast: Profiles of Women and Couples
The oft-repeated phrase, inja Afghanistan ast, meaning "This is Afghanistan", was used both 
by men and women frequently to punctuate a phrase. Women used it in exasperation to 
rationalize 'bad things’ that happened to them. Men used this line to justify 'the situation of 
wom en’ and as a counter to strong pushes for change and importing alien ideologies. "This 
is Afghanistan," I was told on many occasions. "Those things just don ’t work here". Both 
women and men conveyed a sense that because "This is Afghanistan", things were not 
going to change -  and certainly not in the way that the aid apparatus expected. It was 
therefore important to compare not only women and men as separate entities but also 
women and men from the same household in order to determine how they define what
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Afghanistan is within their own households. Profiles ot ten couples can be found in Appendix 
3. The profiles ot couples reveal the differing dynamics between men and women animating 
each household. This will be discussed in the conclusion and checked against wom en’s life 
stories and histories to provide a deeper analysis.
Qafra qafra darya mesha
Drop by drop, water becomes a river
This Afghan expression has been employed as a saying used to advance the women's 
movement. It advocates slow, gradual change. In this vein, it is important to observe Afghan 
women ‘drop by drop’ in order to better understand the significance ot the changes in their 
lives over time. Appendix 4 provides life stories from selected women who were interviewed. 
These women all felt the need to talk about their lives and their contexts. Many women 
began the interviews with stories ot their post as a way to illustrate their unhappiness in the 
present and the extent to which their lives have not improved. The stories ot Norgis, Aniso, 
and Zarmina (found in the Methodology) represent the sentiments ot women who were tilled 
with hope in 2002. They believed that their participation in aid interventions would better 
their lives. The 20 additional profiles were collected three years after those ot Norgis, Anisa, 
and Zarmina. They provide a sample ot the perceptions and experiences ot women tour 
years into Afghanistan’s aftermath. There is more sadness that characterizes these stories, 
and noticeably less hope. There is also a hint ot disappointment in the lack ot changes in 
their lives in the last three years. In tact, these women felt that their expectations were raised 
and now their hopes ore further thwarted. Their stories speak to these themes.
In Appendix 5 are two more detailed profiles ot Afghan women at seemingly opposite ends 
ot the spectrum. Both ot these women spoke a t great length about their lives and ottered 
more detailed profiles. They present an interesting comparison, as one woman is career- 
driven, successful, and employed in a traditionally male field in a high-ranking position. She 
does not represent the norm. The other is uneducated and relies on charity and aid 
interventions tor her subsistence. The former has chosen to remain without a husband. The 
latter woman is burdened by a husband who cannot support her and feels she has suffered 
more because she lacks male protection. One feels like a victim, the other like a survivor. 
These women share some perspectives, however. They both believe that Afghan women 
can stand on their own and can act on their own behalf, to better their lives. They both 
believe that an Afghanistan with foreign influence has only served to retard progress tor
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women. They believe that the right pace of social change is one that is instigated by 
Afghans -  men and women -  and that only this way will Afghanistan achieve 'liberation'. 
Their sentiments are reinforced by Beall’s hope, that “ the complexity of women and men's 
social roles is recognized and their involvement in the control of their everyday lives is 
welcom ed” (1996:2).
Conclusions
In an article written in 2004, Nancy Hatch Dupree cautioned:
Hopefully, fhe aid community will heed fhe lessons learned over fhe past decades. 
Programs are needed fo promote fhe integrity of fhe family, for one can ignore fhe 
family only a t fhe cost o f social sfabilify.
(2004:326)
Analysis at the family level is relevant because it demonstrates the importance of not 
extracting women from their families and contexts. Emergent themes from the profiles of 
couples resonate with those in women's life stories and histories. Firstly, both women and men 
feel that the focus on women has come at the expense of men. They feel that men's honor 
has been compromised by their neglect in aid interventions. Men and women largely agree 
that new elements of disagreement, conflict, and even violence, have entered their lives. 
They feel that this is due in part to the perception that their values and socio-cultural systems 
have been compromised by an ‘ideological occupation ’. Their differences and diversity -  as 
Afghans -  as not been r e c o g n i z e d ’ 69. it is problematic to refer to ‘Afghan wom en’ as a 
homogenous group. Finally, they share a sense of disillusionment with the aid apparatus. 
These themes resonate with those that characterize this research: the centrality of honor, the 
denial of agency, the dissatisfaction with aid, and the exercise of agency through Afghan 
efforts to deal with these social changes on their own terms. Building on the previous 
discussion, the following chapter focuses in-depth on violence as an unintended effect.
This view was reinforced by an Afghan NGO worker, os one example: “All the people, in the medio, everywhere, 
say ‘Afghan community" os if it is one body". Indeed, very few generalizations can be m ade about Afghans or 
Afghan women as a  whole.
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CHAPTER VIII: Effects of Discourses on the Gender Order
Afghanistan aspires to become a state that is pluralistic, Islamic, prosperous, and peace- 
loving (Islamic Republic ot Afghanistan 2006), but the challenges are great. As discussed in 
Chapter I, Afghanistan has some ot the worst social indicators in the world, particularly tor 
women. Many analysts and activists note that women remain oppressed in Afghanistan, 
despite the ott-cited rhetoric ot ‘liberation’ ot Afghan women. It has been said repeatedly 
that women are not yet able to enjoy their human rights. “ Discriminatory practices 
institutionalized prior to and during the war have not disappeared and in some ways have 
grown stronger. The insecure environment exacerbates this further"(Amnesty International 
2005). Amnesty International elaborates that the violence suffered during the years ot 
conflict under various regimes was an extreme manifestation ot the discrimination and 
abuses suffered before conflict as well as the unequal power relations between Afghan men 
and women (2005). Violence against women in Afghanistan must first be viewed as part ot a 
larger landscape that has been shaped by Afghan history.
1. Violence in Afghanistan’s Aftermath
In a speech to the Ministry ot Defense, former Deputy Minister ot Women's Affairs Mazari Sata 
explained that women still suffer from deprivation and oppression, even several years after 
the conflict has ended. She explained that women are still abused, prevented from 
accessing education and economic opportunities, and unable to participate in public life 
(Sata 2005, 13 September). The former Minister ot Women’s Affairs, Masuda Jalal, has made 
numerous speeches about the prevalence ot violence against women. In one such speech 
on wom en’s rights and security in July 2005, she said:
It has been more than three years since we embarked on a journey to peace and  
reconstruction. Our people have em braced  peace... but unfortunately this is not true 
for many of our women... real peace has never entered their sphere o f life. A 
different kind of conflict continues to haunt our women... They live in constant fear of 
being beaten, harassed, abused verbally, discriminated, denied o f rights, robbed of 
self respect and dignity, exchanged for material goods or for settling conflicts. War 
has never been over for them.
(2005, 27 June)
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In further conversations with Masuda Jalal, she had the following to soy about violence 
against women and the existing -  and increasing -  disparities between women and men:
Even after three years of attention to women, it has not succeeded in making 
women equal to men in practical life. In the practical life, at the family and  
community level, power is still in men's hands. The economy of the home, the 
econom y o f the country, all this belongs to men. 100%. Still. So what have we given 
women in the past three years?
We have given them opportunities for education. But not for all of them. Only those in 
urban areas. And even then not all o f them. We can open up the gates of schools to 
them and take away all discriminatory laws -  but even then it ’s not complete 
because th a t’s only the Constitution and we have other discriminatory laws that are 
written and unwritten. And we have given them security, generally that has improved 
but still not fully. Work opportunities, those are limited. Only urban areas again. And 
we have given them opportunities in political life. We have a number of ministers in 
the cabinet^^o^ But still... all this does not mean equality in their lives. Not a t all.
The violence is still going on. It is increasing, even. There has been no positive im pact 
on violence in the last three years. It has not decreased, for sure. If we take deaths of 
women as an indicator, those deaths that have taken place in Herat and other 
places, self-burning and other things. This happens more than the media reports. I 
hear these things from the head of the Women’s Unit in those places. If we take all 
this into account, it has increased. Forced marriages are going on, and more than 
before. Domestic violence is more than before. There is no change in terms of legal 
protection for women. Small small interventions are taking place, but that has had no 
impact. So we need to do a lot. For a country where the load o f centuries of 
discrimination is on the shoulders of women, with this little investment in three years it 
is not possible to give them real equality and freedom and justice
'70 There Is now only one woman in the Afghan cabinet -  the Minister of W omen’s Affairs. The resf were not 
approved by the parliament.
'7' In meetings and discussions with senior gender policy-makers who work closely with the former Minisfer of 
W omen’s Affairs and also serve os senior members of the Advisory Group on Gender, I was told that it is a  "widely 
held belie f’ (by these particular policy-makers as well as others who were not present) that the Minister herself was a 
vicfim of domestic violence. It is believed that this was due to tensions between the Minster and her husband over 
her position ot power.
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Afghan women today are still battered in the home, harassed in public places, married ott 
w ithout their consent, and traded and exchanged to resolve disputes (Sata 2005, 13 
September). This belief is reinforced by the Report ot the UN Secretary General on The 
Situation ot Women and Girls in Afghanistan (2004) which states that "the volatile security 
situation and traditional social and cultural norms continue to limit women's and girls’ role in 
public life and deny them the full enjoyment ot their rights" (2004). There is further evidence 
ot violence against women in the private sphere. Researcher Pamela Hunte’s study on 
livelihoods ot the urban poor in Kabul revealed a number ot cases ot violent conflict 
between men and women, which may be "attributed to the trying economic conditions 
resulting from war and displacement" (2004: 14). She further points to deprivation and 
insecurity having psychological effects on Afghans, particularly those in Kabul who hove 
com e to the city seeking greater security and economic opportunity. Hunte argues that 
expectations have been raised and media messages ot "large amounts ot foreign aid 
coming into the country tor reconstruction... has created expectations ot greater amounts 
ot assistance than can be tultilled" (2004: 14). Further, people ’s perceptions ore that they are 
not benefiting from the much-publicized assistance to the country. Hunte concludes that "it 
is not surprising that many individuals teel extremely frustrated, contused, and angry about 
their present lack ot access to promised aid" (2004: 15). This displacement ot anger is not 
unusual, as Afghans can generally not point to any improvements in their own lives and as a 
result, anger is directed "to the place where they teel they have dominance -  their relations 
with women" (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 23).
Policy-makers, researchers, and experts argue that violence against women exists, but there 
are tew reliable statistics’ 2^. ra w a  states that officials estimate that at least halt ot all Afghan 
women have been forced into marriage, and that one in three have been beaten or 
abused 173 The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission registered over 1,650 cases 
ot violence against women in 2006 -  and many cases have gone unreported’74. 
Furthermore, this violence is concentrated in Kabul. Afghans teel that violence against 
women will continue -  and gender inequalities will increase -  as long as Afghanistan is under 
occupation and as long as aid institutions and the Afghan government tail to moke 
improvements in the lives ot the majority ot Afghans. A RAWA article explains:
’72 As one example, see Rostomi-Povey, E. (20071. Afohon Women: identity and Invasion. London, Zed Books. 
’73 For further Information, see www.rowa.ora.
’74 www.rawa.ora/femD/runews/2007/03/08/afahanlstan-women-s-hoDes-for-eaualitv-fade.htm
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The Taliban used fhe "women's question" fo enforce its own agenda. The imperialist 
occupation forces have also used the agenda of gender equality to ultimately 
pursue their own interests: the occupation o f Afghanistan for strategic geo-political 
reasons. In the eyes of many people, the ministry o f women is associated with the 
occupation ’^^ .
Indeed, the increased levels of violence ogoinst women ore ottributed lorgely to poverty, 
the ongoing occupotion, ond the foilure of the oid opporotus to moke reol chonges to 
wom en’s lives. Bockloshes ogoinst women in the oftermoth ore not unusuol, ond toke the 
form of continued wortime oggression in oddition to new forms of violence (Ponkhurst 2007). 
There is worldwide evidence thot violence ogoinst women predominotes in situotions of 
poverty, porticulorly where women goin economic independence while men remoin 
unemployed (Ponkhurst 2007). If such socio-economic chonges provoke violence ogoinst 
women, perhops more coution could hove been token in design of gender interventions. 
Ponkhurst orticulotes thot the bocklosh orgument -  often ignored in policy circles -  remoins 
chollenging to exploin. Through this reseorch, I hope to offer one port of this complex ond 
multifoceted story -  o nuonced understonding of this phenomenon in the Afghon context.
2. Understanding Violence In the Aftermath
Data and Assumptions
The greotest chollenge in doing reseorch on violence ogoinst women is in occessing 
informotion. Avoiloble informotion in Afghoniston is bosed lorgely on onecdotol evidence. 
Doto is not yet widely ovoiloble, olthough select reseorch is underwoy'^^. In the few coses 
where figures ore ovoiloble, these moy in foct underestimote reolity. In Afghoniston, mony 
refuse to ocknowledge violence ogoinst women os on issue. In oddition, women -  ond men 
- hove different definitions of whot constitutes violence. Violence ogoinst women in the 
context of intimocy is often not recognized and lobeled os such. This is viewed by women os 
within the reolm of normol gender relotions ond not ossumed to be on obuse of wom en’s 
humon rights. In foct. Amnesty Internotionol reports o generol perception omong women
175 www.rowa.ora/temD/runews/2007/03/03/afahanistan-no-aender-eaualitv-under-occuDation.htm  
'7^  Segments of this section were published In on edited book on domestic violence though the Peaceful Families 
Project: Ablrafeh, L. (2007). Freedom Is Only Won from the Inside: Domestic Violence In Post-Confllct Afghanistan 
Change From Within: Diverse Perspectives on Domestic Violence In Muslim Communities. M. Aikhoteeb and S. E. 
Abugldelrl. Washington DC, Peaceful Families Project.
’77 UNIFEM, Global Rights, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs are all In the process of conducting research.
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that violence was to be expected in their lives (2005). Women who recognize violence 
against them are still not likely to change or address it. Such women recognize the added 
challenge this presents to gender relations, which could in turn provoke additional violence.
Women may be reluctant to speak publicly about the violence they have feared, witnessed, 
or experienced for fear of being stigmatized. In addition, there is a perception that violence 
against women in the domestic sphere is a private affair that should be addressed within 
families and not revealed to outsiders. The concern is that such public admissions will bring 
shame to the family. Violence against women is often disguised and denied within the family 
to retain honor and standing within the community. In addition to the fear of social stigma 
and the blame they may receive, women are reluctant to report violence because existing 
institutions are not equipped to take action and protect them. Reporting the crime may 
place the woman at greater risk. The crime itself may not be recorded or classified as a 
crime by the institution. In Afghanistan, women's complaints of violence are often 
disregarded by national institutions, such as the Afghan National Police. Thus, women run the 
risk of exposing themselves to additional violence from the community, the institutions, and 
the state. It is difficult to measure rates of violence accurately, particularly when there is a 
social stigma attached. In a context of changing gender roles and relations, the space 
created for women may bring resentment and backlash, manifesting in a shift from public to 
private violence. When public violence turns private, it then becomes hidden from policy­
makers and is beyond the purview of aid institution p r i o r i t i e s indeed, this reinforces the 
possibility, posited in Chapter II, that a shift is taking place from a public to a private 
patriarchy.
In early 2006, UNIFEM began a nationwide effort to collect data  for a comprehensive 
database on violence against women in order to analyze trends, determine strategies for 
action, and provide response mechanisms and s e r v ic e s '^ ’ . Global Rights is currently 
conducting a national survey on domestic violence with 4,500 people in 16 provinces’®^. 
There are very few statistics to demonstrate violence against women in Afghanistan, and 
even fewer figures that are reliable. A 2003 study found that nearly 60% of the several 
hundred women interviewed had experienced some kind of domestic violence (Terre des 
Hommes 2003). In the case of a drastic increase in statistics of violence in a given time, one
'78 For additional information, see Barry, J. (2005). Rising Up  in Response: Women's Riahts Activism in Conflict. Boulder, 
Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights.
179 www.unifem.orq/news events/storv detail.DhD?StorvlP=4t2
'80 For more information, see httD://www.alobalriahts.ora/site/PaaeServer?Daaename=www osi index 58
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cannot necessarily assume that rates of violence hove increased. There might be other 
factors that contribute to the sudden change. Perhaps reporting procedures have become 
less arduous. Perhaps women are part of an organization or support group that is 
encouraging them to speak out. It is precisely these trends that make reporting on violence 
even more challenging. Statistics are unreliable, and quantitative data  is difficult to obtain. 
But this effort requires more than just figures and statistics. Structural issues need to be 
identified and addressed. Patterns of abuse and discrimination need to be revealed and 
studied. And root causes of violence in Afghan society must be understood in context. In this 
vein, qualitative evidence that examines perceptions and experiences should be given 
significant weight.
Finally, it is worth briefly stating that not all Afghan women are victims, as discussed earlier. 
Not all Afghan men are perpetrators. Not all women are inherently peaceful. And not all 
men are bellicose. Such constructions reinforce patriarchal models of the gender order and 
negate patterns of violence practiced by women and patterns of peace practiced by men 
(Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2005). It is important to recognize 
that not all violence against women is at the hands of men. There ore various examples 
across cultures and histories to demonstrate that women have the capacity for violence 
against each other. This ranges from female genital cutting -  where young girls ore mutilated 
by the hands of older women -  to the violence perpetrated on a new bride by her mother- 
in-law. While it is important to acknowledge such incidents, it is clear that in the majority of 
cases, women are primarily victims of violence perpetrated by men. In Afghanistan, new 
brides can face abuse from their female in-laws, particularly if the marriage is the result of 
Bad (giving a female relative to the victim ’s family to settle a crime) or Badal (giving a 
female relative in marriage in return for a bride). If the bride remains childless, violence can 
also result. The forms of such violence perpetrated by women often entails abuse of power 
and could lead to psychological and physical abuse.
Forms and Patterns
There is a nascent understanding that particular forms of violence against women -  
particularly domestic violence -  increase after a c o n f l i c t i n  Afghanistan today, it is not
’8' Barry end others speck well to this. See Borry, J. (2005). Risino Up  in Response: Women's Rights Activism In Conflict. 
Boulder, Urgent Action Fund for Women's Humon Rights.
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unusual to hear women say that they felt ‘safer’ under the Taliban'82. Violence against 
women is believed to be pervasive in Afghanistan, although little data exists to support this. 
The Ministry of Women's Affairs has called violence against women in Afghanistan a violation 
of human rights and an abuse that is sustained by a patriarchy that supports abuse and 
dehumanization of women. Violence against women also has significant econom ic and 
social costs, impairing women from actively and effectively participating in society and in 
their own -  and ultimately Afghanistan’s -  development (Jalal 2005, 27 June). The report of 
Yakin Erturk, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, in July of 2005 notes 
that violence against women continues to be pervasive in Afghanistan. Erturk cites four 
reasons for the perpetuation of violence: (1) the traditional patriarchal gender order, (2) the 
erosion of protective social mechanisms, (3) the lack of rule of law, and (4) poverty and 
insecurity (2005: 2). She states that "efforts to improve the status of women in Afghanistan are 
intimately associated with the challenge of multiple transitions confronting Afghan society 
today’’ (2005: 2).
In this case, it is possible to build on Erturk’s work by adding a fifth element, the idea raised by 
many Afghan men and women that aid institutions are provoking a change in gender 
relations. New forms of violence are emerging as a result of wom en’s increased visibility 
outside the home. Such violence is beyond social, ethnic, religious, tribal, or econom ic 
boundaries. The space created for women may bring resentment and backlash, driving 
violence further into the private domain. Afghanistan specialist Sarah Kamal notes:
Many Afghans dismiss the reconstruction period’s emphasis on wom en’s participation  
as being ‘overly Western’ or a corruption ot Afghan society and morals.,. [Further] 
some men feel that opportunities tor women surpass those open to men, and there 
are occasional indications that resentment against women has increased as a result. 
(2006: 2)
Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals Report for 2005 states the "silent epidem ic" of 
violence against women is due to the combination of their "low status" and years of conflict 
(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2005). Violence against women in Afghanistan is 
widespread and ranges from deprivation of education to econom ic opportunities, through
'82 Corrin and others reinforce this view. See Corrin, C. (2004). International and Local Interventions to Reduce 
Gender-based Violence Against Women in Post-Conflict Situations,
http.7/vww.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2004- Î /conference%202004-1 -papers/Corrin-3105.pdf.
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verbal and psychological violence, beatings, sexual violence and killings. Many acts of 
violence involve traditional practices including the betrothal of young girls in infancy, early 
marriage and crimes of ‘honor’, where a female is punished for having offended custom, 
tradition or honor (Amnesty International 2005). Afghanistan’s National Development 
Strategy -  the government’s overarching strategy for promoting growth, generating wealth 
and reducing poverty and vulnerability’®^ _ also sees widespread inequalities for women. The 
Constitution of Afghanistan guarantees gender equality, however women lack legal 
awareness and many do not effectively enjoy the Constitutionally-guaranteed equal 
protection of the law. It further states that “discriminatory provisions in laws and policies are 
still prevalent and have not been made consistent with the Constitution’’ (Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2006).
According to Afghan tradition, females in the family are under the authority of the father or 
husband. They suffer restricted freedom of movement and nearly no control over the 
choices that govern their lives. Most women will not have the opportunity to assert economic 
and social independence, nor to enjoy their human rights. Girls are not given soy over 
choice of husbands and find that they are abused and mistreated in the husband’s home. 
Those who try to escape the abuse are stigmatized, isolated, and possibly imprisoned. 
Forced and underage marriages are also prevalent. Reports emerging from UNIFEM and the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs indicate that approximately 60-80% of all marriages are forced, 
and occur frequently as payment for debt or to settle a feud (2005). According to Amnesty 
International, a child marriage is by definition a forced marriage, "as a child cannot be 
considered to have consented freely’’ (2005). The selling and trafficking of women is 
increasing. Activists and specialists have expressed concern that domestic violence is 
widespread in Afghanistan and there remains little public awareness, prevention, or 
response. Coses are not reported, and in the rare cases where they are reported, they are 
not properly recorded. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs Legal Departmenf recorded 583 
reported cases in 2004, and it is likely that many more cases remain unreported (2005). 
Violence against women and the absence of effective redress for victims, whether through 
informal or formal justice mechanisms, is a pervasive human rights problem in Afghanistan 
(Ministry of Women's Affairs 2005).
'83 htlD://www.gf/nds/# 1
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other forms of violence against women in Afghanistan include Bad and Badal (as previously 
mentioned), along with the practice of exchanging girls for cattle or material goods, and the 
recently well-publicized self-immolation, which entails women inflicting harm upon 
themselves to end their suffering. Amnesty International reports that the majority of self- 
immolation victims they interviewed had attem pted to kill themselves as a result of violence 
in the family’®^, jhis phenomenon has been studied and publicized in Herat and is prevalent 
all over Afghanistan. In fact, the common perception that self-immolation occurs with 
greater frequency in Herat is simply because that is where the incident was first exposed -  
and therefore where most journalists restricted their focus. Violence against women in 
Afghanistan can also include intimidation of women in the form of sexual or derogatory 
comments, harassment, and other means of drawing boundaries and delineating women's 
‘p lace ’ in the gender o r d e r ’®^.
Studies demonstrate that it is not unusual for men to use violence against women as a means 
of establishing and maintaining power relationships and structural inequalities (Paci 2002; 
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2005). In short, one strategy for 
safeguarding the present gender order is to employ violence against women. Research by 
UNIFEM elaborates that “men’s traditional roles have been threatened and rather than 
finding alternative roles, men have in some coses sought to assert their masculinity through... 
domestic violence” (IRIN 2004: 7). In cases where men employ such violence, wom en’s 
choices, safety, and behavior is restricted as a result. In fact, "the formation of dominant and 
violent military masculinities in conflict zones around the world, for example, creates extreme 
forms of gender oppression” (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2005: 
12). Several researchers, such as Chris Corrin, have noted this unfortunate trend. She explains 
that “ in parts of Afghanistan women have stated that the insecurity and risk of sexual assault 
they face make their lives worse than during the Taliban era” (2004: 11). Corrin attributes this 
to the absence of rule of law beyond the capital and the continued presence of illegal 
armed groups.
Amnesty International (2005). Afgtianistan: Women Still Under Attack -  A Systematic Failure to Protect, 
http://web.amnesty.org/librory/print/ENGASA 110072005.
'85 For further discussion, see Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2005). Masculinities: Male  
Roles and Male Involvement in the Promotion of Gender Equality. New York, Women’s Commission for Refugee 
Women and Children.
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othe r Countries and Cases
Having said all of this, it is worthwhile noting that violence against women is not exclusive to 
contexts such as Afghanistan. So-called ‘third world’ violence against women is viewed by 
those outside as a ‘death by culture’, in Narayan’s words (1997). It is important to think ot the 
context that is lost -  and the new one that is gained -  when issues ot violence against 
women cross borders and become part ot a Western feminist agenda. These ‘other’ issues ot 
‘other’ women are subsequently adopted (read: hijacked) by academics and feminists and 
becom e part ot what the West understands ‘third world gender issues’ to be. It these issues 
occur in Muslim countries, they then become ‘Muslim issues’ and they continue to be 
misconstrued and de-contextualized with increasing publicity (1997).
Examples from other countries emerging from conflict seem to demonstrate that increased 
domestic violence forms an unfortunate component ot the aftermath agenda. “ In virtually 
all post-contlict settings, [domestic violence] is acknowledged as a component ot the 
“culture ot violence" that ensues from war” (Ward 2002). The UN Secretary-General’s Report 
on Women, Peace and Security states that domestic violence is one particular form that 
continues otter the contlicrt®^. In the aftermath, conditions tor women risk further 
deterioration, violence tends to increase, and the potential tor future conflict is likely. It is in 
this context that international attention and support begin to wane (Barry 2005: 70). 
However, Human Rights Watch reports that during the reconstruction process in the 
aftermath, violence against women is often ignored or relegated to low-priority status 
com pared with other concerns (1999). Indeed, as previously mentioned, violence against 
women is not even a precursor tor peace, according to the Peace Index as mentioned in 
Chapter I.
The experience ot women in Bosnia is an ott-cited case to demonstrate the trend ot 
increased violence against women in post-contlict contexts. Violence was inflicted upon 
Bosnian women a t the hands ot demobilized soldiers in the form ot domestic violence. 
Similarly in Rwanda, women experienced increased violence following the conflict and 
becam e ‘soft’ outlets tor men's frustrations. Research on increased violence in post-contlict 
Guatemala notes that despite a decline in political violence, social violence was increasing 
(Moser and Mcllwaine 2001: 41). In addition, there was a notable shift to increased urban-
'86 UN 5/2002/1154
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based violence coupled with a general sense of lawlessness and disorder. Afghanistan is 
experiencing a similar phenomenon. Manifestations of the current crisis of poverty and 
vulnerability in urban areas includes domestic violence and social breakdown alongside 
increased crime rates (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 56). Similarly, in 
Angola, many men were left unemployed following the conflict. Research revealed that 
men felt undermined by the fact that they were unable to contribute to the household and 
that instead women were supporting the tomilies. As a result, men’s frustrations led to 
increased violence against women, coupled with greater drug and alcohol use (IRIN 2004: 
18).
Myriad reports have explained that there are consequences for women when, in the context 
of conflict and the aftermath, men perceive that they have lost their traditional roles. One 
such example is the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children who state that:
While women are often marginalized and excluded during their displacement
humanitarian organizations often attem pt to focus on women which can lead to
their empowerment... This may further alienate the men.
(2006: 16)
Simon Turner’s research in the Lukole Refugee Camp in Tanzania revealed striking similarities 
to Afghanistan. Turner noted that UNHCR efforts to empower women through aid 
interventions had negative effects. He explains that the men felt threatened by the 
perceived loss of their position as breadwinners and figures of authority. In short, they felt as if 
the "UNCHR was taking their authority and their women from them ” (Turner 2000: 8). Turner 
elaborated that feelings of loss following a conflict -  particularly feelings of social and moral 
decay -  are interpreted in terms of gender relations, which are, in turn, projected as 
resentment toward the agency that is attempting to take ‘their’ women and ‘their’ 
masculinity (2000). Turner also notes that women in so-called empowerment programs were 
not particularly in favor of ‘equality’ . In fact, women gave half of their financial support from 
the agency to their husbands so os not to antagonize them (2000)
While not in conflict or the aftermath, research in Atzompa, Mexico, also bears resemblance 
to Afghanistan. Researcher Ramona Perez writes that women feel compelled to accep t
’871 have noted the some trend in Afghanistan where women are cautious to present cash and in-kind earnings to 
male members of the family to appease them and to secure their continued participation in the aid program.
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increased male violence as a reaction to men's own sense of displacement as women are 
granted greater economic opportunities (2002: 32). She says the following about this 
particular case:
This indicates a complex ‘developmenfoT process in which econom ic benefits for 
women are offset by an intensification of patriarchal violence. This dynamic 
problematizes the very category o f development with its notion o f progress, since 
material ‘progress' entails a regression -  an escalation in male violence.
(2002: 32)
Increased violence against women in the aftermath is not just a phenomenon of the 
developing world. In fact, research in the United States following Hurricane Kafrina revealed 
that American men are also susceptible to violence in times of uncertainty:
Especially when so much is out of their control in Katrina’s aftermath, men without 
jobs... may feel unmasked and unmanly... Some men will cope through drugs, 
alcohol, physical aggression or all three, hurting themselves and putting the women 
and girls around them a t risk. We can count on increased reports o f violence against 
women as this is so common in US and international disasters.
(Enarson 2005: 2)
3. Evidence of Violence as an Unintended Effect
When poverty walks in through the door, happiness flies out through the window.
- Afghan proverb indicating that poverty brings trouble and difficulties at home.
Perceptions
Policy-makers, policy implementors, NGO leaders, and Afghan specialists interviewed 
highlighted domestic violence, trafficking, and rape as prevalent forms of violence. Reports 
of increased domestic violence are emerging in Afghanistan, for reasons that include the 
continued availability of weapons, violence that male family members have experienced or 
meted out, trauma, frustration, and men’s inability to access trainings and economic 
opportunities. Afghan history demonstrates that this is not unusual. The United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Developmenf (UNRISD) explains that "attacks on wom en’s newly
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assumed rights and behaviors constitute what frequently amounts to a postwar backlash 
against women" (2005: 233). Afghanistan is cited as a case in point. An Afghan woman 
working on gender issues with on aid institution explained:
I think that the communities ore not ready to accep t the new changes in wom en’s 
situation. They think women expect too much. One way to not give [women] what 
they want is to use violence against them.
An Afghan NGO leader elaborated:
Men and women are not ready to accep t the extent o f freedom that Westerners are 
asking for in their programs in Afghanistan. People becom e sensitive to the fact that 
Afghan women are expected to dress in Western style -  if they are ‘liberated’ -  and  
to work very closely with men and foreigners. That is the reason violence against 
women has increased. If the status quo continues, there will be more violence 
against women. Instead, it should change to a more Afghan -  more slow -  pace. 
Change doesn’t need to be revolutionary for it to work.
Another gender specialist shared her experience:
There were several cases known to me where women were being abused by their 
husbands for taking classes and participating in women's workshops. Some women 
becam e scared and stopped attending. Fathers, brothers, husbands were never 
involved in any of the programming activities.
Some policy-makers and policy implementors attributed the perceived increase in violence 
against women to a general sense of lawlessness and disorder that characterizes countries in 
the aftermath. A gender advisor continued:
If in fac t violence has increased, my guess a t the main reason would be a growing 
insecurity toward the position of women in the home/community and the fear of 
Westernization. In short, a backlash against various trends -  some good and some 
decidedly bad  -  that have come due to Afghanistan opening up to the West, not to 
mention the sudden and dramatic increase o f Western individuals and  
organizations... If we compare to other post-conflict countries, it ’s possible to predict
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that violence against women is greater here because of the increased power of the 
mafias and warlords, exacerbated income disparities, the continuously unstable 
situation, and trauma in men that leads to violence.
Indeed, Kondiyoti reinforces this point in her research on Afghanistan, arguing that violations 
ot wom en’s rights are determined by mutually reinforcing influences: gender disadvantage, 
erosion ot livelihoods, poverty, lawlessness, insecurity. Further, poverty and displacement 
have eroded social safety nets in form ot family and kinship ties (2005: 13). The gender officer 
tor an international agency put it this way:
There are hardly any reports focusing especially on violence against women from 
different periods during the conflict. However, I would not be surprised if there was a 
rise in domestic violence as part of post-conflict developments. There seems to have 
been an increase in kidnappings and trafficking.
Most ot those interviewed, however, could not confirm an increase in violence against 
women, per se, but certainly suspected that this was the case. Many cited concerns ot an 
imminent backlash, or the possibility that the backlash was already underway. An Afghan 
woman policy-maker in an aid institution had the following to soy:
There is a kind of negative idea among the people [on gender] that has to be 
corrected. And some people think that too much goes to women. The communities 
are sometimes not ready to accep t the changes in wom en’s situation. For them it is 
too much and too fast. One way for men to not give women what they want is to use 
violence against them. There is a backlash a t the speed of change and the focus of 
foreign aid, women being the focus.
Afghan Voices on Violence
Ot the 14 (out ot 50) men who expressed concern that violence was increasing, the majority 
are from rural origins (57%), married (57%), and have a high level ot education (64%). The 
majority ot women who reported incidents ot violence or tear ot violence were from rural 
origins, married, and with no education. Ot the 33 (out ot 71) women who believed that 
violence was increasing, the majority are also rural (64%) and married (61%). However, 
regarding education levels, the majority ot women who expressed concern that violence
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was increasing come from the category that has had no education (73%). In terms ot level ot 
education, this is opposite to the men in that men in the highest education category were 
more conscious ot increased violence than those with less education.
During the interviews, participants were not asked specifically about violence. Instead, they 
were given the opportunity to share their own perceptions ot how gender roles and relations 
ore changing and how they ore at present. In so doing, it was not assumed a priori that 
violence would be an important issue. Instead violence emerged from the interviewees 
themselves when they found it to be on issue that was relevant to the discussion.
Interviewees -  particularly women - also alluded to violence without specifically stating it. 
Examples include referring to increased verbal abuse, decreased mobility, increased fighting 
in the family, and statements such as “ he makes things more difficult tor me now” . Terms to 
connote increased violence include ‘danger’ and ‘fighting’ . In Dari, the term tor violence, 
fashadud, generally refers to political conflict and violence on a large scale, unless 
fashadud aley-he zanaan - violence against women - is referred to specifically. The more 
common term tor violence against women in the form ot domestic violence is khshoonat 
aley-he zanaan. The term tor conflict, kash-ma-kash, was generally not employed tor the 
home. Women used nezaa -  fighting - more frequently along with words that connote 
‘family problems’ or ‘family concerns’. Women also expressed the tear - farsidah - of 
increased violence in the future and the sense that this was to be anticipated as a result ot 
present status. For both men and women, a mention ot violence did not always mean that 
they are personally facing violence in the home. This was true tor some cases, but further in- 
depth study is needed to explore this trend. Violence in the home should also be put in the 
context ot a general sense ot frustration, lawlessness, and disorder. This is particularly relevant 
given recent incidents ot public violence and the increasing tension in Afghanistan.
Afghan men who addressed issues ot increased violence did not do so directly, but implied 
that conflicts at home were becoming an increasing part ot their lives. For instance, one 
man explained that “relations between men and women have gotten worse than in 
previous periods” . Another stated that “ tear still exists” between men and women and that 
“ relations are not so good like before” . Men referred to difficulties at home and increased 
pressure. One man even said: “ I wish that men should give up irrational discrimination and 
violence against women” . An Afghan man in his late 20s from Kabul put it this way:
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The international community cam e here and want to work only for women. And they 
don 't want to improve the status of Afghan men. Therefore Afghan men start making 
problems for their sister, their mother, their wife. They start making problems.
Men who referred to violence expressed that they telt ‘anger’ against their wives when, after 
men acquiesced to wom en’s participation in a training program, the women tailed to find 
gainful employment and were unable to provide support to the family. Many men explained 
that there had been much debate and argument in the house in order tor the wife to 
convince the husband that she should participate in aid interventions - particularly when 
they entail income generation - as this could question the m an’s role as ‘provider’ . Economic 
necessity trumped all other concerns, and certain men agreed to let their wives leave the 
house. When the said trainings tailed to yield significant economic support, these men telt 
that their wives were ‘useless’ (and also told their wives this) and that they were let out ot the 
house ‘tor nothing’. This also bred resentment with the intervention itself, which was also 
labeled ‘useless’ and accused ot using women to till some kind ot quota without ottering 
substantive training. A man alluded to raised expectations that his wife would be able to 
support the family -  yet she tailed. The outcome generally seemed to be increased verbal 
and psychological violence. Women’s self-esteem suffered as a result, and they telt less likely 
to take risks or make unconventional demands in the future. Many women articulated that 
they would feel more comfortable accessing their opportunities it men were not neglected.
With women also, most discussions about violence were implicit, but many were also able to 
refer to violence directly. Most ot the discussions on violence centered around men’s 
frustrations and inabilities to access opportunities. Women saw this as an explanation tor the 
violence that was newly directed towards them. One elderly woman explained: “My 
husband didn’t have good behavior during the Taliban regime. He was angry because he 
didn’t have a job, so he left me forever” . Another was more direct, stating that “men should 
stop abusing women because ot their opportunities” . She telt that her husband resented her 
ability to bring some an income, however meager, and that she would prefer that he work. 
Some women expressed this new violence as a result ot men’s ‘insulted honor’ . This married 
woman in her late 20s put it this way: “We don’t want our men to be backed from any other 
man in the world. It is this that causes violence” . She elaborated to explain that Afghan men 
are feeling dependent on others and as a result their dignity was under question. Both men 
and women expressed a strong desire tor men to be able to stand on their own feet, without 
the support ot others. Another woman reinforced this point, explaining that “men are more
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aggressive and angry” because they lack employment. A few women were vocal in their 
blame of aid institutions and their focus on women. One said: "They increased violence 
between men and women and it will increase more". An Afghan woman elaborated: "The 
men, they have become more angry, more violent. Much more violent” .
A few men, and many women, shared the view that violence against women has increased 
in the aftermath. Some felt that this is a continuation of wartime violence, such as this man 
from rural Afghanistan with no education who said: "Still men are the same. Most men are 
cruel to their wives and daughters. It might be a cause of the war” . Another man blamed 
the enforced changes in gender relations for increased violence and hostility, explaining 
that "fundamentalist ideas have developed because many people feel that the changes 
happening with gender are obligatory and they are resisting them ” . Women from varied 
ages and backgrounds expressed more strongly worded concerns. Below are a tew 
examples:
• I think that violence is increasing against women because men are angry.
• Apparently men and women’s rights are equally distributed but still the violence 
against women has increased. This talk of rights has just increased the gap between 
men and women.
• Relations between men and women are getting worse because women are trying to 
have a new life and men don't want it.
• I think relations are not based on equality. Women are trying to gain power and men 
do not want to allow it.
• I think that women are fighting with men to secure their rights, and men are resisting 
the changes.
• Men and wom en’s rights are not equal yet. Men are more aggressive and angry.
• Apparently men and women have equal rights - but violence against women has
increased.
Most ot the women interviewed did not refer to violence directly, but used other words such 
as anger, hostility, and tension. Some examples are:
• Some wom en’s organizations have reflected wrong things about women, which has 
made men very angry.
• They do not support men directly. It makes the men angry.
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• All bad things happen when men are not educated and literate.
• In some places, men have become sensitive about wom en’s organizations. They 
believe that these organizations train women to stand against the laws and their 
husbands. Of course this is not true. It is actually what men think.
• Men know that they are not involved. And they are angry as a result.
• We want dignity for our men, and then they will treat us better.
• An imposed war has bad influence on men and women's relationship.
• Relations between men and women are getting worse because women are trying to 
have a new life and men don’t want it.
• Relations seem good, but nothing is as it appears.
• Relations are changing and in many ways it is worse.
In Afghanistan, women are being increasingly castigated for being ‘Western-influenced’. 
Strong pushes for women's rights run the risk of being undermined "because fhe impression 
of foreign heteronomy would be counterproductive’’ (Glatzer 2002). Fatana Gailani, 
longtime head of the Afghanistan Women’s Council, told a story about her experience 
working to create a school for Afghan children in a refugee cam p in Peshawar. Even the 
perspective that she might be working towards a ‘Western’ agenda could undermine her 
efforts and put her personal safety at risk. She said:
Some Mullahs, some fundamentalists made publicity in this camp. They said ‘she is 
working for Western countries, she has a Western idea, and this and tha t’, but I d idn ’t 
have a Western idea, I had an Afghan idea. I am a Moslem, and I am an Afghan, I 
love my customs, I love my religion, and I was not using them in a wrong way.
(Ellis 2000:192)
It is therefore important to recognize the role that aid interventions and their accompanying 
rhetoric might play. The notion that there may be unintended consequences of interventions 
is beginning to be addressed. However, identification of these unintended, negative gender 
consequences will not automatically result in a solution to the problem (Skjelsbœk, Barth et 
al. 2004). A leader of an aid institution for women suggesfed that the aid apparatus should 
work with Afghan women to help them recognize possible negative implications and to see 
“whether they are prepared to take on that fight. At the end, if they are not prepared, 
nothing is going to happen’’. Those interviewed noted a need for increased sensitivity to 
program design, and to promises made, as well as an increased understanding of the
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im pact G foreign presence might have in Afghanistan regarding violence against women. A 
member of Afghanistan's Judiciary and Justice Reform Commission explained why violence 
has increased:
We have another problem  too. Now we are not in isolation from the world as we 
were 100 years ago. Now we have links with other parts of the world and the world 
looks a t us, and it affects us. The effects had their Influence on the way we wear 
clothes, and our livelihoods. We had a strong cultural background, but today 
Western culture is dominating our society day by day.
(Women and Children Legal Research Foundation 2004: 71)
Documented Cases
Afghan wom en’s groups hove expressed repeated concern about the increased levels of 
violence -  both at the public and private levels. There has been a dramatic increase in 
violence against women at the time of this writing. In May 2005, three Afghan women were 
found raped and strangled in Baghlan Province. It is believed that these women were 
murdered for their involvement with international non-governmental organizations and 
"w horedom "'88. As a result, 300 women protested in Kabul'®’ . Soon after, another woman 
was stoned in Badokhshan Province. This prompted a reaction from Afghan women resulting 
in the Declaration of Afghan Women’s NGOs of 5 May 2005 urging for investigations that will 
bring the perpetrators to justice and asking for increased security for all Afghan citizens'’ o. 
This further prompted plans for a protest and an email entitled What you can do about the 
Backlash, listing the following os one of the action items:
Contact your country representative/embassy in Afghanistan and ask for 
accountability on how your tax dollars are being spent in Afghanistan. No more 
empty rhetoric on ‘national programs and policy’ -  what are the results on the 
ground?
’88 This comes from a  note that was left pinned to the women's bodies blaming their fate on their involvement with 
NGOs and its resulting "whoredom".
’89 For more information, see Kazem, H. (2005). Afghans Decry Violence Against Women. Los Angeles Times. Los 
Angeles: np.
”0 Security remains precarious in Afghanistan. Nearly every document, speech, and report on Afghanistan -  by 
Afghan and non-Afghan alike -  has highlighted the need tor improved security. No political or social process can  
be successful or sustainable without a  genuine commitment to provide security in Afghanistan. There is no need to 
belabor this point. Many have said it, yet it continues to toll on deaf ears.
’”  This email was sent to a  select distribution list, ot which I am a member, on 6 M ay 2005.
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A few days afterwards, Daily Outlook, Afghanistan’s English language newspaper, noted the 
increase in violence against women in several front-page articles (2005). On the following 
pages, there was on article about the Minister ot Women’s Affairs’ work program, including 
support tor widows and disabled women. She also expressed concern with the increase in 
domestic violence and the lack ot mechanisms to bring perpetrators to court. The adjacent 
article reported a 16-year old girl who was raped and killed in Kabul. The Kabul Weekly -  in 
English and Dari -  ran several articles during that week also. The front page article stated 
that violence against women continues while the aid apparatus "looks on". A subheading ot 
the article stated that the incident revealed “a village uncomfortable with outside 
interference" (2005).
A tew months later, Afghanistan was shocked at the murder ot Nadia Anjuman, a tamed 
Afghan poet, by her husband>92. she was 25 years old. According to friends and family, 
Anjuman was seen as a disgrace to her family due to her poetry, which described the 
oppression ot Afghan women:
I am caged in this corner, full o f melancholy and sorrow 
My wings are closed and I cannot fly 
I am an Afghan woman and I must wall
Her death is cited as a "tragic example ot the violence that so many Afghan women still 
face despite their advances tour years after Taliban rule" (Gall 2005) and an indication that 
the Afghan government and the aid apparatus had tailed to address issues ot domestic 
violence. Anjuman’s poem. Soundless Cries, is one ot the tew that is available in English in its
entirety>93.
I hear the green paces o f the rain 
Here they are coming 
A thirsty few who have come  
With their dusty outfits on 
With their breaths soiled with the
” 2 Nadia Anjuman is famous for her book of poetry, Gul-e-dodi (Dork Red Flower) published in 2005. Very few of her 
poems ore available in translation.
” 3 Soundless Cries by Nadia Anjuman was translated by Abdul S. Shayek and can be found at 
httD://www.DulDmovies.com/aaawatch/2005/11 /lethal-ooetrv/
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Deception of mirages
Paces, dry and dusty
They arrive here now
Girls, grown up with hurting soul
And wounded bodies
Happiness has escaped their faces
Hearts, old and cracked
The word of a smile never wriften
In the book of their lips
Not even a drop o f tear can come out
The dried rivers o f their eyes.
Oh dear God!
I do not know if their soundless cries 
Reach the clouds. The skies?
I hear the green paces of the rain.
Conclusions
Researcher Jonathan Goodhand explains that we still know far too little about the 
interactions between aid and the dynamics of violence: "The more ambitious the objectives 
the more difficult they are to measure and the more ambiguous and open to challenge they 
are" (2002: 840). He could have been talking about violence against women in Afghanistan. 
Other research has documented men’s sense of frustration with their inability to meet the 
household’s basic needs and the violence that they mete out as a result. Research on urban 
vulnerability presents a good discussion of this issue. Stefan Schutte highlights this quote from 
a 35-year old man as an illustration of the negative impacts insufficient income have on 
intra-household relations:
When I had a job, everything was fine: we had good relations in our house. But it was 
only temporary, and now I am a t home and everything gets on my nerves. I am not 
able to feed my family, and I am angry about that and then I am beating my wife, 
because she is complaining about that. What can I do? Give me a job, then 
everything will be good again.
(2004: 23)
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Schutte explains that "accounts like these are frequent, and especially women report 
increasing domestic violence” (2004: 23). He elaborates that social assets have become 
vulnerable, and this in turn has put significant pressure on social relations. Poverty leads to 
domestic violence and deteriorating intra-household relations. This is more relevant for urban 
households as displacement has resulted in a lack of traditional social support systems in the 
form of extended families (Schutte 2004: 29-30).
Chapter IX addresses implications of ideological occupations and potential consequences. 
This chapter also reveals the ways in which an anti-politics framework can be viewed 
through a gender lens. The chapter concludes with the voices of Afghan women and men 
and their views of what the future holds, followed by avenues for possible future research.
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CHAPTER IX: Insecurities, Ideological Occupations and Gender Anti-Poiitics in ttie Aftermath
The Dari word for transition, gozargah, represents a place people pass through, a point ot 
transition, and an historic location in Kabul where nomads sought respite. Afghanistan’s 
gozargah is neither the beginning ot the journey nor the end.
Fairness, justice, and freedom are more than words -  they are perspectives.
V tor Vendetta
Jaggar writes that "the structure and context ot [feminists’] discursive interventions may have 
the consequences ot positioning the subjects ot their discourse as less than equal. In these 
circumstances, discussion ot some issues by some feminists may not only mute the voices ot 
other women but even suggest that they are incapable ot speaking tor themselves" (1998: 
11). This is an argument that reinforces the importance ot highlighting Afghan voices, as has 
been done in this research. It is through my long experience in Afghanistan that this study 
can be validated. I am conscious ot having been on ‘both sides’ with Afghan wom en’s 
issues. I do not use this as an imposition ot binary oppositions, but simply to mean that I have 
been both active participant and researcher in this context. Explanations ot my position os 
well as discussions to close the feedback loop and verity findings can be found in 
Appendices 1 and 6.
1. Roles, Relations, and Opportunities
What Space Does Conflict Create?
There is a burgeoning literature on wom en’s roles in conflict and its aftermath. In this context, 
an examination ot the gender order is particularly relevant as Afghan society is undergoing 
processes ot socio-political transformation, one result ot which is the fluctuation ot gender 
identities. Conflict compels individuals, households, and communities to fundamentally 
rethink and restructure their ways and beliefs. A part ot this restructuring is played out on 
gender roles, and subsequently on gender relations. No consensus exists on whether these 
new gender roles are advantageous to women or sustainable in the long term. Despite new 
roles, opportunities, and responsibilities, women may easily be marginalized in the 
reconstruction process. Further, many theorists have argued that any expansion ot wom en’s
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roles in war is only temporary and fails to sustain itself when the war ends (Pankhurst 1998). 
Conflict can stimulate a shift in gender roles while simultaneously provoking a retreat to 
conservative notions of masculinity and femininity (Meintjes, Pillay et al. 2001: 152). A woman 
working with on Afghan woman's NGO explained:
Conflict certainly seemed to create some opportunities for women in a position to 
work in NGOs or international agencies or even to start their own organizations, but 
I ’m not sure to what extent it created opportunities outside the sphere of work -  
especially within the household where it seems the real power is.
Aid interventions, particularly in the aftermath of conflict, ore often conflated with radical 
social change. However, interventions that are implemented do not often challenge gender 
power relations, and even run the risk of doing a disservice to women by implementing 
programs and policies that have not token all possible repercussions into occount^’ .^ Aid 
interventions aiming to empower women may in fact p lace women at increased risk. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of Afghanistan, where the rhetoric used to justify aid 
interventions stemmed from the language used to justify the ousting of the Taliban -  a 
military intervention. And yet, nearly five years later, one could argue that Afghan women 
ore neither ‘liberated’ nor ‘em powered’. Interventions that raise expectations of 
empowerment encourage women to step outside pre-existing gender roles. In so doing, 
gender and power relations are challenged. Women face greater risk if the environment for 
social change is seen to be on external imposition. Amnesty International notes the “cautious 
and precarious atmosphere under which the issue of advancing wom en’s rights is currently 
deba ted ’’ (2005). Women may suffer further when gender-focused interventions foil to take 
gender issues into account, focusing only on women. As seen from the research presented 
above, men’s perceptions that they are neglected could result in a backlash for women. 
Social change and transformation ore not simply introduced by aid interventions, but are 
longer-term processes operating at a structural level to address gender inequalities - on 
wom en’s own terms. Such processes are contextual and local, raising doubts as to whether 
on international aid-imposed social change agenda is really the right approach (Amnesty 
International 2005).
For further information, see Abirofeh, L. (2005). "From Afghanistan to Sudan: How Peace Risks Marginalizing 
Women." Forced Miaration ReviewfNovember 2005).
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Afghan women felt that they were not sufficiently consulted on the direction and pace ot 
social change. This demonstrates a denial women’s agency and in their ability to ac t on 
their own behalf and achieve gains. Theorists hove elaborated on this point, arguing that the 
possibility ot a backlash against women confirms that aid interventions should be designed 
by women participants. Empowerment is not a technical tool that can be handed to 
women. Instead, it must be generated by the women it is meant to serve (Pickup, Williams et 
al. 2001). It is crucial to support and advocate a contextualized approach that recognizes 
Afghan history and Afghan pace and patterns ot social change. To this end, interventions 
must aim to understand concepts ot gender and empowerment and the construction ot 
gender roles and relations in local contexts. This entails congruence with Islam and other 
social frameworks within which Afghans chose to operate. Interventions should be further 
cognizant ot the images used and the resulting perceptions that emerge. The perception ot 
an imposed Western agendo coupled with the image ot Afghan women os downtrodden 
creatures beneath chaddaris does little to advance the cause ot Afghan women, 
particularly in the context ot the Western world’s current climate ot teor/tascinotion with 
women in Islam. Women’s rights activists advise caution in order to avoid backlash from the 
conservative elements ot Afghan society.
Shifts in the gender order ore largely indigenous, yet they con be supported or hindered by 
external interventions. There is little consensus on how to sustain positive changes. This is 
particularly relevant in the context ot Afghanistan, "where you open doors tor women, 
showing them another reality. And it you don ’t also work with men... you close the doors 
again and she goes bock home and probably is less satisfied and less compliant than she 
was before," a senior gender advisor explained. Aid interventions in the context ot conflict 
and the aftermath may create additional dependency and a loss ot control over one’s life 
and future (Women's Commission tor Refugee Women and Children 2005). While women 
may benefit from the increased emphasis placed on them by aid institutions, men tend to 
feel emasculated as a result. Failing to take gender dynamics into consideration could result 
in increased inequalities, as respondents hove frequently stated. This perspective is 
reinforced by studies that show that ignoring the needs ot men and focusing exclusively on 
wom en’s participation can create additional challenges such as male resistance, token 
female participation, and the continuation ot male domination (Women's Commission tor 
Refugee Women and Children 2005).
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Aid interventions that do not take gender dimensions into account may be exacerbating 
violence against women. Domestic violence - and even the fear of violence -  is a key factor 
in limiting wom en’s participation in aid interventions (Pickup, Williams et al. 2001). In fact, 
women are well aware that their active involvement in aid interventions may present 
challenges to men's roles. There may be tensions if wom en’s newly-assumed roles are not 
viewed in line with traditional social structures. This backlash could return women to their pre­
war roles, or perhaps leave women worse off than they were before the war. It is not unusual 
to witness a return to, or even on increase in, patriarchal control over women (Pickup, 
Williams et al. 2001). Even if gender roles change in conflict, gender relations may not 
change (Bouta, Frerks et al. 2005: 55, from El-Bushra et al. 2002). However, it is possible to 
emphasize women’s centrality to reconstruction efforts and aid interventions without 
marginalizing men. Working with men in gender programming as participants and as 
advocates and supporters could help change male perceptions of women and help to 
overcome practices which restrict wom en’s rights. This is integral to com bating violence 
against women and to pushing the progression of engagement with men to the fifth phase -  
working with men in their own right. An Afghan woman explained that “when society is 
ready [for changes]... the women will ask it by themselves’’ (Amnesty International 2005).
2. Interventions, Implications, and Occupations
Now, more than a decade later, the US and its allies wanted to sort out Afghanistan. They 
had defined a problem, and now they were setting out to solve it, on their own terms.
(Shah 2003: 293)
It is as if there is an invisible corrective to the West in Afghanistan, a force of nature, dragging 
it back to its roots.
(Shah 2003: 200)
Understanding Context
Again and again throughout the country’s history, the Afghan people have shown 
that they are against any kind of imported culture. It was clear that if wom en’s rights 
were to be widely accep ted and realized, they must not be perceived as imposed 
by foreign interests.
(Mosadiq 2005:30)
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Thus, the ‘gender agenda’ in Afghanistan is lost in a desert of sorts, as mentioned in Chapter 
V. It is desert that lacks context and lacks history. It is a desert that failed to recognize what 
Afghan history aptly demonstrates, namely the deep and pervasive nature of the dislike of 
foreign intervention. In fact, even the perception that an initiative is foreign-driven could 
likely result in its failure. Furthermore, women may jeopardize their own safety and standing in 
the community by linking themselves with foreigners. Even the perception that an Afghan 
woman is promoting a foreign agenda could lead to the believe that she is "contam inated 
by [her] association with outsiders" (Dupree 1996: 6). In associating with foreigners, it is 
believed that she has betrayed the trust of the community and thereby undermined her own 
-  and men's -  honor.
Afghan history has also demonstrated that the most powerful means by which to destabilize 
agendas for social change is to label them un-lslamic. Understandings of Afghan socio­
cultural contexts inevitably entail recognition of the value and significance of religion in the 
lives of Afghans. Every Afghan interviewed -  woman or man -  highlighted the importance of 
achieving gains within the context of Islam. Among discussions with non-Afghan policy­
makers and policy implementors, the importance of Islam was often overlooked. Many 
Afghan members of aid institutions, in the words of one Afghan woman NGO leader, urged 
that interventions "should do everything with respect to Afghan and Islamic culture” . Despite 
Islam’s contested interpretations, it is vital to the functioning of Afghan society and reflects 
how most Afghans see themselves (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 28). An inability to engage 
meaningfully with Islam will prevent social change from penetrating the surface, particularly 
when dealing with gender issues.
Researchers have noted a cultural dissonance between changes within Afghan contexts 
and the values advocated by Western aid (Barakat and Wardell 2004: 110-1). For example, 
many Afghan women have argued that the traditional division between public and private 
worlds does not necessarily mean that they have no decision-making power. These women 
prefer to view changes within the contexts of their traditions and religion. Many of those 
interviewed, particularly Afghan women, expressed strong sentiments against using radical 
language and tactics for fear of a backlash. This also includes adopting a seemingly-Western 
approach to working with women. Another Afghan woman wifh an aid institution 
advocated that "gender experts should follow a gender perspective in Afghanistan through 
Afghan eyes. This means taking into consideration the prevailing customs and traditions” .
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An understanding of Afghan history, as previously illustrated, demonstrates that backlashes 
are not new to Afghan history. “ Whenever attempts have been made to force the issue of 
wom en’s rights in Afghanistan this has resulted in a violent backlash, often with disastrous 
consequences for women themselves" (Barakat 2004: 128). In fact, "the lessons of previous 
attempts to fast-track social change in Afghanistan seem to have been forgotten" (Johnson 
and Leslie 2004: 25). In light of the above, an understanding of the Afghan historical 
trajectory -  particularly regarding gender politics -  could illuminate patterns and problems 
that might pose obstacles in present attempts to restructure gender relations. "There is no 
short-cut to a historically and sociologically informed analysis of the socio-economic 
transformations and institutional context of Afghan society as a backdrop for gender 
analysis" (Kandiyoti 2003: 4-5). More profound analyses of and engagement with Afghan 
society could prevent women from being addressed in a social and historical vacuum, 
thereby creating interventions that complement women's realities.
An interview with an Afghan woman named Zohra in the book Women of Afghanistan Under 
the Taliban expressed the sentiments of many:
Of what I have read in history... and what I have experienced in 46 years ot my life, 
one thing has been confirmed to be right that it there is foreign handling o t our 
affairs, our people will never see a progressing Afghanistan. And I must say that our 
people throughout history have proved their opposition to fhe foreigner and never 
have accep ted  any kind ot slavery. I have a piece ot advice tor US, Pakistan, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia that before faking any decision on Afghanistan, spend a tew 
minutes and flick through the pages ot Afghanistan's history, I am sure they would 
find some useful materials. The 20 years ot wars have struck our innocent nation 
severe blows that they are incapable to speak out against the external and internal 
aggressors, but a time will come when our people will stand on their feet and sweep 
out the enemies o t Afghanistan.
(Skaine 2002: 102)
An Afghan woman working as a policy implementor with an aid institution expressed strong 
sentiments about the push to import and impose foreign concepts in Afghanistan, as history 
has demonstrated the repeated failure of fhis sfrategy:
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/ do not need to remind you that imposing an idea on Afghans is impossible. You 
know fhis. To bring positive change, the idea should be fixed in an Afghan cultural 
framework. Gender is the most valid example of this. We should have started by 
focusing on men because they are the ones traditionally with more power. When 
men understand the meaning of gender and its importance -  and how it benefits 
them -  women will immediately gain what they deserve. But we have not yet learned 
from history and we still try to do things the wrong way. Backwards.
A New Occupation of Afghanistan
Norman Long explains a ‘dom ain’ as a concept that illuminates areas of social life organized 
by reference to a central core of values which are recognized as a locus of certain social 
‘rules’ and imply a degree of social commitment, similar to the definition I have used for an 
institution (2000: 191). Long's domains present an understanding of social ordering in a 
particular context and explain a situation where differing domains come into conflict. Such is 
the point of ‘interface’ . Long might agree that a point of interface is underway in 
Afghanistan. This interface is one that has played out repeatedly in Afghan history, that 
between a foreign ‘occupier’ and Afghans in Afghanistan.
It is problematic to note the trend emerging from data that parallels the ‘regime’ of the aid 
apparatus to previous occupiers in Afghanistan’s history^^ 5 Again, this is not new. Aid has 
long been a means by which outsiders gain influence in Afghanistan (Johnson and Leslie 
2004: 95) ” 6. “What the West has underestimated is the degree to which our interventions 
look to many Afghans like history repeating itself. Another foreign invasion... It’s not a matter 
of reality... but of perception" (Hensher 2006). Indeed, it is the perception that is the most 
important aspect of this scenario, and one that the aid apparatus repeatedly neglects. 
Researchers Magnus and Naby explained it this way in 1998:
With family and community being as coherent and cohesive as they are in Afghan 
society, historical memory... plays an important role in the perceptions o f people and
” 5 This is not exclusive to Afghanistan. Jaggar notes that "some argue that Northern-funded NGOs ore a  new form 
of colonialism, despite using the language of inclusion, empowerment, accountability and grass-roots democracy", 
because they undermine local efforts to assist people. Jaggar, A. M. (2004). "Saving Amina" Global Justice for 
Women and Intercultural Dialogue, University of Colorado of Boulder.
For example, in the 1980s, aid to Afghanistan was tied to Cold War alliances, and in the mid-1990s the agenda  
switched to promote peace. For more information, see Johnson, C. and J. Leslie (2004). Afahanistan: The Miraae ot 
Peace. London, Zed Books.
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in fheir concept of their identity. An evaluation of [Afghanistan's legacy of 
imperialism] can help to explain the attitudes of Afghans toward foreigners... and  
why Afghans are both susceptible and resistant to outside interference.
(1998: 50)
Nearly ten years earlier, Dupree wrote of Afgtians' appretiensions about w tia t ttiey were 
calling ‘cultural imperialism’. She wrote of Afghans' sense that "outsiders, no matter how 
well-intentioned, sit poised, ready to engult the nation with new sets of foreign values" (1990: 
131). It is said that the one thing that repeatedly unites a very divisive Afghanistan is the need 
to drive out occupiers.
This opposition to ‘cultural imperialism' is voiced most strongly when it relates to women. 
Specifically, it is assumed that the corruption and degradation of Afghan women is a 
fundamental part of the Western ‘cultural imperialism' agenda (Weiner and Banuazizi 1994: 
24-5). This sentiment resonates with other countries. Cockburn's work on the gender order in 
Cyprus revealed that toreign occupation of a country actually fueled gender divisions 
(2004). In the 1960s, Cyprus under British occupation was a traditional society with a gender 
line strongly dividing public (male) and private (female) space. During this time, notions of 
honor -  linked to women -  emerged as strong social forces that further delineated space. 
Return to ‘tradition' was expected: "In societies that are most opposed to Western capitalist 
cultural and consumer imperialism, one aspect of resistance is often the reinforcement of 
traditional gender dichotomy and hierarchy" (2004:30). In Puma Sen's words:
All should be promising and optimistic for women but it is not so. No, it is not only the 
troubled process of transition that brings women continued problems but the 
'freedom ' and liberties of the western systems themselves.
(2002: 13)
This freedom manifests itself in the form of parties, pornography, and alcohol -  a direct 
onslaught on Afghan values (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 25). This can be demonstrated by the 
‘no Afghan' door policy in Kabul restaurants that serve alcohol -  or the myriad brothels 
masquerading as restaurants. These recreational activities appear -  to Afghans -  to be an 
attack against their Afghaniyat, or sense of Afghan identity. Indeed, this ideological 
occupation has taken the form of perceived imposition of an alien culture. This imposition.
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coupled with the lack of meaningful changes in the lives of Afghans, has resulted in Afghans 
adopting more conservative views (Rostami-Povey 2007).
The present day project of perceived cultural imperialism is one that stems from experiments 
in social engineering led by the aid apparatus (Giles and Hyndman 2004; Dorronsoro 2005). 
At several periods of interface in Afghanistan’s history, the hostility toward this project was 
led by those largely in rural areas against a government or military apparatus. The current 
interface is now also experiencing open clashes in urban areas. Rostami-Povey explains that 
the failure of development efforts and wom en’s rights is not simply due to a contradiction 
between modernity and tradition. It is in fac t a widening of the gap between the urban elite 
and the rural majority (2007: 19).
This is, firstly, because the aid apparatus is centered in urban areas. And, even more 
noteworthy, the rural population has been displaced to the cities. The old urban elite, those 
who applauded strong pushes for social change in the past, have since largely left 
Afghanistan. The population of Kabul is predominantly comprised of Afghans of rural origins. 
Once a liberal urban center, Kabul has become a site of violence in the supposed aftermath 
- and therefore on interface where a more rigid gender order is enforced.
In the recent increase of violence, many have documented the Afghan perception of their 
‘occupation ’ ’97, Former Afghan president Professor Burhonuddin Robboni’ s^ has become an 
outspoken critic of Western "cultural imperialism’, arguing that it has com e to corrupt Islam 
and obstruct Afghanistan’s development os on independent country. He put his views this 
way:
We consider this a conspirocy against our religion, our freedom and security. They 
talk about women's issues, while thousands of women die, and nobody cares for 
them. But that does not stop them from talking about ‘moral corruption’. They 
haven't come here for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but they have come here 
to corrupt us ...The regime that rules our country stands against the wishes o f the 
entire nation ... In Afghanistan, our policies should be defined by our nation, not by 
any foreign country. The current Afghan government's policies are not acceptab le  to
” 7For one exemple, see Burke, J. (2006, 25 June). "Fear Bottles Hope on the Rood to Kandahar." Guardian Unlimited 
Retrieved 25 June 2006, http://observer.guardian.co.Uk/world/story/0,, 1805334.00.html.
”8 Robbanl is a  Tajik leader who tounded Jomiat-i-lslomi os an offshoot ot the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s 
and played a key role in the Afghan jihad, or holy war.
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the Afghan people. We must protect our freedom. If o foreign country gives old, that 
should be without any strings attached. If the donors put conditions, we should not 
accep t such old.
(Bhodrakumar 2006)
His influence over Afghan public opinion should not be underestimated, nor should his 
understanding of it. Robbani’s thoughts might appear to be provocative, but his words 
speak tor many in Afghanistan. In May 2005, an article in Kabul Weekly - a paper written in 
English and Dari by Afghan authors -  also reinforced this point. It is relevant that the authors 
were Afghan and the text was English because the messages conveyed were geared to the 
aid apparatus. The article NGO-Union founded to create self-sustoinobility: NGOs in 
Afghanistan take a step towards ending reliance on international funds in that same edition 
told the story of Afghan NGOs wanting to d ictate their own agenda and end their 
"dependence” . The subheading read: "Afghan NGOs seeking to rid themselves of 
international funds" and elaborated that foreign organizations are "attempting to project 
the values and norms of foreign civil societies on Afghanistan... [bringing] negative results". 
The article also stated that "experts believe that NGOs' activities are not useful unless they 
find national financial sources and organize their programs according to the priorities of the 
nation’s needs". One Afghan NGO-Union member said: "Their meetings and activities are 
com m anded by foreigners, who are of no use to Afghanistan". He continued to say that 
NGOs should be tree of foreign donors so that they can be allowed to implement projects in 
line with the values of Afghanistan; "Only then can they release themselves from the 
bondage of strangers" (2005).
The significance of the Afghan perception of being occupied by yet another regime cannot 
be overstated. It is expressed most clearly in this Open Letter to Expatriates in Afghanistan, 
written by Sanjar Qiam and posted on various websites and distribution lists’99. Segments of 
this letter follow:
The historical irony of this phenomenon never ceases to amaze me. Both post and  
pre Taliban eras ore marked by oligarchic order: worlordism rooted out whatever was 
left of state infrastructure and committed all sorts of atrocities. The post Taliban period 
is marked by Expotlordism - a new type of oligarchy... There is on increasing
For the full text, see httD://saniar.bloasDot.corT>/2006/07/oDen-letter-to-exDatrlates-in.html
216
concentration of the means of communication a t the fop, this is due to 
communication culture, instruments, language and tendencies in foreign 
organization... Organizational oligarchy has brought about societal oligarchy. Just 
like everything else a society can absorb certain dose of foreigners over a certain 
period o f time. Afghanistan can take a very small dosage of foreigners as they are 
allergic to them. Every page of history witnesses the low ‘absorption capac ity ’ - if I 
may borrow the term from EU... I am making a reference to the history of a proud 
and individualistic man who defends his way of life... hAy point is for one reason or 
another we are all protective. Except the difference is in your network everyone 
should play by your rules, which is fine. But you play by your rules in my network too. 
You d o n 't have the faintest idea of my network and you even don 't try to acquire 
some. You never think of shifting your stand, and redesigning your aims and your way 
of work. You tend to make Afghanistan feel like home. But Afghanistan is not your 
home. The more you try to live 'your life ' the more Afghans would hate you.
Yours truly, Sanjar
Continued Insecurities
On 24 June 2006, BBC aired a special report entitled “Afghanistan: Losing the Aid Game". 
This report was quite timely as it coincided firstly with the writing of this dissertation and, more 
importantly, took p lace within a discouraging political climate in Afghanistan where 
frustrations and disillusionment appeared to be the order of the day. This report was aired a 
few short weeks after the riots in Kabul, the worst demonstration of violence in so-called post­
conflict Afghanistan since the ousting of the Taliban in late 2001.
On 29 May 2006, riots erupted in Kabul, ignited by a traffic accident between Afghan 
vehicles and a US military convoy, leaving over 14 people dead and nearly 150 injured. A 
volcanic reservoir of discontent overflowed into the city, directed at those who -  in principle 
-  are in Afghanistan to help. Myriad news articles reported on the sense of frustration felt by 
Afghans at the lack of progress in their country. “Underlying it all is the fact that young men 
have not seen any tangible change in their lives in terms of either jobs or basic services,” 
explained a British aid worker (Morarjee 2006). Another article quoted an Afghan security 
officer who said: "Many people hate the NGOs because they see all this money coming into 
the country and they have not been able to get jobs. They were waiting for a day like 
today" (Morarjee 2006).
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These riots followed the killing of tour Afghan aid workers with an international NGO in 
Jawzjan Province (Morarjee 2006). 2006 has proved to be on exceptionally brutal year for aid 
workers in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch presents a comparison of aid workers killed 
since 2003:
12 aid workers killed in 2003 
24 aid workers killed in 2004 
31 aid workers killed in 2005
24 aid workers killed from 1 January to 20 June 2006 
(Human Rights Watch 2006: 18)
The sense among the aid apparatus is that the situation will continue to deteriorate. Many 
have speculated that Afghanistan will once again be plunged into war by the end of the 
year200. BBC seemingly concurs. A June 2006 report stated that "international development is 
failing one of its biggest challenges” in Afghanistan (Loyn 2006). The producer, BBC's 
Developing World Correspondent, David Loyn, reported that the people ore disillusioned 
with the government and the aid apparatus, and that, as a result, "a return to war is still a 
possibility” . Afghanistan's semblance of freedom is fragile, the report explains. Loyn lined up 
on array of reputable guests to address the discrepancy between so-called peace and the 
absence of prosperity in Afghanistan. One of these guests was Ramazan Bashardost, the 
infamous former Minister of Planning whose critique of 'NGO-ism' was previously discussed. 
Bashardost referred to the aid apparatus as a mafia who have "killed a golden and historic 
chance to foster cooperation between a Muslim country and a Western country” (2006). 
Loyn added that while the aid apparatus may have had good intentions, " it’s often more 
difficult to do things on the ground than on paper” (2006).
Ashraf Ghani, the former Minister of Finance and outspoken critic of the aid apparatus, said 
that Afghanistan was in fact undermined by aid interventions, citing the absence of action 
despite the abundance of consultants as a case in point. The report demonstrated that in 
many parts of Afghanistan, the conditions ore so poor it appears “as if an emergency had 
just hit” (2006). One would never believe that Afghanistan is nearly five years into so-called 
'post-conflict'. Loyn concluded that Afghanistan is an example of what he called "the law
200 This is based on myriad discussions on ‘the situation in Afghanistan’ that increasingly dominate any gathering of 
aid workers in 2006.
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of unintended consequences", and yet the country could have been a positive example ot 
what a concerted international effort can accomplish (2006).
In a personal email communication from a friend and colleague following the riots and 
reports, she wrote:
There ore reports circulofing on internet groups of the onger omongst Kobulis when 
they heor and see internotionol lovish porties and self-congrotulotory news of their 
contribution to the development effort when the city and the country os o whole is 
still teeming with o holf-storved, ill serviced, growing populotion^^K
Education is likely the sector that received the most kudos in Afghanistan’s aftermath. It was 
widely believed that great progress was made, but the below example suggests that any 
perceived successes would be premature.
Shobnom: Increased Insecuritv in Education
This is to worn oil the teochers and those employees who work with Componies to 
stop working with them. We hove warned you eorlier and this time we give you o 
three doys ultimotum to stop working. If you do not stop, you ore to blome yourself. 
Taliban Shobnom, or Night Letters, from Zabul 
(Human Rights Watch 2006: 50)
This brief example ot the deleterious im pact ot insecurity on the education sector provides a 
strong diagnostic indicator ot the costs ot insecurity more generally (Human Rights Watch 
2006: 5). Historically, schools in Afghanistan have been at the frontline ot hostilities that are 
directed at the central government and at perceived foreign interference.
The Afghon government and the internotionol community hove not developed  
odequote policy responses to the im poct o f increosing insecurity on development in 
generol, and educotion in porticulor -  o porticulorly sensitive topic becouse 
educotion is often touted os one o f the mojor successes o f the post-Tolibon 
government in Afghoniston.
(2006: 11)
20’ Personal email communication, June 2006.
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In the Human Rights Watch report Attacks on Education In Afghanistan, research was 
conducted on violence and threats against the education sector. 110 attacks against 
schools, teachers, and students have taken place between 1 January and 21 June 2006 
(2006: 125). Many of these involved girls’ schools. One NGO worker had the following to say:
We always have to be careful when we do wom en’s activities... [so that] women are 
not targeted... Something that can take a month may take us four to five months 
because we have to be so careful. This makes us look bad  to someone in 
Washington... But it is the insurgency that hampers us from moving faster.
(2006: 79)
Fear of violence has a profound effect on women both because they are targeted for 
violence and because of the stigma they face if they are victims. Groups opposed to girls' 
education have used threats of violence as a deterrent, keeping an increasing number of 
girls out of school every year. The forces against girls’ education are stronger than the 
communities’ will to resist them. A member of a wom en’s group in Kandahar explained it this 
way: "Culture is an issue, [but] security is more important because even those people who 
want to break tradition are not able to ” (2006: 98).
Shabnam, or Night Letters, ore threatening letters left in public places or on the doors of 
individual homes at night. This tactic was frequently employed during the parliamentary 
elections to intimidate female candidates. Shabnam frequently make the case that those 
Afghans who are ‘associating with infidels’ are thereby ’betraying’ Islam and Afghan culture 
and will be punished:
Muslim Brothers: Understand that the person who helps launch an attack with infidels 
is no longer a member of the Muslim community. Therefore, punishment of those who 
cooperate with infidels is the same as the [punishment of] infidels themselves. You 
should not cooperate in any way -  neither with words, nor with money nor with your 
efforts. Watch out not to exchange your honor and courage for power and dollar. 
Taliban Shabnam from Helmand 
(2006: 46)
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Back to the Beginning
To conclude, it is worthwhile going bock to ‘the beginning’ to gauge progress. The following 
excerpt was written in March 2003, in the relatively early days of Afghanistan’s aftermath. 
During this time, there was hope that Afghanistan -  and the much-touted cause of Afghan 
women -  was on the path to victory. Since the writing of this piece, the situation in 
Afghanistan has suffered myriad evasions and rewritings, so much that the original aim has 
been lost in a haze of rhetoric. "The world’s attention turned elsewhere, and Afghanistan, we 
were told, was now OK’’ (Hensher 2006). Perhaps the following passage on women will serve 
as a good measure to judge how "OK" Afghanistan really is:
Sustainable gender mainstreaming must recognize that Afghan women cannot be 
disaggregated from the communities in which they live. Past attempts a t legal and  
institutional reform... failed in part because they did not enjoy a base o f community 
support; they drew instead on poorly understood models that were not adap ted  to 
the political and social realities of Afghanistan. There is a risk that today ’s reform will 
prove equally ephemeral. The international com munity’s approach to gender has 
been guided not so much by Afghan history and its own accum ulated experience in 
community developm ent but by a desire for immediate, visible signs o f progress in 
wom an’s [sic] educotion and economic empowerment.
(International Crisis Group 2003: 23)
I argued at the beginning of this writing that Afghan women have been wrongly used as the 
barometer to measure social change in Afghanistan. However, as this case of Afghan 
women has demonstrated, the relative ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of ‘the situation of Afghan 
women' can surely be a barometer to measure the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the aid 
apparatus in Afghanistan. Indeed, the ‘rights agenda ’ -  most directly applied to Afghan 
women -  "will be one of the main parameters by which international donors and the Afghan 
people will assess developments in Afghanistan" (UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
2004: 152). If the rights agenda is indeed the benchmark, what could be said about present- 
day developments in Afghanistan?
This research should not be taken as a judgment on whether a particular type of intervention 
has succeeded or failed. Success or failure is really not the point. Even a failed intervention, 
as Ferguson explained, can accomplish a strategic task (1994). This attem pt at a political
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task - restructuring ttie gender order - ttirougti a technical aid intervention has actually 
served to destabilize the gender order as the complexities of this task have been 
underestimated. The current gender order in Afghanistan is therefore far from settled as 
Afghan men perceive a challenge to their institutionalized patriarchy through aid institutions. 
These institutions come in good faith but with a flawed understanding, and an inability to see 
indigenous challenges to the gender order that were already undenvay. As one effect, 
violence against women has appeared as the mechanism by which the gender order is 
defended when it is challenged. This study has attem pted to place anti-politics in a gender 
framework to illustrate the above points.
It is important, however, to place this particular analysis in the context of increased violence 
and conflict, and a deteriorating situation. The existing measures of countries-in-contlict 
confirm this. For instance, the World Bank uses a nine-point checklist to indicate countries 
that could be approaching conflict:
1. Violent conflict in the past ten years
2. Low per capita GNI
3. High dependence on primary commodities exports
4. Political instability, including transformation of the state structure and a 
breakdown in law and order
5. Restricted civil and political rights
6. Militarization
7. Ethnic dominance
8. Active regional conflicts
9. High youth unemployment
(2002: 2)
One might argue that present-day Afghanistan qualifies for all of these points. To balance 
this, the UNDP Human Development Report lists seven elements that are necessary for long­
term human security and a sustainable development process in Afghanistan:
1. Security and safety
2. A responsible state and an accountable state-building process
3. Inclusive and empowering institutions and policies
4. Genuine participation
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5. Balanced development (specifically in terms of focusing equally on rural areas 
and ensuring wom en’s participafion)
6. A supporfive infernational communify
7. Peaceful and cooperative regional agendas 
(2004: 228-236)
One might further argue that given the recent escalation of violence, the inability of the 
central government to exercise authority over many provinces, the continued 
marginalization of Afghan civil sociefy groups, the further deterioration of social indicators in 
rural areas, the decreased funding and focus from the aid apparatus, the continued 
tensions with Pakistan, and the possible increase of violence againsf women, Afghanisfan in 
facf meefs all of fhe World Bank’s conflict indicators and none of fhe UNDP’s elements of 
success. How Afghanistan will fare in the future remains to be seen.
3. The Personal Is Still PolitlcaPoz
It is worthwhile restating what has been emphasized throughout this work and myriad others. 
Mariam Nawabi, an Afghan lawyer and leader, put it this way:
Throughout Afghanistan’s history, wom en’s... rights have reflected internal and  
external tensions. Various political groups have used the issue of women's rights to 
criticize other groups and to rally support for their ideologies. The issue o f w om en’s 
rights in Afghanistan has also been linked to attempts by foreign nations to interfere in 
Afghan politics. History in Afghanistan has taught that when foreign intervention or 
influences are seen as the catalyst for ref arm in wom en’s rights, rather than allowing 
the reforms to grow from within, the changes are not long-lasting. Conservatives and  
traditionalists inevitably use the issue of wom en’s rights to link the ruling government 
with foreign interests or to accuse the government of running counter to Afghan  
culture or tribal customs. These accusations are then used to build popular support 
against the government and its reforms. In many cases, these foreign interests have 
been successful in hampering developments in wom en’s rights... If the issue of 
wom en’s rights is regarded solely as an agenda to appease pro-Western influences.
202 ‘The Personal is Politico!' is a  feminist approbation of on onorctiist notion to democratize everyday life. The 
underlying concept is that power inequalities are rooted in sociai structures and therefore changing the institutions 
that shape personal life is a  form of political activism. Jaggar, A. M. (2005). "Arenas of Citizenship: Civii Society, State 
and the Globai Order." International Feminist Journal of Politics 7(11.
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conservative groups are likely to use fhe issue to build popular support against the 
government that brings about such changes.
(2003: 7)
The idea of o brewing backlash and negative effects for women is therefore not a secret. 
Even the UN has articulated their concern, stating that Afghan history repeatedly 
demonstrates that “efforts to strengthen wom en’s status inherently carry the danger ot a 
backlash" (2004: 18).
In a discussion ot the failure ot redistributive reforms in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, Barnett 
Rubin, a leading authority on Afghanistan, cites tour lines ot argument that could easily be 
applied to present-day attempts to restructure the gender order:
1. The reforms failed because the reformers had insufficient knowledge of the 
society they were trying to reform.
2. The Afghan state did not have the capacity to carry out the reforms.
3. According to the government itself, external intervention deprived it of the 
chance to correct its "mistakes".
4. Finally... the reforms failed because the government that carried them out 
lacked legitimacy.
(1994:216-7)
These tour lines ot argument tit well with the tour presuppositions with which I began this 
discussion. Indeed, Rubin’s analysis confirms that a robust understanding ot the Afghan 
context is lacking. For these purposes, it is therefore likely that policy formulation reflected a 
discourse on women that was not socially and historically contextualized. Rubin continues to 
address issues ot capacity. This is relevant to aid institutions because their intent, based on 
policy, was to transform wom en’s position, yet the discourse on transformation denied 
wom en’s agency. In short, meeting political concerns with technical responses does put 
capacity into question. Rubin further states that external intervention debilitated the Afghan 
government from implementing policies. In this case, the technical nature ot implementation 
would contribute to achieving the stated goal ot transformation. Thus the aid apparatus in 
tact debilitated itself. This is linked to Rubin’s fourth point, that the apparatus lacked 
legitimacy. In tact, it continuously ted its lack ot legitimacy, leaving Afghans with little belief 
that the aid apparatus can actually achieve the political project it set out tor itself. Finally, to
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extend Rubin’s argument one step further, I have argued that the combination of these lines 
of argument has produced significant unintended effects, including increased violence 
against women -  a direct counter to the one vociferous goal the apparatus set for itself.
Extending Ferguson’s anti-politics framework to gender-focused aid interventions in 
Afghanistan might further illuminate Rubin’s lines of argument. Ferguson might argue that the 
aid apparatus portrayed Afghan women as eager candidates for the political project of 
’liberation’ -  manifesting itself in the rights and empowerment discourse. Yet, the aid 
apparatus was not equipped to take on this political project, so they responded in the ways 
that they were able -  through a standardized package of fechnical responses. In so doing, 
however, the aid apparatus further fueled the political game within which they found 
themselves. It is not possible to de-politicize women in Afghanistan -  the most dangerously 
political project of all. The aid apparatus naively believed that advancing the ‘gender 
agenda ’ would be a ‘safe’ issue (who can say no to a little wom en’s liberation, after all?) 
and a guaranteed success. But if ‘success’ is measured by the perceptions of those who are 
its supposed ‘beneficiaries’, the evidence is less clear. Ferguson puts it this way, illuminating:
... fhe fundamental contradiction in the role "development agencies” are intended 
to play. On the one hand, they are supposed to bring about "social change", 
sometimes of a dramatic and far-reaching sort. At the same time, they are not 
supposed to "get involved in politics" -  and in fact have a strong de-politicizing 
function. But any real effort a t "social change" cannot help but have powerful 
political implications, which a "development project" is constitutionally unfit to deal 
with. To do what it is set up to do (bring about socio-economic transformations), a 
"development" project must attem pt what it is set up not to be able to do (involve 
itself in political struggles).
(1994: 226)
Indeed, as Walby aptly stated, "the ‘personal’ is as political as ever" (1997: 196) -  and 
perhaps even more so when it comes to gender issues in Afghanistan. Both Ferguson and 
Jaggar would agree, advocating for a reconnection between personal and political. 
Kandiyoti sees this as a struggle to raise consciousness. Monlyneux grounds it in an 
identification of needs and interests. I see a link between an Afghan feminism and a 
contextualized politics presenting opportunities for advancement rooted in human rights 
and gender justice. But this has not been the path taken.
225
Afghan history demonstrates that externally enforced social reforms hove been resisted time 
and again, "leading to vacillations between periods ot relative progress, on the one hand, 
and ot retrenchment, it not reversal, on the other” (Weiner and Banuazizi 1994: 24). Attempts 
at engineering a social transformation will continue to have serious repercussions tor women 
as long as their agency is denied in the process. Gender policies do not operate in a socio­
political vacuum. Such interventions "are more likely to repeat history it they do not 
effectively reflect on that history” (Goodhand and Cramer 2002: 904). Lessons can also be 
learned from other countries in conflict and the aftermath. Kandiyoti argues that women's 
increasingly restricted mobility in Iraq is a reflection ot deteriorating security coupled with a 
backlash against occupying forces. She articulates that the external promotion ot the 
wom en’s rights agenda is serving to undermine local women and their organizations (2007: 
195-6). The same argument can be made tor Afghanistan.
Kandiyoti’s views on Iraq reinforce my argument about Afghanistan. In short, the political 
vision ot a transformation agenda has been stripped ot its political significance and as a 
result has been neutralized, it not excised (Molyneux 2007: 234). The aid apparatus 
attem pted to depoliticized what is likely the most political discourse ot all in Afghanistan -  
women. Such an excision cannot but have political ramifications. Further, according to 
Afghan perceptions, it might appear that the aid apparatus took ‘sides’ in its restructuring ot 
the gender order -  with women, and therefore against men. The significance ot these 
perceptions should not be overlooked. While the aid apparatus presented the ‘liberation’ ot 
women as a ‘rights’ issue without political context or consequences, Afghans saw this as an 
entirely political action, with entirely political effects. Ferguson concluded his research by 
asking it the concept ot anti-politics is transferable. The Afghan example is a case in point, 
demonstrating that there are side effects from an attem pt to engineer social transformation. 
Neglect ot the politicization ot the ‘women issue’ has only served to teed the political tire. 
And women are increasingly burned by those flames.
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Freedom for Women: Only Words
One year after the fall of the Taliban, . the wom en’s magazine, asked what has
changed for Afghan women one year on. The lead article, entitled Freedom for Women: 
Only Words argued that "the freedom which now exists for women is a freedom with little 
meaning" (Mujahed 2002: 2). The author and editor, Jamila Mujahed, a prominent Afghan 
woman leader, explained thaf women were expecfing greafer changes in fhis firsf year of 
so-called freedom. And yet, despite promises and rhetoric, there are few changes. "This 
flame of hope has been kepf alive... [fhough] endless speeches abouf fhe tragic lives of 
women and fhe imporfance of paying atfention to them", but maybe those speakers have 
"too many things to do" and perhaps they do not care enough to make good on their 
promises, Mujahed argued (2002: 2). As a concluding thought, she states: "We do not need 
this slow and essentially positive process disrupted" (2002: 2). What would Jamila Mujahed - 
or any of fhe Afghan women who have dedicafed fheir lives fo fhis cause -  say now? This 
senfimenf of frusfrafion has only increased since this article was written in November 2002. 
Afghan women and men alike are increasingly disillusioned with the reconstruction process 
and believe that it is indeed ‘only words'.
"We need more than words", I wrote in a statement on International Women’s Day (8 
March) in 2003, issued by a consortium of wom en’s NGOs in Afghanisfan, led by the Afghan 
Women’s Resource Cenfer (AWRCj^o^, the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN) 205 and Women 
for Women Infernafional -  Afghanisfan:
We must follow through with action. But we must also be prepared to be patient. This 
will not be a “quick im pact project”. What is needed is social evolution. Just a glance  
a t the history of Afghanistan shows that rapid social change has resulted in serious 
consequences. Efforts to improve women's lives will be worthwhile in the long term if 
we remain sensitive to the culture and history of the country and if we operate with a 
clear sense of where Afghan women themselves want their future to be. Essential to
203 The magazine is nam ed after the tam ed heroine Malalai, who is known tor securing on Afghan victory in the 
Battle ot Moiwond in 1880 during the second Ango-Atghon war. Malalai used her veil os a banner to encourage  
Afghan soldiers. Her nam e has becom e port ot Afghan legend and is used tor many schools, hospitals, and so on.
2o< AWRC's mission is to empower the most vulnerable women through providing them with opportunities to access 
education, skills training, health services and employment, in a  culturally appropriate environment, to enable them  
to becom e active, selt-esteemed and self-reliant members ot their families and society.
205 The Afghan Women's Network is a  non-partisan network ot over 1200 women and 30 wom en’s NGOs. It provides 
capacity building and advocacy tor its members and encourages collaboration and coordination between its 
members.
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storting this process is recognition and awareness that women are essential to the 
rebuilding of Afghanistan and should be given an active role in all development 
efforts. Women across Afghanistan want to participate meaningfully in the 
reconstruction of their community.
(2003)
Possible Avenues for Future Research 
A Deeper Understanding of Social Roles
In a paper on gender in urban governance, Beall wrote: “The challenge will be met when 
the complexity of women and men’s social roles is recognized and their involvement in the 
control of their everyday lives is welcom ed" (1996: 2). There is still much research that can be 
done on Afghan men and wom en’s social roles, including a collection of longitudinal data  
over time and across generations. There is also a generation gap that is making itself more 
apparent in Afghanistan, coupled with the dynamic of the refugee experience. The older 
generation is of late being met with a younger generation who has spent time across 
Afghanistan’s borders and is bringing new ideas into Afghanistan. The social dynamics 
between a displaced generation and those who have spent time in Pakistan, Iran, or even 
farther, could produce a deeper understanding of the multiple social fissures in Afghanistan 
and how these might ploy out in the future. Further, Walby advocates a better 
understanding of social inequalities, starting with an understanding of what constitutes 
equality “ to ascertain how for the current situation deviates from it" (2000: 816). An 
examination of Afghanistan’s traditional social fissures and how they have changed in the 
aftermath could present an interesting point of analysis.
Comparison Across Conflict Countries
Further research can elaborate on Afghanistan’s experience alongside that of other 
countries in the aftermath. There are key aspects of Afghanistan’s context that can translate 
to other countries and present an interesting comparison between countries. An analysis of 
context, conditions, conflict, and aid involvement could prove to be interesting research. 
Afghanistan’s economic history is one of great dependence on foreign aid. Strategies 
designed to ‘a id ’ Afghanistan have been created and implemented from the top through 
ruling elites -  without consultation with the people. Afghanistan’s context also demonstrates 
that gains, particularly in terms of social change, have also been followed by rapid reversals
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(UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004: 165). Perhaps Afghanistan is not alone. A 
cross-country comparison could reveal further trends in the link between aid and conflict.
Power
Ferguson's anti-politics work presents an interesting entry point into studies ot power, inspired 
by Foucault. It would be interesting to apply Foucault's studies ot power to an Afghan 
context. One can take Foucault's experience in Iran as a good starting point. This marked his 
only experience ot revolution, spawning Foucault's most extensive set ot writings on a non- 
Western society (Atory and Anderson 2005: 2). These writings on Iran are closely related to his 
theoretical work on discourses ot power and hazards ot modernity, expressing characteristic 
aspects ot Foucault's worldview including his "highly problematic relationship to feminism" 
(Atary and Anderson 2005: 5 )206. Foucault and the Islamist movement in Iran shared "an 
opposition to the imperialist and colonialist policies ot the West" and "a rejection ot certain 
cultural and social aspects ot modernity that had transformed gender roles and social 
hierarchies in both the East and the West" (Atary and Anderson 2005: 39). Foucault lacked a 
contextualized understanding ot Iran, yet his opposition to the secular modern state left 
room tor him to remain uncritical about socially retrogressive movements (Atary and 
Anderson 2005). It would therefore not be tar-tetched to conclude that Foucault would be 
no triend ot Afghan women, particularly in his Orientalist stance favoring a ‘premodern social 
order' over a Western order -  and his reproduction ot androcentric patterns ot discourse 
(Atary and Anderson 2005: 18). This might merit further study based on the similarities 
between the Iranian Revolution and Afghanistan's social transformation - in their roles as 
cause célébrés tor international feminists, and the link made between feminism and 
modernization as part ot a Western agenda.
Men and Masculinities
While the da ta  collected has presented an array ot theories and perspectives, the important 
lesson to draw from this is that well-intended efforts and interventions may in tact produce 
unexpected outcomes tor women. Violence against women is not exclusive to Afghanistan, 
to developing countries, or to conflict and aftermath countries. It is an epidemic that affects 
women worldwide and knows no social, cultural, or religious boundaries. It would do a great 
disservice to women in Afghanistan to isolate their suffering and label it an Afghan 
phenomenon. This research reveals that a more profound understanding ot the gender
20* However, there are convergences between Foucault and teminists on theories of power and the role of 
discourses in constructing power.
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order in the aftermath is needed. This entails further research into externalities of aid 
interventions and work on men and masculinities as entry points. There is a need for further 
research in deconstructing gender identities in different parts of Afghanistan, across different 
generations and experiences, and even in different cultural contexts (Cleaver 2002: 22). 
Kandiyoti points to "the sociological effects of a war generation of uprooted mole youths" as 
an important focus (2005: 12). As Nancy Hatch Dupree explained in Chapter I, it is not 
unlikely that a greater crisis of masculinity will emerge if aid interventions continue to neglect 
men as partners. This will undoubtedly result in reversing the potential for strategic change for 
men and women alike.
This story of an aid intervention represents a historical snapshot of an ongoing institutional 
and social process. This is also a highly political process -  with political outcomes. The story 
began with a contextualized understanding of women and men in Afghanistan to reveal its 
incompatibility with the discourses that surrounded these women and men. It is a story that 
argues for agency of both women and men -  and demonstrates that it always existed in 
Afghanistan. The primary argument revealed the disconnects between the pervasive 
discourses and the realities of Afghan lives. It also exposed the disconnects between policy 
formulation, intent, interpretation, and implementation. As one result, the sub-argument 
exposes the effects of such disconnects -  namely that aid interventions have possibly mode 
life more difficult for women. It is through the voices of Afghan women and men that this 
gozargah, this juncture in Afghanistan’s transition, is understood.
At this gozargah, one can only 'work to hope’ as Afghanistan specialist Jeanne Bryer 
explained in the conclusion of my article Burqa Politics:
Recently returned from research in Afghanistan, Jeanne Bryer asked an Afghan man 
what his assessment was o f Afghanistan's future. His response was, "I work to hope." 
She understood his answer to mean that an opportunity seems to be lost again. 'The 
world focused on helping Afghanistan after September 11: money was allocated, 
promises were made, thousands of internationals including heads of state, the UN, 
media, aid agencies, and businesses arrived and m ade pronouncements - but things 
are most definitely going backwards again," explains Bryer... All any o f us can do is 
'work to hope' - and continue doing what we think is right from a humanitarian point 
of view. We need to try to understand and learn with humility what Afghan women 
think is right for them. This would be the right thing for us to do."
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(2004)
And with those words, the Afghan saying upon parting becomes more relevant: B'aman 
Khoda. Go with G od’s hope.
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Appendix 1: Methodology
This appendix provides a supplement to the explanation of methodology already 
em bedded in the main text. As stated in Chapter I, this research set out to investigate 
renegotiations of the gender order from policy to project outcomes, drawing primarily on the 
perceptions and experiences of Afghan women and men but also those engaged with 
women in the aid industry. The study was inspired by a need to illuminate the perspectives 
and experiences of Afghan women and men during the social and political transition in the 
aftermath of conflict. In addition, this research set out to understand the discrepancies 
between policies and realities as perceived by the policies’ supposed ‘beneficiaries'. 
Despite significant progress -  and policy rhetoric -  there remains a void in understandings of 
Afghan experiences.
This study is the culmination of a ten-year engagem ent with Afghanistan, including four years 
of experience working with gender-focused international aid in Afghanistan. Donini writes 
that "a vast gray literature exists in the archives of aid agencies (and in the memories of aid 
workers), which remains largely untapped” (2004: 140). It is in this vein that I elected to 
undertake this research and make the transition from a member of the aid apparatus in 
Afghanistan to a researcher. I began in 2002 through a reflexive journal and published 
articles to document and share my observations on the dynamics animating the aid 
apparatus. In 2003, I began systematically to collect data  through interviews, focus groups, 
and discussions. Policy texts, articles and reports were collected for the study period, 
December 2001 -  September 2005. These dates are relevant as they delineate the Bonn 
Process, as outlined in Chapter I.
The present investigation began by testing policy discourse against actual outcomes starting 
with analysis of aid and gender policy texts, followed by a critical reading of the media and 
popular literature. The latter were tested first against the insights and practices of policy­
makers, policy implementors and other actors in Afghanistan’s aftermath; and second 
alongside the experiences and perceptions of Afghan women and men. Findings from all 
categories of informonfs have been triangulated using emergent themes. Efforts have been 
made to close the feedback loop with workshops and discussions to share findings. Indeed, 
this study was built using an iterative approach that combined triangulation and feedback 
at various intervals. Triangulation increases the reliability of findings through the use of various 
techniques and sources. Both data collection and data  analysis were iterative processes.
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Data collected in earlier stages of the research informed and was tested against data  from 
later stages. Therefore, the data was continuously analyzed and the methodology refined in 
order to ensure validity of the data.
The core of the data emerged from discussions with gender policy-makers and practitioners 
and is enhanced by semi-structured interviews with 71 Afghan women who were 
participants^^/ jp a u  interventions and 50 Afghan men, to collect their views on gender- 
focused interventions. Discussions and interviews were designed in order to allow 
respondents to speak for themselves and to raise issues they felt were important a t the onset.
This research pursued an empirical line of inquiry to illustrate the story of a group of women 
involved in an aid intervention, where the rhetoric suggested that wom en’s lives would be 
transformed. The research also engaged with a methodological line of inquiry to test various 
techniques that could contribute to a better understanding of the 'development in terface’, 
the interactions between social groups engaged in aid interventions -  os policy-makers, 
policy implementors, participants, and agnates -  to observe how power discontinuities are 
recreated and transformed.
Segments of this research build on previously published analysis that has appeared in a 
variety of articles and reports. All of these are cited where relevant. Further, these findings 
have been shared in several international conferences where I have been invited to speak 
and have benefited from critical feedback. Appendix 7 provides a list of publications, 
workshops, and speaking engagements that also form part of the research. However, the 
present conclusions are drawn from a fresh analysis of findings in the light of research 
material collected and reviewed during the period of doctoral research.
Qualitative Methods and the Case Study Approach
Qualitative methods hove been used because at this early stage in Afghanistan’s 
development the country lacks reliable data and meaningful indicators, thereby constituting 
a handicap in efforts to monitor progress (Beall and Esser 2005). Further, qualitative methods 
ore appropriate because the focus is not to judge the outcom e of aid interventions but to
207 For this study, I use the term ‘participants' to represent those who might be more commonly known as 
‘beneficiaries' of aid inferventions. The designation ‘beneficiary’ is passive and falls short as it does not fully convey 
the depth and complexity of fhe relationship between actors.
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illuminate different actors’ understandings and perceptions of gender-focused aid. In 
addition, I sought to pay particular attention to unanticipated effects -  either direct or 
indirect. Use of various qualitative methods therefore took into account the possibility of such 
effects -  and how these might im pact on the success of the aid intervention, based on the 
perceptions and experiences of those directly implicated.
I used qualitative methods because a study of gender relations -  similar to other dimensions 
of the human experience - does not lend itself to enumeration (Kabeer 1994: 134). 
Qualitative research has the capacity to reveal both intended and unintended effects in aid 
interventions. Further, it exposes the changes in understandings and perceptions, the 
direction and intensity of social change, and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
institutional structure that was used to operationalize the intervention (Rist 1994: 9). 
Quantitative data collection techniques could abstract women from the relationships they 
participate in, thereby reducing a gender analysis to the study of women (Kandiyoti 2003). 
My interest was in obtaining the perspectives of women and men in Afghanistan and 
examining them in the social settings in which they exist. Examining women served first to 
explore the "social experience of being a beneficiary" (Mosse 2005: 19). Speaking to male 
agnates only reinforced their “negative beneficiary status" when com pared to the focus of 
the aid apparatus on women -  as the ones who need the developing (Mosse 2005: 170).
Case studies contribute to our knowledge of individual, organizational, social and political 
phenomenon, and allow researchers "to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life evenfs" (Yin 1994: 3). Case studies allow for multiple sources of evidence and can 
yield rich data. This case study consisted of an in-depth investigation of a select community 
of men and women in Kabul, Afghanistan engaged in formulating, implementing, and 
experiencing gender-focused aid activities in the aftermath of conflict. Therefore, purposive 
rather than random sampling was used in order to select communities that were considered 
representative of the issue under investigation. For the duration of fhe research, I was able to 
use data  from my analyses to contribute to the burgeoning theories on gender and conflict 
and the aid apparatus.
This research was both a political and an institutional ethnography in that it sought to 
describe and explain the lives of select Afghans affected by an aid intervention in a 
particular political period in the country’s transition. The data is therefore strongly rooted in
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the context of Afghanistan’s turbulent social and political situation with a view to examining 
the aid apparatus as an institution in its own right.
Setting
1 conducted this research in Kabul, Afghanistan. Kabul was an appropriate location for such 
research because the aid apparatus and its activities are concentrated in the capital city. 
Cities present an interesting focus of study as cities are loci of power, and host to competing 
interests (Beall and Esser 2005). In a discussion of fhe aid apparafus as an insfifution, Kabul 
plays a central role in understanding how aid processes are negotiated and what effects 
these might have.
Further, as Beall and Esser note, the urban population has increased dramatically since 2002 
as refugees and internally-displaced persons are lured to Kabul and other Afghan cities to 
access the “perceived benefits and livelihood opportunities offered by urban life" (2005: 7). 
As a result of this mass urbanization, the condition of women has dramafically worsened due 
to lack of adequafe housing and infrasfructure. Nancy Hafch Dupree described Kabul in 
2004 as a cauldron with a mix of groups with diverse backgrounds, affiliations, and 
experiences coming into play in a way that appears to be unpredictable. She writes: [In 
Kabul] "undercurrents heave like fermenting yeast. How these undercurrents will rise is 
impossible to predict" (2004:326).
Delloye writes that many rural families mighf exist today in the same way they have for 
generations. It is in the cities, however, that the dramatic social changes have been 
received or resisted. And it is in the cities where, historically, Afghan women have been both 
delivered and stripped of their rights. Forces of change have been played ouf in the cities, 
and the first discussions of women's righfs and roles began in Kabul and confinue to transpire 
largely in the capitapos. Thus, urban women face a particular challenge, and - even if fhey 
only comprise a small percenfage of Afghan women -  “ if is on their shoulders that the hope 
rests of having the country evolve toward modernity” (Delloye 2003: 17). And yet, in present- 
day Afghanistan, it is not so much a conflict between urban and rural, or city and village, but 
between a notion of Afghanistan that Afghans have repeatedly tried to defend and an
208 For more information, see Dupree, N. H. (1996). The Women of Afghanisfan. Stockholm, Swedish Committee for 
Afghanisfan.
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imported state that has been enforced by external intervention (Roy 1994: 95). This dynamic 
is well played out in Kabul city.
I was already familiar with Kabul prior to launching the doctoral research as I had spent over 
one year living and working there. I was therefore better able to access information and 
conduct fieldwork because of my experience in the country and the credibility I had 
achieved. The organization for which I worked was a small NGO focusing on women at the 
grassroots level so that was not inordinately tainted by the extremes of the aid apparatus. 
Given the real constraints in Afghanistan -  security, difficulty traveling around the country, 
access -  Kabul was also the most feasible and practical location for such a study.
1. Methods Used
Textual analysis was used in order to better understand policy formulation and how the 
gender discourse was formulated and used. This was followed by media and literature 
analyses to reveal popular perceptions of Afghan women. Policy intent was addressed 
through interviews with policy-makers, which were in turn tested against interviews with 
policy implementors and NGO leaders in order to examine policy interpretation, 
engagement, and implementation. Focus groups and interviews with Afghan women and 
men revealed policy effects and perceptions of im pact at the community, household, and 
individual levels. Specialist interviews, workshops to close the feedback loop, and 
ethnographic field notes addressed the link between policy formulation, intent, 
implementation, and effects -  and served to verify findings.
Textual Analysis
The textual analysis examines the aid and gender policy texts of five aid institutions -  UNAMA, 
USAID, UNIFEM, UNDP, and the World Bank -  operating in Afghanistan. This is an entry point 
into the research to determine how these policies are conceptualized and what rhetoric is 
used. Analyses of at least two of the operating documents were presented for each 
institution: the core paper at the onset of the study period, and a follow up docum ent to 
examine evolution of the discourse. An exception to the time frame is made for the Afghan 
government documents. The most recent aid and gender papers have been used as they 
represent an amalgam of previous documents produced during Afghanistan’s aftermath.
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They are also the most thorough and detailed documents available, and therefore they 
comprise the only exception to the requirement that papers fit within the study period.
In the cases of several institutions, it was not obvious which documents were the most 
significant. It was a further challenge obtaining some of these documents as they are not 
available to the public. I therefore began by inquiring of my sources in these institutions as to 
which documents were the most relevant. In the cases where I was not able to obtain the 
documents directly, I used these inside sources to obtain the documents in confidence. This 
was based in my former insider status as a part of the aid apparatus, including my 
membership as part of the Advisory Group on Gender (AGG).
Initially, the agencies were to be selected based on the size of their financial contributions to 
Afghanistan during the study period. This proved difficult to determine given the discrepancy 
between funding that was committed and funding that was actually disbursed. It was also 
challenging finding accurate figures. Further, the larger donors in Afghanistan are individual 
countries and bilateral institutions, some of which ore more discrete about their financial 
confributions. It proved more empirically interesting, therefore, to examine those institutions 
that were most vociferous in their efforts. These institutions were selected firstly based on 
Afghan perceptions that these were the ‘big players’ in Afghanistan. These names are 
familiar to all and are readily employed in general discussions amongst Afghans when 
referring to the aid apparatus. Further, these agencies have all employed gender language 
in their program plans and policies. Each of these agencies has a ‘gender focal point’ 
representative who sits on the AGG and in fact forms the core group of the AGG. These 
agencies might appear to be the loudest in terms of a gender discourse, but initial 
investigations into budgets revealed that this rhetoric is not m atched by financial 
commitments.
I began the textual analysis by organizing the data into key categories of interests, themes, 
and terms. This was followed by an examination of variations within the text, as well as 
silences and gaps. It was important to learn both from what was said and what was not said 
regarding gender issues. The use of one word over another, for example, could have 
denoted a particular perspective. My interest was in understanding how policies on paper 
are translated into practice and what effects discourses have when they are brought to light 
in the form of aid interventions. Unpacking the meanings of gendered terminology revealed 
the ways in which the aid apparatus viewed Afghanistan. Guiding questions follow:
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How do these policies address women and gender issues? What terms are used? How 
frequently do these terms appear? Are they explicit or implicit?
What language is used? How is gender conceptualized?
What priority does this have in the text? This can be represented by the percentage of 
the text that it occupies and by its location in text structure.
What changes are there over time (i.e. is there more focus on gender in current plans vs. 
2002 plans)? Is there a shift from addressing women to gender or vice versa?
Do gender and social concepts appear (i.e. gender relations, gender power, etc.)? In 
what context? To what end? Are they integrated into general or sectoral policy analysis 
or do they appear as separate concerns?
Do concepts of technical and political issues appear (possibly manifested by framework 
of strategic interests and practical needs)? In what context? To what end? For whose 
benefit?
What image of women emerges from the text?
What notable omissions are there?
Is mention of gender/women fokenistic or does it appear to be relevant part of the text? 
Is ‘gender’ used in place of ‘sex’?
Any value judgments or assumptions made in text?
Are gender goals clearly delineated? At whom are they targeted? Who is responsible for 
implementation?
Is there mention of effects of interventions?
Is there a historical, cultural, social analysis/understanding in the text?
Are men addressed as part of the gender focus?
Does fhe distincfion between strategic interests and practical needs appear? In what 
context? To what end?
• How is transformation conceptualized? What terms are used (i.e. empowerment, 
liberation, etc.)? How frequently do these terms appear?
Discourse Analysis: Media and Literature
It is relevant to understand how the international media and popular literature in English
have portrayed Afghan women and what discourses are created and promoted. Content
and discourse analysis of media allows for an understanding of world views, values, attitudes, 
opinions, prejudices, and stereotypes that play no small part in shaping aid interventions.
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Indeed, discourses help create and reproduce systems of social meaning, presenting 
different pictures of reality that can be used to sway others (Tonkiss 1988). Additional details 
on how this was conducted can be found in Chapter III. Guiding questions included:
What image of women emerges from the text? Of gender issues?
What kind of rhetoric is used?
What measures of progress are used for Afghan women?
How is transformafion concepfualized? What terms are used?
Is there mention of effects of intervenfions?
Is fhere a historical, cultural, social analysis/understanding in the text?
Are men addressed?
What assumptions are made?
How frequently do terms appear?
For the review of popular literature, I examined book titles and covers using Amazon as the 
search engine, and “Afghanistan” and "wom en” os the terms. Chapter III provides further 
information.
Questionnaire and Focus Group
In March of 2005, I was invited to speak on the issue of Afghan women of the Women as 
Global Leaders Conference in Dubai, United Arab Emirates^o?. At that point I had already 
been working in Afghanistan for nearly three years. I used the conference os an opportunity 
to gauge public opinion on the situation of Afghan women more than three years after their 
liberation and virtual disappearance from the media. The description I prepared for my 
session was the following:
The case of women in Afghanisfan remains highly confenfious. Twenfy-fhree years of 
conflict -  Soviet occupation, civil war, the Taliban, and finally the US-led bombing  
cam paign -  have taken a toll on women in Afghanistan. The country’s turbulent 
history is closely linked to the fate of its women. An analysis of Afghan history will 
demonstrate that wom en’s rights have always been highly politicized and that 
gender politics, as much as geo-politics, has provided the impetus for conflicts. Since
^  httD://www.zu.ac.ae/leadershiD2005/
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fhe fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghan women have been fhe focus o f much 
infernafional affenfion and fhe cornerstone o f fhe largest gender-focused 
infernafional aid intervention. Afghan women are used as fhe barometer fo measure 
social change in Afghanisfan. And ye t who has designed fhis measure? I will argue 
that a particular discourse on Afghan women was created fo justify intervention - a 
discourse that was not contextualized and largely denied Afghan women's agency. 
Media images of fhe downtrodden woman beneath the bourka helped to fuel the 
rhetoric of ‘liberation’ and ‘em powerment’ that characterized aid interventions. As a 
result women in Afghanistan might say that they have been neither ‘liberated’ nor 
‘em powered’. In my experiences in Afghanistan -  both as Director o f international 
NGOs working with women and as a PhD researcher -  there is much to be learned 
from Afghan women about how external intervention can best support them in their 
quest to be leaders. Afghan women recognize that they face a greater challenge in 
articulating their own definitions of leadership in the face of a growing global 
feminism. The challenge is to cultivate responsible and responsive wom en’s 
leadership training programs that reflect Afghan wom en’s definitions o f leadership 
and their desire for social change on their own terms and in their own socio-cultural 
contexts.
The audience comprised 40 female participants, mostly American. Ages ranged from 15 to 
68 and included students, academics, and aid practitioners. At the beginning ot the session, 
I circulated a questionnaire to the participants and asked that they complete it immediately. 
The answers then served as the starting point tor the discussion on images ot Afghan women. 
A two-hour focus group followed. The questions were:
Describe Afghanistan after the Taliban 
What is your image ot Afghan women?
What was the m edia ’s role in creating this image?
What was the role ot the aid apparatus in creating this image?
What should the aid apparatus be doing in Afghanistan?
What are the main obstacles tor women?
How can they be overcome?
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Interviews with Policy-Mokers
The findings from this focus group session were reinforced by the in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with the five senior gender advisors of the five selected agencies. I refer to this 
group as policy-makers because they were charged with designing gender interventions 
and setting policies tor their agencies in Afghanistan. In addition, the senior gender advisors 
were responsible tor supervising the process of implementation and were accountable to 
their agencies. Policy-makers were those who occupied senior positions and possessed 
sufficient authority to assign priorities and commit resources (Rist 1994: 4). It was interesting to 
note that none of these personnel were Afghan.
Interviews with policy-makers, policy implementors, NGO leaders, and Afghanistan specialists 
were all conducted in a similar manner. I conducted these interviews individually, spending 
between one and two hours with each person. I used a digital voice recorder to record the 
conversations and also took keyword notes during the discussions. I then transcribed the 
interviews verbatim and often returned to the respondent tor additional information -  either 
by email or in person. I hod worked with many of those I interviewed. Therefore trust and 
access did not present obstacles. Because of my previous role os insider to the aid 
apparatus in Afghanistan, and also because of the recognition I hod received tor my work in 
the country, I was able to obtain candid and detailed information that enriched the findings. 
I was com mitted to sharing findings of my research and did so through various means 
including discussions, workshops, and presentations.
The conversations all began with an informed discussion and ended with open questions to 
allow participants to raise any other issues that they felt were relevant. These interviews 
began as semi-structured but became open conversations, addressing issues such as the 
interpretation and implementation of gender programs, the role of the media and images, 
social constructions of the gender order, and dynamics animating the aid apparatus, 
amongst others. I then synthesized the data  and analyzed the content to identity patterns, 
trends, and shared perceptions.
In addition to the above, policy-makers were asked specifically about program design, 
expected implementation, and expected impact. To understand transformation, a 
component of the social relations framework entails the undertaking of a gender audit to 
determine the extent to which gender policies ore integrated in planning and to understand
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the goals of programs and their im pact on gender reiations^’o. Based on this concept, 
guiding questions were:
• What are the program goals/targets? Expected outcomes? What specific econom ic 
and social changes are sought?
• To what degree are social and historical analyses taken into consideration in design?
• Are women the major beneficiaries? Are there secondary beneficiaries? What 
categories of women?
• How have programs been designed? Who was consulted in the process? To whom are 
programs accountable?
• Are distinctions made between gender programs and programs for women?
• How are the different needs and interests of women in the target population defined?
• How does the organization intend to im pact women's and men’s roles? What analysis 
has been taken into consideration?
• Is the concept of practical needs and/or strategic interests used or implied?
Interviews with Policy Implemenfers
Following interviews with policy-makers, I then conducted semi-structured interviews with the 
gender focal points, or policy implemenfers, of the selected agencies. Policy implemenfers 
are the frontline workers who interface directly with those whom the programs aim to serve. 
Ten women were interviewed: five Afghan and five non-Afghan.
Policy-makers are significant as they create gender policies, yet the importance of 
implemenfers should be recognized as they translate policies into action, often based on 
their own interpretations. Understanding the implementation process is therefore crucial as it 
is the interface between policy and the people those policies are intended to serve (Grindle 
and Thomas 1991). Implemenfers can therefore exert influence on programs and their ability 
to achieve policy objectives. Within the context of gender policies fhis is even more crucial 
as implemenfers play a key role in determining whether dominant power relations will be 
sustained or challenged (Goetz 1997).
2 'o For more Information on gender oudit and possible questions, see Kabeer, N. (19941. Reversed Realities: Gender 
Hierarchies in Development Ttiouatit. London, Verso.
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Interviews with policy implementers addressed similar themes to those above, and also 
interpretation, engagement, and implementation of policy, and observed/perceived 
effects. Implementers were asked many similar questions from the gender audit, including 
the following:
How are gender policies of the supporting agency interpreted and implemented? What 
challenges are there?
Are policies relevant to the local context? If not, can you adjust them? How?
What is the expected im pact of gender policy? What is the actual impact? What are the 
externalities?
Are men consulted regarding wom en’s participation? If so, are incentives/rewards used 
for men to facilitate their acquiescence?
How have women/men been involved in execution of the intervention? Are women part 
of project staff? Participants? In governing bodies?
How does the project affect male/female access to and control over resources and 
benefits?
Is there continuing attention to possible changes in men/women's lives?
Have men/women grown in gender awareness through the project?
What means are there for consultafion prior to intervention? During intervention? After 
intervention? What accountability measures are in place? To whom is the implementing 
agency accountable?
What are your understandings of the policy and how to implement it?
What changes would you like to see? What suggestions do you have for improvement of 
the policy and the way it is implemented?
• What frustrations and challenges have you encountered?
Interviews with NGO Leaders
I then interviewed ten NGO leaders -  all Afghan. These NGOs were implementing the gender 
policies on behalf of fhe larger agencies whose texts I examined. They offered insights into 
their engagement with policies at the frontline, enhanced by their contextual understanding 
and long experience in the Afghan NGO sector. NGO leaders were asked similar questions 
to policy-makers to assess where the discrepancies might be. In addition, questions included 
the following:
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• What is your impression of progress for Afghan women? Whaf are priority areas?
• Whaf are your views on fhe gender policies of fhe supporting agency?
• Are gender projects addressing both women and men’s needs?
• Are social and historical factors taken info account?
• To whaf degree can fhe implementing agency, community groups, and participants 
influence program design?
• To whom are you accountable -  the supporting agency or the program participants?
• What are the greatest obstacles in implementing gender policies? How are they solved?
• What are the main goals of your intervention -  strategic or practical?
• Are you able to manipulate the implementation of gender policies to reflect local 
realities?
• What is the gender order in Afghanistan? Is it important in implementation or gender 
policy formulation?
• What perceived im pact do the projects have on the gender order? What actual 
impact?
• What is most needed to improve women's situation in Afghanistan?
Focus Croups
In order to triangulate between the feedback received in the interviews, focus groups were 
held in order to allow selected women who were interviewed to speak as a group and share 
ideas. These focus groups were held on the premises of an Afghan wom en’s NGO where 
women frequently meet. Women participants in the NGO program attended bi-weekly 
sessions where they met in small groups and address issues that concern them. Discussions in 
groups presented an opportunity to build on existing work and to expand discussions. 
Women welcomed the chance to meet other women and forge friendships. Sitting and 
talking about issues that a ffected their lives in the company of other women was a luxury 
that their circumstances did not previously allow. This mutuality also served to replace the 
social safety nets that had been destroyed by years of war, loss, and displacement. These 
groups brought together women of diverse ethnic groups and geographic origins in 
Afghanistan, and were perceived as helping to bridge divides and ease remaining ethnic 
tensions. The groups were structured in a way that allowed for rotational leadership and for 
the women themselves to decide what they wanted to discuss and to guide the direction of 
the conversations.
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The focus group sessions built on these sessions and recruited volunteers to participate in 
smaller, parallel sessions. Using this pre-existing torum worked to the advantage ot the 
women. Firstly, the tocus group themes were a welcome addition to an ongoing discussion. 
In tact, they sparked additional discussion in the larger group. Further, the session did not 
create an additional imposition on the wom en’s time. Many women were already restricted 
in the time that they were able to participate in the NGO programs. It was therefore 
important that the collection ot data did not create any additional burdens tor the women.
During the tocus group sessions, women were very comfortable sharing their perceptions 
and experiences. The groups were told ot the tocus ot the research and expressed 
willingness and interest in participating. They spoke freely about their concerns and their 
feelings and were quite vocal in articulating their needs and desires and in voicing their 
opinions. The discussions were extremely animated and actually sparked additional 
discussions beyond the duration ot the sessions.
Each session lasted approximately one hour. A facilitator was present. She was prepared 
with a list ot guiding questions to stimulate discussion. I was present as a silent observer. In all 
the sessions, this guiding document was not needed as women carried the conversation 
comfortably and did not need prompting. In tact, when it becam e obvious that women 
were able to discuss the topics a t hand without a facilitator and without encouragement, 
the facilitator took a backseat role and let the women direct the conversation. Focus groups 
are a good arena not only to obtain varied opinions but also to analyze group dynamics 
and interaction. Issues and themes raised during tocus groups with women guided the 
questions tor semi-structured interviews. Opinions did not change in an individual setting.
Three tocus groups were conducted: Pashtun women, women originating from Kabul and 
other urban areas, and rural women. Each group contained five women. The women 
present were from different parts ot Afghanistan. All ot the women had received no 
education and were illiterate. These women were all participants in aid interventions. The 
women were all married and with children. A tew had been w idowed during the conflict 
and were married tor the second time -  some by choice and others by torce^ii. The women 
all came to the NGO out ot econom ic necessity and agreed that their first priority was to find 
a means to support their families financially. The women were all living in relatively poor
2” Widows In Afghanistan are often torced to marry the brothers ot their late husbands. This is in part to protect the 
woman and also to keep the children with the man's side of the family.
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conditions in Kabul city. Some were in multi-family tiomes and others occupied makeshift 
housing in the form of containers, abandoned shops, or a combination of tents and walls. 
These women all felt that the responsibility of providing for their families fell to them. Some of 
the women were supporting disabled family members. Two of the women had husbands 
who were drug addicts and therefore unable to work. The women all felt saddened by their 
experiences during the years of conflict and concern that elements of conflict appeared to 
be resurfacing in Afghanistan. Many felt the need to shore their stories of loss. A few of these 
women cried as they told their stories. I was told that these women had heard each other’s 
stories before, but that they often felt compelled to repeat the stories in the com pany of a 
new audience. Clearly wounds of the conflict will take many years to heal.
Questions were translated into Dari and Pashto and made appropriate to the Afghan 
context. Many of the terms that were not directly translatable were therefore clearly defined 
with a view to the connotations they might hove. Below is a selection of questions that were 
used.
Demoaraohic and Identitv Information
Basic demographic data (age, ethnic group, marital status, employment, education) 
Household composition 
Identity ranking and analysis
What does it mean to be a woman in Afghanistan? A man?
How has this changed over time based on conflict/ofterm ath/peace?
What is the role of Islam for women in Afghanistan?
Perceptions of the Aid Apparatus
• What is your view of aid institutions?
• What do you think is the role of the international media in Afghanistan?
• How is the chaddori portrayed by aid agencies? The international media?
• What kind of support would you like? What kind of support would you like to see for men?
Enaaaement with Aid Institutions
• What brought you to the organization? How did you hear about it?
• What was the reaction of your family to your involvement? Has it changed since you
became involved?
• Do you feel that the organization takes your needs/interests into account?
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• What do you hope to gain? What have you actually gained?
• What changes have taken place at home since you joined? Are these good or bad?
• How do your husbands feel about aid organizations? Are they involved in programs?
Violence Against Women and in Socletv^
• What kind of violence is there in the aftermath in Afghanistan? Who is targeted? Why?
• How is current violence different from violence in previous periods?
• What is the im pact of aid interventions on violence against women?
Concluding Questions
• What is the most important thing for Afghanistan?
• What should be the priority for aid interventions?
• What does the future hold for Afghan women?
• If you could change one thing about your present life...
For men, I asked many of the above questions, including in addition:
How has your situation changed in the aftermath?
What are the most important issues for you today?
Are you engaged in any NGO programs? Why/why not?
How do you feel about your wife/sister/daughter participation in the NGO?
What do you hope to gain? What is the most troubling aspect of their involvement?
Has their involvement changed anything for you at home?
If you could change one thing about Afghan men today, what would it be?
If you could change one thing about Afghan women today, what would it be?
Interviews with Afghan Women and Men
In-depth, semi-structured interviews with Afghan men and women provided an 
understanding of their experiences and perceptions in light of the emerging social reality. 
This research did not set out to be representative of all Afghan women and men, only of a 
particular group examined in their natural setting, using methods to understand social 
meanings and situations. The goal was to hear their own voices and to illustrate common 
and diverse themes that emerged. These themes -  aid, agency, honor, neglect of men -
2 '2  These questions were asked only If violence against women was raised firstly by the participants themselves.
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were then contextualized in order to provide on analytical frame for them. In so doing, it 
becam e apparent that this methodology “historicizes narratives of experience by identifying 
how geopolitics... helped determine the current social formation of Afghanistan. Afghan 
wom en’s accounts need to be read against this history” (Khan 2001 : n.p.).
Interviews present an opportunity to analyze interface situations. These ore critical points of 
intersection between multiple life worlds where discontinuities exist based on discrepancies in 
values, interests, knowledge, power (Long 2000: 197-8). Social interfaces are meeting points 
between different discourses (Hilhorst 2003). The interviews were the most crucial part of the 
research, revealing perspectives of Afghan women and men on aid interventions. Afghan 
women participants in the NGO were asked to volunteer for interviews. Afghan men who 
were affiliated with women NGO participants also participated willingly.
Interviews began with a collection of demographic data and continued with open-ended 
questions that allowed for the respondents to articulate their own perspectives. Further, 
questions were triangulated when necessary to determine the accuracy of answers. Data 
was collected from 71 Afghan women and 50 Afghan men. The women were selected 
based on their participation in aid interventions through local NGOs. Twenty-five of the men 
interviewed were mole agnates of the women participants -  husbands, fathers, and 
brothers. Agnate interviews allowed for a more detailed analysis at the household level and 
provided useful comparison between women and men’s perspectives. The remaining 25 
men were selected randomly. All data  from the 121 interviews was coded using a tailored 
database with customized fields for each of the questions. The database allowed for 
comparisons across categories and presented a cohesive and secure way to store and read 
the data.
As the questions moved beyond demographics, towards identity, and gender roles, women 
becam e increasingly more surprised. These questions were more challenging and perhaps 
more sensitive. Their expressions were often startled, and slightly amused. The women were 
generally pleased with their engagement with aid institutions - if they were receiving 
financial assistance. A few women said that their husbands and families did not know that 
they were participating in an aid intervention and that they would not be allowed to do so if 
they had made their participation public. These ore from the category of women who were 
not able to provide an agnate interview. Men reacted differently to the questions. They were 
frustrated at first, and felt that nothing would result from their participation. They spoke more
248
freely and openly when they learned the objective ot the research -  and that their voices 
would be heard. Fortunately, a male research assistant was conducting the interviews. This 
contributed to the accuracy ot information and the candor ot the discussion.
There were notable differences between individual interviews and tocus groups. While 
Afghan women as a whole are articulate, confident and strong, these characteristics were 
magnified during the tocus group sessions. Women as a group expressed more strength and 
confidence. They were tearless and vocal, building on each other’s comments and 
punctuating each other’s remarks with comments ot agreement. The sessions were 
animated and lively, and the hour went by very quickly.
Similar to the individual interviews, women expressed a clear understanding ot their roles and 
repeatedly emphasized the importance ot men’s and wom en’s roles and how these 
manifest themselves In Afghanistan. There were a tew comments that related to ethnic 
differences, but on the whole women spoke ot a uniform ‘Afghan culture’. The women in 
groups were more forceful in expressing great pride in being Afghan and Muslim. These 
sentiments also cam e out in the individual interviews, but these were much more strongly 
expressed in the groups.
The following table lists demographic data  ot the sample. This could not be correlated with 
the actual population because reliable demographic data  in Afghanistan is largely absent, 
and the tew figures that exist cannot be confirmed. A population census began at the time 
ot writing in 2005. Data is currently being processed and is expected to be disseminated by 
the end of 2007.
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Demographic Data for Afghan Women
Afghon Women Percentage of Respondents
TOTAL 71 59%
Region
Rural 45 63%
Kabul 23 32%
Urban 3 5%
Marita|2i3
Married 39 55%
Single 24 34%
Widow 8 11%
Education
None 42 59%
1-6 year 16 23%
7+ years 13 18%
Age
17-20 17 24%
21-30 31 44%
31-40 15 21%
41-50 7 10%
51 + 1 1%
Demographic Data for Afghan Men
Afghan Men Percentage of Respondents
TOTAL 50 41%
Region
Rural 33 66%
Kabul 13 26%
Urban 4 8%
Marital
Married 28 56%
Single 22 44%
Widow 0
Education
None 3 6%
1 -6 years 12 24%
7+ years 35 70%
Age
17-20 18 36%
21-30 15 30%
31-40 6 12%
41-50 8 16%
51 + 3 6%
2'3 Instead of using ag e group as a  category of analysis, I use a  life cycle approach that is more relevant to fhe 
Afghan context: unmarried, married, vvidowed.
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Couples Profiles, Life Stories, and Life Historiés
This aspect of the research took the interviews to another level in order to delve deeper into 
wom en’s lives and their domestic situations. To this end, ten couples were profiled in order to 
com pare views from the some household. These were obtained through mutual consent of 
the couples by the male and female research assistant. Each individual was interviewed 
separately. This was further supplemented by the life stories of 20 women. These can be 
com pared with the life histories of Nargis, Anisa, and Zarmina that follow in Appendix 2. In 
addition, I also incorporated oral histories with older women to obtain a historical 
perspective. These various sources should be examined in the light of the discussion in the 
main text in order to obtain a more robust understanding of Afghan wom en’s lives, based on 
their perspectives and experiences.
Interviews with Specialists
In order to close the feedback loop, I sought to verify findings through interviews with 
specialists -  Afghan and expatriate -  who had a commitment to, understanding of, and 
engagement in Afghan gender issues. There is a vast pool of such voices in Afghanistan. 
These open-ended interviews provided the opportunity to share the salient points of my 
analysis and offer space for comments, feedback, and verification. Mosse underlies the 
importance of eliciting responses to the analysis ‘‘from those who shared the experience and 
about whom I write” (2005: ix). He states that findings are further reinforced when those who 
have the capacity to object ore actually in agreement.
The discussions were lengthy and detailed. In the few cases where prompting was needed, 
the following questions were used:
• What image of Afghan women did the world have before the Taliban? During Taliban? After 
Taliban?
• How has this image influenced aid intervention since 2002?
• To what extent were historical or socio-cultural factors taken into consideration in program 
design? In implementation?
• How are Afghan women currently portrayed in the international arena (by media, aid 
agencies, etc.)?
• To what extent are gender relations and dynamics taken into consideration?
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How have these dynamics changed since 2002?
What are the indicators for change/progress for women? How do we know that programs 
are working? Whose indicators are they?
Have Afghan women been sufficiently consulted prior to interventions? Are aid agencies 
sufficiently accountable to women?
What are your thoughts on the influence and symbolism of the bourka in the eyes of the 
media and aid agencies?
How has the focus of the aid apparatus on Afghan women changed since 2002?
How has international funding/support for Afghan women changed since 2002? Is there a 
link between media and aid focus on women and the funding that is received?
Have efforts to secure wom en’s participation for the upcoming election been sufficient? 
What are the main issues and potential pitfalls?
Is there a long-term strategy on the part of the aid apparatus for Afghan women?
What is your assessment ot the future for Afghan women?
Workshops and Presentations
To bring my research to a conclusion, I hosted several workshops in order to share findings 
and receive feedback. These workshops also helped to close the feedback loop and verify 
findings. I conducted one workshop with the NGO leaders and Afghanistan specialists and a 
separate workshop with the policy-makers and policy implementers from the five agencies. 
Additional presentations and workshops held are listed in Appendix 7.
Ethnographic Field Notes and Reflexive Journal
This research qualifies as an organizational and political ethnography because of the careful 
documentation of observations in the form of ethnographic field notes and a reflexive 
journal, maintained from the onset of my arrival in Afghanistan. Underlying the above 
methods is a continuation of the field notes from my experiences in Afghanistan since 
September 2002. I was not a researcher a t that time, but was already making preliminary 
observations on the Afghan context, NGO life, and work with women that has informed my 
study and inspired my initial interest in the subject. The notes I took were reflexive^i^ in that
“Reflexivity requires a critical attitude towards data, and recognition of ttie influence on ttie researcti of sucfi 
factors as ... the sensitivity of the topic, power relations in the field and the nature ot the social interaction between  
researcher and researched”. Miller, R. L. and J. D. Brewer, Eds. (2003). The A-Z of Social Research. London, SAGE.
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they examine not only the context, namely life within an NGO working with women in 
Afghanistan, but also analyze my role and how I com e to understand the observations I 
hove made. I therefore benefited from longitudinal observation of program participants that 
enabled me to measure change over time -  observing and documenting processes and 
shifts to which the women were exposed and how they coped with them, based on their 
role as participants. The outcome has been a more nuanced understanding of processes of 
change for Afghan women since 2002.
The reflexive research journal existed alongside field notes. The field notes presented a 
detailed description of my observations, while the journal placed me in the context and 
enabled an understanding of my relationship to the research, allowing space for me fo 
comment on the findings and narrafe the experience. During my first year in Afghanistan 
(2002-2003), many of these notes were published by various online sources, used for 
promotional purposes, posted on the Women for Women International website, and 
disseminated widely. Below are additional excerpts from these reflexive notes. In January 
2003,1 wrote the following about working with women in groups:
These women have never had the luxury of spending time outside of their daily lives 
talking about issues that a ffect them, in the com pany of other women,,. These 
sessions are based on Women for Women International’s manual, A Woman's World, 
This entails a discussion on the range of issues affecting a wom an’s life and uses 
exercises, anecdotes, examples, and discussion to illustrate different scenarios. The 
idea is that the woman can then determine for herself where she fits in the spectrum. 
By so doing, she takes ownership of the decision and is better able to implement 
these changes in her own life.
The first session always starts by hearing about each wom an’s life and experiences. 
The women are asked to introduce themselves and share one thing they find unique 
about themselves. They also talk about what they hope to get out o f the program. 
The women are then asked to spend time thinking o f what they would like to name 
their group. Freedom, Hope, Wild Flower, are but some of the names that have 
emerged. Where do you see yourselves in one year? We often ask. The answers are 
telling,,, not begging, with children in school, with my own business. All o f these things 
are possible.
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Most o f fhe discussions revolve around parficular themes. One such example is our 
discussion on fhe role of women in post conflict reconstruction. We asked the women 
if they were a delegation going to see President Karzai what would they 
recommend that he could do to ensure peace in the country? One woman said that 
she would create a program where all Afghans could trade In their guns for pens. In 
so doing, education will replace the violence that the country has known for so many 
years.
The collection of longitudinal data is often difficult as it requires ongoing observation and 
discussion over a period of time. I was fortunate to be able to observe 3000 Afghan women 
program participants and 65 Afghan staff (both women and men) over the period of one 
year (2002-2003). I maintained contact with select participants and staff and was therefore 
better able to understand the im pact of changes in the aftermath on their lives. For the 
duration of their participation in the program (one year), I benefited from observation, 
discussion, and debate, as women freely shared with me the concerns they had and their 
experiences and perspectives.
Women participants in the program repeatedly conveyed to me that they resented the 
foreign-imposed division between men and women in aid interventions. They felt strongly 
that they did not identify with ‘being a wom an’ in a vacuum. As the first year progressed, 
they becam e increasingly doubtful of their ability to continue participating. Many explained 
to me that their situation was more difficult at home and the men in their lives were feeling 
increasingly disillusioned and frustrated. These words led me to question many of the 
assumptions made by the aid apparatus in its work in Afghanistan.
The following are select profiles of the women who were participants in Women for Women 
International’s program in the first year. These profiles appeared in my published journals and 
have been taken verbatim from the entries written in January and March 2003. It was 
women like these, and many more, who inspired this research. It is through these wom en’s 
lived experiences that ‘progress’ (or lack thereof) can be measured.
Nargis
Nargis is a woman in her early 20s. She supports eight children -  seven daughters and  
one son. She was married a t age 13. Her husband, a heroin addict, recently 
abandonned her to return to Pakistan. She was left to care for her young children.
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She washes clothes fo earn a living, and one day hopes fo gain a skill that can better 
support her children and pay for their education.
Anisa
Anisa's husband repaired televisions and tape recorders, both of which were banned  
by the Taliban. During the Taliban regime, he continued to operate the workshop in 
secret because he had three children to support. One day, the noise emerging from 
a broken tape recorder attracted Taliban attention. As a result, he was beaten to 
death. Two years later, a t age 25, Anisa was forced to marry her sister-in-law’s 17-year 
old son, still a student.
Zarmina
Zarmina supports a disabled husband. Kidnappers from the North tied one o f his legs 
to a tree and the other to a car. They forced Zarmina to pay WO Afghanis (the 
equivalent of $2.00) or they threatened to kill him by driving the car and breaking his 
legs. Zarmina begged and borrowed and was able to gather the money. But the 
kidnappers still left her husband disabled. He cannot work, but hopes to make 
enough money to buy a vegetable stand in the bazaar.
Nargis, Anise, and Zarmino’s stories are but a few of thie 3000 women that I worked with in my 
first year in Afghanistan. Observing their lives over a one-year period permitted me to 
achieve insider-outsider status. I recall author Tamim Ansary's quote in 2000 explaining that 
we are presented with a historic opportunity "to support the real empowerment of Afghan 
women without engaging in a cultural tug of war with traditional Afghanistan” (Mehta and 
Mamoor 2002: 25). It was my experiences with women such as these that allowed me a rare 
insight to Afghanistan.
With many of these women, I achieved a level of trust and friendship that most non-Afghans 
could not. Azoy speaks to the power of friendship in Afghanistan as a way to obtain a more 
accurate picture of a  parficular situafion:
This honesty-oriented connotation of friendship reveals a set of cultural assumptions: 
that the true nature of any phenomenon is hidden; that everyone typically tells you 
whatever suits his situational purposes; and that only the true friend will share the truth 
as he perceives it.
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(2003: X)
I was in a rare and privileged position, with an obligation to nurse it delicately and share it 
wisely. I becam e very conscious of my responsibility to share the understandings that I had 
acquired. I did not seek to obscure the diversity of people ’s lived experiences, as Beall says, 
by disseminating general statements (1996: 4). Instead, I saw the essence of Afghan recovery 
as an amalgam of these wom en’s stories, and began to share them for that purpose.
2. Positionality and Ctiallenges
In qualitative research, it is challenging to balance insider and outsider status. Despite having 
worked very closely with women in Afghanistan over many years, my role as a researcher 
required that I maintained a professional distance in order to obtain the information that I 
needed. Further, I had to be aware of what those interviewed might gain (or think they 
might gain) from saying one fhing over anofher. Accounts would inevitably vary according 
to where these women and men were socially positioned - os well as their wish to talk 
(Burman, Batchelor et al. 2001: 454). Anthropology also can be challenging if divorced from 
an hisforical perspective in that it can present a partial view of social reality, representing a 
detailed portrait of a particular group in a specific setting at a specific point in time.
Situating Myself
I recognize that my own identity as a researcher cannot be abstracted from the research 
process. In acknowledging my own position, I create space in which to consider the way my 
origins and background have shaped my field experiences and interpretations (Sayigh 1996: 
146). Firstly I situate myself as a developing world feminist with solid experience in the 
developed world. I recognize that my feminist consciousness was born out of my own origins 
and experience, but that it took shape in the developed worldz's.
Although I am an outsider to the lives of women and men in Afghanistan, I have spent 
sufficient time working closely on the inside. Jacobson explains this tension and how she has 
found ways to reconcile it in her work in Northern Ireland: "The tensions of ‘outsider’ status... 
has only been partially compensated for by building up longer-ferm relationships with a
2'5 Narayan speaks well to this experience. Noroyon, U. (1997). Dislocating Cultures: identities. Traditions, and Third 
World Feminism. New York, Routledge.
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number of organizations” (2000: 184). In my experience in the country, I established strong 
contacts with people affiliated with a variety of organizations in the country and therefore 
was better able to access information relevant to my research.
I was in a unique position to investigate Afghan women because I was able to gain their trust 
through my work. I had demonstrated my commitment to them, and also delivered for them 
in my previous work. For this effort, I was rewarded with an honesty and loyalty that many 
outsiders would not see. In addition, my skin color offered me access to their private realms. I 
was frequently mistaken for an Afghan, and therefore in a position of privilege to hear ‘the 
real story’ . My special access was not revoked when I corrected the mistake because I was 
assumed to be from the region and therefore familiar to them, and familiar with Afghanistan. 
Because of this, I was often asked by Afghan women to explain to others "how Afghans are” . 
I was told this was because my background was similar, and so therefore I must understand 
them. During my four years in Afghanistan, I was frequently placed in the role of cultural 
interpreter for outsiders -  be they part of the aid apparatus or the media or other -  who were 
too far removed from Afghanistan and its realities to understand the context. Because my 
origins are Arab, it was assumed that I was Muslim. As a result, the women assumed that I 
was also better equipped to explain to others the centrality of Islam to the lives of Afghans. I 
was therefore in a privileged position as both "Other” and interpreter of "the worlds and 
understandings of the Other into a discourse or knowledge form that can be understood 
and accep ted within the dominant Western frameworks of knowledge and culture” 
(Edwards and Ribbens 1998: 3).
Language
Translation and language were challenges that I overcame by employing two Afghan 
research assistants -  male and female - who were fluent in Dari, Pashto, and English - to 
accom pany me. These research assistants were former members of my staff and were 
therefore very familiar with aid issues, accustomed to working with me, and highly credible 
and capable. These assistants served as my interpreters during interviews and my cultural 
and contextual interpreters after interviews. They also assisted in translating and transcribing 
the data. I was able to verify the accuracy of translation using my existing professional 
network in Kabul. I was also assisted by my rudimentary Dari and an understanding of the 
many words that are common across Muslim countries because they are rooted in Arabic.
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Safety and Security
Research in post-conflict contexts such as Afghanistan presents certain security risks. For the 
duration of the research, I was sutficiently aware of the environment and therefore able to 
ovoid certain high-risk situations and seek help when needed. I maintained contact with a 
variety of securify personnel, including those with the UN, International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF), and the Afghan NGO Security Oftice (ANSO). I accep ted that it was my 
responsibility to remain informed of any ambient dangers. I also ensured that I was prepared 
for the emotional risks that such research entails. This included being aware of fhe possibilities 
of vicarious trauma and the opportunities for self-care in this regard. I therefore sought to 
minimize insecurities -  both emotional and physical -  through knowledge of the context and 
ensuring that I was well prepared for the undertaking.
Human Subjects Protocol
Researching women in Afghanistan is a particularly sensitive subject that requires an 
understanding of potential risks and ethical implications. In this vein, I sought to ensure that I 
did no harm to participants in the study and set out to safeguard their welfare and interesfs 
within the context of the research. This research followed human subjects protocol based on 
principles of respecf for participants in the research and recognition of fhe risks fhey might 
tace in participating. These include psychological risks such as anxiety, stress, or discomfort in 
discussing the subject matter; social and econom ic risks that might diminish the subject's 
status in relation to others by virtue of having participated in this research; and loss of 
confidentiality. To this end, all information that was shared was in strict confidence given the 
sensitive nature of the research. Names have either been changed or withheld. Participant 
consent was obtained verbally, and each person understood the nature of the research, the 
purpose of their participation, and the expected final outcome.
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Area of Investigation Unit of Analysis Method Sources Examined interaction of Sources
Formulation: Policy Aid institutions 
Public sector
Textual analysis Aid and gender policy 
papers:
5 international agencies 
2 Afghan government
-> informs discussion with policy­
makers and implementers
Formulation: Gender discourse Media and literature Discourse analysis Headlines of major U.S. 
newspapers from 2002-2004 
Book titles and covers
-> informs understanding of 
gender discourse
Formulation: International 
perceptions
International actors Questionnaire 
Focus group
40 questionnaires 
Focus group discussion
-> demonstrates extent of 
international perceptions
Interpretation: Policy Aid institutions Open-ended interviews 5 Policy-makers from above 
agencies
-> issues raised set NGO 
discussion
Interpretation and 
Implementation: Policy
Local groups Open-ended interviews 10 NGO Leaders 
implementing projects for 
above agencies
-> informs understanding of 
implementation plans
Implementation: Policy Aid institutions 
Local groups
Open-ended interviews 10 Policy implementers 
implementing projects from 
above agencies
-> issues raised set focus group 
themes
Effects: Perceptions and
experiences
Impact for community
Community/supra-familial 
groups
Focus groups 4 focus groups:
women: 3 groups, 5
women/group
men: 1 group, 3 men/group
-> issues raised set interview 
questions
Effects: Perceptions and
experiences
Impact for individuals
Individual Afghan men 
and women
Semi-structured Interviews 71 Afghan women 
50 Afghan men
> informs effects of above
Effects: Perceptions and
experiences
Impact for couples
Impact for individuals (in depth)
Couples
Individual Afghan women
Semi-structured interviews 20 women life stories 
2 women life histories 
10 profiles of couples
-> provides in-depth 
understanding of effects
Link between policy formulation, 
interpretation, implementation, 
effects
Macro Open-ended interviews 20 Afghanistan and gender 
specialists:
10 Afghan 
10 expatriate
-> closes feedback loop
Link between policy formulation, 
interpretation, implementation, 
effects
Macro Workshops, publications 
and presentations
NGO leaders and policy
implementers
Policy-makers
- > closes feedback loop
Link between policy formulation, 
interpretation, implementation, 
effects
Macro Ethnographic field notes 
Reflexive journal
Notes from 2002-2003, 
continued during field 
research visits
-> informs process and shows 
changes over time
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Appendix 2: Mini Case Study:
Advancing the ‘Gender Agenda’ Through the Pariiamentary Eiections
In September 2004, just prior to ttie presidential election, I wrote the following for an article 
on Afghan women:
Presidential elections in Afghanistan are scheduled for October 9. In the past few  
months, a major cam paign has been launched to bring women to the polls. This 
entails a poster campaign, but little else, [a gender advisor] expiains. "Women 
should be called in a meeting forum at a local mosque or school so that they can  
learn about their rights. From what I know nothing o f this sort was ever done...As a 
result, many women will not vote since they may view it as a 'man's duty.'" In a 
country with little history of or faith in central government, exercising civic duty is not 
a priority. In discussions of women's role in politics, one [Afghan] woman told me, 
"What good is politics? Look a t where it has brought Afghanistan."
Current security risks in Afghanistan have m ade voter registration a difficult task. 
Violence has increased in recent months, and agencies are concerned about 
sending staff to rural areas. The recent deaths of female election workers has 
slowed the registration process. Further, the process is a iengthy one as most 
women will need to be approached individually and within their own homes, [a  
senior UN official] explains.
Although many women have registered, true representation is a challenge. It is 
unlikely that women will vote differently from the men in their household, and men 
will vote to keep themselves secure. [A gender expert] explains that "most rural 
areas have commanders whose word Is law, and no one would be likely to vote 
against the commander's preferred candidate for fear o f persecution. In other 
words, both women and men will do what they are told."
(Abirafeh 2004)
As the final step in the Bonn Process, the ‘free and fair' parliamentary elections of 18 
September 2005 were an ambitious and controversial undertaking. The Afghan
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Constitution of January 2004 established that 25% of the seats in Wolesi Jirga (House of the 
People) and Provincial Council were to be reserved for women^i^. This is a very progressive 
quota that only a handful of countries in the world have in place to ensure women's 
representation. Such a quota would place Afghanistan as 20<^  in the world in terms of 
women's representation in a parliamentary body. The quota itself is hailed as a victory 
achieved through pressure by Afghan women's groups and the aid apparatus, including 
such countries as the US where women hold only 14% of congressional seats (Greenberg 
and Zuckerman 2006: 3).
However, while this may seem impressive at first, many of those interviewed expressed 
skepticism. They were concerned that women were once again being used as window 
dressing and that this progressive quota served to appease international donors at the 
expense of laying a foundation for genuine participation. In countries in transition, it is not 
unusual to see social and economic rights decrease while formal political rights are put in 
place2i7. Quotas have been used both for the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirgas 
to ensure wom en’s participation in the political p r o c e s s ^ is .  Many interviewees felt this to 
have been a good start, but it also appeared to be tokenistic. “ Right now our women are 
all over the place, being used for politics, used like dolls,” an Afghan woman head of on 
NGO lamented. "Every event they are in front of the TV. the camera. They are being used 
just to show that women were there". Interviewees felt that, at worst, quotas and external 
pressure for a male/female balance could run the risk of generating a community 
backlash. In fact, examples from other countries “suggest that this may be more in 
response to the perception that these affirmative action measures are externally imposed 
rather than due solely to resistance from men who feel threatened by a weakening of their 
power or the undermining of traditional norms and social values” (Bouta, Frerks e t al. 2005: 
131-2).
The parliamentary elections were initially expected to coincide with the October 2004 
presidential election. The unstable security situation prompted a delay, and the elections
2'4 For more information on the composition ot the parliament, see www.iemb.orq 
2 '7 Donna Pankhurst speaks well to this phenomenon. See Ponkhurst, D. (2000). Women, Gender and  
Peacebuilding. Department ot Peace Studies Working Paper. Bradford, University ot Bradford. CITE 1996 ONE 
2 '8  Kandiyoti confirms that women were harassed during the Emergency Loya Jirga, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, 
and the Presidential election. This clearly did not set a  good precedent tor wom en’s political participation. For 
more information, see Kandiyoti, D. (2005). The Politics ot Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Occasional 
Paper. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute tor Social Development.
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were then scheduled for April 2005. In the months prior to the April election date, there 
were concerns that the elections would be delayed further. The pervasive sense, 
according to myriad discussions with organizations such as the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) and others was that the country was ill-prepared for elections. While one arm 
of the UN apparatus was plowing forth with elections, another arm was counseling 
caution. The UNDP Human Development Report warned against conducting elections too 
soon after conflict and before ‘peacetime politics’ have had a chance to take root. The 
report stated clearly that "ill-timed, hurried, badly designed or poorly run elections can 
actually undermine the process of democratization" (2004: 142). Others also expressed 
concern, explaining that the parliamentary elections run a greater risk of failure than their 
elections predecessor (Reynolds, Jones et al. 2005:3).
Moreover, the completion of this last step of the Bonn Process was met with fears and 
rumors that the aid apparatus would begin plotting an Afghanistan exit strategy. 
Researchers and political analysts in Afghanistan cautioned that Afghanistan would need 
many years of continuous international support. Plans for a premature exit of the aid 
apparatus could destabilize -  and most likely collapse -  the country’s tenuous 
foundational?. Elections, with their deadline-driven nature, bring the impression that the 
work is done when the election has been held. As such, they are the "holy grail of western 
transition formulas, providing moral cover for exit” (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 169).
The parliamentary elections were finally held on 18 September 2005, despite security issues, 
threats, and warnings. These elections signified the end of a period of transition and 
represented a chance not to repeat the breakdowns of state and society that 
characterize Afghanistan’s recent past. In the months leading up to the elections, female 
candidate participation was widely visible, particularly in Kabul city. Campaign posters 
peppered city walls, and anecdotes of women’s participation abounded. For instance, in 
the northeast of the country, one pregnant female candidate traveled by foot for eight 
days in order to present her candidacy to the Wolesi Jirga. And so the stories went, liberally 
employed as evidence of the Afghan people’s commitment to democracy. Afghan 
wom en’s groups have argued that wom en’s participation in political life in Afghanistan
2'9 For a  full report on fhis, see Wieland-Korlnnl, A. (2005). Afghanistan: Looking Back on 2004, Looking Forward fo 
2005. Kabul, Friedrich Ebert Sfiffung.
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appears to be a favorite subject of aid institutions and ttie media, but Afgtian v/omen 
ttiemselves have barely broached the topic. The Women and Children Legal Research 
Foundation pointed out that both Afghan women - and Afghan men -  who sought to 
enter political life had been given relatively little attention, despite rhetoric.
Myriad reports, such os the Afghanistan Human Development Report, argue that proof of 
wom en’s commifment to political processes comes from the numbers of their participation 
(2004: 79). The report seemingly contradicts itself from fhe prudent counsel if offered 
above. If proof of commitment were indeed measured in numbers, fhis would pose 
additional problems since fhe figures emerging from elections -  particularly fhe 
parliamentary elections -  have been highly c o n f e s f e d ^ s o .  The report from the Women and 
Children Legal Research Foundation on women’s political participation argued that the 
government might boast the participation of women in fhe 2004 presidential election, but 
inequalities remain because women continue to have symbolic assignments in the cabinet 
and key positions. The report argues that very few women have been given the 
opportunity to access higher positions and use their leadership skills (2005: 56-7).
Interviews with gender policy-makers and policy implementers revealed concerns that the 
limitations to wom en’s political participation have not yet been addressed. These include 
lack of security, warlords, and a sense that politics is men’s domain. In addition, it has been 
argued that "the mere presence of women in the parliament will not automatically give 
them their share of influence on decision-making’’ (Boege 2004). Most of those interviewed 
agreed that injecting women into all aspects of the democratic process would not address 
wom en’s interests. Indeed, numbers do not necessarily translate into equitable 
participation and might not lead to an understanding of issues of power when measuring 
parficipation. Leaders of Afghan wom en’s NGOs felf strongly that wom en’s participation 
should be for a purpose, not to appease international donors or to satisfy aid institutions. 
Johnson and Leslie cite a quote by an Afghan woman about the elections:
Why should I vote? ...This election is for you not for us. You will have it and then you
will go, leaving us with a system that has no roots in our country. You can grow new
220 This is due to suspicions of fraud, ballot stuffing, and unclear procedures in polling stations. See www.iemb.ora 
and related articles tor more information.
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systems, yes, but it takes time; they need to put down roots. And the Poshtun 
women in the countryside, they will be herded like cattle to the voting stations. They 
will be just voting fodder. What meaning does this have?
(2004: 174)
An Insider's View
As an insider to the parliamentary elections process, I often found myself asking similar 
questions. In 2005, I spent six months as the Senior Gender Officer and Head of Gender 
Section for the Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat (JEMBS), under the auspices 
of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Afghanistan Project 
Implementation Facility (APIF), managing the 2005 parliamentary elections. This lengthy 
title simply meant that I was responsible for all things ‘wom en’ and ‘gender’ related to 
Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections. In this capacity, I was tasked with supporting 
wom en’s representation os candidates, voters, and electoral officials. To fhis end, I 
conducted trainings with wom en’s groups and reported frequently to the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs Elections Task Force, chaired by the Minister.
In assuming the position, I was told by a senior gender advisor of a UN agency that I was 
just a "warm body" filling a politically-motivated post that the elections officials felt should 
exist because “this is Afghanistan, and everyone wants to know about women here. The 
issue of gender is so contentious and everyone expects that someone will have to do it". 
The elections officials were comprised of an international team who traveled the world 
‘bringing elections’ to countries attempting the transition to democracy. This team had not 
previously included a ‘senior gender officer’ and therefore there was much confusion as to 
what role I would play. This was evidenced by the fact that I was hired several months after 
the elections team was in place, indicating an obvious pressure to have someone ’d o ’ 
gender, whatever ‘doing gender’ really means.
I took this confusion as an opportunity to create my own work, using my experience in 
Afghanistan and familiarity with the context. I began by viewing ‘gender’ in the full sense 
of fhe word. I hired a man on my sfaff, and began a campaign working with men to help 
them better understand the role of women in the political process. This entailed meetings
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with Afghan mullahs, or religious leaders, and the heads of Afghan political parties (all 
men). The challenges that women were facing becam e clear to me when I was told by a 
particularly bushy-bearded political party leader that he would under no circumstances 
endorse wom en’s political participation and told me: "Women have no wisdom. Women 
are ‘sick’ for seven days of every month. They cannot think. They cannot judge. Their 
judgm ent is impaired. They cannot moke decisions for the country".
I was also responsible for managing eight provincial focal points responsible for gender 
and civil society issues. These focal points, known as REROs (Regional External Relations 
Officers), were tasked with submitting a report to me on a biweekly basis detailing their 
efforts to engage women and to work with men to advance the so-called ‘gender 
agenda'. According to the report from the Southeast Region on 11 September: "In Paktia 
province, (there was a) male-dominated elections meeting saying that it is against Pashtun 
culture to allow women to p a r t i c i p a t e ” 221. This was not a unique sentiment. And this 
sentiment was not a t all unique to men. An Afghan woman elections staff member told me 
she did not "believe in elections” when I asked her why she did not vote. She had taken 
the job for financial reasons and felt that the pressure for women to vote was nothing more 
than an opportunity tor journalists to photograph lines of chaddaris in line os evidence of 
‘dem ocracy in action '.
These sentiments were pervasive, even within the elections team. It was believed that the 
pressure to ‘get the numbers' outweighed the quality of civic education and participation. 
A massive cam paign was underway to reach the most remote villages, but the result was 
shallow. In one village, the elder greeted the elections team for civic education with 
pleasure, asking: "Are you coming here to tell us the results from the lost election?” In the 
end, the elections were characterized by a relatively poor voter turnout and a 
discrepancy in figures that took months to resolve222. At the closing of elections day, the 
elections team stood by the head of JEMB as he gave a briefing to an auditorium filled 
with international press. As we listened to the briefing, a colleague turned to me In surprise 
and said: "I d idn 't know the elections were such a ‘success'!”
22' The RERO reports were collected by the Senior Gender Ottlcer and used for Internal Information. They were not 
released publicly.
222 Final figures as listed by JEMB can be found at http://www.results.lemb.org/reDorts.asD
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In one of my weekly press briefings to a group of 15 non-Afghan journalists on gender Issues 
in the elections, I was told that we -  the aid apparatus -  were too smug in our boasting of 
25% seats tor women. In reality, women outnumber men in the population, and therefore 
the representation in parliament should reflect this, I was told. This com e from one mole 
journalist in a room of 15 European and American journalists -  13 of whom were mole. It 
was at that point that I realized that Afghanistan was being subjected to unrealistic goals 
and standards that did not even apply in the so-called developed world. A non­
representative group was demanding women's representation. Not too long afterwords, 
an article appeared asking:
America has had democracy for 200 years, and during that time no woman has
been nominated to the presidency, nor are there large numbers ot women in the
cabinet,,, so why are they imposing on others what they don 't have or don 't want?
(Saeed 2005)
This lesson was again brought home to me one Friday as I listened to the sermon coming 
from the mosque down the street. "Do not vote, I tell you!" the imam wailed. “These 
foreigners ore trying to strip away your Muslim identity by imposing their ‘d e m o c r a c y ’ i” 223
In the end, ‘doing gender' proved to be difficult to coordinate with the elections 
objective. ‘Doing gender' tailed to accom m odate to the deadline and deliverable-driven 
elections timetable. There was little recognition among the elections team that gender is a 
process that requires a long-term investment -  not unlike civic education. These entail 
political consciousness-raising and cannot be brought about through technical solutions 
and numbers in polling stations. The one-time presence ot women at the polls did nothing 
more than appease the aid apparatus. The presence ot the aid apparatus (read: funding) 
could have put pressure on Afghanistan to set a high quota tor women in parliament 
through its Constitution. Many women that I spoke to in my research and professional 
capacity felt that the aid apparatus unknowingly put women at risk by aggressively 
promoting their public presence.
223 During that sermon, the imam  also preached against the consumption of frozen chicken imported from New  
Zealand os it hod the some effecti
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Intimidation of Female Candidates
W omen expressed m uch concern -  and fear -  when face d  with the question o t presenting 
their cand idacy. Two w om en I spoke w ith had considered running tor o ffice  but were 
d iscouraged by their husbands. Another w om an dec ided  not to  nom inate herself when 
her husband and  brothers learned she would hove to be pho tographed tor the ballot. 
They told her having her photograph taken and displayed publicly would bring shame 
upon the family. One fem ale cand ida te  told her story:
During my electoral campaign, I was going to different villages and places when I 
was doing my campaign. When I was talking to women, it turned more into a 
"woman gathering” and women started talking to me about their problems. I 
noticed and found out that there is a huge, really really huge difference between  
women activists and intellectuals and educated women - and women in those 
villages and remote areas. There is a need for us to find solutions and ways to help 
these rural women. How we can help them to be aware o f who they are and how 
they live? There is a huge difference between village and cities. When I noticed  
that it was only 20 days until election day, I noticed that my speech for women was 
too difficult. They d idn 't know what I was talking about. They d idn 't know what was 
voting and who to vote for. When I noticed that they had difficulties presenting 
themselves and understanding, I decided to stop my cam paign to them and  
instead spend time talking to them to understand their issues. The result was that in 
election day, they were going like cattle in a group with a shepherd, leading them 
to the election and putting them in the centers. They were told what to do. They 
didn 't have any independence or the room to use their right to vote in the way 
they wanted. What does election mean for these women?
Voter turnout was m uch lower than expected  because ot a cam pa ign  m arked by 
intim idation -  particularly against w om en candidates and voters (Human Rights W atch 
2006: 14). Officially, JEMBS received regular reports ot intim idation ot fem ale candidates 
that were echoed  throughout the m edia. The JEMBS official position was tha t it received 
very little official information abou t the incidents through their security reporting structures.
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or that they were unable to confirm the incidents. For example, two such incidents that 
could not be confirmed were cited in JEMBS internal security reports^^'*:
J4 Sept: Female Wolesi Jirga candidate shot and injured in Nurisfan province.
inconclusive. No information about possible motive for this attack.
7 Sept: Reported attem pted murder of female Wolesi Jirga candidate in Nangarhar 
province.
inconclusive. [Security company] confirmed that it was coincidental that 
she was near to this attack.
The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) produced three reports in 
conjunction with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) to track progress on 
the parliamentary elections and raise concerns. These reports, known as the “Joint 
Verification of Political Rights” frequently mentioned women and gender issues as primary 
concerns. The first report, for the period 19 April to 3 June, noted that "there is a broad 
perception that intimidation and limitations on political rights are pervasive or will increase” 
(2005: 3). “ Female candidates... have also voiced concerns about their security. In some 
areas women only registered in the last days of the nomination process to ovoid security 
threats" (2005: 7). The report also explained that Afghan society is ambivalent about 
wom en’s participation in political life, stating that women “ internalize these norms and fear 
bringing dishonor to their families if they expose themselves to public critique by standing 
as candidates” (2005: 10). The pervasive sense in the report was that the country was just 
not ready for such aggressive change.
The second report (4 June -  16 August) does not report improvements. During this period, 
acts of intimidation against female candidates forced some of them to withdraw. Female 
candidates continue to feel threatened and have been intimidated and attacked. There 
were also numerous threats and attacks against women election workers (AIHRC-UNAMA 
2005: 11). Further, many mosques hove been publicly condemning wom en’s participation, 
calling it un-lslamic and anti-Shono^^^. The situation continued to deteriorate. The final 
report, for the period of 17 August to 13 September, reported that four male candidates
22-» These were obtained in my professional capacity at JEMBS. They were not released publicly. 
225 Sharia is the Islamic code ot law, based on the Koran.
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were killed and that "women candidates have been the target of a number ot acts of 
discrimination, intimidation and violent attacks” (AIHRC-UNAMA 2005: 4). Religious leaders 
also continued to dissuade people from voting for female candidates and from permitting 
their wives to participate in the election.
Human Rights Watch was also actively monitoring cases ot intimidation of female 
candidates, stating that security in Afghanistan had deteriorated in conjunction with the 
elections, particularly in the form of high-profile cases of social and political violence 
against women (2005: 15). Women were increasingly targeted, the report elaborated, and 
they feared that pushing social norms would incur greater retaliation. The report 
continued:
Women candidates exposing themselves to public review risk retaliation for 
disrupting social norms. Violence and intimidation against these women is highly 
symbolic and sends a chilling message to other Afghan women considering 
expanded roles in public life.
(2005: 3)
Another article stated that Afghan men believed that women have become candidates 
at the "com m and of Laura Bush” - otherwise it would never be allowed, as it is perceived 
to be un-lslamic (Rubin 2005: 6). It was not only Afghan men who believed that the 
parliamentary elections were a decree from the Bush family. A more provocative 
American article stated:
Females, once considered worth less than scum by Muslim males, are now coming 
into their own in Afghanistan, thanks to an ongoing dem ocratic planting. There is 
no other answer but to recognize that it is because of the Bush administration and  
US assistance in that Muslim country that much progress is being m ade on 
numerous levels.
(Swank Jr. 2005)
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Afghan Perspectives
According to research conducted by the Women and Children Legal Research 
Foundation in Afghanistan, 58% of 600 people (525 women, 75 men) surveyed believe that 
women should not be involved in politics (2005: 52). In a further survey of 130 women, 85 
women did not feel that women should be politically active. These findings can be 
confirmed by the JEMBS Gender Unit’s own research to gather perspectives of Afghans. 
Prompted by a concern that Afghan voices were not heard in the days leading up to the 
elections, I decided to send my staff out to collect ‘voices from the street’ . A random 
sample of Afghan men and women was selected and 20 on-site interviews (10 women, 10 
men) were conducted prior to the elections. Of the ten women, five said they were not in 
favor of women running for office. Six of ten men said they do not believe that a woman 
should have a role in the public domain, particularly not in political life -  a realm 
traditionally reserved for men. One woman who was interviewed had the following to say:
I don ’t vote for women, because I don ’t want a woman to a c t as a leader or have 
the authority or power, because women are not capable  of playing this role. They 
will lose themselves easily. It is important for women to vote, but they should support 
men candidates more than women. [The reality is that] people in Afghanistan 
d o n ’t want woman to take on prominent roles among the people... There are 
many obstacles for women. And maybe they cannot be removed.
Another woman also shared this view:
I ’ll never vote for a woman. And it has reason, because in Afghanistan women 
c a n ’t do anything without m en ’s permission, so they are not independent and  
always want to be with men and look to men to support women.
When asked if she thinks it is important for women to vote, the woman explained that these 
kinds of things are nice to have on paper. "For policy, it is good ’’, she stated. She 
elaborated that women voting serves to appease the aid apparatus and fulfills its agenda. 
"For real work, it is not perfect’’, she continued. She explained that in reality these things do
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not work os one would expect. She felt tha t w om en are powerless in the hom e, and  
therefore they would be powerless in a public o ffice. She explained it this way:
Women candidates cant do anything without their husband’s permission and ca n 't 
even make small decisions on their own. And also security is not perfect for women 
candidates. For example, in some provinces women ca n 't distribute their posters 
and they are not allowed to go to rural areas and cannot be far from their homes.
She conc luded  by asking: "W hat is the point of w om en in o ffice  with all these restrictions? 
Afghanistan is not ready” .
A man w ho was interviewed on the street of Kabul expressed concern  tha t w om en would  
not be ab le  to sen/e the peop le  any bette r than men:
In my opinion I w on 't vote for a woman, because if I vote for a woman I don 't trust 
that she will work more than a man does. Also if we have good men who are very 
educated and more capable than women, why shouldn't I vote for a man?
He recom m ended tha t wom en should vote, and had the follow ing to say: “ My adv ice  for 
wom en is to  vo te  for men candidates, because as I m entioned men are more powerful 
than w om en and they are capab le  of doing every type of w ork” .
The m an felt tha t the biggest obstacles to w om en ’s partic ipa tion  are their lack of 
credibility, security issues, and  cultural obstacles. He e labora ted :
There are different issues [between men and women's participation]. As an 
example if a man stands before people in a public area and starts his cam paign  
every one will stand and listen to him. But women c a n 't stand in front o f a crowd  
except in some areas because of lack of security and inappropriateness. First their 
families don 't allow them, and if their families let them work the society is not 
familiar with that type of situation. It is better for women not to try hard because 
they must keep themselves quiet otherwise they may receive punishment or 
harassment.
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When asked if he believed that women should be represented in parliament, he had the 
following to say; "It is good it we have some female representation in parliament and it not 
it is okay also. We have our men and they do whatever needs to be done tor both men 
and women".
One man believed that women in Afghanistan are facing fewer obstacles than men -  in 
terms ot participation in political, social, and economic life. He felt that men should be the 
focus ot attention as well as the primary political actors. One man said he would not vote 
tor a woman because she would be biased towards women and would thereby rob him ot 
the rights he enjoys now. The sentiment ot political power as a zero sum gam e was heard 
frequently on the street. Another man said he would rather cut oft his own hand than vote 
tor a woman. He did not feel the need to elaborate any further on his sentiments.
In a discussion with former Minister ot Women’s Affairs Masuda Jalal on wom en’s 
participation in the parliamentary elections, she emphasized the importance ot support 
from husbands and families ot female candidates. "Without support ot their husbands or 
families, they cannot do this,” Jalal elaborated. She illustrated her point using her own 
example during her campaign tor the presidential election:
My husband often accom panied me to provinces. I did not have guards so he 
acted  as my security too. Sometimes, if I was a t a gathering and I was tired after 
speaking so much, he would speak for me. He said, ‘She is my wife; she has a lot of 
experience; she is capable '. This is the best endorsement -  because he knows me 
well. Husbands and fathers should be supportive. They should help by going out to 
speak to male voters.
Ours is a male-dominated society; they have the political power a t the level of 
making decisions - whether in parliament or as head of the family. The best way to 
tackle the issues is to convince men to give freedom to women and daughters. 
Local Mullahs are very influential. If we can secure the cooperation of the religious 
community, it will have a positive effect on opportunities for women.
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It is very important to target men. The programs should contain very primary 
messages and should encourage men and in fluentia l [sic] to come forward and  
cooperate. It should be done with the target audience in mind -  and should speak 
their language.
These views are reinforced by myriad press articles with quotes from Afghans -  candidates 
and voters -  expressing discomfort with the ‘dem ocracy’ agenda. For instance, in a local 
paper, a male candidate tor the Wolesi Jirga claimed that women who hold political 
office will "eat the rights ot men". Another article reported a political party leader as 
saying: “We will never accep t the Western interpretation ot dem ocracy in our Islamic 
republic which they are trying to implement in Afghanistan” (Coghlan 2005). Another 
candidate said: “The rights the West talks about are not the rights we accept. A w om an’s 
rights as given in the Koran are enough" (Coghlan 2005). Yet another article reported that 
candidates are “ not happy" with the quota tor women, saying that Afghans were 
“overdoing things under the pressure ot the international community" (Biswas 2005).
In the Afghan press, from the weekly publication Rozgaran, an article entitled “ Imposed 
Parliament" appeared, stating that: “The Afghan government, the Western world, and the 
electoral commission had no other objective but to have a parliament tor the country no 
matter ot what standards" (Wilder 2005: 35). Indeed, Afghans were not impressed with their 
new parliament, or with the elections process. In 1980, Louis Dupree wrote the following 
prophetic words: “Take dry constitution, combine with fluid elections and stir, and voila, 
"instant democracy" -  without the agony ot generations ot development” (1980: 587).
Post-Elections
While the strong performance ot female candidates is touted - many won seats in their 
own right and not based on the quota -  these are the minority. It is generally believed that 
most ot the women would not have reached the parliament without the support ot the 
quota (Tarzi 2006). In a discussion with the head ot an international foundation supporting 
parliamentarians, he explained that the members ot parliament face death threats it they 
return to their constituencies. Even during parliament recess, the parliamentarians tear
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returning to ttieir provinces of origin because of security. The current climate is not 
conducive for on effective parliament, he explained:
The parliament hasn’t made one decision yet. They have nothing to show their 
constituencies. They have no idea o f their own job  because it hasn't officially 
started yet. How can they convince their constituents that dem ocracy works when 
they have nothing to show for it? No roads, no schools, nothing.
He continued to say that it is moot to discuss so-called ‘higher issues' when basic concerns 
such as security have not been met. As far as the aid apparatus is concerned, the 
parliament is an old issue. He explained that the parliament received much attention 
leading up to the elections, but now there is a general sense that "the job is done". As for 
the international media, if they speak to parliamentarians, " it’s only to good looking 
women - or warlords". Indeed, the ‘warlord problem" has yet to be resolved. Many have 
noted the parliament's domination by "warlords, criminals, and discredited politicians 
responsible for much of Afghanistan's woes since the Soviet invasion in 1979" (Human 
Rights Watch 2006: 14). It is these very warlords who continue to harass female 
parliamentarians and question their presence in what should be mole political space.
The parliament is not the only political space where women's presence is under attack. 
The cabinet has also lost its female members. Twenty of President Hamid Karzai's nominees 
for the cabinet and supreme court were approved by the parliament in June 2006. The 
sole nominated woman - to the Ministry of Women's Affairs - was rejected. The head of the 
international political foundation explained that many justify Karzai's action by saying that 
there are no qualified women to fill ministerial posts. The reality, he explained, is that there 
are many qualified women, but nobody bothered to look. When asked by a journalist 
about the absence of women in his cabinet, Karzai explained that the cabinet was 
recruited "for practical reasons" and "not political reasons". Karzai argued that the "place of 
women in Afghanistan has been secured, and women have the support of the people" 
(Noory 2006). Many have found these statements hollow.
The progress achieved by these women was m eant to be a starting point for the 
increased participation of women, not the end... The new government’s reticence
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to confirm any women to power invited speculation that the appointm ent of the 
first three women ministers were simply symbolic gestures meant to appease the 
international community.
(Noory 2006)
A few weeks offer the elections, I held o ‘Posf-Elections Debrief on Women’s Participation’ 
bringing together 20 gender representatives from agencies such as UNIFEM, NDI, FES, 
UNAMA, and others. The two-hour conversation resulted in many contentious d is c u s s io n s 226. 
On the quota, participants felt that the aid apparatus had promoted this aggressive 
program with little regard to the risks that women would face as a result. In the words ot 
one participant: “There is a security issue we need to consider here. And implications such 
as violence against women. We might need to rethink this’’. One participant asked:
Is JEMBS as an organization gender-sensitive? Is it the role o f an electoral 
m anagement body to do 'gender'? What will happen when the international staff 
leave and no one is there to push the ‘gender agenda'? Gender receives much 
attention, it is politically important. But for the next election this attention m ight fade  
and then there needs to be more push to ge t gender on the table. It needs more 
than a ‘gender section'. It needs a section with authority. Not Just calling itself 
gender because that's what everyone expects.
In an online communication about the future ot the Afghan government and its obligation 
to uphold a "[Western]-engineered Afghan dem ocracy’’, one Afghan man had the 
following to say about the presence ot the aid apparatus and its dictates in Afghanistan: 
“There is one thing unique about Afghans: we do not appreciate when we are told what 
to do. Millions ot Afghan have died declaring we rather die proud and tree than to live a 
life ot b o n d a g e ’’ 227.
226 Quotes from the meeting of 13 October 2005 were extracted verbatim from meeting minutes. These were for 
internal JEMBS use only and not shared publicly.
227 Communication from distribution list to select members, 28 March 2006.
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Appendix 3: Profiles of Couples
Couple I: Fatima and Amanullah, Wife and Husband
Fatima is in her early 30s. She has had less than two years of education. Amanullah is 41 
years old and has had seven years of education. The couple is originally from rural 
Afghanistan but they moved to Kabul two years ago to live with Amanullah’s brother in 
hopes of finding work and providing for their three children. Fatima explained that 
Amanullah's brother, her brother-in-law, is bitter about the extensive focus on women. He is 
not happy that Fatima attends trainings and tries to convince Amanullah to prevent her 
from going out. Many fights have broken out in the household as a result. Amanullah is 
beginning to think that participating in trainings is not such a good idea. Neither Fatima nor 
Amanullah are particularly pleased with the efforts of the aid institutions. Amanullah is 
concerned that Fatima will start to respect him less with all these new ideas she is gaining 
from the training program. Fatima complained: “You tell me what my rights are, but what is 
the point if he w on 't give them to me? He should understand them first!”
Couple 2: Maryam and Alam, Wife and Husband
Alam is 37 years old and has had several years of education in Kabul. Maryam is 31 and 
has com pleted primary school. They have been married for 12 years. Maryam believes 
that, according to Afghan culture and traditions, women are respected and protected in 
Afghanistan, but that things have deteriorated in recent years. She believes that men are 
responsible for women and must provide for the family. Alam feels that it is a m an’s duty to 
guide women. "Women are innocent creatures” , he said. “They need protection from 
other men. Men are in upper level [more] than women” . Alam feels that institutions are 
undermining men's traditional role. He explained that aid institutions are changing 
“women's minds against their husbands and are encouraging them negatively” . Alam 
further elaborated that the aid apparatus is interfering in family issues. Maryam is 
concerned because “not much is done for men” . She feels that this could cause problems 
tor her at home.
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Couple 3: Zoinab and Ahmadi, Wife and Husband
Zainab and Ahmadi are from central Afghanistan. Their livelihood was based on 
agriculture. They are not happy to be in Kabul and find that they do not like the direction 
Afghanistan is moving in these new times. Zainab sees a lot ot violence against women 
around her. She sees this as a new manifestation ot an old struggle, but the ditterence 
today is that the "position ot women is better than men in the society. Priority is given to 
women in every aspect ot opportunities” . Ahmadi is a day-laborer and is able to bring 
home an irregular income. He is still hopeful that he will find more stable work. As long as 
he is working, he says that he is happy that Zainab is learning a new skill. He sees that other 
men are cruel and angry, and he does not think this will happen to him.
Couple 4: Storai and Hekmat Daugher and Father
Storai is Hekmat’s daughter. She is 21 years old and is not yet married. There are concerns 
that she is getting too old tor marriage. Once she marries, she will have to stop studying 
and participating in trainings. Storai has witnessed how changing regimes have im pacted 
gender relations and have led to increased violence at home. It happens in her home. She 
does not want to get married, she says. Hekmat recognizes that there is more conflict and 
argument at home these days. He hopes tor a day where men and women can return to 
their Afghan ways and respect their traditions and religion. He is not sure that day will 
come.
Couple 5: Lida and Fawad, Wife and Husband
Both Lida and Fawad are from the countryside. They have no education. Both feel very 
strongly that Islam provides the answers to managing changes that are taking place in 
Afghanistan today, particularly those between men and women. Fawad feels that it is his 
job to support his family and provide tor them. He prefers that Lida stay at home. 
Unfortunately, Lida is participating in a vocational skills training program and he is at home. 
Although aid institutions provide his family with an opportunity to earn an income, he is not 
happy with this new international presence. He says "they have done nothing tor men” 
and he would prefer a return to "Afghan ways” and an Afghan pace ot change. Fawad 
feels that Afghans are not in control ot their country, and he is concerned.
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Couple 6: Sweeta and Payman, Wife and Husband
Sweeta and Payman are in their 30s. She has had a few years of education. Payman has 
had nearly 10 years of education and is a teacher by trade, although currently 
unemployed. Sweeta feels that Payman’s profession os a teacher has helped her to have 
greater access to education and training. But she knows that Payman is unhappy that he is 
not working. The aid apparatus has done nothing for men, she says. “My husband says that 
they make men angry when they do nothing for them and only offer opportunities to 
women. He is a teacher so he understands how people think about these things” . Sweeta 
feels that recent changes have brought "uproar to families” . Payman agrees that he has 
seen an increase in family conflict because women ore no longer satisfied "with what men 
expected from them” .
Couple 7: Sara and Waheed, Daughter and Father
Sara is 18 years old. She is not in school, and this upsets her. She says that women in 
Afghanistan still cannot study and work, despite what they are told to believe. Her father 
appears to be an advocate ot education for women and men, but he does not think the 
current climate is conducive for Sara to go to school. He explained that "since the 
Americans came, we are told that men and women have freedom and can work outside 
and learn", but he feels that the situation is still unstable. Both Sara and Waheed feel that 
things were better for men and women before "the Americans cam e” . Sara says that 
"some men think that women ore being cared for more than men. But the reality is that 
both men and women suffer” .
Couple 8: Masooda and Fayzai Sister and Brother
Mosooda lives with Foyzal, her older brother, and his family. She is concerned that men are 
not getting training and are therefore becoming much more rigid and traditional. Her 
brother is one of those men who could benefit from training "to becom e open-minded” , 
she says. Fayzai thinks that a woman should be satisfied with her role as wife and mofher 
and that women today are asking for too much. Aid Institutions have encouraged women 
to leave the house, he explains. These institutions do nothing for men, he says, "only 
women get training but then they stay at home and it is useless” . Women should stay inside 
for their own protection, he believes. Masooda is his responsibility, and she is getting too 
many ideas already.
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Couple 9: Frozan and Waisuddin, Wife and Husband
Frozan is 35 years old. She is illiterate. Her husband, Waisuddin, is more than ten years her 
senior. He grew up in Jalalabad and attended six years of school. Frozan receives food aid 
that she hands over to Waisuddin to distribute to the family. Her job, she soys, is to "make 
the society by raising good children” . She would rather not be the only bringing home 
food. Waisuddin has become more strict in recent years. "Women must obey what their 
husbands command", he says. Women are safer under the chaddari, he explained. He'd 
rather that the women in his family not leave the house at all, particularly his wife. Frozan's 
new role as the breadwinner has made her "stand in front of her h u s b a n d " 228, Waisuddin 
says. He believes that this new influence is taking Afghans away from Islam. Aid institutions 
"keep people away from Islamic prayers since they give them money and they forget to 
pray” .
Couple 10: Sofia and  M/rwa/s, Daughter and Father
Safia is 19 years old and has had three years of education. Her farther, Mirwais, has had 
eight years of education. Sofia sees violence in her family and feels that violence has 
always been a part of gender relations, but it takes different forms in the different periods 
of history. She explains that "women argue with their husbands because they are not 
allowed to go outside. That caused their husbands to beat them” . Sofia says that "the 
government has set some rules that men can ’t beat their wives and they no longer have 
power to be cruel" but she is not sure most men know about these rules. Mirwais thinks that 
the world does not hove a good image of Afghan men. And he feels that aid institutions 
have not helped things at home because "most men think that organizations are creating 
distance between men and women by encouraging women negatively” . He is not sure 
what the future of Afghanistan holds.
228 By this he means Frozan is confronting her husband, or facing him wifh new confidence.
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Appendix 4: Maida, Maida^^^: Women’s Life Stories
Qafra qafra darya mesha
Drop by drop, wafer becomes a river
This Afghan expression has been employed as a saying used to advance the women's 
movement. It advocates slow, gradual change. In this vein, it is important to observe 
Afghan women ‘drop by drop' in order to better understand the significance ot the 
changes in their lives over time.
The following are life stories from select women who were interviewed. These women all felt 
the need to talk about their lives and their contexts. Many women began the interviews 
with stories ot their post as a way to illustrate their unhappiness in the present and the 
extent to which their lives hove not improved. The stories ot Nargis, Anisa, and Zarmina 
present good starting points tor women who were tilled with hope in 2002. They believed 
that their participation in aid interventions would better their lives. The below profiles were 
collected three years after those ot Nargis, Anisa, and Zarmina. They provide a sample ot 
the perceptions and experiences ot women tour years into Afghanistan's aftermath. There 
is more sadness that characterizes these stories, and noticeably less hope. There is also a 
hint ot disappointment in the lack ot changes in their lives in the last three years. In tact,
these women felt that their expectations were raised and now their hopes are further
thwarted. Their stories speak to these themes.
Zachaha
Our family consists of 12 people. We are four families who live in one house. We live 
in one room. Most of our family is women and small children. I am not literate. 
Because o f the war, we moved from one side to another, so I cou ldn ’t study. With
much difficulty we spent six months in Pakistan. We spent our time knitting rugs so
we could provide a little food to keep us alive. I lost a daughter during the war, but 
now that we have peace in our country I want to live in peace and comfort. I've 
already suffered a lot.
229 Maida, M aida  is the nam e of a  famous Afghan wedding song. The word m aida  means slowly, making small 
steps. In the central part of the country, however, m aida  can also be used to mean broken.
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Wahida
I want to fell you about my tragic life. Twenty years ago, I was a young single girl. I 
studied in school and my only dream was to be educated and serve my country. 
But one day -  I can still remember it -  when I cam e home from school I realized 
that my cruel parents had promised me to an army officer without letting me know. 
Nine days after my engagem ent I got married and I went to my in-law’s family. I 
suffered a lot after that day. My marriage was terrible. Life was getting worse day  
by day. Then many years passed in my hard life. My husband developed mental 
problems because of the war. We tried to cure him, but he did not get well. One 
day he left us. It has been 11 years and I do not know if he is alive or dead. I have a 
son from my lost husband. I lived with my father-in-law but he was not kind to me 
and d idn ’t support me. I went to live with my mother and we went to Pakistan 
where we spent two years as refugees. We heard about peace and the new  
regime, so we came back to our country. Now I am free to go outside the house 
and work. I want to make a good life for myself and my son. I want to make a small 
amount o f money to save for my son’s future. My story is very long. If I tell it all, days 
and nights will pass and I still w on ’t be finished. So I will stop now in hope of peace  
in my country.
Laila
During the fighting between parties, we moved to many different places to escape 
the violence. We were in Mazar-i-Sharif for about seven years, but we were not 
comfortable when the Taliban captured the city. They killed people, cu t hands and  
legs, genocide and many more things happened. They also killed one o f my sons. 
Then we secretly left Mazar and cam e to Kabul City. But unfortunately some other 
problems cam e into being... the difficultly of paying for house rent, material, food. 
Prices got higher because people are coming back to their homeland. I live in one 
of my relative’s house for free. But life with them is difficult for me. I d o n ’t have a 
house of my own. I live in a room that doesn’t have windows. This is only a small 
part of my painful story.
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Habiba
I want to tell you a little about my life. I hope that you won’t get tired of my life 
story. We have passed very difficult days and severity in Afghanistan. Maybe you 
have w atched if on TV that how difficult was life in Afghanistan. We passed our life 
wifh poverty and d idn 't have anything to ea t for many years. I have a son who lost 
his hand. We Afghan women suffered and passed our lives with many difficulties. 
Lots o f Afghan women are illiterate or not literate enough. There is nobody to help 
us. I am wondering about the future. I am a woman with many problems in this 
time. There is no one now to help us, even God.
Homa
I have five children. I am jobless and I don 't work. My youngest child is in second 
grade a t school. I don 't know how to provide clothes and food for ourselves. It is 
very difficult for me. I raised my children with difficulty. I fed them with dry bread, 
because I d idn 't want people to tell me that I do not know how to look after my 
children. They are going to school, but I ca n 't provide them school supplies and  
also clothes and shoes. I d on ’t know from where I should provide them these things.
Dil Jan
I had a good and comfortable life, but all the fightings have destroyed my life. 
Afghanistan has been a country of war for many years, more than half of its 
population is living in crisis and poverty. I'm from the poor women of this part of the 
world. My husband cannot find work. My children are very young. I don 't have any 
breadwinner a t all. I need help to make my life better.
Bibi Shirine
In our country according to the cultural system no father asks his daughter 
regarding her life. Without asking my father gave me to a man and we get married. 
Fortunately I was happy with my husband long time and God has given us four nice 
children. After long time when the conflict started in our country I lost my husband 
and the difficulty has shown her face to me. No one helped us, my children and  
me. I sold my only home and spent it all for my children feeding. There was no job
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for me and I started to sell my home assets to continue my life. Now I am old and I 
cannot work. We spent our life in very difficulties.
M ahboba
My husband is disabled. I have six children but they are small and ca n 't work. I and 
my daughter are working hard to earn money to provide a piece ot bread tor 
ourselves. I don ’t have any house. We have to live in a kitchen with my children. 
During the fightings also we lived here in this kitchen, because we cou ldn 't afford 
to live anywhere else. I've spent days in hunger, nights in the darkness without any 
light or electricity. I am not able to prepare anything tor my family. We are in debt. I 
have more to tell you but you may becom e sad so I will bring my story to an end. 
Maybe you know about the life ot an Afghan woman, tilled with that much pain 
and difficulty that I'm not able to express it.
Nadera
During 23 years of war, the economic, social, and political situation was not good. 
We suffered a lot, and we had to live in difficult situation. Now in Kabul City, the 
situation is getting better, but not in other provinces. There are still warlords and  
gunmen in other provinces. My economic situation isn't good. I becam e a widow  
16 years ago and my oldest child is 15 years old. I want my children to get 
educated and also find money to feed them and improve my econom ic situation 
so my children serve their country and society, not to destroy it and be away from 
education.
Sohila
I am a mother of four children and owner of nothing a t all. My husband got lost 
during the cruel Taliban's regime. Except my four children I have to take care of my 
husband's old parents. I live only in the hope of my husband's return to home, but 
there is not any news of him recently. I actually don ’t know if he is alive or dead. 
Right now I am the only breadwinner for the family o f seven people. Nowadays the 
rent of the house that I'm living in has increased, I ca n 't afford it.
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Rogull
Now let me tell you about my life, I got married when I was 15 years old, my 
husband was 25 years older than me. Now that 10 years has passed from my 
marriage, I haven't seen any good behavior from him. He puts a lot of pressure on 
me and my children. I am really tired of my life. My sons are seven-year old twins 
and my daughter is nine years old. They are all very young. I don 't know what to 
do. Since the day o f my marriage I haven't had any comfortable day. I've always 
worked myself. I am not sure what to do with my life. My husband is very old now  
and I am 23 years old. I c a n ’t live alone now because of my young children. I have 
to suffer everything. I have a very painful life. He always insults my children. I don 't 
have permission of anything inside my own home. I don 't have any hope for a 
better life now. What should I do? How should I spend my life like this?
Maimona
We have been immigrants in Pakistan in a tent three times. When I was five, my 
father died. And my mother died 12 years ago. I have one sister. My brother 
martyred 15 years ago in fighting. From the time we cam e back to our homeland  
from Pakistan we haven 't had a house. I live in Khairkhana in a shop which is 
someone's property. I am washing clothes to earn money to provide my family 
expenses. My husband is not a good person, he always hits me and my children. I 
was an official worker in government during the Taliban regime. I was fired from my 
job. I was begging from shops and houses. I have worn bourka and crying and  
begging and I have go t a m ental problem.
Shima
I want to tell you of my tragic stories that happened during the Taliban regime. 
Before the Taliban, I had a comfortable and peacefu l life. I was always satisfied. 
Some months after the Taliban came, life was no longer easy in Kabul City. Every 
day they created a new policy for people to accept. We couldn 't tolerate it so we 
left our home and went to Pakistan. We d idn 't have the comfortable life anymore, 
and we had to suffer being refugees. But after the Taliban's failure, we immigrated 
to our beautiful country. We had lost all our life. There was no house left, no things. 
During these years o f war, houses of people were all destroyed. It has harmed
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people's economics. Since i was bon, / have only seen fighting, bombing, 
destroying, and damaging, nothing else, i haven’t feit happiness, peace o f mind, 
and friendship ever, i don ’t know what it is like, i hope to find aii these things in the 
future, i want to hold true friendship in my arms.
Abida
During 23 years of war, our country was destroyed and now American people are 
helping us to rebuild. All Afghan people spread to everywhere. Most o f them went 
to other countries as refugees. Most of the women lost their husbands and becam e  
widows. Children lost their parents and becam e orphans. People have lots of 
economic problems. They have lost their homeland. I support my three children. I 
lived in a p lace where I could only hear the sound of bombs and rockets. I was very 
hopeless in life. I hated everyone. Now I know that there are good people living in 
this world, but in the past I’ve seen very cruel and bad people. We spend each  
night to face the day and each day to face the night only in hope of help and  
kindness. We wait for those who will take weak peop le ’s hands in order to help 
them.
Shekiba
I have suffered the war because of the ones who d idn ’t want our country to be in 
peace. During these wars we couldn’t escape from here too because we d idn ’t 
have enough money to leave and stay in other countries, so we had to suffer and  
get burnt. I live in Qalai-Musa, a dirty and poor area o f Kabul City which has 
destroyed streets, no electricity, and no water supply. Our house is m ade o f mud 
and clay. The windows are covered with plastic paper instead o f glass.
Raya
My 15 year old son is handicapped. We d on ’t have anyone to support and help us. 
Because of facing sorrow and sadness I c a n ’t see very well with my eyes. I was five 
years old when my father died. I lived with my aunt. When I was 13 years old, my 
aunt asked me to marry her son. After a few years, my husband left me and  
married someone else. He ignored my children too. Then, after some time I heard 
that he had died. Wars and fighting made our life more difficult. But now Allah has
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shown his kindness and has brought peace to our country, I would like you to 
convey to the peace-loving women there that Afghan people, particularly 
women, have faced many hardships. And now they are experiencing the very first 
freedom and they are learning to struggle for further rights,
Hafiza
I am living with twelve members of my family in a rental house. We d on ’t have 
salary and we don 't have jobs. We have many econom ic problems. And we are 
wondering how to continue our life. My husband is jobless, I have a baby that I 
ca n 't support with my own milk because we are not eating good foods. There is no 
milk in my breasts,
Khatol
I am going to tell you about my life: I am responsible for providing my family 
expenses. There are five people in our family, I live in a house that has been 
destroyed by a rocket, I wash clothes to provide some food to feed my fatherless 
children in order to pass my life. This is the life of an Afghan woman that I am  
sharing with you.
Khalida
I am single and I live with my old father, two brothers, and one young sister. We are 
total five people in our family, I couldn't continue my education because of bad  
economical situation, I live in a rented house. We have a very simple and poor life, I 
myself sometimes wash clothes in houses to earn living. Now that I have enrolled 
myself in this organization, I am very happy that I ge t support. It is like a drop of 
water that a person pours into the mouth of another who is in a dry desert. That is 
the drop of water that is going to save her life,
Qandi
It will be a long time until all the women in pain in Afghanistan are able to live 
peaceful lives. During these past years we were left from everything. During the 
dark regime of the Taliban, women d idn ’t have the right to go out of their houses. 
We were in deb t and hungry. And we are still not able to pay the debts. I really
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want to forget all the past. I want to struggle for a better life. I believe that we are 
all women and we are able to help each other from anywhere around the world. 
I ’m from a very poor family, but my spirit is always strong, not poor and weak.
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Appendix 5: Women’s Life Histories
Mariyam: Waiting for Change
Mariyam was 35 years old. She was a mother of two small children. She cannot read and 
hoped that one day she will have enough “free space in [her] head to think of such 
things". For now she must find a way to support her children because her husband could 
not. Her family lived in one small room and shared a cooking space with the family in the 
ad jacent room. "This is how our lives have become, in this time of peace ” [emphasis hers], 
she said. Her husband was unemployed. He tried to find work as a day-laborer but was not 
able to bring home a steady income. "He is angry", Mariyam explained "and so he has 
turned on me, and turned to drugs. What can I do but tolerate this? I am a woman, after 
all".
Mariyam told the story of how her life had changed:
My husband was kinder to me during the Taliban time. We were both scared. I felt 
safer then. We both had no opportunity for work or leaving the house. Life was very 
difficult but we struggled together. We were equal in our suffering.
Today, she said:
Afghan men are not given chances. But this is not our fault. Afghan women have 
always been patient, strong, brave, silent. We do what we must do to support our 
families and feed our children. If I don ’t go out and take advantage of this [waves 
hand around organization office], how will we live? He cannot. He wanted to 
before, but now he is an add ict and he is useless to us. But he is my husband and I 
have no choice.
Mariyam felt that relations between men and women were deteriorating, not just in her 
household, but in those she saw around her.
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Women ore still struggling to make better their relations with men. It is not easy 
because there is still violence against them. It is a m an ’s Job to take care of the 
family and children financially. In most families that I have seen, relations have 
gotten worse because of poor economy. If is a bad fhing, this change.
Mariyam explained that part of the tension between her and her husband was primarily 
because she had become the ‘m an’ in the family. Further, she was going out of the house. 
And, even more serious, she was "involved with foreigners” . It was not just her husband, she 
explained. “Men don’t like their women out of the house, especially with foreigners” . She 
elaborated:
/ wish that women would work in local and governmental organizations and  
schools, not in foreign NGOs. It will cause them problems with the men if they work 
with foreigners. But I am here because this is where I get money.
If there were opportunities for men to work, and for [Afghan] men and women to 
work together, things will change. But I do not know what opportunities men have. I 
see many of them without opportunities. Organizations are promising rights that 
women can not achieve and can not understand. On paper, women have been 
given rights and freedom. But in my mind, women expected more rights because 
that was what was promised to them.
Mariyam was not unlike other Afghan women she knew in that she was able to make 
astute observations about the work of the aid apparatus and the im pact its presence and 
programs have had. She explained:
Women are the center of interest for everyone. I never imagined I would see a day 
where foreign people don 't stop talking about Afghan women. Every day in this 
organization some people come, some journalists come, and they want us to tell 
them that our lives are better. They want us to tell them that we are not wearing 
chaddari, that we are happy. They think we are stupid. And when they go away, 
we laugh because we have nothing else we can do. The world is watching, and 
this is what they want to see.
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Mariyam had the following to say about the international obsession with the chaddari:
The foreigners say, ‘remove your bourka, bourka kharab (bourka is bad), but I say 
Afghanistan kharab. Afghan men kharab. Until we change this -  and we will never 
change it -  my chaddari protects me. I put it on and 'where is Mariyam?’ No one 
knows. And Mariyam comes and Mariyam goes. And Mariyam stays sate. What 
choice do I have?
Still, Mariyam was able to end on a positive note. “ I hope for a bright future” , she said. 
"What else can we do but hope?”
General Nazari: Making Change
General Nazari was the Deputy of the Human Rights Department in the Ministry of the 
Interior (Mol). She also represented the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in 
the Mol. She was tasked with training and assigning women police officers to handle 
women's security issues. General Nazari also worked to sensitize men in the Mol to wom en’s 
human rights and security.
General Nazari's story was a rare one. She had served with the Afghan police for 31 years. 
In 2002, she became a general. Her father was in the military, and, although he was a 
liberal man, he did not want his daughter to follow suit. General Nazari recalled her father 
taking a trip to Turkey and returning with new ideas about women. He began to advocate 
for women's education, and he expressed opposition to his wife wearing a chaddari. At 
age 5, while watching a military parade with her father. General Nazari had decided on 
her course in life.
General Nazari was serving as a police officer a t the beginning of the Soviet invasion. She 
sent her husband abroad to protect him, while she remained in Afghanistan with their 
three small children. He returned many years later, but she had decided that she did not 
want a husband. She continued to invest in her career and served as a role model for 
women. She expressed concern with the current direction of her country, and asked why
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organizations were not working witti men. She explained: "It is not only women who need 
help. In Afghanistan you may think that women don ’t know anything and men do. But this 
is not the case. Both need help".
When asked about wom en’s security issues and the prevalence of violence against 
women, she strongly stated that violence against women has increased recently because 
men are having difficulties dealing with changes in wom en’s rights and status. She 
elaborated:
In oil the world, violence against women is increasing, not just in Afghanistan. But 
we are Muslim people and we need to study gender issues and wom en’s rights in 
the context o f Islam and society in Afghanistan.
General Nazari explained that the large international presence has prevented women in 
Afghanistan from defining their rights for themselves. Furthermore, it has created 
resentment with men who feel that their own issues ore not addressed. Even in the context 
of violence, she explained, violence against men and violence against women by other 
women are unacknowledged problems and are never discussed. She elaborated that the 
international community only talks about wom en’s rights in relationship to men. General 
Nazari put it this way: “Women and women! That’s what the men say. This makes difficulties 
and problems in families because all men hear from the outside is ‘women and women'. 
They no longer know where they fit” .
On the concept of gender, General Nazari explained:
‘Gender’ has not had a chance to define itself in Afghanistan. It is unknown here 
and does not translate. People think gender is brought from other countries and  
doesn’t belong to Afghanistan. But when we say equality o f men and women, then 
the people say ‘Yes. This is in Islam. Yes. This is in the Constitution.' But ‘gender’, this 
is foreign to us still. In this society, it is difficult for people to accep t changes so 
quickly.
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Appendix 6: Closing the Feedback Loop
As discussed in Chapter I, this research was part of an iterative process spanning four years, 
and an interest spanning over ten years. In terms of dissertation research, the FES Lessons 
Learned Re port 220 constituted a major first step in the sharing of my ideas. The bulk of the 
feedback received stems from this report and the subsequent meetings, discussions, and 
debates that ensued. The report was produced in the spring and summer of 2005 and 
released in September 2005. Its release was accom panied by a public presentation that 
allowed for discussion in addition to several smaller presentations. Those who were 
interviewed as part of the report formed port of a round-table discussion and an electronic 
conversation. Those who were not interviewed were also part of a separate discussion. All 
of these events provided feedback that has since been incorporated and has helped to 
refine my initial ideas.
I also presented findings from the FES report at the international forum of the Association for 
W omen’s Rights in Development (AWID) in Bangkok, Thailand in October 2005 and at the 
annual conference of Women as Global Leaders in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates in 
March 200623’ . These events also provided feedback that contributed to the data. Upon 
completion of da ta  collection, I once again conducted various workshops and sessions to 
share findings and solicit comments and input -  both from those who had formed a part of 
the research and from those who were independent -  to verify the findings. I received the 
following emails from Afghanistan and gender specialists, policy-makers and policy 
implementors, and interested others sharing their views.
A researcher, professor, and specialist on Afghan women had the following to say:
The main thing that struck me is that [men] thought many women hear about 
"women's rights" through international channels but they do not know what that 
means or how they should or can go about getting/asking for rights within the 
Afghan legal con tex t... and this creates conflict and they believe that for some of
230 For additional information, please see Abirafeh, L. (2005). Lessons from Gender-tocused International Aid in 
Post-Contlict Atgtianistan... Learned? Gender in International Cooperation. F. E. Stiftung. Bonn, FriedricFi Ebert 
Stittung.
23' For more information, please see www.awid.ora and tittp://www.zu.ac.ae/leadersliiD2006/
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the self-immolation victims this was part of the cause ... a clash between the 
discourse of women's rights without the understanding of the definition of rights in 
Afghanistan.
An independent gender specialist and published author on Afghan women cam e across 
the FES report and sent the following email in March of 2006:
I was hoping to get a chance to speak with you about [one of my projects] 
because I think you would probably see the same dilemmas I do as I think about 
how to "translate" many of the Western notions that underlie the field into 
something that is progressive and possible and built from indigenous Afghan 
thought. Ever since I got the request to help with this. I’ve been of really mixed 
opinions as to how this m ight work and in whose image.
I just thought [the FES report] was great and raised so many important issues that 
are exactly what I'm trying to figure out re [my new project] and the questions of 
relativity and respect and empowerment and shared language, or lack thereof...
I'm also looking for some options for getting back to Afghanistan to continue 
looking a t women's resilience, which I hypothesize may be both positively and, 
more concerningly, negatively im pacted by liberation from above, which I suspect 
destroys the sense of agency, empowerment and community control by and for 
women that was found a t the grassroots level. Now while some women have seen 
improvement, many have seen none and others have lost informal, community 
opportunities for agency as elites, "experts", and government and international 
controls are put in place.
I'll look forward to hearing more, especially about your new position [as Senior 
Gender Officer for the Parliamentary Elections] if you are interested in sharing what 
must be very challenging work given the time frame and the escalation in backlash 
against women and others that appears to be in the works.
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A leader of on international NGO in Afghanistan working very closely with women had the 
following to say:
My personal opinion today... is that the West is frying to push its own kind o f thinking 
on programs such as the Parliament, women in Parliament trying to get women to 
form a group in Parliament and so on. I think we are way too ahead of the past 
here and we are all guilty of this....we all come here with our own preconceived  
notions, experiences and so on and try to structure programs according to what 
we did in other countries. It is obvious from the way the West arrived here in 2001 to 
today. Just look a t the hearts and minds effort by the European armies (they don't 
learn any lessons, even recent lessons from other countries where it didn't work), the 
promise of a better future, a better tomorrow by the West if you adopt dem ocracy  
or "our way" without explaining the context that it is going to take years and years 
and will not happen overnight, the consequent disappointment, disillusionment of 
Afghans because the pace of change to improve their daily existence is too slow, 
their expectations are dashed, their security is not improved, the cost of living rises 
and salaries do not, lack of jobs. Where is the leadership to explain that things take 
time, to help people understand? But then you have the massive corruption, the 
drugs, warlords, criminals and those involved in the most awful atrocities back inside 
the circle of power. Is it any wonder people are skeptical? Who explains to them
why it may be necessary to keep your enemies close to your side and anyway
have they really changed, are they really going to adopt to a new system or are 
they already planning the downfall of this government....there is so much to be 
done and already the corruption is massive, and women naturally are the ones 
who have to deal with the consequences of all this every day. Men frustrated, 
young lads with no prospects of work, the arranged marriages and the bridal price. 
Well, I better not go on.... there is fault on all sides but I find it hard to believe that 
for most women life has not changed much in the past 5 years but the West will 
proclaim "freedom for women".... I wish it were so.
The gender representative of a USAID contracting agency shared the following feedback 
after having read the FES report, and following extensive discussions on the subject:
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[The data] definitely resonated with the experiences, difficulties and challenges I 
have faced in my work. I felt myself nodding in agreement in various places 
throughout the report. I think you m anaged to fairly represent what was 
happening, and how it differed from what people, both national and international, 
felt should be happening. I especially liked your point about the lessons learned but 
not applied  - I think that is definitely true. When I started the micro-enterprise 
program, we planned to include men in the training, however for various reasons 
that did not happen. I think it is a weakness in our program that I hope will be 
addressed in the future. Taking more time to create and plan for both the technical 
and logistical aspects of program implementation would help improve the impact, 
but we need to work more with our donors to ensure we have the space to do so.
I very much agree that 'gender' has really meant 'women' in terms of programs. The 
concep t o f gender, and creating gender equality or equity seems difficult to relate 
to this environment and cultural context. It seems like it just gets confused with 
women's issues and rights, and is perceived to be favoritism to women. Even 
though my staff understand that gender is about both men and women, in our 
work it is hard to translate that into effective inclusion of men.
We had an interesting meeting with the Chancellor o f the Nangarhar University the 
other day. We were talking about some of our programs for women, and he was 
very upset that we were setting a bad example by creating segregated programs 
that would favor women. He encouraged us to not leave out the boys. It was 
unclear whether he just wanted to make sure the men had more opportunities, or if 
he genuinely felt that there should be more equal interaction. My immediate 
reaction was that he didn't want the boys to be excluded from opportunities for 
them to be making money, but I also think it may provide a good opportunity to 
encourage that kind of mixing a t the university - if it can be done appropriately in a 
way that both girls and boys are comfortable.
I find the lack of contextualized analysis to be very true among the international 
staff. Early after I arrived I actually read a book about women and politics and  
development in Afghanistan that clearly outlined how difficult it has been to make
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change in the past and how negative the reaction was by the Afghans when they 
felt the changes were being imposed too quickly. It really made me aware o f the 
need to work within the culture and to expect slow change, and only when it was 
initiated by the community. However, our donor, USAID, requires more immediate 
outputs and numbers. So even knowing the history, I often feel that we have to 
push things a little bit to meet the requirements o f our donor. That often means that 
our monitoring is a t a very superficial level - so many women trained, so much 
money disbursed - and thus does not reflect any potentia l meaningful change that 
will continue after our program ends.
There is also a lot o f frustration by the men that they cannot find work, which I think 
leads to resentment when their wives are selected for training. Women around the 
world struggle with the issues that arise when their husbands earn less, are not 
working, or feel otherwise inferior - it is not unique to Afghanistan. However, here 
there are much more violent repercussions against women as the resentment by 
individual men feeds into a larger group within a cultural context where women are 
supposed to be taken care of, not supporting the family, and where the culture 
allows for much more violence in general, and specifically against women. In a 
gender training that we held for our own staff the men com mented that they 
would have no problem with women working, as long as jobs for all the men were 
found first.
An Afghanistan and gender specialist had the following to say on the concern that the
term ‘gender’ has becom e conflated with ‘wom en’ :
I have found when interviewing and talking with international aid workers about 
gender mainstreaming that that reaily means mainstreaming women into various 
projects and programs. Why c a n ’t we just say mainstreaming women? Gender 
mainstreaming seems misleading.
Gender is a Western concept for sure... but also note that it is also a flexible, 
overused, and misused term in the West as well. Perhaps addressing issues of 
masculinity and femininity in both the local and international context would make
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more sense. Also for example U.S./Wesfern conceptions of femininity and being a 
successful female in society vary greatly from Afghan conceptions of womanhood, 
femininity and the success of a woman in society - even in the public sphere. 
Conceptions of gender when implemented as a focus of aid - this is what I getting 
from your study - bring with them all of the com plicated and contradictory  
definitions of gender within a Western context and then try to m ap that onto 
local/Afghan context without a clear and consistent understanding of that context 
and how much it has shifted/been altered by war, conflict, and dramatic changes 
in gender norms, codes, and expected behavior for men in women in various 
social, political and family contexts. [In addition to the neglect of men, there is also] 
the neglect of the family and family relationships as a central focus of Afghan life 
for both men and women.
There have been several local indigenous movements towards wom en’s rights: the 
wom en’s party, RAW A, locally based wom en’s NGOs, wom en’s operations of 
secret schools, and facilities for women both during the civil war and Taliban. There 
have been women consistently working on altering the social and political fabric of 
their lives, and they need assistance. But it seems that no one or very few of those in 
international gender development are seeking out these existing relationships 
because they have their own agendas or programs or ways o f "doing gender”.
She also shared with me an email that she received on 14 July 2006 in response to her
request for information on Afghan women's leadership. The author is a long-time
Afghanistan specialist and analyst, and was also a participant in my study:
Special plea: Take it easy, a t least publicly, on "Afghan women's leadership." The 
whole country is on the brink o f collapse in a manner not altogether unlike what 
happened in the late 1920s and late 1980s. Karzai's a spent force, if he was ever 
one domestically in the first place, and the main attack comes from ultra­
conservatives. I worry that post-9/11 gains for Afghan women could be reversed as 
happened after the fall o f Amanullah and then Najibullah. Foregrounding wom en’s 
issues a t the moment risks severe backlash.
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Afghan Voices
An Afghan activist and leader ot an NGO tor women said the following:
This study is quite valid especially for the international aid players in Afghanistan but 
I hope that they learned from the lessons that you remind them. From my point of 
view, lack of a clear agenda and appointing of unprofessional staff for the position 
of experts in Afghanistan caused that only women be considered gender in 
programs, therefore most people think that gender is empowerment o f women. In 
Afghanistan, any word which is not part of the patriarchal terminology and is 
perceived as a Western term and [having Western] value - even if this word be part 
of other Islamic concepts and terminologies - still [Afghans] will considered strange 
and anti-culture and will not be accep ted  by the majority of people. Gender 
concept is always a strange concept for the Afghan patriarchal society. And, there 
is no interest in understanding these things about Afghanistan. This is a fact, and I 
think the international communities/aid organizations are not interested to the 
fundamental social and political changes in Afghanistan otherwise they should 
already have passed the process of analyzing the social institutions and their 
backgrounds and histories for better ways to make changes. Backlash has resulted 
but we also should not expect that a great social change in values and norms in a 
traditional and patriarchal society be warmly welcomed by the society. But still for 
decreasing the backlashes we should have had strategic approaches. I am  pro- 
positive discrimination and I think to balance the rights of men and women in 
Afghanistan for the first stages we need a huge cam paign of empowering women 
but still with strategic approaches to prevent the backlash and violence against 
women.
In a group discussion on the FES report, Afghan women NGO leaders who had been a part
ot the study had the following to say:
Orzala: People in Afghanistan - and especially the women in Afghanistan - were 
not given the time and space to sit a little bit and evaluate what they wanted to 
do. I can give you my own experience. I established an organization in January of
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7999. I started the organization by my own opportunities and possibilities. And I 
started this organization in an emergency context. And I remember very well from 
that day up until this time that I am talking to you, I am running, running, running... 
For people like me, and the majority of us, it ’s very important to be given some 
chances to look a t what w e ’re doing... In the West, people plan their year. Here 
we plan our day. We cannot look beyond the day. This causes lack of coordination 
and this causes why we just run behind opportunities. We d on ’t have our own 
strategies. Unfortunately, we run after anything. There is no specific - 1 will say again  
- cultural-sensitive and context-specific strategy for this country, taking into account 
its culture and history and very specific situation. A strategy that can take into 
consideration men as well as women.
Indeed, this ‘strategy’ for women and men was an oft-repeated mantra, the absence of 
which was problematic for men and women alike. On a discussion on the neglect of men 
in aid interventions as a key to understanding possible increases in violence against 
women:
Foribo: / do agree with you that to some extent this does create some problems 
and does increase violence against women. Just as an example - we established a 
computer course for girls, for girls from poor families. A free course. And then we 
were faced with boys. The boys cam e to us and they said “ If your priority is really for 
poor families, I am also the son of a poor person, so why am I not counted?”
Najia: Again I want to come back to this fact o f positive discrimination. I think there 
is a need for positive discrimination for women. When we say that it should be 
gender-sensitive and only focusing on women, perhaps the reason why it is too 
much focused on women is because the positive discrimination we think is 
important because of the difference in m en’s opportunity and wom en’s 
opportunity. But we should never, ever forget m en’s participation. Because as soon 
as you forget m en ’s participation this will not be balanced, but it will actually be 
worse. The balance will be totally broken.
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Orzala: We don ’t want to have educated and professional women and yet 
illiterate men. At the same time it should be equal.
Roya: if you say that being gender sensitive and the aid we get for it, perpetuates 
sensitivity of men toward this issue and perpetuates VAW more, I would say that I 
agree exactly in what Orzala said in that perspective... It is true that men are 
getting uneasy about it and thinking that ‘Uh Oh! This gender focus is not going 
weir. Violence increases when people don ’t have opportunities. It happens 
everywhere in the world, not just Afghanistan. But in Afghanistan and other third 
world countries, the women tend to be more domestic. That is the difference. So if 
they are not given an opportunity to work outside or earn their money, it ’s not 
affecting them as much as it would affect a man. And when a woman gets that 
opportunity and a man doesn’t, he becomes frustrated. That is true. And I think it 
would be true all over the world, not only Afghanistan. Because he cannot work 
and the woman does. It is a natural thing... or rather let me say that it is a "nurture- 
a l” thing that men have the ego and sense of being in power and controlling. So 
when they see this, they feel that they lose their confidence and they d o n ’t feel 
good about it. And this frustration certainly contributes to the violence against 
women.
Laila: Absolutely I think you are right. This is a pattern that we have seen everywhere 
in the world, and especially in most post-conflict countries, when men are in war 
and then there is no more war and what do they do? And they are very tense and  
frustrated and violent. They are influenced by the violence they have seen and  
they are unable to access economic opportunities and so they becom e  
increasingly frustrated. But what is different about Afghanistan from Bosnia and  
other cases is that yes, probably violence against women has increased for those 
kinds of reasons. But we c a n ’t even begin to say that we can prove it. There are no 
numbers a t all. We ca n ’t show numbers to demonstrate this, to prove that this is 
really the case. The only thing we can go by are peop le ’s stories, which I think to 
me are much more powerful than the numbers anyway. It’s the stories of the 
individual women that are a good measure. That’s how I would measure. So the 
difference here from a Bosnia, for example, is that there was such a high profile
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p laced on women and the infen/enfion on behalf o f women that disrupted the 
social dynamic in the house. What I heard over and over again is that "if there is no 
training for my husband, I c a n ’t come here, if there is no job for my brother, I c a n ’t 
keep coming here to this center. I ca n ’t do this anymore’’. And very often they said 
that they would prefer that he works, and not her. But everything was coming for 
her and not for him. So when you come in as a development organization and you 
d o n ’t know how things work in Afghanistan, how Afghans think... and you put 
women on one side and men on the other side, like cattle. And you distribute 
benefits unequally, tha t’s not a very smart thing to do.
A Final ‘Gender’ Meeting
In summer 2006, a large meeting of gender and women's groups and interested individuals 
was convened in Kabul, Afgtianistan. The purpose, according to the organizer, was “ to 
bring together an inclusive and diverse group of people who share a deep interest and 
commitment to creating and understanding gender issues in Afghanistan"232. in a 
discussion with the organizer, she explained that it was the FES Lessons Learned report that 
inspired her to form this group and initiate this meeting.
An email group was created prior to the meeting, and the discussion of the agenda 
yielded many interesting comments, such as the following, taken directly from emails 
received as part of the d is c u s s io n  233;
• There are many well-meaning initiatives, but few of these seem sustainable.
• We had a lot of gender meetings in the past.
• Gender mainstreaming and economic empowerment for women of Afghanistan... 
is not as easy and simple like people think.
• “Gender" is a big topic and it may be difficult to hold a comprehensive gathering 
that would be useful to everybody over a protracted period of time.
• What is sometimes rather destructive is the tendency for a number of the wom en’s 
groups to engage in politics or turf-wars, international and national both.
232 As per a  personal email I received from the organizer.
233 Personal email communications, May-June 2006.
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• Development agents otten pose a barrier to progress in that they take on all the 
responsibility and decision making torgetting to pass the baton to the 
“developees” ... giving up control is not easy to do... allowing people to make 
mistakes in your presence is even harder... it is so much easier to just tell people 
what to doll
• I think that the current and seemingly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan makes 
the gender discussion even more critical. We do so much relatively high profile 
work with women. I’ve begun to be concerned about what kind of negative 
attention we could be in for in the future.
• After the terrible incident last week, when three female Action Aid staff were killed 
in Jawzjan, we probably have to rethink gender and how we understand and 
facilitate it in the communities.
• In doing gender work in areas of high insecurity, am I jeopardizing the women that I 
work with?
On 27 June 2006, approximately 60 women (Afghan and non-Afghan), and three men, 
met in an attem pt to revive the 'gender discussion’ in Afghanistan. The organizer 
introduced the meeting by announcing "we are all here because of Lina’’. She explained 
that she initiated the meeting based on the FES report. In so doing, this can be viewed as a 
further attem pt to close the feedback loop and to build constructively on the findings of 
the report. The first debate ensued over a lack of accurate translation and definition ot the 
term gender in Dari and Pashto. The translator -  a man -  had been using the term jinsiyaf in 
place of gender. As previously addressed in Chapter IV, this Dari term is used to mean 
"sexuality". This presents a good example of a basic issue that has yet to be resolved.
I participated in the thematic working groups called "Post-Contlict and Negative 
Attention” , comprised ot representatives from two international NGOs, one large 
international agency, and two Afghan NGOs. The discussion centered around a debate 
on what would be appropriate approaches to ensuring community accep tance in 
Afghanistan. Participants agreed that there were some fundamental flaws in the aid 
apparatus, starting with a resistance to genuine promotion of gender issues on the port of 
aid institutions. The lack of coordination, funding difficulties, short-term focus, and desire for 
‘quick-fix solutions’ were also cited as problems.
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The group raised the importance of understanding people's perceptions and the impact 
ot rhetoric, particularly that stemming from the US discourse of ‘liberation’ that animated 
interventions in Afghanistan. Such language is problematic, it was agreed. It raises 
expectations and results in unmet promises and disillusioned people. Further, it comes with 
the assumption that a ‘savior’ is going to ‘deliver liberation’ . One woman continued that 
“we were not at all prepared to deliver on what w e ’re saying, and if we don’t, we are 
creating new tensions’’. This rhetoric may have stemmed from a particular discourse, but it 
was heard by all, particularly Afghans. As a result, a ‘rhetoric fatigue’ has set in, coupled 
with a renewed dislike for 'foreign occupation ’ that brings its own short-lived enthusiasms 
for alien ideologies.
Afghan participants in the working group felt that it was a convenient excuse to blame 
‘Afghan culture’ for resistance to gender-tocused approaches, but this only reflected a 
failure in the apparatus to adequately understand Afghan society. One participant put it 
this way: “We don 't spend enough time understanding. We need to build trust, we didn’t 
do that. Go back to history and see what went wrong. They went out aggressively to bring 
reform with women, whatever regime it is -  Soviet, American, and so on’’. The group 
emphasized the importance ot understanding Afghan history and the ways in which social 
change has been resisted and received. A contextualized analysis, one Afghan woman 
explained, could have revealed that in the 1920s, for instance, the ‘wom en’s issue’ 
brought down a monarchy, resulting in many years ot silence and regressions in terms of 
women's rights. This was the result of an aggressive program for social change led by an 
urban minority with little relation to the rural communities. She elaborated that “we need a 
more in-depth analysis and we need to look a t what we're doing and turn it around before 
a backlash becomes inevitable” .
An analysis of Afghan contexts, members ot the group explained, could have revealed the 
gaps and errors in our assumptions. One Afghan woman explained that the aid apparatus 
assumes that Afghan w om en’s voices are not heard, “but maybe they are not heard by 
us” . The few voices that might be heard are not the ones that are representative of 
women in Afghanistan. She advocated a more thorough understanding of Afghan culture 
and society before starting operations, including knowledge of power and decision­
making structures in the home. In so doing, efforts tor ‘empowerment’ could be better
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guided and not destabilize thie family. Indeed, the pervasive feeling in the group was that 
in these last four years, the aid apparatus has nearly failed Afghan women. It started with 
flawed policies, and continued to accumulate flaws from there. One woman elaborated: 
"It was clear that the policy that was set for the US to free Afghanistan was to ‘liberate’ 
Afghan women from the bourka. No Afghan is going to align themselves with that".
The Afghan woman continued: "I’ve been pushed a lot to work with women and women 
only but you can ’t work with just women. The more you work with women the more the 
men get annoyed". Participants reported that, in their organizations, Afghan male staff felt 
strongly that men’s needs should be met first. "Find jobs for men first and then w e ’ll talk 
about women," said one man in Jalalabad. It was agreed that the discourse employed for 
the gender agenda has become pervasive -  and contagious. Even men use the 
language of ‘gender’ and ‘empowerment’, no matter what they really believe, one 
woman said. "They think it’s what we need to hear".
And yet there are repercussions. "Why ore girls’ schools being burned? Are we facing a 
situation that is creating new tensions?" one woman asked. There is a backlash, another 
woman explained, to what we -  the aid apparatus -  believed was the appropriate 
response to the ‘gender and women issue’. It was agreed that this environment never was 
post-conflict -  firstly because the tensions never really subsided, and now "because new 
tensions have been created".
In one of the workshops convened to share findings of the FES report, a discussion of so- 
called wom en’s leadership programs ensued. This was part of the language that followed 
the recent intervention trends that have moved from income generafion to rights to 
leadership, amongst other short-lived aid fads. These shifts generally occur faster than 
many institutions can follow, and certainly too fast for participants, leaving Afghan men 
and women no time to consider their roles in the process and no opportunities to set the 
direction of the interventions. One Afghan woman specialist had the following to say:
The title [ ‘wom en’s leadership programs'] itself creates so much resentment.
Gender relations in Afghanistan are complementary and not juxtaposed men
against women. This juxtaposition from aid agencies reflects individual rights and a
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Western capitalist context. This isn't applicable in Afghanistan because traditionally 
there is coexistence.
In an electronic discussion with select gender specialists in Afghanistan, a discussion 
ensued about how to discuss 'the women's issue' with members of the Dutch Parliament 
who had expressed interest and made inquiries. One of the non-Afghan specialists 
expressed her sentiments this way:
There have been reports that women themselves are not happy about having so 
much focus upon them, numerous women's projects, freedom from the bourka, 
etc. Although, of course, they need so much, focusing exclusively on women is 
sometimes having a negative effect... The kind of negative effects can be, for 
example, upsetting the dynamic within communities by giving more to women 
than men who are also very needy causing tensions. Women themselves feel 
uncomfortable about this.
In an electronic discussion group on The Struggle for Women's Rights a t Home and Abroad, 
one member -  an American woman and women's rights activist - had the following to soy 
about the situation of women in Afghanistan after having read the FES report:
Sadly, what we've seen is that US rhetoric on "liberating Afghan women" was 
completely devoid of substance. We saw this from the beginning with the 
willingness of the US to cooperate with the Mujahideen groups whose gender 
ideology was just as restrictive as the Taliban's. Reports from Afghanistan are 
uniformly bad  on women's rights issues; violence against women is still common 
and women are still being intimidated out of participating in public life. In my 
opinion, the Bush administration used Afghan women -  used them by focusing on 
their real suffering under the Taliban to get what they wanted (support for US 
military action against Afghanistan), and then never putting in any real effort 
towards improving their lives. You ask if there have been any unexpected  
outcomes -  I'm sorry to say that I expected this outcome from the beginning.
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Lessons Learned?
The following appeared in the FES report in a discussion ot lessons that have not been
Iearned234:
‘Lessons learned’ is a peculiar piece of development lingo. We know the lessons, 
but we neither learn nor apply them. The idea of lessons learned is therefore a 
misnomer. “More studies will not help us," many have said. “We know the lessons; 
we have difficulties implementing them” (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 213). Others 
have hoped that we can do-no-harm, or perhaps do-less-harm by learning from 
past efforts. “Since we cannot, after so much discussion, attribute this state o f affairs 
to ignorance, we must look for other explanations for the consistent failure to apply 
the lessons learned from practice” (Barakat and Chard 2004: 18). Sadly, even when 
interventions are described as ‘unsuccessful’, the resulting consensus on what 
ought to be done has not led to change. “ We d on ’t learn, we just repeat,” an 
Afghan human rights activist explained. “ When we talk about women in 
Afghanistan, there is a list of important things showing what we did wrong. And we 
are still doing it. And we have not learned... yet” .
In conducting research for the FES report, I cam e across its predecessor; a report 
entitled Gender and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons Learned from 
Afghanistan emerging from a conference of the same name held in Paris in July 
2003^35. I decided to use this document as a test case. Had anyone heard of it? 
Had anyone provided input to it? Were the lessons translated? Disseminated? 
Applied? The answer was a resounding No.
This report serves as a good starting point to measure the lessons cited com pared  
with those that have emerged from discussions two years later. What lessons have 
we learned? Below are select recommendations from the report that have been 
raised again in discussions in 2005 and 2006 as lessons-to-be-learned:
23^  The full text can be found of Abirafeh, L. (2005). Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Posf-Conflict 
Afghanistan... Learned? Gender in International Cooperation. F. E. Stiftung. Bonn, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
235 Adopted from UN Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, OECD/DAC Network on Gender 
Equality, et ol. (2003). Gender and Post-Contlict Reconstruction: Lessons Learned from Afohoniston. Gender and 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons Learned from Afghonisfon, Paris.
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• Promote long-term efforts and commitment to social transformation - shift from 
welfare-orientation to long-term strategic perspectives
• Avoid top-down, donor, ‘o ffice ’ perspectives - and donor pressure to focus only 
on results
• Build partnerships and alliances with men -  and provide incentives for men to 
support wom en’s full participation
• Understand historical, social, and cultural identities, local efforts for human 
rights, local realities, and rhythm of local processes of change - allow for 
change to come from within
• Take into account how women and men view themselves, their own hierarchies 
and values - link human rights to local understandings of human value, self- 
worth, dignity
• Work together in synergy as an aid community and coordinate efforts - be 
reflexive about our own assumptions and perspectives
• Recognize that any aid intervention in the aftermath must guard against 
“ unintended negative consequences for women’’ (2003: 19).
The report argues to engage men, appreciate the cultural and historical context, and work 
with existing, indigenous human rights efforts (2003: vii). On the subject of context, the 
report urged that interventions recognize the variety of both wom en’s and men’s historical 
and cultural identities and their responses to change (2003: 11). Georg Frerks, Head of the 
Conflict Research Unit at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands, had this to soy during 
his panel presentation for the report:
[Development work in the aftermath suffers] from a reductionist view of gender, 
focusing mainly on women and wom en’s roles... Most policy approaches also 
ignore how processes of "gendering" work in reality and how... policies or projects 
in everyday life get "gendered".
(2003:91)
Upon finding this report, I was nearing completion of my Lessons-not-Learned 
report. Again, one year later, the same lessons apply.
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Appendix 7: Publications and Presentations
Publications
"Freedom is Only Won From the Inside: Domestic Violence in Post-Contlict
Afghanistan” Chapter of edited book Chanae from Within: Diverse Perspectives on
Domestic Violence in Muslim Communities. July 2007.
httD ://www.Deacefulfamilies.ora/abirafeh.html
"Women in Afghanistan” Afghanistan Lonely Planet. July 2007.
"Women in Afghanistan: Discourses of Social Change” (title TBD) Chapter of edited 
book on War and Muslim Women (title TBD). March 2007.
"Gender Dynamics, Increased Insecurities, and the Backlash: Afghanistan Five 
Years Later” Der Ueberblick (German journal of international affairs). November 
2006.
"The Gender Agenda: Where Do Men Fit?” Chapter of edited book on Afghanistan 
(title TBD). October 2006.
Women, Gender and Non-Governmental Organizations: Afghanistan and Women, 
Gender and Sustainable Development: Afghanistan entries for Encyclopedia of 
Women and Islamic Cultures (EWIC), Brill Academ ic Publishers. Winter 2006.
Book Review for "Afghanistan: The Mirage ot Peace” Nations and Nationalism. 
Volume 12. Issue 1. February 2006.
"From Afghanistan to Sudan: Flow Peace Risks Marginalizing Women” Forced
Migration Review. November 2005.
httD://www.fmreview.ora/FMRDdfs/FMR24/FMR2425.Ddf
"Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post-Conflict Afghanistan...
Learned?” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Report. September 2005.
http://www.fes.ora.af/AFGFIANISTAN0905ABIRAFEFIGENDER.pdf.
"Afghan Journal” International Report, Arabian Woman Magazine. March 2005.
"A Small Twist of Fate” Zenda - Alive, ArtSpace. February 2005.
"Burqa Politics: The Plights of Women in Afghanistan” Chronogram Special Report, 
Chronogram Magazine. October 2004. 
http://www.chronoaram.eom/issue/2004/10/news/buraa.php 
"Women in Afghanistan” Central Asia Lonely Planet. October 2004.
"More Free, But No Less Poor” The Script: Journal of the LSE Students' Union. Vol. 3, 
Issue 2. May 2004. http://www.stkw.nI/thescript/archive/vol3/issue2/9.html 
"Women in Afghanistan: Response to Violence Against Women” Human Rights 
Dialogue, Carnegie Council on International Affairs. Series 2, No. 11. Spring 2004. 
"Women in Afghanistan” Project Spera Newsletter. January 2004. 
http://www.proiectspera.ora/Januarv%202004%20Newsletter%20fHTML).htm#Autho 
r
“The Role of Religion in the Lives of Women in the New Afghanistan” Critical Half. 
Vol. 1, No. 1.2003.
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Presentations
Women's Agency in Conflict: Voices of Men and Women. Feminism and War 
Conference. Syracuse, NY. October 2006.
Issues in Human Development. Center for the Global South. American University. 
Washington, DC. October 2006.
Examining the effects of gender-focused international aid in conflict and post­
conflict contexts. Society for Internafional Development, Women in Development. 
Washington, DC. October 2006.
The Cyclical Nature of Conflict/Post-Conflict. Co-hosted by Net Impact, Georgetown 
Women in Business and the Emerging Markets Network. Georgetown University. 
Washington, DC. October 2006.
Supporting Women Entrepreneurs in Afghanistan. Co-hosted by Net Impact, 
Georgetown Women in Business and the Emerging Markets Network. Georgetown 
University. Washington, DC. March 2006.
The International Feminist Community and its Impact on Women Worldwide: The 
Afghan Experience. Women as Global Leaders International Conference. Dubai, 
UAE. March 2006.
On Lessons Learned: Release of the FES Report. How Does Change Happen? AWID 
International Forum on Women's Rights and Development. Bangkok, Thailand. 
October 2005.
Women and Elections in Afghanistan. OSCE Observer Delegation, Afghanistan. 
September 2005.
Networking and Political Participation. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Young Leaders 
Forum, Afghanistan. September 2005.
Why Politics? Roqia Center for Women, Afghanistan. September 2005.
Progress Report: Women and Elections. Advisory Group on Gender, Ministry of 
Women's Affairs, Afghanistan. August 2005.
Gender and Elections. Weekly press briefings for groups of international journalists, 
Afghanistan. July-August 2005.
Women's Political Participation. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) “Conference on 
Women's Human Rights in Political and General Life", Afghanistan. 16 July 2005. 
Lessons Learned in Gender and Development in Post-Conflict Contexts. American 
University of Sharjah (AUS) Medina Forum Lecfure Series, UAE. May 2005.
Supporting Women's Leadership: Strategies and Challenges. Women as Global 
Leaders International Conference. Dubai, UAE. March 2005.
Images of Afghanistan. ArtSpace Gallery. Dubai, UAE. February 2005.
Women and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Perspectives and Outlooks. Soroptimist 
International -  Germany. Bad Wildungen, Germany. September 2004.
Afghan Women One Year Later. Women for Women International. Washington, DC. 
June 2003.
Afghan Women and Technology. World Bank Information Solutions Group. 
Washington, DC. June 2003.
What Next for Afghan Women? World Bank Development Gateway. Washington,
DC. May 2003.
Women for Women's work and Rights Awareness Training: Why It Is Unique in 
Afghanistan. World Food Programme. Kabul, Afghanistan. March 2003.
309
Microfinance and Women’s Empowerment. Microfinance Policy Workshop: A 
Supportive Framework for Microfinance in Afghanistan. Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development, Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), 
World Bank. Kabul, Afghanistan. February 2003.
The Role of Information and Communications Technologies in the Lives of Afghan 
Women. Empowering the Poor Through Rural Information Telecentres. The World 
Bank. Washington, DC. December 2002.
Women’s NGOs and NGO-Government Collaboration. Ministry of Planning of the 
Transitional State of Afghanistan. Kabul, Afghanistan. November 2002.
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Appendix 8: Dari Terminology
Dari Word English Definition
Afghaniyat Afghan national identity
AkI Responsibility
Bad Offering women as brides in reparation for offenses
Bcdol Offering women as brides in exchange for another bride
B’aman Khodo Go with God's hope
Bi-ncmoos Without chastity
Bourko/Burqo Full body covering tor women
Chador Women’s veil
Chaddori Full body covering for women
Dari Persian dialect spoken in Afghanistan
Farsi Persian language
Ghayrat Right to defend one’s honor by force
Gozargah Transition, juncture
Hiiab Women’s veil
Imam One who leads prayers, also head of Islamic community
Jihad Holy war
Jirga Tribal council
Jinsiyat Sexuality
Kash-ma-kash Conflict
Khan Man of influence
Kharab Bad
Khariji Foreigner
Khshoonat aley-he 
zanaan
Domestic violence
Kuchi Nomad
Landay Short poem
Loya Jirga Grand Assembly
Madrasa Religious school
Mahram Close male relative with whom women are allowed to have 
contact
Mamus Men’s duty to protect and respect women
Masjid Mosque
Muiahid Fighter in the holy war
Muiahideen (plural)
Mullah Religious official of small community
Namaz Prayer
Namoos Pride
Nang Honor
Nar-shedza Man-woman
Nezaa Fighting
Nufus-dar Having people, belonging
Pashto Language spoken in Afghanistan
Pashtun Afghan ethnic group, Pashto speakers
Pashtunwali Pashtun tribal code
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Purdah Restricted movements for women
Qowm Collective units based on dependents
Rish-sofed Elder, “white beard"
Shabnom Night letters
Shah Sovereign, ruler
Shahid Martyr, one who dies in the Jihad
Shaikh Man of religion
Shariat Islamic law
Shura Consultative council
Talib Student of religion
Taliban (plural)
Tarsidah Fear
Tashadud Violence
Tashadud aley-he zanaan Violence against women
Wasita Having special contacts and access
Watan Fatherland, nation
Wolesi Jirga House of the People
Zan Woman
Zanaan Women
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Appendix 9: Acronyms and Abbreviations
ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
AGG Advisory Group on Gender
AIHRC Afghanistan independent Human Rights Commission
AMDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANSO Afghan NGO Security Office
APIF Afghanistan Project Implementation Facility
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
AWID Association for Women's Rights in Development
BFPA Beijing Platform for Action
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CGA Country Gender Assessment
CSO Civil Society Organization
FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
GAD Gender and Development
GAG Gender Advisory Group
GEM Gender Empowerment Measure
GoA Government of Afghanistan
GSG Gender Sector Group
HDI Human Development Index
HDR Human Development Report
l-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JEMBS Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MoWA Ministry of Women's Affairs
NAPWA National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan
NDF National Development Framework
NDI National Democratic Institute
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSP National Solidarity Programme
OTI Office of Transitional Initiatives
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PDPA People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAWA Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan
RefWID Refugee Women in Development
RERO Regional External Relations Officer
SAP Securing Afghanistan’s Future
TSS Transitional Support Strategy
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bonk
WDC Women’s Development Center
WID Women in Development
WRC Women’s Resource Center
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